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Abstract 
 
The original contribution of this thesis is the examination of the official construction of a 
post-apartheid foundation myth through the analysis of the dead body politics of five iconic 
South African women that spans the three presidencies that have defined South Africa’s 
democratic era. This thesis examines the death and funeral of Albertina Sisulu, the return and 
burial of Sara Baartman, and the commemoration of Charlotte Maxeke, Lilian Ngoyi, and 
Helen Joseph. Sisulu, Baartman, Maxeke, Ngoyi, and Joseph have been constructed as 
heroines and as foundational figures for the post-apartheid nation in official rhetoric. It will 
contend that the dead body politics of these women not only informs a new foundational 
mythology, but also features in the processes of regime legitimation when the ANC-
dominated government faces strong societal criticism. Although such official expressions of 
nationalism may appear exhausted, this thesis will show that nationalism remains a powerful 
and dangerous force in South Africa that attempts to silence opposition and critical analysis 
of perceived failing government policies or inaction. This thesis will indicate that as women’s 
bodies and legacies are appropriated for nationalist projects they are subsumed in discourses 
of domestic femininity in official rhetoric that dangerously detract from women’s democratic 
rights and their ability to exercise responsible and productive citizenship in the post-apartheid 
state. It will argue that women’s historic political activism is contained within the meta-
narrative of ‘The Struggle’ and that women are re-subsumed into the patriarchal discourses of 
the past that are inherited in the present. This thesis approaches this topic by considering a 
top-to-bottom construction of post-apartheid nationalism through applying feminist critical 
discourse analysis to official rhetoric articulated at the public mourning and commemorative 
rituals of these five women.     
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Introduction 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
“A Habit of Piety”: Mourning National Icons 
 
It is not strange that time should have confused the words that once 
represented me with those of the fate of he who accompanied me for so many 
centuries. Words, displaced and mutilated words, words of others, were the 
poor pittance left him by the hours and the centuries.
1
 
- Jorge Luis Borges 
 
On 5 December 2013, South Africa‟s greatest national hero, Nelson Mandela, passed away. 
A great sense of sadness seemed to blanket South Africa as the news spread across the 
country. Ordinary citizens and South African celebrities called into local and national radio 
stations, appeared on television news channels and attempted – and sometimes failed – to 
choke away tears of sadness as they expressed their condolences and explained what 
„Madiba‟2 had meant to them. At grocery stores, shopping malls, and other public spaces 
strangers would engage in conversation to express shock and sadness at the loss of „Tata3 
Madiba‟. The South African „nation‟, however imagined and constructed as it might be, 
appeared to rally and (re)form in the few days following Mandela‟s death. It was a rare 
experience for a country persistently divided by class and race to present a mostly united 
front in the face of what was perceived as the post-apartheid nation‟s greatest loss. A 
common sense and understanding pervaded that someone important who had been vital to the 
creation of the Rainbow Nation, had been lost – an individual who represented so many of 
the values that the post-apartheid state had been imbued with. In many ways, Mandela was a 
                                                            
1 Jorge Luis Borges. “The Immortal”, Labyrinths, (Penguin: London, 1970), p.148-149. 
2 Madiba is Nelson Mandela‟s clan name – a reference to the ancestor from which he is descended and more 
meaningful than a surname. 
3 The isiXhosa word for „father‟ and a term used affectionately by many South Africans to refer to Mandela. 
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foundational hero; a living embodiment of the qualities that were lauded and meant to be 
espoused by the citizens of post-apartheid South Africa.  
           For a student of nationalism/dead body politics this was a fascinating time to witness 
politicians and the public actively engaging with nationalist sentiment and public mourning 
and the many ways in which these factors manifested themselves in official rhetoric, the 
media, and public discourse; for an individual who has lived in South Africa for nearly two 
decades it was also a time to assess the power of public mourning and nationalism on a more 
emotional level as realisation dawned that despite a nuanced understanding of the influences 
of nationalism at work, I was not exempt from experiencing an emotional response to the loss 
of a national icon. 
           When I embarked on this thesis, I approached the topic of the public mourning of 
prominent icons in South Africa with a deep sense of cynicism and tended to view public 
expressions of mourning and „national sadness‟ as little more than official rhetoric onto 
which a wealth of political agendas and nation-building ideologies were scripted. These icons 
were seemingly considered as little more than the forgotten „dying birds‟ whose „plumage‟ 
was pitied in official rhetoric to allude to Percy Bysshe Shelley‟s allegory which he employed 
in his exploration of the politics of the death of England‟s Princess Charlotte in 1817 and 
from which the title of this thesis owes its provenance.
4
 However, the genuine sadness that 
many South Africans, and indeed, I, expressed at the death of Mandela required a 
reconsideration of this approach. While political agendas were undeniably attached to the 
spectacles of public mourning that were enacted around the death of Mandela and the 
political ideological capital reaped from the death of such a well-loved icon were prodigious, 
in this particular death the recognition of loss expressed by the public and the genuine 
emotions that were exhibited cannot be understated. Of course, the case studies of the women 
addressed in this thesis do not carry the same deep emotional connections – women icons are 
sidelined to a vertiginous degree in South Africa‟s foundational mythology. Sara Baartman, 
Albertina Sisulu, Charlotte Maxeke, Helen Joseph, and Lilian Ngoyi – the women who make 
up the case studies of this thesis – do not hold the same iconic status in South Africa as 
Nelson Mandela. As the „father of the nation‟, Mandela‟s iconic status is unparalleled and 
many ordinary South Africans relate to him as „Tata‟. The outpouring of loss and sadness at 
the burial, commemoration, and death of the individuals addressed in this thesis does stem 
                                                            
4 Percy Bysshe Shelley, “We Pity the Plumage But Forget the Dying Bird: An Address to the People on the 
Death of the Princess Charlotte” in David Lee Clark, (ed.), Shelley’s Prose, (Fourth Estate: New York, 1988). 
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predominantly from official rhetoric and groups with vested interests in their legacies rather 
than from the wider public. However, this does not completely exclude any genuine 
emotional connection to their lives, celebrity, and legacies from ordinary South Africans.  
           The initial impetus that sparked an interest in this topic stems from an undergraduate 
experience where my third-year History class was shown Zola Maseko‟s film The Life and 
Times of Sarah Baartman. I witnessed with some discomfort the political agendas attached to 
Baartman‟s remains, legacy, and repatriation which were all imbued with a sense of 
sacredness that was the result of the deeply emotive and sanctified nature of death and 
mourning. By inscribing human remains with political agendas, these agendas, by virtue of 
their association with the sacred rituals of death and burial, appear to become sacrosanct. In 
the context of Baartman‟s particularly emotive life experiences such a re-exploitation (despite 
the positive context of the existence of a democratic South Africa) seemed crude at the very 
least. This initial emotional response to dead body politics was further explored in my MA 
thesis
5
 which addressed the iconography of Sara Baartman in post-apartheid South Africa 
within a context of nation-building and would lead to a deeper interest in the ways that 
nationalism and public mourning interact to create and reinforce a larger foundational 
mythology for this country. Having previously completed a short Honours Degree thesis that 
examined the way that Afrikaner nationalism constructed, employed, and exploited the laden 
category of „woman‟ in establishing power and nationhood it became clear that the female 
dead body seemed especially vulnerable to political exploitations that sought to symbolically 
affirm the nation. Of course, women and „womanhood‟ have always had a deeply 
complicated and contradictory relationship with nationalist movements across the world but 
in post-apartheid South Africa, where women have almost unequalled constitutional equality 
and protection, this relationship is further complicated by high levels of violence perpetrated 
against them. With the importance granted to Women‟s Day celebrations in South Africa and 
its extension into Women‟s Month this then led to the question of the role that representations 
of female icons play in official constructions of womanhood and femininity in South Africa 
and the ways in which these constructions feed into the larger foundational mythology of the 
post-apartheid state. A great deal of academic attention has been given to the ways in which 
South African women interact with nationalism but there appears to be a gap in studies that 
consider official constructions of female icons within a larger foundational mythology and 
                                                            
5 Simone Kerseboom, “‟Our Khoi Heroine‟: Remembering and Re-Creating Sara Baartman in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa, 1994-2007”, MA Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 2007. 
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how these constructions feed into popular perceptions of womanhood, gender, and other 
socio-political concerns in South Africa. This thesis is a response to some of these questions 
as nationalism remains a potent force in South Africa that attempts to submerge socio-
political discontent and persistent societal inequalities under a layer of nationalist rhetoric 
that is evident in the official mourning practices and commemorative celebrations of 
prominent female icons. Moreover, this thesis also attempts to analyse the re-subjectification 
of women from historical actors to historical subjects in official nationalist rhetoric as 
nationalist discourses seemingly seek to revoke the status of women as agents in history.    
 
Methodology 
The time period addressed in this thesis stretches from 1994 to the present and addresses 
representations in official discourse and to a lesser extent in the media of the deaths, funerals, 
and commemorative events of the women considered. It also investigates the myriad ways 
that these carefully constructed representations which are bolstered by death rituals and dead 
body politics shape, inform, and create foundational mythologies. The research methodology 
required the location of newspaper articles, documentaries/films, government-issued speeches 
and documents, and other official statements pertaining to the subjects of this study. I also 
consulted secondary sources concerning each of the individuals, as well as representations of 
each case study in school textbooks, museums, and memorials which indicates how they are 
represented to the public, mostly through state-funded projects, and identifies the variety of 
symbolic meanings with which the public is confronted. This is supplemented by interviews 
with various stakeholders who have vested interests in the case studies. All these sources 
have been subjected to feminist Critical Discourse Analysis. Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) is known for its overtly political stance and its concern with all forms of social 
inequality and injustice. Feminist CDA is CDA with a determined gender focus that adopts “a 
critical feminist view of gender relations, motivated by the need to change the existing 
conditions of these relations…”6 Lazar states that the “task of feminist CDA is to examine 
how power and dominance are discursively produced and/or resisted in a variety of ways 
through textual representations of gendered social practices, and through interactional 
                                                            
6 Michelle M. Lazar, “Politicising Gender in Discourse: Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis as Political 
Perspective and Praxis”, in Michelle M. Lazar (ed), Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis: Gender, Power and 
Ideology in Discourse, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2005), p.3.  
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strategies of talk.”7 The analysis of official discourse through the application of feminist 
CDA indicates the importance of language analysis as a method for studying social and 
political change through texts – whether written or spoken.8 Discourse is viewed as a site of 
struggle where the forces of social (re)production and contestation are played out. Official 
discourse constructs social relations or entities rather than represents these relations and it is 
the effects of these discourses upon which feminist CDA focuses. Moreover, a primary focus 
of feminist CDA is the dialectical relations between discourse and power in producing social 
inequalities and how ideology (meaning „in the service of power‟) establishes and sustains 
unequal relationships of power – significantly in terms of gender.9 Applying feminist CDA as 
the preferred methodology establishes a distinct feminist politics of articulation
10
 that defines 
the “need to theorise and analyse the particularly insidious and oppressive nature of gender as 
an omni-relevant category in most social practices.”11 Thus, through the application of 
feminist CDA, this thesis analyses and critiques official discourses present in the above 
mentioned sources. This also demonstrates how the language employed in these discourses 
have shaped new foundational myths for the post-apartheid state which attempt to sustain a 
patriarchal social order and entrench political hegemonies that have potentially adverse 
effects on representations and social understandings of gender and power in South Africa.  
 
Notes on Terminology and Theory 
Firstly it must be noted that it is recognised that „women‟ is not a homogeneous category. 
The category of „women‟ is mediated by various hierarchies of difference such as race, 
gender, class, sexuality, and ethnicity. Moreover, as Denise Riley suggest in her frequently 
quoted study of the category of „woman‟ in history, “‟women‟ [are] a „volatile collectivity‟ 
whose identities [are] constantly in process, defined and redefined through an endless series 
of conflicting discursive practices... women [are] cultural constructs „all the way down‟, the 
                                                            
7 Lazar, “Politicising Gender in Discourse”, in Lazar (ed), Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis, p.10. 
8 Chris Barker and Dariusz Galasinski, Cultural Studies and Discourse Analysis: A Dialogue on Language and 
Identity, (Sage: London, Thousand Oaks & New Delhi, 2001), p.62. 
9 Norman Fairclough, “Introduction”, in Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language, 
(Routledge: Oxon & New York, 2013). 
10 Margaret Wetherell, “Romantic Discourse and Feminist Analysis: Interrogating Investment, Power and 
Desire”, in Sue Wilkinson and Celia Kitzinger (eds), Feminism and Discourse: Psychological Perspectives, 
(Sage: London, 1995), p.141 
11 Lazar, “Politicising Gender in Discourse”, in Lazar (ed), Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis, p.3. 
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„effects‟ of historically variable discourses...”12 However, it must be acknowledged that 
sexual difference cannot be adequately mediated by language alone as women are flesh and 
blood beings. Laura Lee Downs argues,  
Resistance via deconstruction can therefore give us only half a strategy, one which de-centres 
„woman‟ as textual/social construct, while leaving aside the dilemmas of women, who must 
live as subjects in time... For those who live in society, sexual difference is not something 
which can simply be argued into a corner and then left behind. Rather, individuals must 
inhabit those gendered categories, even as they strive to unmake them.13  
Thus, while acknowledging the constructed nature of the category „women‟, it cannot be 
allowed to undermine the physical experiences of oppression experienced by women. As 
June Purvis asserts, “The emphasis on difference at the expense of what women have in 
common denies the existence of women as a political category and as a subordinate class.”14 
Within this context, the employment of feminist CDA implies “a perspective that is 
comparativist rather than universalising, attentive to the discursive aspects of the forms of 
oppression and interests which divide as well unite groups of women.”15 This thesis, then, 
while showing that layer upon layer of official constructions of „womanhood‟ are 
ideologically plastered onto physical remains, accepts that no representation or recreation of 
women‟s history is definitive. 
           Sue Morgan states that “‟[r]ace‟, like gender, is a primary system through which 
western thought (not least) has established hierarchical social classifications on a putative 
basis of biology and skin colour.”16 Informed by social constructionist theory, this thesis 
accepts that bodies of knowledge, theories, and facts (concerning race) are cultural artefacts 
that are discursively constituted and can be replaced in order to transform social life.
17
 Racial 
classification remains a cogent force in post-apartheid South Africa, justified by a history 
preoccupied with racial division and white minority political and economic control over 
                                                            
12 Denise Riley, “Does A Sex have a History?”, pp.149-159, quoted in Sue Morgan (ed), The Feminist History 
Reader, (Routledge: London and New York, 2006), p.15. 
13 Laura Lee Downs, “If Woman is Just an Empty Category Then Why am I Afraid to Walk Alone at Night?: 
Feminism, Post-Structuralism, and the Problematic Politics of Identity”, accessed at 
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/51235/469.pdf;jsessionid=E3E089D06A40477DF7B1F
8EFC913E437?sequence=1, p.18. 
14 June Purvis, “From „Women Worthies‟ to Poststructuralism? Debate and Controversy in Women‟s History in 
Britain”, quoted in Morgan (ed), The Feminist History Reader, p.16. 
15 Lazar, “Politicising Gender in Discourse”, in Lazar (ed), Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis, p.11. 
16 Morgan (ed), The Feminist History Reader, p.27. 
17 Andy Lock and Tom Strong, “Introduction”, in Andy Lock and Tom Strong (eds), Social Constructionism: 
Sources and Stirrings in Theory and Practice, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010).  
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resources driven by colonial and apartheid exploitation. Historically, the term „black‟ has at 
times been employed by the resistance movements to include other racial groups beside the 
African population while the apartheid state employed the term „non-European‟ or „non-
white‟ to group together population groups not classified as „white‟ and restrict their 
movements in public spaces. The term „non-white‟, however, reifies the hegemonic state of 
„whiteness‟ and renders „white‟ as normative and unproblematic and will therefore not be 
used.
18
 For the sake of clarity, this thesis will continue to employ the individual racial 
categorised terminology in use in South Africa today to refer to the country‟s population 
groups when necessary but with an understanding that these are constructions that are both 
problematic and contested.   
 
Thesis Structure 
The nine chapters that make up this thesis have been laid out along two axes. Chapter 1 
serves as the literature review for this thesis and considers the literature that directly relates to 
the ways in which public/official mourning and dead body politics in the post-apartheid state 
construct a new foundational mythology for the nation. It briefly situates the context of this 
thesis before the following chapters embark on a in-depth exploration of the literature that 
informs the lenses employed to view the central issues addressed in this thesis, namely public 
mourning, nationalism and foundational mythology creation, and women-and-nation and the 
ways that these forces interact to shape the present. The chapters that provide the theoretical 
backbone of this thesis are the first axis and have been laid out in terms of focusing a lens on 
the central topics addressed here. The second axis follows the progression of the case studies 
which follow the natural order of firstly witnessing death, followed by the ritual of burial, and 
then commemoration or a return to the physical remains in order to remember, remind, and – 
in some cases – reconstruct a „national memory‟. 
           Commencing with the broader but central theories that inform this thesis chapters 2 to 
5 hone in from the global to the local. Chapter 2 explores the central body of literature and 
the canonical texts that have informed theories of public and official mourning and nationalist 
myth-making.  Theories of public mourning and dead body politics are explored as historical 
discourse in this chapter and are further investigated by their application to global female 
                                                            
18 Morgan (ed), The Feminist History Reader, p.27. 
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icons to illustrate that the South African case studies in this thesis are neither singular nor 
unique and are informed by global nationalist tendencies. Chapter 3 further focuses the lens 
on theorising women and nation and investigates the particular roles assigned to women in 
nationalist movements in general and the ways in which women dynamically interact with 
nationalism. This chapter acknowledges its comprehensive analysis of women and nation to 
the invaluable contribution of the works of Floya Anthias, Cynthia Enloe, Anne McClintock, 
and Nira Yuval-Davis to the development of the field of gender and nationalism studies. It 
shows that nationalist movements are almost exclusively male-dominated and serve male 
interests, yet constructions of womanhood and women themselves play an important role 
within these nationalisms. This provides a more general theory of women and nation which 
will inform the rest of this thesis as it situates official representations of iconic women within 
a larger South African nationalist discourse which constructs the nation‟s foundational 
mythology. This chapter will demonstrate the complicated and contradictory relationship that 
women have with nationalist movements that seek to define specific constructions of 
womanhood that restrict women‟s agency. Simultaneously, however, certain women operate 
within these defined boundaries to assert some form of power. This is expanded upon in 
chapter 4, which further focuses in on the central topic of this thesis by addressing the 
historical precedents of women‟s interaction with African nationalism and Afrikaner 
nationalism in South Africa. Both nationalisms had clearly defined roles for and expectations 
of women to further the nationalist cause. While seemingly empowering women, these 
specific discourses defined women‟s roles in terms of domesticity and motherhood. Yet, 
women often shaped and adapted these predominantly male-constructed roles to allow for 
greater public participation within the nationalist movement. Within a post-apartheid 
nationalist context, constructions of motherhood within the framework of African nationalism 
are significant as they continue to dominate official discourse in present-day commemorative 
efforts that „celebrate‟ women‟s anti-apartheid activism and „honour‟ struggle heroines. 
Moreover, this chapter will also argue that the political power wielded through publically 
mourning women and children, a powerful political tool employed in both these nationalist 
movements, informs the very constructions of womanhood and motherhood that harness 
women to the perceived appropriate values of femininity that serves their particular 
nationalist movement.  
           In order to bring the discussion into the democratic time-period which this thesis 
addresses, chapter 5 contextualises the four chapters that follow by outlining post-1994 
9 
 
nationalist tendencies in South Africa. It illustrates the creation of a „usable past‟ in order to 
forge a workable present and imagined future for the country. Based on the processes of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), reconciliation became a key aspect around 
which rainbow nationalism was constructed. Moreover, a successful nationalist movement 
relies on powerful symbols around which national identity is created. Thus, this chapter also 
shows how the symbols of the post-apartheid state, embodied by a new flag, national anthem, 
coat of arms, and the philosophy of Ubuntu, were a significant aspect of nation-building 
while the reconfiguration of public time and public spaces that honoured a new set of 
historical events and individuals (the national heroic pantheon) played powerfully into the 
construction of a post-apartheid foundational mythology. This provides the point of departure 
for the selection of case studies that support the central argument of this thesis that political 
constructions of iconic women play a significant part in post-apartheid South African 
foundational mythology creation. Chapter 6 discusses the Women‟s Legacy Project launched 
by the South African Heritage Agency (SAHRA) in 2010, „Honouring and Celebrating 
Women‟s Sacrifices and Roles as Midwives of Political Emancipation‟ which seeks to 
commemorate a significant number of South African „heroines‟ in the public sphere to 
address imbalances of representation. Immediately it becomes clear through the wording of 
this project that women‟s political activism is framed by discourses of womanhood and 
domesticity and the attempt to forge a homogeneous category of domestic femininity. Thus, 
while seeking to „honour‟ women and their contribution to the advent of democracy in South 
Africa within the democratic dispensation, women remain restricted by these official 
nationalist discourses that undermine the constitutional equalities that women are legally 
guaranteed. 
             
The Case Studies 
Chapters 7 to 9 focus on the case studies that are informed and supported by the theoretical 
chapters that have gone before. Their linear placement in this thesis follows the chronological 
order of death, burial, and commemoration; the South African nation witnessed the death of 
Albertina Sisulu, followed the processes of repatriation and the burial of Sara Baartman, and 
saw the declaration of the graves of Charlotte Maxeke, Lilian Ngoyi, and Helen Joseph – all 
of whom died before the advent of democracy in South Africa – as national heritage sites. 
These three chapters draw on the wealth of theory and contextualisation outlined in the 
10 
 
previous chapters and will show how public mourning and dead body politics are reflected in 
official and public discourse to construct a functional foundational mythology for the present. 
Furthermore, these chapters illustrate the deeply entangled relationship of nation and women 
and the many ways in which official constructions of womanhood have the ability to impact 
gender relations of the present as they continue to (re)position women within a domestic 
context. Each chapter will show how these women, through the processes of public 
mourning, the rites of burial, and the more celebratory practices of commemoration, are 
persistently reshaped and recast to aid the present regime in bolstering their social legitimacy 
by reminding the „nation‟ of an oppressive past and the sacrifices made for their freedom 
during times when social, economic and political conditions in the country become tense.  
           The women selected for discussion in this thesis are fairly well-known and have 
become important symbols for resistance to oppression in post-apartheid South Africa. The 
more recent commemorations of Maxeke, Joseph, and Ngoyi, and the death of Albertina 
Sisulu as well as the publicity and official attention received by these events led to their 
selection for consideration in this thesis. Baartman‟s selection stems from my initial interest 
in the ways that mourning and dead body politics intermesh to form a powerful influential 
force in foundational mythology creation that arose while researching Baartman‟s 
iconography for my M.A. thesis. The remains of these women have selectively been inscribed 
with political agendas that reflect the socio-political (dis)order of the time-period in which 
they died, were buried, and were commemorated. Despite the vocality of some of these 
women during their lifetime, death rendered them silent. Their words have been forgotten, 
undermined, or re-interpreted by the ostensible „custodians of the nation‟ and were narrated 
into their legacies and onto their remains through the forceful political rhetoric that has been 
issued by some of the most influential politicians and icons in South Africa. Honoured in 
official discourse as mothers, grandmothers, daughters, and heroines of the nation, their 
legacies become part and parcel of the gendered and familial language that constructs the 
nation in terms of family relationships in order to create a sense of national kinship despite 
the language, racial, religious, economic, and cultural differences that have seen South Africa 
constructed as the „Rainbow Nation‟. Moreover, their names are present and visible in the 
public sphere. The official mourning and commemorative events staged for these women 
received television coverage: the funerals of Sisulu and Baartman were televised live on the 
national broadcasting station SABC2, while the commemorative events honouring Maxeke, 
Ngoyi, and Joseph were briefly aired on SABC2‟s popular morning show, Morning Live. 
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Furthermore, Baartman‟s funeral was strategically planned to fall on national Women‟s Day, 
while the declaration for the graves of Maxeke, Ngoyi, and Joseph as national heritage sites 
were also organised to take place during August – Women‟s Month. This thesis, then, will 
investigate how the public spectacle of mourning these women and their representation in 
official discourse informs, shapes, and creates a foundational mythology for the post-
apartheid state as these women, in death, become part of a national pantheon of heroes and 
heroines. Moreover, it will demonstrate the power of dead body politics in establishing 
nationalist sentiment and how each particular history and legacy is harnessed in order to 
shape and influence the present.      
           The death of prominent struggle activist Albertina Sisulu in 2011 serves as the first 
case study for this thesis. Sisulu is the only female struggle icon in this thesis who witnessed 
the transitional period and who served in government during the Mandela presidency. Sisulu, 
known as the „mother of the nation‟ – a title not uniquely reserved for any particular female 
individual in South African struggle history – came to symbolise the fierce nature of 
motherhood popularised in the African nationalist movement during the 1950s. As a 1956 
Women‟s March participant and organiser, a member of a „golden‟ generation of anti-
apartheid activists, and a lifetime of dedication to fighting apartheid oppression within the 
ANC structures alongside her husband, the more famous Walter Sisulu, Sisulu has always 
occupied a special and honoured place in South African struggle history. However, in death, 
that legacy is imbued with a sense of the sacred as it is recognised in official discourse that 
the nation, with her death, has lost someone important. Sisulu‟s public importance was 
recognised with an official funeral that was televised on SABC2 and prominent politicians 
were invited to read eulogies. What became evident in the official rhetoric surrounding 
Sisulu‟s death was the symbolisation of her legacy to reflect and comment on present-day 
social, economic, and political discourses. The remains and legacy of a female icon were 
employed to narrate the nation under particular circumstances through the sacred rituals that 
accompany death and burial. 
           The second case study of this thesis shows how the repatriation and burial of Sara 
Baartman in her „native soil‟ became symbolic of the founding of a new nation now free from 
oppression just as Baartman had been freed from her oppressive exploitation as a curiosity in 
nineteenth century England and France. Unlike Sisulu, Maxeke, Ngoyi, and Joseph, 
Baartman is silent – with the exception of a problematic court record that briefly gives 
Baartman a (mediated) „voice‟, Baartman has no recorded words – she is always represented 
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by others. She is the perfect silent dead body to embody narratives of the post-apartheid 
nation and its foundational mythologies. This chapter is a sequel to my M.A. thesis but here 
the focus falls on Baartman‟s funeral, dead body politics, and foundational mythology 
creation rather than on the systematic construction of Baartman‟s iconography. Her funeral 
and the mourning rituals that marked her „homecoming‟ became deeply symbolic events on 
which narratives of nation were enacted. Located in the distant past, Baartman was honoured 
as the „grandmother of the nation‟ by then president Thabo Mbeki and her iconography had 
been deeply entrenched in Mbeki‟s African Renaissance philosophy. However, the processes 
of Baartman‟s repatriation and burial spanned two presidencies whose nationalist ideological 
focus differed and it becomes clear how her legacy and remains became imbued with a 
wealth of narratives as each presidency attached different meanings to this particular 
individual. Moreover, the contestations over Baartman‟s remains are indicative of the 
political power that important dead bodies continue to hold in the present. Despite this initial 
focus on Baartman‟s remains, in recent years it has become clear that her political salience 
has weakened as the present day societal challenges require different icons to narrate the 
nation. Baartman was an important female icon for the transitional period in South Africa 
when nation-building required a wealth of (preferably) silent heroes and heroines on whom 
the post-apartheid nation could be written and narrated.        
           The three women whose commemoration makes up the final chapter of this thesis are 
fairly well-known in South African political history. Charlotte Maxeke was the founder of the 
Bantu Women‟s League (the forerunner to the ANC Women‟s League) and influential in 
organising women‟s political anti-colonial activism and in initiating the 1913 Women‟s 
March in Bloemfontein. Helen Joseph and Lilian Ngoyi were amongst the most prominent 
female anti-apartheid activists of the 1950s onwards and leaders of the 1956 Women‟s 
March. These three glass-ceiling breakers of their times have been grouped together for 
discussion as the declaration of their graves as national heritage sites was celebrated in one 
combined event in a collaboration of the South African government and SAHRA in 2010 to 
launch the Women‟s Legacy Project. These three women illustrate the tendency in the post-
apartheid state to equate women‟s anti-pass campaigns with women‟s resistance in its entirety 
while also enforcing entrenched notions of womanhood and femininity in supposedly 
honouring women‟s resistance. Furthermore, the official consideration of the 1956 Women‟s 
March as a foundational event for the post-apartheid state and the grand importance assigned 
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to this march in the public holiday calendar and in official discourse are illustrated and 
emphasised through addressing this specific commemorative event.  
           While post-apartheid South Africa has a wealth of female icons that have come to be 
representative of women‟s resistance to colonial and apartheid oppression in official 
discourse, few of these women are as well-known or appear to enjoy the same recognition 
that their male counterparts receive in public spaces and commemorative events. With the 
exception of the prominence accorded Women‟s Day on the public holiday calendar and the 
importance assigned to the 1956 Women‟s March as a foundational event for the post-
apartheid state, official celebrations and recognition of male liberation leaders and their 
achievements continue to dominate the public sphere. Iconic women are mostly honoured by 
having hospitals, clinics, streets, schools, and ships named in their honour. Men, in addition 
to receiving the same honourary recognition as their female counterparts, tend to be 
commemorated on a more monumental scale that includes individualised statuary and 
commemorative stamps issued by the South African Post Office – an honour that is rarely 
extended to women. Essentially, narratives of „The Struggle‟ and resistance to oppression 
remain quintessentially male. SAHRA has attempted to address this imbalance with a 
Women‟s Legacy Project that seeks to remember and honour women in South African history 
who have made a contribution to a variety of different fields and not political resistance to 
oppression alone. Although the project‟s intentions are laudable, it remains framed by 
popular discourses of femininity and womanhood and funding and project planning indicates 
that, thus far, the only progress made has been in developing projects of famous struggle 
heroines. This is indicative of the present focus on developing a strong foundational 
mythology reflecting a „glorious past‟ that seeks to legitimise the current political 
dispensation as it faces increasing criticism for failing to address persistent socio-economic 
inequalities.  
           The public/official mourning of Sisulu, Baartman, Maxeke, Joseph, and Ngoyi reflect 
the power of dead body politics and the specifics at work when these politics are inscribed on 
the female dead body and the investigation of these case studies will indicate that nationalism 
remains a dominant force in South Africa and that its manifestations in official discourse 
require closer examination. Nationalism, even when seemingly benign, is a dangerous 
ideology that silences, excludes, and forgets. It constructs who is „us‟, who makes up the 
„nation‟, and does not tolerate contestations. Officially-sanctioned discourses of nationalism 
are reinforced by the power of the state and are rendered even more dangerous when 
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buttressed by state resources. This thesis does not attempt to calculate or measure the social 
impact of official nationalist rhetoric that emanates from the officially-sanctioned public 
mourning and commemorative rituals of iconic South African women. The analysis of 
official rhetoric in this thesis offers critical perspectives on the unequal social gender 
arrangements in South Africa that are sustained through distinct language use with goals of 
social transformation. Moreover, this thesis attempts to advance the understanding of the 
complex relationship between power and ideology contained in official discourse in 
sustaining this hierarchically gendered social order. This is especially pertinent in present 
South Africa as issues of power, gender, and ideology have become increasingly complex 
and subtle.
19
 As a form of „analytical resistance‟20 this thesis seeks to identify, analyse, and 
critique this nationalist rhetoric in order to identify the potentially harmful narratives of 
regime legitimation and normative domestic femininity that such discourse seeks to embed 
within a new foundational mythology. Through such an approach it attempts to contribute to 
ongoing struggles of contestation and change as such narratives could ultimately undermine 
democratic principles and the potential for South Africans in general, and more specifically 
women, to fully exercise their rights and responsibilities as citizens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
19 Lazar, “Politicising Gender in Discourse”, in Lazar (ed), Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis, p.3. 
20 Ibid., p.6. 
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Chapter 1 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
A Historiography of the Dead Body Politics of South Africa 
 
Introduction 
Post-apartheid nationalism, the central theme around which this thesis is built, is multi-
faceted and its popularity and effectiveness in constructing the „nation‟ waxes and wanes 
while its meaningfulness shifts and alters. Throughout the following chapters several aspects 
which shape post-apartheid nationalism will be addressed and the academic literature that has 
critically examined the central tenets of this thesis will be investigated. This chapter will 
navigate the more prominent and directly relevant literature that addresses South African 
dead body politics and the ways in which dead bodies have been employed more specifically 
in post-apartheid nationalist movements. While post-apartheid dead body politics is 
addressed to a certain extent in academic literature, it is often done so within a context of 
heritage development and public history. The studies examined in this chapter will reflect 
this.  
           „Dead body politics‟ denotes the symbolic efficacy of dead bodies as physical 
embodiments of particular ideologies for political gain. These dead bodies might be the 
remains of the famous deceased or they could be the corpses of individuals whose manner of 
death or their lives have become politicised. They are silent vehicles that can carry multiple 
meanings but whose potential multiplicity is mitigated by the singularity of the corpse. The 
physical presence of political dead bodies in the public landscape in the form of graves, 
mausoleums, and monuments denotes a visible space for representing pertinent ideological 
concerns. Yet, their legacies which inform official expressions of nationalist discourse can be 
called upon at any time. This demonstrates the salience of politicised dead bodies to 
(nationalist) ideology production. Garrey Dennie discusses the importance of what he calls 
the „contested corpse‟ in his PhD dissertation “The Cultural Politics of Burial in South 
Africa, 1884 - 1990”1 and explores the ways in which political dead bodies became „treasured 
                                                          
1
 Garrey Michael Dennie, “The Cultural Politics of Burial in South Africa, 1884-1990”, (D.Phil. Johns Hopkins 
University, 1997). 
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possessions‟ and „potent political weapons‟ and the contestations that arose between families, 
church, and liberation movements about who would lay claim to the legacy that was left 
behind by the deceased individual(s). Dennie‟s exploration of dead body politics briefly 
predates the publication of Katherine Verdery‟s impressive theorisation of this topic.2 
Verdery, who coined the term „dead body politics‟, applies this phrase to case studies in post-
socialist Eastern Europe. The corpses of prominent Eastern European revolutionary and 
religious heroes and leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens were exhumed and reburied 
in new locations in the post-socialist era. Verdery examines the socio-political implications of 
these reburials in constructing national and ethnic identities while also considering physical 
representations of such icons in the form of statuary when their physical remains were 
inaccessible or lost. While both phrases are applicable for use in this thesis, Verdery‟s term 
„dead body politics‟ is preferred here. „Contested corpses‟, the term used by Dennie, denotes 
specific interest groups simultaneously laying claim to politicised corpses for furthering their 
own agendas. Verdery‟s terminology situates these „contested corpses‟ in a wider framework 
of nationalist ideology, identity politics, and local contestations which relates more closely to 
the subject matter of this thesis. Furthermore, correlations exist between post-socialist 
Eastern Europe and post-apartheid South Africa in terms of socio-political transformation and 
the search for and construction of nation, national identity, and a „usable past‟ after a history 
of oppression and trauma.
3
 This renders the term „dead body politics‟ as highly applicable to 
a case study of post-apartheid foundational mythology creation through the spectacle of the 
public mourning of the famous dead.  
           This thesis is concerned with how political and politicised female dead bodies 
influence and shape the specific nationalisms of the post-apartheid state and is situated within 
gender and nationalism studies. While most of these studies appear to focus on how women 
have interpreted and engaged with their positionings in the post-apartheid state, this thesis is 
concerned with a top-to-bottom approach to this topic: it explores how the lives and legacies 
of political and politicised dead women are constructed in official discourses in order to 
complement the establishment and entrenchment of a post-apartheid foundational mythology 
that is currently still under construction. The body of literature that addresses this topic is 
                                                          
2
 Katharine Verdery, The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change, (Columbia 
University Press: New York, 1999). 
3
 Monica Popescu explores the possibilities of “(re)shaping and (re)conceptualising the relationship between 
post-communism and post-colonialism” and the interconnections between the post-apartheid and post-
communist discourses in Monica Popescu, “Translations: Lenin‟s Statues, Post-communism, and Post-
apartheid”, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 16, 2, 2003, pp.406-423. 
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severely limited which can be attributed to its contemporary timeframe. Moreover, it possibly 
reflects a deep concern within academia (on whom the burden of investigation and 
representation has partially fallen) about the lived experiences of women in South Africa in 
the present and a need to address this outside of official government discourse. While 
considering how women engage with a post-apartheid nationalism on ground-level is 
essential, this thesis attempts to address how state-sanctioned narratives and public mourning 
rituals imbued with official rhetoric of political and politicised dead female icons reveals the 
positioning that this nationalism attempts to impose on South African women. It also 
illustrates how such official constructions of womanhood can possibly reflect on and impact 
the already problematic gender relations in South Africa. The historiography of South 
African gender and nationalism studies has traditionally tended towards histories „from 
below‟ to counter the silencing effect of apartheid‟s grand narratives on subaltern voices. Yet, 
changing political trends in South Africa make it necessary to once again consider how 
histories „from above‟ not only reflect societal problems in the present but also how these 
master narratives of the past have the power to transform and impact the lived experiences of 
South Africans. Much media attention has recently been given to the dead body politics of 
ordinary South African citizens who have died as a result of state violence in response to 
mass protest action or those who have been victims of brutal crimes such as protester Andries 
Tatane,
4
 the thirty-four miners killed at Marikana,
5
 and rape and murder victim Anene 
Booysen.
6
 All have become deeply politicised bodies as political parties or politically-
motivated individuals seek to exploit their narratives of fatal tragedy for political gain. While 
exploitation for political gain is not always the case and altruistic intentions are at times 
promoted, overwhelmingly these individuals, reduced to political bodies, become tools in 
political disputes.   
           While it is easy to dismiss official expressions of nationalism as „exhausted‟ or to fail 
to take seriously popular expressions of nationalist sentiment it is essential to factor 
                                                          
4
 The death of Andries Tatane as a result of police brutality during a service delivery protest in Ficksburg in 
2011 has become synonymous with public perceptions of increased state violence after the footage of the assault 
was disseminated in the media. 
5
 Also known as the „Marikana Massacre‟, the deaths of thirty-four miners following violent clashes with the 
South African Police Service (SAPS) during a miner‟s strike at a Lonmin mine in Marikana has led to 
investigations into the increase in violent state response to protest action.  
6
 The violent rape and murder of seventeen-year old Anene Booysen in Bredasdorp in 2013 was highlighted in 
the media and became a brief rallying point around which the persistent high levels of sexual violence and abuse 
against women in South Africa were – once again – highlighted. 
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nationalism into an analysis of current events. Gillian Hart makes a decisive argument for the 
continued study of nationalism in post-apartheid South Africa and stresses that 
post-liberation nationalisms cannot simply be shrugged off or wished away. The challenge 
instead is to grasp their popular appeal, and work towards critical understandings that can 
help to denaturalise increasingly dangerous articulations of nationalism. In other words, we 
have to think with nationalism against nationalism.
7
  
This thesis will begin to identify how the dead body politics of iconic women informs the 
nationalist project of foundational mythology creation while simultaneously reflecting and 
shaping present day societal, economic, and political discourses. Popular nationalist 
sentiment is a powerful tool in the armoury of the ruling ANC to temporarily contain or stifle 
rising civil discontent. However, official expressions of nationalism are also inherently 
gendered. By inscribing the remains and legacies of deceased women associated with 
resistance to oppression with grand narratives of the nation, official rhetoric presents its ideal 
forms of femininity, womanhood, and female citizenship to the public sphere. Yet, these 
often conflict with the lived experiences of women in the present. Moreover, proclamations 
of closure of the racial and gender oppression and inequalities of the past dangerously deflect 
from the very real crisis in gender relations experienced in South Africa. As the following 
chapters will show, invocations of nationalist sentiment at public mourning events of popular 
heroines have the ability to entrench traditional and patriarchal concepts of womanhood and 
simultaneously silence contesting voices and ideologies through the deployment of the 
emotive foundational myths of the post-apartheid state in which these heroines play a 
significant part.  
           The first decade of democracy in South Africa was attended by a wealth of academic 
literature addressing post-apartheid nationalism, nation-building, and identity construction 
and the ways that South Africans dynamically interacted with these ideologies that defined 
the post-apartheid state. As a uniquely positioned state that had experienced a dramatic but 
relatively peaceful socio-political transition, the power of rainbow nationalism and the 
rhetoric of the TRC was effectively harnessed from „above‟ to construct a new and inclusive 
national identity for „below‟. However, it would be facile to consider discourses of 
nationalism as simple cynical manipulations imposed from „above‟. In the immediate years 
following the 1994 national elections official rhetoric utilised symbols and narratives of 
                                                          
7
 Gillian Hart, Rethinking the South African Crisis: Nationalism, Populism, Hegemony, (University of KwaZulu-
Natal Press: Scottsville, 2013), p.12. 
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national unity that had popular appeal and spoke to deeply emotive histories and experiences 
of struggle and victory. It was sanguinely intended that a South African identity should 
supersede, or at the very least, co-exist with racial, ethnic, religious, or regional identities 
already firmly entrenched. Moreover, articulations of nationalism that invoked popular 
understandings of freedom, justice, and liberation reinforced the ruling party‟s hegemonic 
project.
8
 Unsurprisingly, this bold and optimistic nationalism would become the subject of 
global academic interest as South Africa emerged from international pariah to become the 
world‟s template of forgiveness, reconciliation, and peaceful transition. However, after ten 
years of democracy academic focus tended to shift away from post-apartheid identities, the 
construction of new grand narratives, and rainbow nationalism as the optimism of the 
transitional period could no longer disguise the growing socio-economic crisis and the 
preoccupation this held for South Africans in public discourse. The flimsy disguise of the 
Rainbow Nation could not plaster over the histories of racial oppression, exploitation, 
dispossession, and economic inequality and the discourses of an official post-apartheid 
nationalism would quickly be dismantled only to be recalled sporadically at events such as 
the 2010 FIFA World Cup.
9
     
           Chapters 2 to 5 carefully trace and examine the theories of mourning, dead body 
politics, and nationalism (internationally and locally) that are the foundation for this thesis. 
The focus for this literature review regards the body of literature that relates directly to the 
dead body politics of post-apartheid nationalism with a brief consideration given to two 
seminal studies that address the dead body politics of the Anglo-Boer War and the political 
funerals of the 1980s. Considering the long history of competing nationalist movements in 
South Africa is essential to a more nuanced understanding of a state-sanctioned post-
apartheid nationalist movement but the extensive bodies of literature and theories that address 
women‟s positioning within African and Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa will be 
considered in chapter 4 and to avoid overlap will not be examined here. While the colonial 
nationalism of South Africa remains an under-researched topic, women never featured 
strongly in the attempt to establish a white male-dominated South African identity; white 
women served as racial boundary markers and as the moral compass of the white „nation‟. 
The aggressive progression of Afrikaner nationalism effectively employed the Afrikaner 
woman as martyr/heroine in its campaign for socio-political, economic, and ethnic 
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 Hart, Rethinking the South African Crisis, p.23. 
9
 However, as Hart indicates, this moment of „romantic rainbowism‟ was accompanied by violent xenophobic 
attacks and threats. p.171. 
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dominance. African nationalism favoured the image of the militant and strong black mother 
fighting for her children and family. This served to contain women within a nationalist 
discourse that recognised women‟s importance in furthering the cause of black liberation but 
simultaneously contained women within a domestic framework of political activity.  
           As a result of the limited body of literature that addresses the dead body politics of 
female icons in the post-apartheid state,
10
 this literature review will consider the broader 
literature that investigates post-apartheid foundational mythology creation through dead body 
politics. This literature review will also explore a topic that has received greater academic 
attention; the dead body politics of famous struggle heroes and its ability to contribute to the 
construction of a foundational mythology for the post-apartheid state. Struggle icons such as 
Solomon Mahlangu and Hector Pieterson have become prominent founding figures in the 
post-apartheid heroic pantheon and have been addressed extensively in studies considering 
themes such as nationalism, identity, and heritage and memorialisation in post-apartheid 
South Africa.
11
 Altogether, male icons feature more prominently in the commemorative 
public landscape and have been addressed more extensively as individuals in academic 
studies as a result. The only female post-apartheid icon that has truly received abundant 
academic and official attention is Sara Baartman and this stems from a historic preoccupation 
with her body politics and the academic interest she has received since her death ranging 
across the fields of science, humanities, and the arts.
12
 Baartman is the only woman in this 
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 Only Sabine Marschall has addressed the commemoration (but not necessarily dead body politics) of female 
icons in South Africa within the context of post-apartheid heritage development. Sabine Marschall, “Serving 
Male Agendas: Two National Women‟s Monuments in South Africa”, Women’s Studies: An Interdisciplinary 
Journal, 33, 8, 2004, pp. 1009-1033. “How to Honour a Woman: Gendered Memorialisation in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa”, Critical Arts, 24, 2, 2010, pp.260-283. 
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 Gary Baines, “The Master Narrative of South Africa‟s Liberation Struggle: Remembering and Forgetting June 
16, 1976”, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 40, 2, 2007. Gary Baines, “Commemorating 
Solomon Mahlangu: A South African Struggle Martyr”, Paper presented at „Recycling Myths, Inventing 
Nations Conference‟, University of Aberystwyth, Newtown, Wales, 2010. Angel David Nieves, “Places of Pain 
as Tools for Social Justice in the „New‟ South Africa: Black Heritage Preservation in the „Rainbow‟ Nation‟s 
Townships”, in William Logan and Keir Reeves (eds), Places of Pain and Shame: Dealing with ‘Difficult 
Heritage’, (Routledge: Oxon and New York, 2009). Sabine Marschall, “Visualising Memories: The Hector 
Pieterson Memorial in Soweto”, Visual Anthropology, 19, 2, 2006. Sabine Marschall, “Memory and Identity in 
South Africa: Contradictions and Ambiguities in the Process of Post-Apartheid Memorialisation”, Visual 
Anthropology, 25, 2012. Helena Pohlandt-McCormick, “‟I Saw a Nightmare‟: Violence and the Construction of 
Memory (Soweto, June 16, 1976), History and Theory, 39, 4, 2000.  Ruth Kerkham Simbao, “The Thirtieth 
Anniversary of the Soweto Uprisings: Reading the Shadow in Sam Nzima‟s Iconic Photograph of Hector 
Pieterson”, African Arts, 40, 2, 2007. Darren Newbury, “„Lest We Forget‟: Photography and the Presentation of 
History at the Apartheid Museum, Gold Reef City, and the Hector Pieterson Museum, Soweto”, Visual 
Communication, 4, 3, 2005. 
12
 A wealth of literature addressing Sara Baartman exists following her inclusion in George Cuvier and Geoffrey 
St. Hilaire‟s seven-volume "Histoire Naturelle des Mammiferes avec les figures originales d'apres des animaux 
vivants" (Natural History of Mammals with original pictures after living animals) published between 1818 and 
1842. The few listed here intend to reflect the preoccupation of academia with Baartman across the years. 
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thesis whose life has been recorded in two separate biographies despite having the least 
archival or recorded information available.
13
 Sisulu shares a singular authorised biography 
with her husband, Walter Sisulu, written by her daughter-in-law Elinor Sisulu.
14
 Joseph 
extensively recorded her life experiences in her autobiography, Side by Side,
15
 but her life has 
not been examined through meaningful and critical biographical research. Maxeke and Ngoyi 
have no existing biographies with the exception of educational booklets intended for primary 
school pupils.
16
 Nonetheless, autobiographies of liberation leaders often become important 
national texts – perhaps even foundational texts for the new nation. Elleke Boehmer 
addresses the significance of the autobiography of the leader of national independence 
movements (almost always male) and states that “the leader‟s tales operate as inaugural 
symbolic texts shaping and justifying configurations of status and power in the post-colonial 
nation (-to-be), including the interconnection of nationalist ideology and gender politics.”17 
The male leader‟s autobiography, in a sense, becomes the biography of the rise of the nation 
and the touchstone on which the values of the nation are reflected. Boehmer argues that the 
autobiographies of liberation leaders are often published to coincide closely with the moment 
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of independence indicating the crucial part such biographies play in the inscription of the new 
nation. Boehmer cites the release of Nelson Mandela‟s autobiography, Long Walk to 
Freedom (which could be considered as one of post-apartheid South Africa‟s foundational 
texts), in 1994 as a prime example of this global trend and also refers to the release of Walter 
and Albertina Sisulu‟s authorised biography in 2003 as possibly being timed for publication 
close to the ten-year anniversary of democracy in South Africa. Boehmer continues to situate 
the male leader‟s autobiography in the familial makeup of the nation:  
In the act of writing his autobiography the male nationalist leader validates his role as the 
chief and representative son of the nation, and then – as he and the nation reach political 
maturity – as its father. He confirms, in other words, his pre-eminent, even dynastic, position 
in the national family drama. From this it is already clear that, for the literate middle class at 
least, the „hero‟s‟ autobiography operates as an important vehicle in the articulation and 
authorisation of the dominant gender both of anti-colonial resistance and of nationalist self-
imagining.
18
 
With female activist autobiographies being overshadowed by those of their male counterparts 
and critical biographies of prominent female struggle icons lacking, the nation, in effect, is 
inscribed with male hopes and aspirations. Moreover, as Boehmer suggests, the 
autobiographies of prominent female leaders tend to “give predictable insights into the at-
times-critical yet also broadly supportive relationship of South African women to the always 
male-led nationalist liberation movement, in which national freedom was prioritised over 
women‟s rights.”19 Elinor Sisulu‟s authorised biography of Albertina and Walter Sisulu 
signifies an important departure from this trend as it foregrounds the symbiosis of the 
political relationship between her parents-in-law. However, as Boehmer suggests, “[f]or the 
rest, it is almost exclusively the case that father figures and brother-comrades pass on 
political inspiration and words of guidance to the new national leaders. The patrilineal 
genealogy that their interrelationships build undergirds the male dominance of the wider 
national family network.”20 
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           Post-apartheid nationalism, defined by nation-building and multiculturalism, has seen 
three different presidencies highlight different aspects and employ its influence for various 
ends. The immediate post-1994 era saw Nelson Mandela stress rainbow nationalism where 
the focus fell on creating a multi-racial and stable South Africa after a dramatic and swift 
socio-political transition. Rainbow nationalism made the transitional period in South Africa 
possible but was quickly undermined by the realities of the continued racial, economic, and 
social inequalities that it sought to „cover up‟. Thabo Mbeki‟s presidency saw a change in 
focus to African Renaissance philosophy and positioned the ANC at the head of the battle 
against racism. While continuing to champion nation-building and multiculturalism the stress 
also fell on creating a geo-political awareness and pride in pre-colonial African development 
and African identities. Jacob Zuma‟s presidency has been somewhat ambiguous and 
identifying a clear nationalist trajectory during this period is difficult. Zuma‟s ascendance to 
the presidency – also known as the Zunami (Zuma tsunami) – has been defined by populist 
politics. Rather than ascribing to a model of appeal to the „mindless masses‟, Zuma‟s 
populism is grounded in his ability to “articulate multiple, often contradictory meanings into 
complex unity that appeals powerfully to „common sense‟ across a broad spectrum.”21 Zuma 
positioned himself as the hero of national liberation, a man of the „left‟, a traditionalist, and 
as an anti-elitist in re-articulations of race, class and nationalism that “are also shot through 
with gender and sexuality.”22 Zuma, in many ways, was able to resonate with millions of poor 
black South Africans through his “capacity to connect with and speak to the painful 
articulations of race, class, gender and sexuality” that signify, for many, their everyday 
experiences.
23
 Simultaneously, articulations of the nation and liberation remain crucial in 
retaining popular consent and the over-arching ideologies of nation-building remain 
observable in official rhetoric while the entrenchment of „The Struggle‟ as foundation myth 
has become increasingly predominant.
24
 The positioning of women within post-apartheid 
nationalism has remained fairly static over the past two decades, yet Zuma‟s presidency, 
marked by strong traditionalist patriarchal influences, has caused an observable shift in how 
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these positionings are observed and interpreted in public discourse. While official discourse 
has stressed government‟s continued dedication to women‟s equality and empowerment in 
the democratic state there has been an observable change in the perceived disposition of 
government and some of its officials in recent years and often displayed in bombastic 
unofficial statements made to the media which will be discussed in the following chapters.  
           Despite the varieties of interpretations and meanings assigned to post-apartheid 
nationalism in the past two decades of democracy the constant of foundational mythology 
creation and fortification has remained. As the ANC-led government has affirmed its firm 
grip on political power once again in the 2014 national elections, a foundational mythology 
that enshrines the struggle and its (ANC-affiliated) icons will continue to be honoured in 
official rhetoric and in state-sanctioned public commemorative efforts. Dead body politics 
will continue to powerfully inform this foundation myth as the „golden generation‟ of 
struggle heroes and heroines ages and passes on. The positioning of iconic women within this 
nationalism has played an important part in enforcing the myth of the dissolution of gender 
discrimination in the post-apartheid state but has dangerously deflected from the high levels 
of violence committed against women in South Africa in the present. The official narratives 
that are inscribed on these women‟s bodies at their funerals or commemorations not only 
reflect on or attempt to diffuse dominant themes of public dissatisfaction or protests at play in 
the public sphere but have also served to establish normative concepts of gender in South 
Africa and continues to employ these women‟s bodies and legacies in the service of post-
apartheid nationalism and regime legitimation. Foundational mythology creation, dead body 
politics, and women and nation and the multitude of ways in which these themes interact are 
at the theoretical centre of this thesis. As the following chapters explore this theory more 
closely this chapter will address the extant historiography and the central texts that apply the 
functional theme of dead body politics to a South African context. Divided into three brief 
sections, this chapter will first address the historiography of dead body politics in South 
Africa paying attention to the deeply entrenched mythology of the concentration camps of the 
Second Anglo-Boer War (also referred to as the South African War) more recently re-
addressed in the work of Liz Stanley and then the power of the political funeral during the 
struggle for liberation as investigated by Garrey Dennie. This will then progress into a 
consideration of the literature addressing the dead body politics in post-apartheid South 
Africa of Hector Pieterson and Solomon Mahlangu; perhaps two of the most iconic figures 
symbolising the moral bankruptcy and violent nature of the apartheid state. 
25 
 
A Review of Dead Body Politics in South Africa 
The dead body politics of the post-apartheid state is an emerging but still limited field of 
research. While the cultural politics of burial and death have been addressed in studies 
ranging across several disciplines the significance of who lays claim to specific deceased 
individuals and the political salience of such claims remains confined to a small volume of 
articles and chapters.
25
 With the deeply entrenched political nature of mourning in South 
Africa – the result of South Africa‟s colonial and apartheid past – the political power of 
mourning and laying claim to the struggle icons of the past may yield economic gain and 
promote political and cultural legitimation projects. For this reason, it is important to address 
the dead body politics of the present and the ways in which this is yielded in establishing, 
entrenching, or contesting hegemonies. The studies addressed below focus on tangible 
heritage sites associated with traumatic histories that resulted in deaths. With the exception of 
the Anglo-Boer War, dead body politics has overwhelmingly focused on male dead bodies as 
„tangible heritage‟ which have become sites of contestation. As post-apartheid heritage is 
built on a legacy of trauma it would be impossible to address every memorial or monument 
erected to the deceased heroes of the past in this chapter. Instead, this chapter focuses on 
those academics and their studies whose works have informed and shaped the theory of this 
thesis while also demonstrating an understanding of the larger field of study within South 
Africa in which this thesis is located.  
            
The Second Anglo-Boer War 
 
The dead body politics of the Second Anglo-Boer War is a fitting departure for a discussion 
of the historiography of women and dead body politics in South Africa. The deaths of 
approximately 26,000 Boer women and children in British concentration camps during the 
Anglo-Boer War would become a powerful factor in fuelling Afrikaner nationalism. 
Deliberate dis-remembering and re-casting would foster a narrow but effective mythology of 
the camps that continue to persist in the present. Women played an important part within this 
nationalist myth-making process as they, as women, came to symbolise the trauma inflicted 
upon the putative Afrikaner „nation‟ which was still in its infancy at this time. Liz Stanley‟s 
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Mourning Becomes... Post/Memory, Commemoration and the Concentration Camps of the 
South African War,
26
 provides an insightful look into the exploitation of the memory of the 
deceased women and children to promote an Afrikaner nationalist agenda. Stanley explores 
the local memories of the camps – represented by private memories, family grief, and local 
graveyards and community monuments – and how these would be superseded by politically 
motivated official state commemorations which shaped the meta-narrative of the war.
27
 
Stanley initially focuses on the memoirs written and published by proto-nationalist women 
survivors of the camps and how they served as perfect vehicles for enhancing early Afrikaner 
political agendas. These testimonies, supported by the memoirs of famous Boer generals 
would, according to Stanley, establish a meta-narrative through the use of fictive devices and 
employing powerful Biblical references and imagery in the texts which juxtaposed the „good‟ 
Afrikaners with the „evil‟ British and the pre-war racial ordering of society as a harmonious 
Eden.
28
 This meta-narrative, Stanley shows, consists of four themes; that the war was fought 
to preserve the Boer „way of life‟, the destruction of and removal of Boer women from the 
farms exposed them to humiliation and ill-treatment by British and blacks, that the camps 
were in fact, „murder camps‟ and the camp hospitals places of punishment and death, and the 
fourth theme, „the worst thing of all‟, was that the removal to the camps exposed Boer 
women to the gaze of blacks, and even worse, that they were treated like blacks.
29
 As will be 
shown in chapter three, the deliberate mistreatment of Boer women (the „bearers‟ of the 
nation) and children (the future of the nation) would, in later years, be recast in a nationalist 
light as a direct attack on the Afrikaner nation and an insult to its male pride. Moreover, 
nationalist narratives of the camps situated women as martyrs, victims, and heroines central 
to the survival of the Afrikaner nation in an ethnic nationalist mythology in which women 
would come to play a central role – significantly even more so after white women in South 
Africa gained the vote in 1930. The mythology of the „death camps‟ would be enhanced in 
the late 1940s through their association with the concentration camps of Nazi Germany and, 
through its interrelation with ideologies of deep suffering and victimhood, became an alibi for 
apartheid policies once the Nationalists had gained political victory in South Africa. This 
reflective re-interpretation of the camps, according to Stanley, allowed “nationalism and 
nationalists to grief-ride on, and gain political and moral capital from, the Shoah, thereby 
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avoiding responsibility for institutionalised racism and apartheid.”30 Yet, these themes of 
suffering and victimisation would, oddly, resurface in post-apartheid South Africa. In a 
reconciliatory spirit that also recognised the black suffering in the British camps, Thabo 
Mbeki in 1999 spoke of the Boers as „freedom fighters‟ who “‟asserted the right of all 
colonised people to independence‟ and of „mutual suffering and interdependence, in spite of 
inequalities, of both black and white during the South African War.‟”31  Stanley suggests that 
the absurdity of such statements could be indicative of a new nationalist foundation myth in 
the making; one built on the traditional nationalist motifs of mutual suffering brought upon 
South Africans by an oppressive „outsider‟. However, Stanley cautions against such 
deliberate misrememberings in the name of nation-building and reconciliation. Such laboured 
reconstructions of the past, after all, only serve to silence traumatic histories of racism and 
oppression that simply cannot be erased as their legacies continue to persist in the present. 
Traumatic histories, especially those relating to the suffering of the nation‟s women (and 
children), are deeply emotive experiences in a nation‟s past that are often called upon to 
construct or enforce national unity in the face of societal upheaval. While Stanley focuses on 
the private and official mourning practices that emerged after the Anglo-Boer War and which 
developed and altered over the following decades, the manner in which nationalist rhetoric 
employed the emotive category of death and loss resonates in the present. While a great deal 
of research exists that examines the suffering experienced by Afrikaner women and 
especially the 1913 Women‟s Monument in a context of promoting Afrikaner nationalism 
and foundational mythology creation, Stanley has extensively addressed the ways in which 
mourning and commemoration influence such mythologies. Moreover, as Elizabeth van 
Heyningen states, “Stanley has done South African historians a signal service by opening up 
a history which has been trapped in a paradigm of suffering and sentimentality for far too 
long.”32 This is a cautionary statement indeed; when mythologies of traumatic pasts become 
so deeply entrenched and sacralised in society that critical investigation is considered 
subversive, nationalist desires will continue to employ these mythologies to fortify 
hegemonies. This has the potential to be detrimental in terms of constructions of gender and 
gender relations. In post-apartheid South Africa, where a foundational mythology rooted in 
the years of struggle against the apartheid state is being established, this sacralisation of a 
grand narrative of the past is becoming increasingly observable with critical revision 
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aggressively labelled in official circles as „counter-revolutionary‟. As will be shown in the 
following chapters, the deaths, funerals, and public mourning of women whose legacies and 
lives form part of this grand narrative „in the making‟ reflect a worrying trend. Women‟s 
bodies are employed in narratives of nationalist ideologies that often attempt to „re-
domesticate‟ women with an acutely gendered rhetoric that is indicative of the existing 
dichotomy of official rhetoric and actual perceptions of womanhood in South Africa. While 
Stanley, in part, addresses the dead body politics of a large group of seemingly anonymous 
and singular „womenandchildren‟, this thesis is concerned with the dead body politics of 
individual and well-known women icons of the post-apartheid state. The Boer women and 
children-martyrs, unified yet unindividuated by their experience of death in the camps, were a 
moderately silent
33
 group to appropriate for nationalist projects. This „silence‟ of a large and 
anonymous group contrasts sharply with the dead body politics of iconic individuals whose 
prominent words have often been recorded and are, at times, well-known. Yet, as will be 
shown in this thesis, even recorded words are easily manipulated for contesting claims or can 
come to mean different things to different people at different times. Herein lies the power of 
dead body politics – the dead cannot contest such manipulations. 
 
 
Funerals as Sites of Struggle  
 
Dennie addresses dead body politics in South Africa through his study of the cultural politics 
of burial in black communities stretching over a period from 1884-1990 in his PhD 
dissertation. Of special interest to this thesis are his final three chapters that discuss the mass 
political funeral that dominated the political landscape of protest in the 1980s. The 
prominence of dead bodies and funerals as a site of political protest inspired a sense of 
justified outrage and unity against a common enemy and was indicative of the political 
salience of the deceased. Shaped by a historical context of avoiding the debasement of black 
corpses by white municipalities, pauper funerals were avoided at all costs within black 
communities and for Dennie this is a stark reminder that, in many ways, the black funeral in 
white-controlled South Africa has always been political. By affirming the value of their dead, 
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black South Africans contested the racially debasing nature of colonialism and apartheid.
34
 
Historically faced with persistent white municipal resistance to black mourning practices, 
death in black families was a site not only for the outpouring of grief and mourning, but was 
often accompanied by a deeply politicised clash of interests. Dennie commences his study of 
this particular topic with the mass-funerals that followed the 1976 Soweto student uprisings 
and also pays special attention to the mass funeral of murdered Black Consciousness (BC) 
activist, Steve Biko. The killing of children by the apartheid state during the Soweto uprising 
would become a particular and justified site of community outrage and funeral attendance 
was a statement of political intent. Moreover, as the apartheid state tightened its control 
against any form of opposition the mass funeral became a space where black mourning rituals 
were employed in direct confrontation with the state. Indeed, as Dennie shows, the “mass 
politicised funeral became a weapon of choice as Black South African mourners wove their 
pain of bereavement into a fabric of political resistance to apartheid.”35 The use of political 
slogans, songs, and eulogies introduced a new component to black South African mourning 
rituals.
36
 Dennie argues that this introduction of new mourning practices to traditional rites of 
burial “elevated their anti-apartheid struggle from a political commitment to a near sacred 
imperative”37 that would extend beyond the boundaries of Soweto and become part of black 
mourning ritual across South Africa.
38
 
 
           Changing funeral rites after Soweto would further enhance their political nature as, for 
the first time, children had become involved in the mourning rituals for their school and class 
mates. At the Soweto funerals thousands attended, even if unknown to the deceased, to show 
their solidarity with the affected families. The state feared these mass funerals as they were 
seen as a convenient cover for the organisation of black political activity as no other avenues 
of public black political expression existed. The politicised students of Soweto did indeed use 
these funerals to organise themselves in the aftermath of the massacre. Continuous clashes 
with the police at these funerals deeply entrenched the new politicised culture of mourning at 
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funerals. Dennie shows that the occurrence of political violence at funerals was an 
unprecedented development in the history of black mourning rituals and following Soweto, 
even the peaceful funerals became political as attendance itself became a political gesture.
39
 
Dennie identifies the new political consciousness of black mourners by the performance of 
political songs, slogans, dances, and political eulogies at politicised funerals. The locality of 
these political funerals reached national distribution as the unrest of Soweto spread to the rest 
of the country. The funeral of prominent Black Consciousness leader, Steve Biko, in 1977 
would draw approximately twenty thousand mourners despite a concerted effort from police 
to stop people from reaching the funeral. Biko‟s funeral, however, was more than a ceremony 
at his graveside. According to Dennie, hundreds of thousands of black mourners gathered at 
commemorative services across the country, turning churches, factories, streets, homes, and 
shops into political localities as every tribute to Biko‟s life became an indictment of 
apartheid. Biko‟s death became an occasion for nation-wide mourning “with unparalleled 
political potency and enormous political consequences.”40 As Dennie eloquently states, 
Biko‟s life had been a „tapestry of resistance‟ to apartheid and his stature as an heroic figure 
within the anti-apartheid movements and his relentless persecution by the state resulting in 
his murder had turned him into South Africa‟s most famous martyr.41 With Biko‟s death 
placed firmly in the tradition of Christian martyrdom, his philosophies “gained new life and 
legitimacy from the very fact that he died because of them.”42 Biko‟s funeral and the 
memorial events organised around the time of his burial were religio-political events and 
attendance became a necessary political action – especially as some of these events had met 
with violent reaction from the state resulting in more deaths – delivering further judgement 
on the apartheid state. Biko‟s funeral demonstrated the new ritualised politics of mourning 
which usually accompanied the death of a black political activist.
43
 The police‟s invasion of 
the sacred space of the funeral strengthened black resistance to apartheid and the martyrs of 
the struggle strengthened the political platforms of the organisations that produced them. 
           During the turbulence of the 1980s and the declaration of a state of emergency the 
government placed a ban on funeral activities such as memorial and commemorative services 
taking place outdoors in areas considered to be „unrest areas‟ and gave the Commissioner of 
Police the power to immediately classify any area as an „unrest area‟. Furthermore, only 
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ordained ministers of a religious denomination were allowed to speak at funerals in these 
areas and it became a criminal offence to criticise the government in such sermons. It also 
banned the large funeral processions that accompanied the death of important individuals, 
restricting them to vehicular processions with the police selecting an appropriate route which 
they would monitor. The display of any flags, banner, pamphlets or posters was forbidden, as 
was the use of a public address system. The ceremony could last no longer than three hours 
and attendance was limited to 200 persons.
44
 This state control over the large public funerals 
restricted political expression, yet the size of a funeral did not influence its politics or the 
militancy of its attendants. Many smaller, politicised funerals were held for lesser known 
individuals and occurred far more often than the mass political funerals. The state was aware 
that politicised funerals were instrumental in radicalising the black communities.
45
 However, 
it failed to understand that through restricting these funerals they were creating the response 
that they sought to suppress. Dennie expresses this sentiment well and states that the 
“government never understood that radicals were created in the cauldron of repression.”46 
The government was never truly able to restrict the political content of eulogies at funerals 
and these remained strongly politicised throughout the 1980s.  
           Dennie also considers the contestations that arose around the burial of Dr. Neil Aggett, 
a white trade unionist, and Sabata Dalindyebo, a Thembu Chief opposed to apartheid and 
how the struggles for control over their bodies reflect the struggles between the demands of 
private grief and public politics. This particular chapter of Dennie‟s dissertation perhaps 
relates most closely to the focus of this thesis. Where Dennie examines the dead body politics 
of the political mass funeral of the struggle years this thesis addresses the dead body politics 
of those women who contributed to the success of the liberation struggle in the post-apartheid 
state.
47
 Dennie‟s focus, however, remains on the topic of how the politics surrounding these 
„contested corpses‟ influenced and altered African mourning rituals in South Africa. This 
thesis takes a broader approach to show how dead body politics has the ability to entrench the 
foundational mythologies of a new nation. Of course, the glaring contrast lies in Dennie‟s 
study of what would have been considered subversive funerals and this thesis‟ focus on 
official funerals. Yet, a continuity can be observed in that what once was subversive is now 
official. The official funerals of the present celebrate and commemorate those who 
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contributed to the struggle against the state that would have labelled them subversive and the 
mourning rituals of the political funerals of the past have been incorporated into the official 
funerals of the present. 
           Chapter 7 of Dennie‟s dissertation addresses the political mass funeral in South Africa. 
Dennie describes the violent years of confrontation between the apartheid state and black 
communities during the period 1984-1990 as a decade which witnessed the constant 
production of dead bodies in black townships.
48
 Dennie ensures that the distinction between 
the mass funeral and the political funeral are not collapsed but recognises that, in South 
Africa, most mass funerals during this decade were inherently political. As a result, the focus 
of his study falls on the distinctions between the political mass funeral of famous political 
leaders and the smaller politicised funerals of lesser known individuals. Drawing a 
comparison between the mass funeral of Tsieti Mashinini, a famous political activist and the 
funerals of three lesser know activists – Prakash Napier, Yusuf Akhaklwaya, and Happy Boy 
– Dennie shows how even smaller and less visible funerals were not necessarily less 
politically militant in nature. Dennie argues that the political funeral “became a powerful tool 
for drawing previously un-politicised individuals into the influence of resistance movements, 
especially once the state attempted to extend its influence and control into the sacred space of 
the funeral ritual.”49 Funerals of activists, regardless of the numbers in attendance, became 
sites of political mobilisation and recruitment; grief and outrage could draw un-associated 
family members and friends of the deceased into the liberation movements that often played 
an important part in the organisation of the funerals and delivering politicised eulogies while 
these events were marked by political songs, sermons, and addresses.  Importantly, in terms 
of liberation theology, Dennie recognises that the sacred nature of the funeral saw “religious 
belief [become] political conviction; and political action [become] a religious necessity.”50 
Moreover, Dennie concludes that the politics of each funeral are ultimately, situational – a 
point that the case studies in this thesis will reflect. 
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Male Dead Body Politics in the Post-Apartheid State 
            
While Stanley‟s and Dennie‟s studies address the cultural importance and political salience of 
pre-democratic South African dead body politics, the case study of Hector Pieterson emerges 
repeatedly in articles dealing with post-apartheid heritage and commemorations of which 
dead body politics are an inherent aspect. More than any other notable post-apartheid icon, 
the legacy of Hector Pieterson has been contested by those laying claim to and hoping to 
benefit from his iconic positioning as a foundational figure and child-martyr. Hector 
Pieterson stands as a text-book example of the political salience inherent in the silence of 
dead bodies on which the new nation can be inscribed and through which it can be narrated. 
The events of 16 June 1976, now celebrated as Youth Day in South Africa, have repeatedly 
been under contest in competing claims by organisations and individuals laying claim to the 
organisation of the youth uprisings in Soweto. Gary Baines argues that this “has obvious 
political implications for groups seeking to stake their right to the story of the liberation 
struggle that has become the cornerstone of the new nation‟s collective memory and 
identity.”51 Baines‟ illuminating article, “The Master Narrative of South Africa‟s Liberation 
Struggle: Remembering and Forgetting June 16, 1976”, addresses how and why South 
Africans remember June 16 through a study of „memory texts‟: the iconic Sam Nzima 
photograph, the TRCs rehearsal of the events of June 16, the Hector Peterson Museum, and 
the commemorative events that celebrate Youth Day. It considers how the processes of 
remembering and forgetting the events of June 16 in the post-apartheid state influences the 
construction of a national identity and questions “whether it is possible (or even desirable) to 
aspire to some sort of consensus about the meaning of the past in order to forge a sense of 
nationhood.”52 Baines shows how the iconography of Pieterson originates from the acclaimed 
photograph taken by journalist Sam Nzima. Pieterson, it is believed, was amongst the first 
victims of the police shootings on the protesting students. As a result of this photograph – 
which captured the lifeless body of the 13-year old boy being carried away by the anguished 
Mbuyisa Makhubu – and its syndication in the international media, Pieterson became the 
embodiment of the uprising and the ultimate symbol of apartheid brutality.
53
 Baines questions 
why this photograph evoked such a strong emotional response as “the picture imparts little 
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information and has little or no referential value.”54 For Baines, the composition of the 
photograph and the manner in which it captured the human anguish of the moment partly 
explains its power. Its representation of innocence and victimhood and the senseless death of 
a child lends itself to powerful symbolic associations. Moreover, Baines argues that it is the 
relative anonymity of Pieterson “that makes him the ideal symbol of a sacrificed childhood 
that has no life beyond the picture. He is the „perfect victim‟; a symbol of the unfulfilled 
potential of youth cut down in their prime – South Africa‟s own Anne Frank.”55 These 
symbolic associations and inscriptions have only become more politically salient in the post-
apartheid state as it seeks national heroes, martyrs, and icons to bolster a new foundational 
myth for the nation. Yet, Pieterson was not a political activist nor involved in student protest 
politics. Rather, as his sister Antoinette Sithole remarked at the TRC hearings, her brother 
was “in the wrong place at the wrong time.”56 However, the image and its ability to lend itself 
to strong symbolic associations rendered Pieterson as an icon of the struggle. His death 
became a martyr-act for the struggle against apartheid legislation and his eternal silence and 
anonymity presented a clean slate on which narratives of struggle, morality, and eventual 
victory could be projected – and indeed, were done so extensively in the post-apartheid state. 
Baines shows that through the TRC processes 
 
an ANC-approved narrative came to be integrated into a newly created national master 
narrative. Thus, the story of the Soweto uprisings became part of a triumphalist grand 
narrative of the liberation struggle, which is the foundation myth of the post-apartheid state.
57
 
 
Hector Pieterson, then, became synonymous with the uprisings in the post-apartheid state and 
Baines argues that in “the case of the Soweto uprising, the students/participants have been 
virtually airbrushed out of the „official‟ narrative and their agency has been downplayed.”58 
Amidst contestations between various political parties and individuals over who inspired and 
orchestrated the 1976 uprising and despite indications that it was student activists themselves 
who organised the protest action, the official version of events has allowed the ruling ANC as 
the emerging victor in the democratic state “to appropriate the story of the Soweto uprising at 
the expense of the other liberation parties.”59  
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           This official version of events has become manifest in the Hector Pieterson Memorial 
precinct in Soweto which includes a memorial, a wall of names, and a museum. Despite 
acknowledging the other victims of the Soweto uprising, “the precinct is clearly devoted to 
one symbolic figure.”60 Sabine Marschall identifies the Hector Pieterson Memorial precinct 
as a “key structure in the visualisation in the foundation myth through commemorating the 
Soweto uprising and specifically Hector Pieterson.”61 Moreover, for Marschall “the memorial 
represents a significant shift towards an increasingly formal, public, and „official‟ form of 
commemoration”62 that is aimed at a wider public rather than those directly bereaved and 
which “condenses emotions and projects them onto one person, whose suffering represents 
that of all those nameless and faceless others.”63 Most importantly, however, Marschall 
points out that “[m]emorials are never erected for the sake of the dead, who demand our 
respect. Rather, they are set up by the living for the sake of the living.”64 Once again 
Marschall makes an emphatic statement and recognises that commemorative markers such as 
memorials and monuments to the dead tend to be “proud monuments glorifying resistance 
[and] intended to forge a sense of collective identity among the living.”65 While for some 
there is a genuine desire to honour the dead, memorials for the political and politicised dead, 
in their visible, public, and lasting capacity, are open to political reinterpretation, 
exploitation, and strategic appropriation. What Baines identifies as the (mis)appropriation and 
politicisation by government of Pieterson has silenced the voices of Pieterson‟s family who 
have been mostly excluded from commemorative processes or financial compensation and 
indicates that while private memories fade with time, “the authority of public memory 
increases as time passes, for it invariably becomes the more widely accepted version of the 
past.”66 Nowhere does this become more discernable than in the official celebration of 16 
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June as Youth Day – a public holiday. This annual commemoration celebrates and 
remembers the struggle of the „youths‟ against apartheid legislation and involves a variety of 
official celebrations with the Hector Pieterson Memorial as the focal point of official Youth 
Day commemorative activities.
67
 As officials pay tribute to the heroes of the struggle “such 
ritualised remembering tends to drown out multiple voices in favour of a singular privileged 
one.”68 Official rhetoric reflects an ANC-controlled foundation myth in which the name 
„Hector Pieterson‟ has “become synonymous with the sacrifice made by the younger 
generation in the name of the struggle.”69 For Baines, then, the heroicisation of Pieterson and 
the annual commemoration of Youth Day exemplify the processes of nation building.
70
 As 
will be shown in the case studies of this thesis, dead body politics are a vital aspect of nation 
building and regime legitimation in the post-apartheid state. The case of Hector Pieterson is a 
relevant study to consider as he exemplifies the protean meanings that can be inscribed on a 
body/memory whose silence and singularity seemingly renders these – at times conflicting – 
meanings invariable.
71
    
 
           The dead body politics around the iconic martyr-figure of Solomon Kalushi Mahlangu 
have become a similar site of political contestation. Bill Nasson identified Mahlangu as the 
first modern martyr of the liberation movement.
72
 Marschall, who has addressed the dead 
body politics of traumatic and violent histories in several studies of contested heritage sites in 
the post-apartheid state, illustrates the contested nature of two post-apartheid heritage sites 
that have been informed by dead body politics in her article “Pointing to the Dead: Victims, 
Martyrs and Public Memory in South Africa.”73 Analysing mainly the Umkhonto Memorial 
and the PAC memorial in Mamelodi and briefly addressing the Sharpeville memorial, 
Marschall reveals the politicised and contested nature of these two post-apartheid memorials 
steeped in a deeply traumatic past. In this important study of dead body politics, Marschall 
points to the manner in which both the ANC and the PAC have competitively employed the 
salient politics of death to enhance their respective public profiles and entrench and remind 
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the nation of their „Struggle‟ credentials. Mamelodi, the site of the Mamelodi Massacre in 
1985 and a township representative of mobilised opposition to apartheid legislation, has 
become home to two „opposing‟ memorials: the predominantly ANC-inspired Umkhonto 
memorial on Solomon Mahlangu Square (also known as the ANC monument, MK statue, or 
Solomon Mahlangu memorial
74
) unveiled in April 1991, and a PAC memorial unveiled at 
Mamelodi Cemetery in August 1992. Each public memorial, on the surface, represents an 
acknowledgement of the fallen cadres of the respective political parties. Yet, Marschall‟s 
analysis indicates that these memorials play  
 
an important and ongoing role in the competitive process of laying claim to key icons of the 
„Struggle for Liberation‟, demonstrating ownership of significant events, and strategically 
appropriating selected dead heroes, fallen comrades or scores of victims.
75
   
 
By claiming ownership of contributions to the struggle for liberation, each movement 
effectively writes itself into the foundational mythology of the post-apartheid state. However, 
as the ruling governing party, the ANC, more than any other political party, has the political, 
organisational, and financial influence to orchestrate and guide what will be remembered and 
how narratives of liberation will be narrated in the public space.
76
 Marschall acknowledges 
that indeed, 
 
today, the school curriculum, the media and the heritage sector entrench the popular notion of 
the freedom struggle, a teleological narrative, implying relative coherence and unity, a more 
or less concerted effort toward liberation, ideologically and logistically led by the ANC and 
crucially supported by Umkhonto we Sizwe...
77
 
 
While the impetus for a monument to commemorate the victory of an historic organised rally 
against authorities considered illegitimate came from the non-party affiliated Mamelodi Civic 
Association, Marschall relates from interview evidence that all its members were ANC 
supporters at the time the decision was made to raise a monument.
78
 The design appears to be 
based on the ANC logo, the wheel, the spear and the shield, which are held aloft by a stylised 
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male figure. This statue was placed adjacent to the site of the Mamelodi Massacre, 
reinforcing the symbolic significance of the site. Marschall indicates that the surrounding 
square was renamed in honour of Mamelodi activist, Solomon Mahlangu, who was executed 
by the apartheid government in 1979. Born in Mamelodi, Mahlangu became involved in 
struggle politics in the context of the 1976 student uprisings. He joined the ANC and left the 
country to be trained as a member of MK in 1976. Upon his return to South Africa in June 
1977, Mahlangu was arrested following a shooting incident in Johannesburg in which two 
whites were killed. Although it was accepted by the court that Mahlangu had, in fact, never 
fired a shot, he was sentenced to death on 2 March 1978. Mahlangu‟s sentencing received 
international attention and on the eve of his hanging the UN Security Council held a meeting 
to protest the execution and President Jimmy Carter of the USA, made a personal appeal for 
commutation of sentence. Marschall relates how 
 
Mahlangu immediately became a martyr to the liberation struggle and an icon of the 
prevailing injustice; his execution prompted a new wave of international condemnation of the 
apartheid regime. Mahlangu was originally buried in Atteridgeville, but was exhumed and 
reburied in the local Mamelodi cemetery two years after the unveiling of the Umkhonto 
memorial; his grave site is easily identifiable by a fairly prominent memorial stone, topped by 
a cylindrical marker displaying the ANC logo.
79
  
 
The symbolically charged act of moving the body of Mahlangu nearer to the monument is 
indicative of the importance and the sense of the sacred that the presence of symbolically 
significant dead bodies can lend to a site. Chris Hani, who in 1991 had assumed the position 
of chief of staff of MK and a high-ranking member of the SA Communist Party, unveiled the 
Umkhonto memorial. Hani‟s presence, according to Marschall, 
 
stresses the organisational aspect; Mahlangu‟s symbolic significance as a courageous member 
and martyr of the liberation struggle; the memorial as a tribute to him as an individual hero, 
but also to all those who died with him for the cause of liberation. It is a tribute to the ANC as 
an organisation and liberation movement in alliance with the Communist Party.
80
   
 
Marschall emphasises that while Mahlangu and the victims of the Mamelodi massacre were 
fundamentally non-aggressive, the memorial relates clearly to the armed struggle and 
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primarily honours MK.
81
 This contradiction then, Marschall argues, “certainly underlines the 
opportunistic appropriation and symbolic coding of popularly rooted and emotionally charged 
past events for the political needs of the present.”82 In short, dead body politics has shaped a 
deeply emotional narrative of resistance that seeks to entrench grand narratives in order to 
inform a new foundation myth for the post-apartheid state which, at its centre, establishes the 
ANC and its stalwarts as the supreme organisational and driving force of „The Struggle‟. This 
assertion will be reinforced in the case studies addressed in chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this thesis.   
 
           While the memorial project reflects an ANC-driven narrative of the organisation‟s 
prominence in the struggle history in Mamelodi that was centred around the iconic martyr-
figure of Solomon Mahlangu, the impetus for such a project apparently emerged in response 
to a planned PAC initiative to set up a large-scale pyramidal stone memorial in a prominent 
position in Mamelodi cemetery.
83
 Despite this, the PAC memorial was only unveiled a year 
after the Umkhonto memorial. The memorial was erected in honour of Poqo (the military 
wing of PAC) cadres executed by the apartheid regime and to APLA (Azanian People‟s 
Liberation Army)
84
 fallen combatants. The memorial is intended as a collective tombstone 
intended to restore the dignity of those dead PAC/Poqo members apparently buried in mass 
graves in Mamelodi cemetery without funerals by the apartheid regime who had withheld 
executed prisoners from their family members. While the initiator and builder of the PAC 
memorial denies that one memorial was put up as result of the other, Marschall argues that 
the competitive history of the ANC and PAC does support the speculation that the ANC 
memorial was erected in response to a planned PAC memorial.   
 
           While both memorials attempt to honour those activists of Mamelodi associated with 
their respective movements, it is only the Umkhonto memorial that has received official 
attention through recent upgrades to the site. As Marschall argues, the careful selection of 
which sites receive these upgrades and renewed official attention “points to an increasing 
institutionalisation of certain memories and the entrenchment of a particular interpretation of 
the past anchored around selected events and persons.”85 The Umkhonto memorial, according 
to Marschall, has always been associated with Mahlangu but through its visual design has 
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represented a collective form of memorialisation. However, the individual persona of 
Mahlangu has come to assume an increasingly prominent role. In 1999 the Solomon 
Mahlangu Freedom Square project was officially launched in order to develop and upgrade 
the area. In 2005, an imposing bronze statue of Solomon Mahlangu, situated on a high 
pedestal, was unveiled in place of the Umkhonto memorial. Further development of the site 
takes the visitor on a metaphorical journey to the newly erected Umkhonto memorial leading 
up to the monumental Mahlangu statue. For Marschall, the erection of such a monumental 
statue represents a shift to an elitist approach to commemoration which is focused on 
individual leaders, martyrs, and heroes and which is manifested through a wider trend of 
erecting statues of individual male leaders throughout the country.
86
 According to Marschall, 
the “intention was to personalise the struggle for freedom through the example of Mahlangu, 
and to pose a respected model of identification for the youth of Mamelodi today.”87 As will 
be shown in the following chapter, national identification with the moral superiority of a 
(often) deceased (or sometimes mythical) hero or heroine is a central aspect of dead body 
politics and foundational mythology creation. Through his iconisation in the post-apartheid 
state, Mahlangu has become a heroic martyr who has become part of a national pantheon of 
heroes and heroines designed to morally inspire the new South African nation. The official 
focus on carefully selected individuals like Mahlangu arguably limits the choices of how the 
public remembers the past. As Marschall suggests, the “narratives proffered by the heritage 
sector and addressed mostly at the younger generation...tend to leave little room for divergent 
memories and alternative interpretations.”88 Contestations to the increasingly hegemonic 
narratives of the past do emerge but are often limited and arise from individuals or 
communities who sometimes chose to engage in their own forms of remembrance of events 
they have experienced themselves or that are meaningful to them on a personal level.
89
 
            
           By addressing the prominent dead body politics of two iconic male post-apartheid 
hero-martyrs it becomes clear that what on the surface appears to be a re-shaping of South 
African historical narratives through the institutionalisation of official discourses of black 
resistance politics to white oppression requires deeper analysis. Post-apartheid dead body 
politics speak of the formation of hegemonic narratives of the past that silence voices of 
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opposition in the attempt to create a foundation myth of „The Struggle‟ that, as Marschall 
argues, consciously or inadvertently, tends to coincide with an ANC-preferred reading and 
interpretation of past events. The dead body politics of famous political and politicised 
women reflects this trend as this thesis will show. However, women tend to be honoured in 
public spaces in significantly less individualistic and personalised memorials and monuments 
and the official narratives that define their lives and legacies tragically reflect the 
contradictory positioning of women in present South African society.          
 
Conclusion 
This chapter served to demonstrate the larger body of literature of dead body politics in South 
Africa that can be broadly divided into three separate categories. As the following chapters 
will investigate these topics more closely, the discussion above is intended as a brief 
introduction to earlier and relevant approaches in South African historiography that engage 
with the powerful relationship between public and official mourning and nationalism. Dead 
body politics in post-apartheid South Africa tends to reflect power struggles and competition 
for recognition for roles played in the struggle for liberation that is presently being 
monopolised by an ANC-dominated narrative. Moreover, the expression of dead body 
politics in official rhetoric is often indicative of present day societal and economic disputes 
that are emotionally enhanced by the presence of dead bodies so augmenting their salience as 
political tools. The prominent role played by dead body politics in political discourse in 
South African history is neither unique nor singular. The following chapters will show that 
dead bodies play an important role in foundational mythology creation and bolstering 
political ideologies and claims through their status as sacred objects on the global level. 
Moreover, the political salience of dead bodies was harnessed in the South African context by 
early Afrikaner nationalists and African nationalists alike to lend credibility and integrity to 
their political projects. These trends persist, and although perhaps distasteful to a critical 
observer, the sacred status of dead bodies across cultures and countries and the emotional 
state of death amongst survivors and those who associate or identify with the deceased render 
them powerful tools (perhaps even weapons) for political claims and actions. Despite the 
prominence and importance of dead body politics in the post-apartheid state in constructing 
official narratives of struggle and victory, studies within this field are lacking and dead body 
politics tends to be attached to larger studies of post-apartheid heritage development and 
contestations rather than being addressed in its own right. This thesis will expand upon the 
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field of dead body politics in post-apartheid South Africa by recognising that the physical 
presence of dead bodies that are considered as important in the present represent more than 
the country‟s heritage; they are physical yet symbolic markers that, when harnessed for 
ideological pursuits, have the power to define the foundational mythology of the „new‟ South 
Africa. Baines and Marschall have examined the political salience of dead bodies in a context 
of foundational mythology creation in South Africa but have done so indirectly and without 
employing the phrase „dead body politics‟ itself. This thesis will expand upon the work done 
by Baines and Marschall by further focusing the lens on the dead body politics of prominent 
South African female icons within a context of foundational mythology creation but also with 
an understanding that the ideologies that are shaped by the official narratives about these 
women are indicative of the tragic dichotomy of women‟s perceived positioning in South 
African society and their lived experiences in the post-apartheid state.     
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Chapter 2 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Theories of Public Mourning and Nationalist Myth-Making 
 
Men do well to mourn for the dead: it proves that we love something besides 
ourselves; and he must have a hard heart who can see his friend depart to rottenness 
and dust and speed him without emotion on his voyage to “that bourne whence no 
traveller returns.”To lament for those who have benefited the state is a habit of piety 
yet more favourable to the cultivation of our best affections.
1
 
- Percy Bysshe Shelley 
 
Introduction 
Percy Bysshe Shelley wrote this statement in response to the death of England‟s Princess 
Charlotte in 1817 – an occasion marked by a public display of grief and mourning as well as 
political rhetoric. According to Shelley, “the moral benefits derived from public and private 
mourning differ in degree, not kind [and] he defines public affections as a critical aggregate 
of private sympathies.”2 While this is a somewhat simplistic and perhaps exaggerated notion 
of the relationship between the private and the public, Shelley‟s poetic take on public 
mourning is often echoed in the official rhetoric issued at the deaths of important public 
figures.  Public funerals and the work of mourning play an essential role in nationalist myth-
making. The nature of public funerals and the subsequent commemorations of important 
deceased individuals or past traumatic events are politicised. The political nature of such 
events lends them to become fundamental components of larger nationalist project. 
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           Mourning implies that there is grief for something that has been lost, that a process 
takes place in which that loss is confronted. But questioning what has been lost begs the 
question of what it is that remains. David Eng and David Kazanjian suggest that “loss is 
inseparable from what remains, for what is lost is known only by what remains of it, by how 
these remains are produced, read, and sustained.”3 This imputes to loss a creative quality to 
the politics of mourning which this thesis will address.  
           Firstly, this chapter will establish the theoretical framework of mourning that will 
inform discussions of case studies in later chapters. It will examine theories of mourning as 
they have been shaped by scholars of psychology, anthropology, and history before entering 
into a discussion about how this thesis will apply these theories to a study of official public 
mourning
4
 in post-apartheid South Africa. Although theories of mourning are often 
considered the domain of psychoanalysis due to Freud‟s significant contribution in his paper 
„On Mourning and Melancholia‟5 and the consequent pathologising of the process of 
mourning, this chapter will attempt to avoid providing a discussion grounded in 
psychoanalysis. This chapter will approach theories of mourning as a historical discourse 
while drawing on the contributions of psychoanalytic theories to the study of public 
mourning. Where psychoanalysis interprets mourning as a discourse amongst the living and 
that which has died, or has been lost, a historical account of mourning considers mourning as 
a discourse amongst the living where the past becomes a “crucial partner of the present.”6 A 
brief discussion of the development of individual and private mourning as a subject of 
psychoanalytic studies will be followed by an account of psychoanalytic theories of public 
mourning in societies as initially developed and applied by Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich. Although this literature has almost exclusively focused on public mourning 
rituals on the European continent and the United States of America in the last century, strong 
correlations can be found in the recent public and state mourning of important female 
political figures in South Africa.  
           The public mourning for women who have in some way contributed to the body politic 
for the „greater good‟, or are perceived to have done so, is at the centre of this thesis. In order 
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to shape the discussion that will take place in the following chapters a brief account of similar 
and somewhat more well-known cases of public mourning for the passing of politically 
significant women such as Princess Charlotte and Eva Perón will be provided. Not only will 
this illustrate that the public mourning of important women contains and animates a variety of 
discourses, it will also show that this is a phenomena that has spanned centuries and 
continents and will dispel any notions that what is happening in South Africa in the present is 
a singular event completely distanced from what has happened elsewhere. However, it must 
be noted that the circumstances and agendas that have shaped the particular dead body 
politics that are central to this thesis are of course unique to South Africa as a country that has 
undergone a relatively peaceful transition from minority rule to democracy.     
           Informed by Katherine Verdery‟s seminal work The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: 
Reburial and Postsocialist Change,
7
 a closer examination of the political efficacy of named 
and famous corpses will take place. This will allow for a continuity of theoretical discussion, 
starting with death leading into burial and memorialisation which then continues into 
eventual commemoration. A discussion examining the social symbolism of burial will follow 
in order to determine the ritualised importance of this practice to allow the dead to „rest in 
peace‟ and allow them to once again resume their place in society with a continuity of 
purpose that is susceptible to political and ideological moulding. The memorials erected to 
the known and important dead – which comprise several ways in which the dead are 
physically remembered – can represent a variety of meanings to different groups of people. 
This multiplicity of meanings and their physical presence in both the geographical and 
political landscape allows for a very tangible remembrance of these dead – they are still 
present but separated from the living. The importance of the connection between the burial of 
public figures and their entrance into a pantheon of national heroes and heroines will be 
addressed. This will indicate that the social practices of mourning and burial shape how these 
public figures will be remembered and how their publicly remembered contributions to the 
nation informs the creation of a new foundational mythology.  
            The role of foundational mythology in nationalist movements will be discussed 
briefly within the context of the theories of nationalism that this thesis ascribes to and applies 
to individual case studies. This examination serves to contextualise the significance of 
foundational mythologies within nationalist movements, and how these mythologies serve as 
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symbolic statements about the social order that, in turn, serve a legitimating function for new 
political dispensations. The focus falls especially on the myths constructed around individuals 
who are considered to have contributed beneficially to the existence of the modern nation. 
The narratives of their lives are interpreted and reinvented by nationalists in order to serve as 
a source of inspiration and unification for the nation.    
           This chapter is intended to create the general framework of thinking for the rest of this 
thesis. The theories introduced and addressed here will be applied more thoroughly to each 
case study in the following chapters. Each case study that will be examined will draw on all 
elements discussed in this chapter but vary to which degree they apply. All nationalisms are 
contextual and therefore unique. In two decades of democracy in South Africa, the new post-
apartheid nationalism has repeatedly changed focus. Each elected President and his cabinet 
have attached a different meaning to what South Africans and South Africa, as a nation, 
should work towards to achieve that „golden era‟ that most nationalist movements advocate 
and use to create unity in each „imagined community‟. Without concentrating on South 
Africa, this chapter will demonstrate that while most studies on nationalism focus almost 
exclusively on Europe, the USA, and at times Asia, the seminal works that have shaped 
modern academic nationalist discourse can be applied, although in altered form, to the South 
African case study with which this thesis is concerned.   
 
Applying Psychoanalytic Theories of Mourning 
This thesis is concerned with the official rhetorical uses of grief in the politicised 
lamentations of public mourning of women who have been assigned the status of national 
mothers, heroines and martyrs. This is grounded in a wealth of literature about grief, 
mourning, burial, and nationalism crossing several disciplines. This thesis, however, will give 
a historical account of the work of mourning in the context of public funerals and how the 
narratives shaped by this politicised form of mourning become part of a new foundational 
mythology for the post-apartheid state. Yet, the place of psychoanalytic theory in studies 
about public mourning cannot be ignored. They have informed and shaped the way that 
scholars analysing public mourning approach and think about societies that have undergone 
traumatic events and how those societies deal with such histories. Indeed, nearly every study 
concerning public mourning will, however briefly, refer to Freud‟s initial research into 
individual mourning and melancholia in order to define how societies deal with loss.   
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           A theoretical discussion of grief, mourning, and burial within the context of public 
funerals is necessary before continuing with its application to specific case studies in the 
following chapters. It is important for the purpose of this thesis to distinguish between grief 
and mourning. Grief is the emotional response to the impact of loss. Corr et al. explain that 
“[t]he word grief signifies one‟s reaction, both internally and externally, to the impact of 
loss.”8 Thus, grief is a personal or societal reaction to the loss of a loved one. Mourning, 
Kastenbaum explains, “refers to the culturally patterned expressions of the bereaved person‟s 
thoughts and feelings.”9 Stroebe and Schut note that “[m]ourning refers to the social 
expressions or acts expressive of grief, which are shaped by the practices of a given society 
or cultural group.”10 Thus, with its focus on the public space, this thesis will approach the 
term „mourning‟ as the ways in which state and society express and memorialise grief as a 
national event when burying and commemorating those women whom the state has identified 
as being essential to the project of nation-building in South Africa. The state converts the 
private grief of a deceased individual‟s family and friends into a public mourning process that 
is meant to be shared by the nation. However, the grief of public mourning – whether a 
society is mourning the loss of a national hero or heroine, or the loss of certain ideals or 
geographical space – is a somewhat different phenomenon. For Shelley, mourning is a 
“cultivator of affections which promote social bonds.”11 This observation will be applied 
throughout this thesis as women‟s lived experiences are inscribed with the political morals 
and qualities which are considered to be important to fostering „unity in diversity‟ and 
building the nation in post-apartheid South Africa – whether this is actually promoting unity 
or not. 
           Although it was Freud‟s 1917 paper that has been considered as one of the most 
influential works on the development of the study of mourning, his work was restricted to 
studies of private mourning as, indeed, are most recent psychoanalytical studies. Despite this, 
theories of private mourning have been applied to studies of public mourning and thus it 
becomes of some importance for this thesis to have a basic understanding of the terminology 
employed by psychoanalytic studies as this is a point of departure for understanding how 
mourning can be studied as a historical discourse. Freud wrote that “mourning is regularly the 
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reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the 
place of one, such as one‟s country, liberty, an ideal, and so on.”12 Freud distinguished 
between normal mourning and abnormal mourning which he termed melancholia. Although 
modern psychoanalytic theories problematise these distinctions it is vital for the purpose of 
this thesis to create a basic understanding of what is implied by these two processes. For 
Freud normal, or successful, mourning leads to resolution. This idea of resolution presented 
by Freud involves realising that the loved one has really gone, being able to find a new love 
object and the eventual re-entry of the mourner into society. Freud argues that “we are 
familiar with this experience, we know that it will pass and therefore we take it as normal.”13 
For Freud, “…when the work of mourning is completed the ego becomes free and 
uninhibited again.”14 In essence, the work of mourning allows the mourner to relinquish past 
attachments and consequentially to form new ones.  
           Abnormal or pathological mourning, which Freud identified as melancholia, is the 
result of the inability to disentangle the self from the lost love object. According to Ian Craib, 
in the case of melancholia,  
…the mourner identifies with the lost loved one and directs the criticism and anger which 
belongs to the lost one to the mourner. Melancholia, then, is a state in which we have taken 
the lost loved one inside and kept him or her there, attacking ourselves rather than the person 
who is lost.
15
 
Melancholia, then, prevents the mourner from fully relinquishing their hostility or anger 
toward what has been lost. Forter, following Freud‟s work on mourning and melancholia, 
states that melancholia 
…entails an ambivalent incorporation of the object as a strategy for keeping one‟s argument 
with it going and results in a sense of inner desolation, an incapacity to form new 
attachments, and a self-bereavement whose unconscious target is the internalised object – but 
whose intensity can nonetheless culminate in the melancholic‟s suicide.16 
Freud found that, 
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The melancholic displays something else besides which is lacking in mourning – an 
extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impoverishment of his ego on a grand 
scale…[and] an overcoming of the instinct which compels every living thing to cling to life.17  
Thus, the work of mourning cannot take place and the mourner is unable to return to social 
life, or cannot continue with life at all. By juxtaposing normal and abnormal mourning, Freud 
endeavours to pathologise melancholia as he characterised “the melancholic‟s sustained 
devotion to the love object as not only pathological but also antithetical to the ego‟s well-
being, indeed, its continuous survival.”18 However, Freud‟s insistence that it is only because 
mourning is understood so well that it is considered normal appears to imply that if 
melancholia was better understood it would cease to be considered pathological. It is this 
striving for a clearer understanding of the melancholic‟s attachment to loss that “might 
depathologise those attachments, making visible not only their social bases but also their 
creative, unpredictable, political aspects.”19  This in turn would allow the past to remain 
steadfastly alive in the present, to actively induce a tension between the past and the present. 
Although Freud changed his mind on the subject of incorporation of the love object, later 
claiming in The Ego and the Id
20
 that “incorporation, originally associated with melancholia, 
was essential to the task of mourning.”21 What is essential to melancholia is that the mourner 
does not know what it is in the other person that has been lost and “mourning would be 
maintained by its enigmatic dimension, by the experience of not knowing incited by losing 
what we cannot fully fathom.”22 For Freud melancholia is an “enduring devotion on the part 
of the ego to the lost object... [M]elancholia results from the inability to resolve the grief and 
ambivalence precipitated by the loss of the loved object, place, or ideal.”23 It is this very 
maintenance of mourning, the continuing dialogue with loss and its remains, and the 
possibility of interpreting loss as a creative process that becomes a significant point of 
departure for a study of public mourning. 
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           Despite the influence of Freud‟s paper, psychoanalytical studies of mourning have 
ploughed new ground.
24
 The distinctions that Freud made have been blurred and their very 
validity questioned. The pathological nature of melancholia implies that it may be destructive 
to the melancholic, yet it is important to question whether mourning can ever be truly 
completed or if it necessarily requires a forgetting or letting go of the lost love object and the 
acquiring of a new love object to take its place. As will be shown in this chapter, a continual 
state of mourning – an ongoing engagement with what has been lost – rather than a self-
destructive melancholia, need not be destructive for the societies that attempt to confront 
traumatic histories of loss. It can be a positive engagement to produce new meanings in the 
present, even if these meanings are often politically motivated and manipulated. Although 
psychoanalysis is primarily focused on the private sphere several psychoanalysts have 
realised the importance of studying the phenomena of a nation in mourning.  
            The traumatic events of the twentieth century have resulted in an increase of studies 
on societal mourning in order to investigate the societal traumas of war and genocide on the 
citizens of states directly affected by such events. Applying psychoanalytic theory to the 
public, or collective sphere, in 1967, German psychoanalysts Alexander and Margarete 
Mitscherlich published The Inability to Mourn.
25
 This study focused on the inability of post-
war Germany to confront its Nazi past. Asserting that the majority of German citizens 
identified with and supported Hitler, they argued that the enforced rupture of individual egos 
from Hitler as the Führer and ego-ideal, the sudden reversal of his qualities, should have 
caused a kind of melancholic crisis, “a collective plunge into depression…”26 Melancholia 
was, for the Mitscherlichs, a condition of authentic mourning: 
a state arising from the loss of identifications so profound as to be constitutive of one‟s self, 
and a state which must be worked through in order to establish the sense of separateness that 
enables one to relinquish what one has lost.
27
 
 The Mitscherlichs argued that,  
Before Germans could really begin to perceive the full magnitude of the crimes committed in 
the name of the fatherland and to mourn for the victims of Nazism, they would have to work 
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through the traumatic shattering of the spectacular relations they had maintained with Hitler 
and the Volksgemeinschaft.
28
 
This process would have allowed the German people to overcome the “narcissistic 
identifications that provided the psychosocial support for the Holocaust.”29 This, in turn, 
would result in the ability of the German people to mourn the genocidal deaths caused by a 
regime which they had supported. The Mitscherlichs identified many „evasion‟ strategies 
employed by the German people to avoid having to confront this past and to undergo the 
process of working through a potentially debilitating melancholia. This was achieved by a 
derealisation of the past, a sudden shift of identifications with Hitler to the democratic allies 
and the self-identification of the German people as victims.
30
 The Mitscherlichs indicate that 
this led to an unconsciously sustained rupture of the past which “has been responsible for 
much of the psychic and political immobility of large segments of the German population.”31 
The Mitscherlichs argue,  
That so few signs of melancholia or even of mourning are to be seen among the great masses 
of the population can be attributed only to a collective denial of the past. The very grimness 
with which the clearing away of the ruins was immediately begun – which, in over-
simplification, was taken as a sign of German efficiency – itself betrayed a manic element. 
Perhaps this manic defence also explains why news of the greatest crimes in Germany‟s 
history was received with so few indications of outward emotion.
32
 
Margarete Mitscherlich, in her 1985 evaluation of the state of the political culture of West 
Germany, showed that the post-war generations “inherited not guilt so much as the denial of 
guilt, not losses so much as lost opportunities to mourn losses.”33 For Margarete Mitscherlich 
“...we must acknowledge that the younger generation, which feels itself to be innocent, has 
inherited not a past that has been worked through, but rather its denial and repression.”34  
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Although the „Historiker-Streit‟35 (Historians debate) of the late 1980s showed how a post-
war generation was attempting to deal with its traumatic past, more recent debates centring 
around German victimhood have shown that the period of German history from the rise to 
power of Hitler and the eventual defeat of Germany by the Allies and questions of culpability 
and victimhood remain at the forefront of German historical consciousness. 
           The Mitscherlichs‟ study and application of theories of private mourning and 
melancholia to the public sphere was groundbreaking and their work coined many of the 
keywords that would shape public debate in post-war Germany.
36
 Although they approached 
mourning through psychoanalytic theories, their work characterised the nature of the debates 
around German history in the 1980s and became a valuable source in understanding theories 
of societal mourning, or, indeed, a society‟s inability to mourn. Although the Mitscherlichs 
saw melancholia as a state to be worked through in order for mourning to be successful, this 
thesis will reject the need for societies to complete the work of mourning. This thesis will 
suggest that societies that have suffered traumatic pasts are in a continual state of mourning 
and that this state may produce new meanings from historic loss rather than merely act 
destructively through deliberate misrememberings. 
           The focus of several, recent psychoanalytic studies of mourning, appear to be 
concerned with thinking in terms of emphasising the creative dimensions of mourning.
37
 
Although Freud never probed the relationship between mourning and creativity in his 
“Mourning and Melancholia”, the contemporary psychoanalytic view and expectation of 
gaining something positive out of the mourning process can undermine the individual‟s 
continuous and lasting painful emotions for the lost loved object. Yet, for societies to 
creatively engage with a traumatic past can create new meanings about such a past while also 
shaping understandings of the present.
38
 Harlow, in her study on the many displays of public 
mourning in New York after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 shows that “creative acts not only 
give those encountering death a project to focus on, but also provide them with a way to 
physically enact grief – to give shape to sorrow, and to evoke the presence of the dead among 
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the living.”39 This transformation of the energy of loss into a creative energy is clearly seen in 
exercises of public mourning and commemoration. This thesis will argue in the following 
chapters that in post-apartheid South Africa the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
processes, viewed as memory work, worked against melancholia but created a society in 
perennial or continuous mourning which is further enhanced by the creation of memorials 
and the commemoration of traumatic events and the public mourning of prominent deceased 
individuals.  
           After 30 years of conducting a study of hundreds of mourning processes and their 
various consequences, psychoanalyst Vamik D. Volkan has in recent years identified the 
perennial mourner and extended this term to include societies that he identifies as being 
perennial mourners.
40
 This term applies to individuals and societies “who are unable to bring 
their mourning to a practical conclusion…”41 For Volkan some of these perennial mourners 
lead miserable lives while other express their unending mourning in more creative ways. 
Volkan states that,  
The perennial mourner, to a large extent, cannot identify with the enriching aspects of the 
mental representation of the lost object and the adaptive ego functions associated with this 
mental representation. This kind of mourner cannot find „suitable reservoirs‟ for externalising 
the representation of the lost person or thing. On the other hand, the mourner does not end up 
identifying totally with the lost object representation and does not, in other words, go through 
a „normal‟ mourning process or develop depression. Instead, these mourners keep the object 
representation of the lost person or thing within their self-representation as a specific and 
unassimilated „foreign body‟.42    
Thus the perennial mourner is „stuck‟ in his/her mourning process and employs concrete 
animate or inanimate objects such as photographs as linking objects that symbolise “a 
meeting ground between the mental representation of a lost person or thing and the mourner‟s 
corresponding self-representation.”43 By creating and employing these linking objects the 
mourner makes the mourning process unending and externalised. The mourner can then 
locate and access these objects whenever they wish to, and store them away when they feel 
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anxious about the complicated mourning process. Volkan advances his argument by focusing 
on memorials and monuments as shared linking objects in order to understand societal 
mourning and identifies the building of memorials and monuments as a common societal 
expression – a symptom – of societal mourning. He identifies memorials and monuments as 
psychological containers in which the remaining unpleasant feelings about the past can be 
sealed.
44
 Yet, the physical presence of monuments and memorials in the landscape inherently 
implies that these feelings can be accessed at any time in the future. It is here that the 
connection between psychoanalytic theories of mourning and a historical discussion of public 
mourning can be made. The memorials and monuments of post-apartheid South Africa are 
imbued with complex „unpleasant‟ feelings about the apartheid past. They are sealed in these 
memorials for visitors to explore, but tend to be brought back into the socio-political sphere 
at occasions such as the anniversaries of specific historical events in order to legitimate the 
new political dispensation which has ensured that all that was wrong with the previous 
dispensation has now been done away with and that the nation, through looking back on the 
traumatic past, can see a brighter future ahead.    
           However, this loss need not only be sealed in physical monuments or memorials made 
of concrete materials. Mourning the physical remains of past heroes and heroines, and even 
lost ideals can become a renewed focus of engaging with the past in the present. By 
considering the mourning process as never being „completed‟ or „finished‟ allows loss to 
become available to alternative meanings of the past and alternative identifications in the 
present.
45
 Eng and Kazanjian, referring to Freud‟s identification of melancholia,   
...find in Freud‟s conception of melancholia‟s persistent struggle with its lost objects not 
simply a “grasping” and “holding” on to a fixed notion of the past but rather a continuous 
engagement with loss and its remains. This engagement generates sites for memory and 
history, for the rewriting of the past as well as the reimagining of the future. While mourning 
abandons lost objects by laying their histories to rest, melancholia‟s continued and open 
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relationship to the past finally allows us to gain new perspectives on and new understandings 
of lost objects.
46
 
 Eng and Kazanjian suggest that, 
while the twentieth century resounds with catastrophic losses of bodies, spaces, and ideals, 
psychic and material practices of loss and its remains are productive for history and for 
politics. Avowals of and attachments to loss can produce a world of remains as a world of 
new representations and alternative meanings.
47
 
For Tammy Clewell this refusal to heal sustains “bereaved memory for the work of 
establishing new constellations for identity and culture”.48 Thus, by rejecting notions of 
successful or completed mourning, that mourning and the work of grief is the sole domain of 
the psyche rather than socially shared rituals it becomes clear that nations are 
melancholically, creatively, and continuously confronting loss as a way to critically engage 
with the past in order to create new meanings in the present. 
 
Dead Body Politics 
Schor argues that mourning is a force “that constitutes communities and makes it possible to 
conceptualise history.”49 Schor continues,  
As we approach the millennium,
50
 our century continues to afford us cautionary reminders 
that we need the dead to be fully human: by the Holocaust deniers, on the one hand, and by 
the tenaciously political mourners of AIDS victims, on the other, we are reminded that both 
forgetting and remembering the dead have enormous consequences for the present and the 
future of our world. Even as we give life to the dead, the dead shape the lives we are able to 
live.
51
   
The implication here indicates that the socio-political meanings assigned to dead in the 
present shape the moral expectations of the living. The many traumatic social and political 
events of the twentieth century have led to reflections on the rupture of social ties amongst 
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large groups and the processes of collective mourning related to them. Drawing on 
psychoanalytic theories of mourning it will become clear that changing trends in private 
mourning influence how this is institutionalised in public displays of mourning. The death of 
Princess Charlotte that is referred to at the outset of this chapter is a fitting point of departure 
for a discussion of mourning women in the public sphere which is at the centre of this 
thesis.
52
 The subsequent examination of the death and public mourning of the political figure 
of Eva Perón and Princess Diana will also indicate that the general increase in the 
privatisation of death, mourning, and funerals since and throughout the twentieth century 
have made public mourning more restrained with a public being at odds with genuinely 
mourning a figure with whom they had no real personal relationship. Schor, in Bearing the 
Dead, focuses extensively on the death of Princess Charlotte as an example of the „British 
Culture of Mourning‟ during the 1800s. Not only does this serve as an exclusively British 
example but the public mourning of a popular female political figure that Schor describes is a 
practice that finds resonance, albeit with many differences, in South African nationalisms in 
the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and indeed, in many other nations.  
           When Princess Charlotte died in childbirth on 6 November, 1817, the British nation 
mourned her passing. Within two weeks of her death nearly 200 documents were published 
that captured the „nation‟s sorrow‟. Memorial services were held across the nation and on the 
day of her funeral on 19 November 1817, all commercial activity was halted. The funeral was 
an aggressively marketed event with tickets being sold for the aisle at St. George‟s Chapel in 
Windsor, and exorbitant prices were charged at inns along the procession route. Despite her 
death being described as being „above politics‟, two distinct narratives emerged. The first was 
the clear monarchical crisis. Issues of legitimacy amongst the siblings of the Prince Regent 
meant that with the death of Princess Charlotte and her child, the crown could possibly fall 
into the hands of a foreign ruler. Contemporary issues such as the “pressure for reform, 
workers‟ uprisings, Dissenters‟ liberties, the emerging distinction between masculine and 
feminine „spheres‟, the role of women in the home and society at large, and the character and 
function of the royal family”53 were communicated within the documents published after her 
death expressing the nation‟s sorrow. These documents would also emphasise the Princess‟ 
domestic and feminine virtues, her benevolence, sense, her sweetness, and describe her 
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marriage to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg as the “very model of domestic harmony.”54 
Schor argues that the national mourning for Princess Charlotte was manifest in a paradoxical 
politics when she states that “these documents conscript the Princess in death for the 
marshalling of a national moral consensus that would conceal fissures in the body politic.”55 
On the other hand, the death of the Princess becomes inscribed with a revision of the 
patriarchal family “in accordance with the emerging middle-class meaning of „family‟ – a 
group of contemporaneous individuals related by blood or marriage residing within a 
household, usually under a male head.”56 Simultaneously, pamphlets criticising the female 
relatives of Princess Charlotte for not attending her on the childbed or on her deathbed served 
to alert women “that if the family is to be the moral guardian of society at large, it is for them 
to be the moral guardians of the family.”57 Thus the moral and domestic roles of women in 
British society were entrenched through discussions of the Princess‟ „betrayal‟ by female 
relatives through their equation of femininity, domesticity, and morality and by “reviving the 
sentimental precept that private affections are constitutive of public morality and national 
character.”58 Not only does the private become public in the context of morality, in the case 
of the Princess‟ death, private mourning became constitutive of public displays of mourning. 
Thomas Beck indicates this in his elegy,  
Now should a Nations Sorrows flow! 
For lo! Tremendous cause appears, 
When public grief and private woe,  
Combine to ask a people‟s tears.59 
This simplistic conflation of the public and private is, of course, problematic. However, the 
poetic nature of such writings lends them to oversimplification and this very conflation of 
public and private mourning is evident in the rhetoric issued at many state funerals. Returning 
to Shelley‟s address quoted at the head of this chapter, Shelley also asserts that public and 
private mourning differ only in degree, not in kind. For Shelley, then, public affections are a 
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critical aggregate of private sympathies: public mourning is merely the “public erection of 
signs of private sympathies that indicate the „the sorrow and indignation which fill[s] all 
hearts.‟”60 Thus, rather poetically expressed, the private (mourning for a famous figure) is 
public, and indeed, in the case of mourning an object of public love and admiration, political. 
           Argentina stands out as a case study in several central texts on mourning and indicates 
what Antonius C. G. M. Robben has labelled “the Argentine political obsession with corpses 
and spirits”61 that has continued into the twentieth century. Eva Perón, affectionately known 
in Argentina as „Evita‟, was one of the most charismatic and prominent figures of twentieth 
century Argentine politics and is a more recent and prominent case of a female political 
figure becoming a nationalist icon after her death. The national obsession with her corpse 
after her death in 1952 indicates the political power that remains might wield by those who 
lay claim to them. Perón became influential serving as Argentina‟s First Lady from 1946 
until her death in 1952.
62
 She was represented as the embodiment of the Argentine feminine 
ideal
63
 and her involvement in charity left a legacy of newly built schools, hospitals, homes, 
and a community named Ciudad Evita (Evita City) through an amalgamation of city planning 
and personality cult. This charity work resulted in Perón gaining a fierce devotion from the 
general population.
64
 Perón fought for women‟s suffrage and established the Female Perónist 
Party which had great influence in her husband, Juan Perón, winning the 1951 elections and 
nearly led to Perón taking the Vice-Presidency. Her popularity led to her being awarded the 
title „Spiritual Leader of the Nation‟ which she received shortly after Juan Perón‟s 
inauguration. Although Eva Perón was admired in life, her status as a national heroine was 
confirmed after her death of cancer in 1952.
65
 Her body was embalmed by Spanish physician 
Pedro Ara, she was granted a state funeral, and in the space of two weeks an estimated 65 000 
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mourners passed by her body in state.
66
 A grand monument was planned where her body 
would eventually be stored. This commodification and glorification of Perón‟s body has been 
interpreted as the Perón government sentimentalising Eva Perón‟s death in an attempt to 
secure their support base amongst the general public.
67
 However, after the successful 1955 
military coup d‟état the cult of Evita and the glorification of Perón came to an end. Their 
names were removed from all public buildings, squares, and streets and Eva Perón‟s 
embalmed body was removed from the trade union headquarters where it had been kept since 
her state funeral in anticipation of the completion of the monument that would be her final 
resting place.
68
 After the removal from public display, Perón‟s body underwent a journey that 
is both strange and phantasmagorical. Several sources claim that the embalmed body was 
shipped out of Argentina in 1957 by the right-wing military junta led by General Aramburu 
that took power after the overthrow of Juan Perón with a number of identical coffins 
containing wax sculptures of Perón being sent to different destinations to ensure that the real 
location of her body would remain concealed. The fictional account of Eva Perón‟s life, 
Santa Evita by Eloy Martinez, ascribes to Colonel Moore King, who was in charge of 
removing Perón‟s body, the following pertinent lines: 
You know very well what is at stake...It is not the cadaver of that woman but the destiny of 
Argentina. Or both, which to many people seems the same. Look how the dead and useless 
body of Eva Duarte has become confused with the country... [By] embalming it, you moved 
history from its place. You left history inside. You realise that whoever has this woman, has 
the country in its fist?
69
 
This is a fictional account of a conversation between Perón‟s body and the Colonel, but the 
removal of the embalmed body to a secret location by the new, and somewhat unstable, 
administration indicates the political power that her remains were believed to have held and 
the “survival after death of political ideals evoked by the presence of human remains.”70 
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           In 1970 a Montoneros commando force kidnapped and executed General Aramburu 
who had been responsible for the 1955 coup. Amongst the list of charges against him were 
the disappearance and profanation of Eva Perón‟s body.71 Documents surfaced that placed 
Eva Perón‟s remains in a cemetery in Milan where they had secretly been buried. Her body 
was flown to Buenos Aires for examination and authentication, and then returned to Juan 
Perón who was living in exile in Madrid. The embalmed body remained in his house for 
several years where, apparently, his third wife would lay atop Eva Perón‟s coffin in order to 
receive her spiritual energy.
72
 When Juan Perón returned to Argentina to head up the new 
government in 1973, Eva Perón‟s body remained in Madrid. When Juan Perón died in 1974 
his wife, Maria Estella Martinez de Perón, took over as president of Argentina. Shortly after 
Juan Perón‟s death a Montoneros task force abducted the body of General Aramburu as 
ransom for Eva Perón‟s embalmed corpse. Maria Perón repatriated the body of Eva Perón 
and placed her next to the embalmed body of her husband at the presidential residence. 
Eventually, after the 1974 military take-over in 1976, Eva Perón‟s body was given to her 
sisters to be reburied in the family tomb. 
 
           The political power of Eva Perón‟s embalmed remains attests to the political 
ideologies that have been assigned to her in life and after death. However, the silence of her 
remains makes them available to overt political manipulation by those who lay claim to them 
or claim to be stakeholders of her legacy. The consequent mythologising of Perón‟s life and 
legacy has ensured that Eva Perón lives on as a mythological figure in global popular culture 
and heritage tourism in Argentina which is propagated by her continued representation in 
literature, on stage, and in film.
73
 
 
           The employment of the public, dead, female body and the processes of public 
mourning for socio-political rhetoric are not uncommon. Instead, this is a practice that is 
intrinsically linked to the gendered language of nationalism. The death of Princess Charlotte 
became a national tragedy and all those who bore witness, despite political divisions, 
constituted a national audience which consumed pamphlets, newspapers and documents 
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reporting and lamenting her death. Similarly the deaths, and indeed, lives, of public women 
such as Eva Perón, Eleanor Roosevelt, Frida Kahlo, Indira Gandhi and Princess Diana 
became events around which discourses of femininity, family, and nationalism were assessed 
and entrenched. Their public status, or celebrity as in the case of Princess Diana, is what 
allows for their deaths to result in public mourning, even if that public has only experienced 
them as remote public figures. Adam Smith‟s theory of sympathy shows that this is a 
phenomenon of identification with a remote public figure: 
 
We cannot truly grieve for every one who dies beyond the circle of those especially dear to 
us; yet in the extinction of the objects of public love and admiration and gratitude, there is 
something, if we enjoy a liberal mind, which has departed from within that circle.
74
 
Writing in 1759, Smith‟s words find even greater application in the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries and the ubiquitous nature of the media in all its forms and the phenomenon of what 
has been termed „celebrity culture‟. The access that the media allows the general public into 
the lives of public figures allows for the sympathetic identification of these public figures as 
familiars. According to Smith, sympathy results from our tendency to imagine ourselves in 
the place of the suffering. When a public figure dies the identification that takes place is, 
according to Schor, a second-order sympathetic identification: “This phenomenon calls forth 
intense affections for remote figures, even to the point where our sympathy rivals the „true 
grief‟ we bear”75 for those dear to us. Schor continues to show that, according to Shelley‟s 
theory of „celebrity‟, public mourning is “simply mourning for the imaginary, intimately 
known simulacrum of a public figure.”76 Thus, the imagined relationship with the public 
figure allows individuals to sympathise with their passing and this mourning is then enacted 
in the public space through the rituals associated with public mourning. Verdery indicates 
that it is when the genealogies of the famous dead have been successfully integrated into the 
national imagery, citizens, in some way, can view them as „ours‟.77 It is important to note that 
these feelings of mourning and sympathy for important public figures are not shared by all 
members of the public and that the phrase „a nation in mourning‟ constitutes a myth of 
mourning often perpetuated by the media and politicians. James Thomas, in his study of the 
public mourning of Princess Diana, illustrates this point that despite the intense media focus 
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on those individuals of the general public in deep mourning for the Princess, many of the 
British public felt very little for her at the time of her death and were sceptical about her 
sudden sanctification.
78
 Thomas illustrates that despite the privatisation of death, at the 
occurrence of a high profile death,  
 
older and conflicting traditions of communal mourning quickly and spontaneously re-emerge. 
In other words, death temporarily becomes renationalised and everyone is expected to mourn 
regardless of whether they feel personal loss.
79
    
 
Despite this, the myth of a nation in mourning persisted as negative reactions to Princess 
Diana‟s death were sidelined in the media and often deemed deviant echoing perceptions as 
outlined by Shelley that “To lament for those who have benefited the state is a habit of piety 
yet more favourable to the cultivation of our best affections.”80 Thus, despite the increasing 
modern perception that only those close to the dead are entitled to genuine grief there appears 
to remain a societal expectation that it is necessary to mourn the passing of a prominent 
public figure. For the purposes of this thesis then, it becomes important to note that in a 
country as culturally and ethnically diverse as South Africa, a nation in mourning is indeed a 
myth, that although some genuinely mourn, and the expectation to mourn or to express 
sympathy exists there is no actual nation in mourning. This myth is constructed „from above‟ 
in order to build the image of a united nation in mourning. That it is the „nation‟ that has lost 
something in the death of an important public and – often in the case of post-apartheid South 
Africa – political figure.  
 
           The five women who will be discussed in the following chapters were hardly 
celebrities in the modern sense of the word. However, in post-apartheid South Africa they 
occupy a special place in the socio-political and cultural spheres. Their names are familiar 
through their presence in the public sphere, their lives frequently honoured by politicians and 
the media, and their deeds taught at schools and universities. This has allowed South Africans 
some form of social „relationship‟ with these figures, an intimacy at a distance, a knowledge 
of who they were and what they „were like‟.81 When these women are mourned or 
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remembered by the South African nation – as an imagined community82 – the political 
rhetoric that is indulged in by government and prominent stakeholders shapes public memory 
of these women in a manner that not only legitimises the current political dispensation but 
also mythologises their legacies (as happened with Princess Charlotte and Eva Perón). This 
places these women firmly in a new post-apartheid foundational mythology that is typically 
based on the years of the struggle against apartheid but can also reach back to resistance to 
the early colonisation of southern Africa. This is not to say that their deaths, funerals, or 
commemorations are simply media or political events – each of these women were real 
individuals who led lives that impacted the future of their country. But what this thesis will 
suggest is that their public mourning and remembering has been primarily mediated by 
political rhetoric that has shaped their legacies to suit current political ideologies.     
 
Burial and Memorials to the Dead 
The physical remains of the dead occupy a sacred space in most societies,
83
 whether this is 
informed by respect for the dead or fear of retribution if the remains are not subjected to the 
proper rituals of passing. The remains of the named and famous dead are exposed to a burial 
politics that determine their place in that particular society. In countries that are undergoing 
dramatic (and often violent) political and regime changes the historic dead and newly dead 
that are honoured in the present come to form part of a new pantheon of heroes and heroines 
that inform a new foundational mythology for the state. The famous political dead of the 
previous regime are cast aside, forgotten, and neglected – or in worst case scenarios defiled – 
while the new heroes and heroines are buried, re-buried, or commemorated. This section will 
briefly address the symbolic importance of the funeral
84
 and also the significance of the 
material culture of death in the form of graves and memorials. This will apply to the 
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following chapters in a multitude of ways as each case study will examine a unique politics of 
burial and symbolic meaning production around the named and famous dead.  
           The political and symbolic efficacy of famous corpses lies in their tangible nature, 
their „thereness‟. But dead bodies also speak to feelings of a common humanity that include 
meanings, emotions, the notion of what is sacred, and they have the ability to establish a new 
moral order when their lives and actions are remembered and honoured in the public sphere. 
This discussion about the symbolic and political salience of dead bodies will be informed by 
Verdery‟s work as one of the most comprehensive studies of dead body politics. Verdery 
shows that,  
Bones and corpses, coffins and cremation urns, are material objects. Most of the time, they 
are indisputably there, as our senses of sight, touch, and smell can confirm. As such, a body‟s 
materiality can be critical to its symbolic efficacy: unlike notions such as “patriotism” or 
“civil society”, for instance, a corpse can be moved around, displayed, and strategically 
located in specific places. Bodies have the advantage of concreteness that nonetheless 
transcends time, making past immediately present.
85
 
The physical remains of the dead, then, render the past present through their materiality. 
When these remains are inscribed with particular meanings captured in ideologically-loaded 
phrases such as „freedom fighter‟, „mother of the nation‟, „national heroine‟, and „rainbow 
nationalism‟, as is often the case in South Africa, they become the physical markers of such 
ideologies. It states that in this grave, at this memorial, these ideologies are present and real – 
and due to the public nature of these spaces they become the moral order of the nation. In this 
way dead bodies become, what Verdery has termed, “symbolic vehicles”.86 They carry the 
meanings and symbolisms that the living have assigned to them. However, the concreteness 
of dead bodies, their actual presence, comes to mean less than the ideologies they 
symbolise.
87
 The dead are silent; they are what the living make of them by the way their lives 
and living words have been interpreted. Words can be spoken for them, or their own words 
rendered ambiguous by quoting them out of context. Their histories can be rewritten and 
reinterpreted to suit a variety of political agendas. This leads Verdery to conclude that it is 
“easier to rewrite history with dead people than with other kinds of symbols that are 
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speechless.”88 It is not unusual for one dead body to be assigned a variety of meanings. For 
Verdery remains are concrete, yet protean; they are open to a variety of readings.
89
 What 
makes dead bodies symbolically effective for Verdery is their “ambiguity, multivocality, or 
polysemy.”90 It is worth quoting Verdery at length here: 
Because corpses suggest the lived lives of complex human beings, they can be evaluated from 
many angles and assigned perhaps contradictory virtues, vices, and intentions. While alive, 
these bodies produced complex behaviours subject to much debate that produces further 
ambiguity. As with all human beings, one‟s assessment of them depends on one‟s disposition, 
the context one places them in (brave or cowardly compared with whom, for instance), the 
selection one makes from their behaviours in order to outline their „story‟, and so on. Dead 
people come with a curriculum vitae or résumé – several possible résumés, depending on 
which aspect of their life is being considered. They lend themselves to analogy with other 
people‟s résumés. That is, they encourage identification with their life story, from several 
different vantage points.
91
 
It becomes clear that dead bodies, and especially those of the famous dead, are powerful tools 
for political symbolism which is employed in nation building, especially at times of political 
upheaval or transitions. When these meanings are constructed through political rhetoric and 
become part of the hegemonic power structures their subaltern meanings are sidelined and 
often disregarded in political ideology production. However, this multiplicity of meanings is 
undermined by the singularity of the body. The famous dead have only one name and one 
body and for Verdery this creates the illusion that the bodies have only a single meaning and 
that they hold the same meaning for all present.
92
 This would assign to the dead a single 
meaning for the living. Despite this, it is the very ability of dead bodies to evoke a variety of 
understandings that allows them their effectiveness as political symbols or even as symbolic 
capital to be used for political profit.
93
 
           The remains of the political dead are the main focus of this thesis. But one cannot 
separate these bodies and the meanings inscribed on their remains from their funerals or 
commemorations as this becomes the space where political rhetoric is publically enacted. The 
ritualised mourning practices enacted at funerals have been extensively researched by 
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anthropologists, encompassing many different cultures. However, this thesis is not concerned 
with the different cultural manifestations of mourning but rather how mourning has been 
enacted in the public space in post-apartheid South Africa. Despite this, the contribution of 
anthropological research to theories of mourning cannot be disregarded. After all, while 
Freud studied mourning as an individual task, Santner importantly states that,  
Mourning, if it is not to become entrapped in the desperate inertia of a double bind, if it is to 
become integrated into a history, must be witnessed. To repeat an earlier formulation, 
mourning without solidarity is the beginning of madness.
94
  
Darian Leader also indicates that “every documented human society gives a central place to 
public mourning rituals”95 and that, after all, “mourning...requires other people.”96Although 
each of these societies differs in rituals of mourning and burial, in a general sense, in every 
society there is an obligation to mourn and to ensure that correct funerary practices are 
observed.
97
 According to Robben “...death evokes moral and social obligations [that are] 
expressed in culturally determined funeral practices.”98 Robben asserts that “[m]ourning is 
not a spontaneous emotion but a collective obligation manifested in appeasement rites.”99 
Thus, it is essential that mourning and funerals are considered as important societal practices 
that “provide a focus for collective, participative behaviour.”100 These practices, or rituals, 
take place at burial and funerary rites and at shrines and memorials to the deceased. For the 
purposes of this thesis it is essential to consider the practices that accompany the burials and 
commemorations of iconic women as societal obligations that are moulded by the political 
ideologies of the post-apartheid state.  
           Although funeral rituals differ across different cultures they share certain aspects. As 
this thesis cannot possibly give an account of all funerary practices enacted by different 
cultures across the world it is important to point out the general aspects that many of these 
rituals share which is of importance for discussions in later chapters. The central purpose of 
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the funeral is to signify the event of a death. It is worth quoting Grainger at length here on his 
analysis of the symbolic purpose of the funeral ritual,  
The reality of death, both the actual death of the person who has died and the reactive trauma 
of the people who are bereaved, is symbolised in a ritual enactment which aims at its own 
kind of completeness. In the funeral, death and its concomitant states of mind (for the 
bereaved) and of being (for the dead person) are symbolised, not reproduced. The relationship 
between the funeral and the work of grieving is one of contiguity rather than congruity; the 
funeral‟s purpose is to institute the work of grieving not to contain or complete it. Its 
comprehensiveness in its most typical form is the comprehensiveness that all funerals aspire 
to...a symbolic comprehensiveness, the basic and irreducible iconography of essential change, 
which must first of all be asserted ideationally before it can be ratified existentially.
101
  
The funerary rite is the rite of final passage; it is the symbolic chasm that makes death final 
and real; it separates the dead from the living in a leave-taking ceremony that is a ritual 
performance of a social nature. Ilana Harlow indicates that,  
The presence of a corpse at funerary rites is necessary not only for the psychological purpose 
of making death real to the bereaved, but it is also necessary for transition rites to be 
performed, for the dead to be incorporated into the hereafter. Without a body, there are no 
funerals, only memorial services.
102
  
The organised mourning enacted at funerals insists that the death has occurred and that this 
must be accepted. John Hinton indicates the value of the traditional funeral practices in 
establishing the reality of death: 
Viewing the body and taking part in the funeral emphasise beyond all doubt that the person is 
really dead. The condolences, the discussion of the deceased in the past tense, the newspaper 
announcements, the public recognition of the dead, all affirm the loss.
103
 
Grainger adds that even more than the grave monument “the funeral says clearly and finally, 
„it is finished. Here he lies. Make no mistake; he is dead.‟”104 Thus, the central purpose of the 
funeral is to recognise that the formerly living are now dead. Not only does this change the 
state of being of the deceased, it also transforms the structural position of survivors.
105
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Anthropologists define the funerary ritual as an event that “makes change” and “moves 
participants, emotionally, ideologically and structurally.”106 These changes are – in the case 
of the public funeral – dependant on the collective nature of the funeral ritual. Émile 
Durkheim, who has had a lasting influence on our understanding of the anthropology of 
death, emphasised “that the individual grief experienced at the death of another human being 
is expressed collectively in culturally prescribed ways of mourning.”107 The funeral is never 
completely private for those who were close to the deceased, it is a collective ritual and is 
always enacted in a socially, and culturally, prescribed manner. For Grainger,  
[t]he funeral is the celebration of a lived life, a completed gesture... It takes all the gesture and 
movements of the past and projects them into a final statement, a statement about finality in 
which it somehow manages to find hope.
108
 
The funeral, then, becomes the symbolic leave-taking ceremony; the rite where a life is 
celebrated and remembered. In the case of the modern public or state funeral this 
remembrance is enacted by stakeholders and reaches a wider audience through the use of 
television, radio, print, and electronic media. These funerals often become sites where 
strategies, conflicts, and struggles for control are subtly or overtly expressed, yet the public 
funeral also has the ability to address and overcome cleavages in society. The multiplicity of 
agendas around official public funerals will be addressed in later chapters where the political 
rhetoric issued at these events is analysed but it is of importance to illustrate how the 
ritualistic nature of the funeral allows for these contending forces to take shape. Funeral ritual 
is often shaped and informed by religious rituals and anthropologists have drawn attention to 
the  
unifying force of religious ritual, whereby the rite becomes a language capable of expressing 
opposing ideas and accommodating differences and contradictions within the framework of a 
comprehensive codification of experience.
109
 
Thus, the religious funeral ritual can actively promote harmony and does not necessarily 
express an existing unity. This will become increasingly clear when the public funeral in 
post-apartheid South Africa is discussed in the following chapters as these funerals are 
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always accompanied by religious ceremony in conjunction with a political rhetoric that 
promotes nationhood.  
           Once the funeral and burial has been completed the dead are not cast aside or 
forgotten. Instead a wealth of material culture around the deceased is created. Shrines and 
memorials to the dead are erected – whether they are tombstones, shrines, or mausoleums – 
marking their place and remembering their presence. According to Grainger, “[i]n some 
shape or form there is almost always a tangible memorial to the dead.”110 Returning to 
Volkan‟s theory these memorials to the dead become repositories for memory, a place to 
return to and remember the lives of the deceased, the meanings assigned to those lives and 
their presence in the past and their loss and absence in the present thus transforming them 
into sites of ritual. These memorials can hold a wealth of memories; memories both 
personally experienced and politically shaped. Elizabeth Hallam and Jenny Hocky, in their 
study on death, memory, and material culture trace,  
[the] connections between the crises of death and the formation of memory, the relationships 
between loss and recovery, how memories operate to render present that which is absent and 
here we find concepts of death and memory intimately bound together. Indeed, we witness 
death acting as a deep incentive to remember and the process of dying can give license to 
intense phases of memory making with all of its attendant material complexity – from the 
disposal of the corpse to the repeated act of returning to the graveside with flowers.
111
  
Hallam and Hocky clearly illustrate the significant relationship between death and memory, 
and subsequently, as this discussion will seek to show below, the connections between 
memorials and memory creation for political ideals.  
           The graves and the memorials erected to the dead function as shrines where people can 
pay their respects to the person that has been lost. When a public figure is being remembered 
or mourned these sites become public spaces. Referring to the appearance of public shrines to 
commemorate the victims of the 9/11 attacks on the US, Harlow indicates that,   
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The public shrines were designated places where people who would not officially be 
considered mourners but who were experiencing feelings of sorrow and loss could define 
themselves as mourners.
112
 
This allows those who were not personally affected by loss to share in the sorrows of a 
traumatic event that shocked the country. This can then also be applied to the 
commemoration of the deceased public figure. Their graves and the memorials erected to 
them become places where those not immediately or personally affected by their passing can 
still define themselves as mourners, or simply show the understanding that, indeed, they feel 
and understand that something has been lost by the nation in that death. Heilman, in his work 
on the 9/11 attacks, states that, 
While the bereaved always feel vulnerable, when those lost have been particularly powerful 
in life or figures of collective or symbolic significance, the vulnerability among the bereaved 
is especially acute. The need then for the memorials or funerals to resolve these feelings of 
helplessness becomes magnified.
113
 
While this vulnerability might not be as intensely acute in cases of natural death, memorials 
and funerals allow the nation to have a material site where such feelings may be confronted 
and where the loss of a famous public figure and their symbolic significance to the nation to 
can be mourned. Hallam and Hockey refer to these physical memorials to the dead as the 
material culture of death. They show that this material culture,  
mediates our relationship with death and the dead; objects, images and practices, as well as 
places and spaces, call to mind or are made to remind us of the deaths of others and of our 
own mortality.
114
  
Placing emphasis on the material culture that encompasses places and spaces, Harlow 
continues to apply Durkheim‟s theories to these public shrines:  
Although they were sites of ritual, their character was „eminently social‟, as Émile Durkheim 
might have phrased it.  Even though (or perhaps specifically because) they were venues for 
the simultaneous display of a range of spiritual and political sentiments, the shrines 
symbolised a sense of „us-ness.‟ As Durkheim has noted, “An emblem is useful as a rallying 
point for any sort of group by expressing social unity in material form; thus making it more 
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obvious to all...The emblem is not merely a convenient process for clarifying the sentiment 
society has of itself: it also serves to create this sentiment.”115  
Although Harlow‟s discussion applies to a country experiencing loss due to a traumatic event 
it becomes important to note that on certain anniversaries of such events, or occasions where 
such events are remembered, this sense of „us-ness‟ that Harlow refers to is re-enacted and re-
enforced. In the case of shared trauma the remembrance thereof becomes politicised. The 
remembrance of victims of colonial exploitation or women who sacrificed their freedom for 
the struggle in South Africa and their graves and memorials similarly contain this political 
power to create the image of a unified South African nation, despite a very recent traumatic 
and divisive past. As Heilman shows,  
Visiting them is a way to demonstrate that while life goes on, they are not forgotten. Indeed, 
in some ways those memorial places give them a life greater than they had when they were 
still among the living. As Henry David Thoreau long ago noted: “Who is most dead – a hero 
by whose monument you stand, or his descendants of whom you have never heard?”116 
The sites associated with the lives of such women become the very rallying points and 
emblems that Durkheim refers to; they have the ability to create and entrench the official 
scripts of the moral sentiments of the „new‟ South Africa. 
           Returning to Grainger‟s reference to finding hope in the ritual of the funeral, it is 
implied that this hope lies in the restoration of a relationship with the dead. Although this 
relationship between the dead and the living must be inherently different to a relationship 
between living individuals, it does not mean that this relationship is not possible. The living, 
or those that are „left behind‟ after the passing of a loved one, can benefit from this ongoing 
relationship to – but not with – the dead.117 As has been pointed out in the introduction to this 
chapter, this thesis considers mourning as a discourse amongst the living with the past being 
an active „player‟ in the present. Consequently, the dead and their lived experiences become 
part of the present and a discourse amongst the living. This is especially true when applied to 
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case studies of the dead who, in life, have somehow contributed to, or are represented as 
having contributed to the body politic for the „greater good‟. The imagined relationship that 
the living maintain with these public figures is animated by the politicisation of their remains 
and legacies but it continues to be the living who shape, apply, and either benefit or are 
disadvantaged by these discourses.  
           Verdery‟s work on the political lives of dead bodies in post-socialist Eastern Europe 
finds great resonance with how those political dead that have been assigned new meanings in 
the present re-enter the socio-political arena in post-apartheid South Africa, where dead 
bodies become inscribed with new national identities and shape a new foundational 
mythology for the „nation‟. 118 Verdery‟s study focuses on the manipulation of politicised 
corpses in the post-socialist era and how this manipulation shapes how the past is assessed 
and remembered in the present.
119
 This not only speaks to ideals of re-imagining the nation 
but also to shaping identities and borders – especially in the former Eastern Bloc countries. 
The dynamic relationship that exists between the meanings inscribed on dead bodies by 
political stakeholders and the dead bodies which they employ attests to the silence of the dead 
but yet indicates how present they are in contemporary politics. As a result the politics of 
mourning and remembering the political dead becomes a powerful means of producing 
foundational mythologies for new regimes attempting to legitimise their rule.  
  
Establishing Nationalist Mythologies: The Politics of Mourning 
This section will bring together all the elements of public, politicised mourning discussed 
above and illustrate how they operate together to form new foundational mythologies that are 
nationalistically inclined. Before embarking on this particular discussion it is important to 
explore the relationships that exist between myths and nationalism in order to better 
comprehend how the myths created around and on dead political women shape new 
foundational mythologies. Few concrete examples for such an exploration exist and this 
particular discussion is only meant to provide a general theoretical basis for the following 
chapters which focus on the post-apartheid state as a relatively new democracy and where 
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such case studies are recent and incredibly dynamic. Thus, this particular section will provide 
a general overview of foundational mythology creation and its role in establishing nationalist 
ideologies before it is applied comprehensively and uniquely first to South Africa in general, 
and then to each case study in particular in the following chapters. It will not attempt to give 
an overview of the historiography of nationalist studies or the many different approaches to 
understanding nationalism in practice. Rather, it will focus on the theories of nationalism that 
this thesis borrows insights from and will apply in further discussions to a country that seems 
to have an exception for every „rule‟.120            
          To effectively define the term „nation‟ has proven to be distinctly complex. Hobsbawm 
has grappled with this issue of definition in his important work, Nations and Nationalism 
Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.
121
 This thesis will apply Hobsbawm‟s premise that a 
student of nationalism needs to be agnostic in his/her approach, implying no a priori 
definition of what constitutes a nation.
122
 For Hobsbawm, the objective attempts to establish 
criteria for nationhood such as common language, common territory, or common history have 
failed as “language, ethnicity, or whatever – are themselves fuzzy, shifting and 
ambiguous...”123 It is this ambiguity that makes these traits convenient for employment by 
nationalists. Subjective attempts at definition would imply that a nation exists where people 
consciously identify themselves as part of a nation. However, Hobsbawm sees this attempt at 
definition as insensibly to subordinate “the complex ways in which human beings define and 
redefine themselves as members of groups, to a single option: the choice of belonging to 
„nation‟ or „nationality‟.”124 In countries such as South Africa such a definition would 
certainly fall short due to the multitude of identities that people subscribe to. For Hobsbawm 
then, “[t]he „nation‟ as conceived by nationalists can be recognised prospectively; the real 
„nation‟ can only be recognised a posteriori.”125 As South Africa is a country that is still 
experiencing a post-apartheid nationalist movement it would be impossible to clearly define 
the South African „nation‟ at this time. As a result, this thesis will analyse how the „nation‟ is 
being constructed from above and how it is conceived by nationalists.
126
 As Hobsbawm 
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indicates, “...nationalism comes before nations. Nations do not make states and nationalisms 
but the other way around.”127 Thus, it will show that the South African nation exists as a 
concept imagined by nationalists and that indeed, the concept of the „nation‟ is created before 
it exists.  
           It is accepted by most scholars of nationalism that nations are „imagined political 
communities‟.128 This phrase, first employed by Benedict Anderson implies that,  
Nations are created in the historical and sociological imagination, through identification with 
generalised communal heroes set in equally generalised but vividly detailed locations and 
times; though we can never meet them, we can „know‟ our fellow citizens, the members of 
our cultural nations, through these identifications and descriptions in journals, novels, plays, 
and operas.
129
 
This is not to be as anxious as Ernest Gellner in Thought and Change
130
 to illustrate 
nationalism as being false and depending on fabrication for its efficacy when he states that 
“[n]ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where 
they do not exist”,131 but rather to employ Anderson‟s terms of „imagining‟ and „creating‟ the 
nation. This thesis, following Anderson, will consider nationalism mainly as a form of 
discourse. Anderson indicates that nations are imagined as limited, sovereign, and as 
communities. Limited because of its boundaries and its inability and unwillingness to become 
coterminous with all of humankind,
132
 sovereign as most nations dream of being „free‟, and 
imagined as a community “because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that 
may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.”133 
Hobsbawm, in particular, shows how nations and nationalism are the product of historicist 
and literary creations of symbolism mythology and national history, and expands on 
considering the modern nation as a piece of social engineering. Speaking of the „nation‟ and 
its associated nationalism and national symbols, Hobsbawm comments that, “[a]ll these rest 
on exercises in social engineering which are often deliberate and always innovative, if only 
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because historical novelty implies innovation.”134 Smith continues to interpret this 
„imagining‟ and „creating‟ in gastronomic terms,  
...nationalists and their followers have put together the various ingredients of the nation – 
history, symbols, myths, languages....In doing so, they often select elements with diverse 
origins, particularly if, as so often happens in modern societies, the state‟s boundaries include 
various ethnic communities. So, the modern nation is a composite artefact, cobbled together 
from a rich variety of cultural resources.
135
     
Such ingredients will be discussed in chapter 5 with respect to the creation of a South African 
identity on top of the many ethnic identities that exist in South Africa that, historically, have 
been both divided and entrenched through apartheid legislation. Even more so, the current 
South African nationalism encourages „unity in diversity‟, simply inserting an ambiguous 
South African identity
136
 on top of existing ethnic identities. As Smith indicates, national 
identity denotes both a central ideal of the ideology of nationalism, and as an analytical 
concept.
137
 This thesis will, in further chapters, apply Smith‟s working definition for national 
identity as 
the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation of the pattern of values, symbols, memories, 
myths and traditions that compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the identification of 
individuals with that pattern and heritage and with its cultural elements.
138
  
However, to continue with Smith‟s gastronomic analogy, the past three decades have also 
seen the development of a further element in the thinking about nations and nationalism and 
this is the insistence on the imaginative quality of the national community and the fictive 
nature of unifying myths.
139
 Smith asserts that,  
There is a polemical, satirical intent here: to unmask the nation and reveal the power games of 
nationalism. Specifically nationalist instruments of elite manipulation are symbolic: they 
involve the creation of a culture-ideology of community, through a series of emotive symbols 
and myths, communicated by print and the media. But in fact it is ultimately a specious 
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community, one that parades as a collective cure for the modern disease of alienation between 
state and society...
140
  
This might seem a rather cynical approach, yet, in the South African case, rather than 
focusing on unifying myths as being fictitious – although some are – the focus will rather be 
on their reductionist nature. Many of the unifying myths of the post-apartheid state, rather 
than fictitious, are incredibly selective about which histories are remembered and which 
histories will be left out of the official narratives about the past. Rather than adopting a 
hyper-critical stance and „unmasking‟ the fallacies of nationalist movements in post-apartheid 
South Africa this thesis will delineate and explore the foundational myths that are being 
shaped in the present to legitimate the post-apartheid state. 
           Nationalist movements attempt to create nations and legitimise states through the use 
of politicised myths about the past. As this thesis will apply what anthropologists have 
termed a functionalist approach to myth as pioneered by Émile Durkheim,
141
 the narratives of 
myth will be observed as having the function of legitimating social structures when new 
political rule demands justification or sanctity. These myths are not narratives that are in 
opposition to truth; rather they serve as symbolic statements about the social order. Joanna 
Overing indicates that “[m]ythic discourse reminds a community of its own identity through 
the public process of specifying and defining for that community its distinctive social 
norms.”142 Thus, the function of foundational myths is to establish the social and political 
norms for a community which can be deemed especially necessary after periods of swift 
socio-political transition – as was the case in South Africa – while simultaneously 
legitimising the current political dispensation. It is important to note that the use of the term 
„myth‟ can be deemed somewhat judgemental if understood in the commonsensical way as an 
„untruth‟. Despite this, it is often clear when the state employs political structures and public 
events to create the narratives of political legitimisation to establish the new social norms that 
attend a socio-political shift. This is evident in South Africa where the transition from 
minority rule to democracy sees the construction of new narratives of the nation as a work in 
progress. Foundational myths then, reach into the past in order to define the future of the 
nation. Schöpflin states in his study of the function of myths,  
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Every group, every political system, virtually every area of human endeavour has to make a 
start and seeks to mark that by some special act which is accorded mythic qualities. In this 
connection, one is dealing with a moment of novation which is not necessarily as drastic and 
radical as a revolution, but which, it is felt by the participants, deserves special note in order 
to point to the future. The implicit, sometimes explicit, message is that afterwards everything 
will be different („better‟) and that the newly founded system has dispensed with whatever 
made the old reprehensible.
143  
The creation of new foundational mythologies is not restricted to past events in its make up 
but will naturally include persons who have contributed to the existence of the modern 
nation. Such individuals will be inscribed with heroic qualities and possess traits that are 
considered favourable for emulation by their descendants – the inhabitants of the modern 
nation. Smith suggests that,  
...while definitions of grandeur and glory vary, every nationalism requires a touchstone of 
virtue and heroism, to guide and give meaning to the task of regeneration... Heroes provide 
models of virtuous conduct, their deeds of valour inspire faith and courage in their oppressed 
and decadent descendants.
144
 
These heroes or heroines are often deceased – if not entirely mythological – and this allows 
their silence to become a valuable tool for present political rhetoric. Ownership of their 
physical remains – if these are in existence – allows for greater commemorative and 
memorial possibilities which strengthens their nationalist symbolism and ensures their 
entrance into a national pantheon of heroes and heroines that form a central part of any 
nationalist mythology. The repetition of their life stories – as interpreted and edited by 
nationalists – in political rhetoric, electronic and print media, at their funerals and subsequent 
commemorative events ensures that these few selected heroic individuals become part of a 
national pantheon of heroes and heroines and the foundational mythology of the new nation. 
These mythologies of the glorified past are created and serve as a unifying force for the future 
where the modern nation should seek to emulate the morals of the nation‟s heroes and 
heroines. 
           The purpose of this thesis, then, is to show how the mourning of political women in 
post-apartheid South Africa influences the creation of foundational mythologies. The deaths 
of women who in life contributed to the eventual transformation of South Africa from white 
                                                          
143
 G. Schöpflin, “Functions of Myth”, in G. Hosking and G. Schöpflin (eds), Myths and Nationhood, p.29. 
144
 Smith, Myths, p.65. 
78 
 
minority rule to democracy are honoured, their qualities praised and narrated as the societal 
norm in political rhetoric. Kastenbaum shows that,  
[t]here are times when the bereavement and grief of individuals finds clear expression in a 
heterogeneous society... But [when] that death represented part of a national, shared 
cause...collectively they signified a loss felt by the entire nation.
145
 
Thus, being mourned and remembered by the „nation‟ and their legacies narrated through 
political rhetoric, in death these women become part of a national pantheon of heroes and 
heroines around whom the foundational myths of the state are constructed. As shown above 
with the cases of Princess Charlotte and Eva Perón, women‟s bodies are inscribed with 
nationalist narratives and their legacies become an integral part of the foundational 
mythologies that establish societal norms for the new state. The gendered language of 
nationalism ensures that they are defined by their relationship to men and are seen as 
grandmothers, mothers, wives, or daughters of the nation – often depending on their age at 
death and the gendered and reproductive roles they held that these familial and generational 
terms describe.
146
 The generalised terms used in many studies of nationalism suggests that 
nationalism sublimates or subordinates social differences to its dominance: that somehow 
loyalty to the nation overrides all other individual commitments and that national belonging 
is uniform for all who share in it.
147
 The works of Gellner, Anderson, Hobsbawm, and Smith 
contain no sustained analysis of gender issues within nationalist movements. It would be 
irresponsible to assume that all members of a nation – or, in this case, women – relate to 
nationalist sentiments in a uniform manner. More obviously, different groups of women in 
different nations experience nationalism and citizenship in different ways and have different 
levels of access to the economic, political, and social spheres. There is no universal 
experience of nationalism for women. However, what is of importance here is how deceased 
politicised women are subsumed by the gendered nationalist discourses of post-apartheid 
South Africa and how the narratives inscribed on their legacies and remains determine not 
only the social norms and appropriate behaviour for women in South Africa, but due to the 
unifying nature of nationalism, the social norms for all South Africans.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to establish a general theoretical framework that will be applied 
throughout the following chapters. It has drawn on theories of nationalism and discussed the 
ways in which the dead are buried, remembered, and politicised in order to create a solid 
theoretical basis for the discussion of the interaction between the public mourning and 
commemoration of deceased politicised women and foundational mythology creation in post-
apartheid South Africa. This has been achieved, firstly, through a brief analysis of applicable 
psychoanalytical theories of mourning to illustrate the mechanisms of the work of mourning 
both at an individual and societal level. As psychoanalytic theory has had a significant impact 
on the field of mourning it was imperative to show how developments in this field have 
influenced the way historians or scholars of nationalism can apply these theories to case 
studies of societal or public mourning. A brief consideration of theory from Freud to the 
Mitscherlichs and then Volkan has shown how theories of individual mourning have shaped 
theories of public mourning and subsequently led to considering societies with traumatic 
pasts as perennial mourners whose monuments and memorials serve as linking objects, or 
psychological containers (or touchstones),
148
 in which the complex and emotive memories of 
the past are temporarily sealed, but always present and accessible. This then, allows for a 
consideration of the graves and corpses of the famous dead, being part of the material culture 
of death, as linking objects – and potential unifying objects – for the „nation‟.  
           In order to illustrate how the lives, deaths, funerals, legacies, and corpses of deceased 
famous political women inform discourses of gender, femininity, identity, and nation, a brief 
discussion of the case studies of Princess Charlotte and Eva Perón was given. In addition, this 
discussion also raised issues of the public‟s identification with and mourning for well-known 
women with whom they had no real personal relationship and resulted in the conclusion that, 
despite the real sense of loss felt by some for such individuals, the „nation in mourning‟ is a 
myth in itself used to foster a sense of unity, especially in times of social or political unrest, 
or simply to legitimate the existing political dispensation. While the ideologies inscribed on 
these women and their remains and their entrance into a pantheon of heroes and heroines as 
symbols, the actual material culture of death and the symbolic nature of the funeral is what 
strengthens these symbolic meanings. The importance ascribed to the dead in most human 
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societies lends them to sacralisation. More importantly, the famous and political dead are 
particularly viable for use by nationalists and politicians as symbols. Not only do dead bodies 
contain an element of the sacred, they are also tangible, silent, and have a concreteness that 
transcends time.
149
 The funeral, initially, becomes the space in which the dead are recognised 
as lost to the world of the living and to the nation. The grave or memorial becomes the 
marker where ritualised and performative practices can take place – whether these are 
anniversary celebrations or public commemorative events. Here political rhetoric inscribes 
the remains of the lost heroes or heroines with the symbolic meanings that will form part of 
the foundational mythology of the nation that promotes harmony and unity. Essentially, the 
dead, their lives, and imagined legacies are a discourse amongst the living.   
           Having established that the public mourning of politicised corpses in countries 
undergoing socio-political change may lead to the creation of myths about the past a broad 
discussion of the purposes of foundational mythology creation within nationalist movements 
showed that these myths function as legitimating and sanctifying narratives for new political 
dispensations. The political rhetoric articulated at the funerals of the famous political dead is 
echoed in print and electronic media, their life stories and living actions assigned mythic 
moral qualities that serve not only as legitimating narratives for the new political 
dispensation, but also as a moral compass for the members of the nation who are encouraged 
to emulate the positive qualities of the heroic dead. These narratives are consequently 
perpetuated at commemorative events, the names of the famous dead placed on street signs, 
buildings, and public spaces promoting them into a pantheon of national heroes and heroines 
which is an inherent part of any foundational mythology. 
           This, then, is at the core of public mourning. The loss of a person who has contributed 
to the body politic for the greater good is a loss that is – or is constructed as – felt by the 
nation. It is the nation that has lost not just a hero or heroine, but also the ideologies and 
symbolic meanings ascribed to that person. This is what must be mourned by the nation. It is 
the very public „witnessing‟ of this loss that allows for the iconisation, sacralisation, and 
mythification of the famous dead, whether it is through televising their funerals, large public 
commemorations, renaming important public spaces in their honour or, as in the case of many 
deceased South African struggle heroes and heroines, the declaration of their graves as 
National Heritage sites. Shelley recognised the importance of public mourning in 1817 as he 
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showed that public mourning “helps to maintain that connection between one man and 
another, and all men considered as a whole, which is the bond of social life.”150 Whether it is 
a traumatic event that affects a society, or the death or commemoration of one of its most 
important citizens, rituals of public mourning have a significant ability to unify 
heterogeneous, or divided, societies through the inevitable „realisation‟ – or, at times, the 
state sanctioned „realisation‟ and rhetoric asserting that – it is not only the individual that has 
lost something, but indeed, the entire nation.   
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Chapter 3 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Theorising Women and Nation 
 
The notion of what the nation was in its finest hour – when it was most unified, most 
altruistic – will be of a community in which women sacrificed their desires for the 
sake of a male-led collective.
 1
  
- Cynthia Enloe 
 
Introduction 
Motherland, fatherland, „mother of the fatherland‟, mother tongue, homeland, patriotism, 
fraternity, mother of the nation, sons of our soil; the language of nationalism is clearly 
familial and gendered. While most nationalisms assert a shared past and future, building on 
common experiences, women‟s experiences of nationalist movements always differ to how 
men view and experience the „nation‟. Women and men are assigned particular roles in most 
nationalist movements unique to each nation‟s constructions of masculinities and 
femininities,
2
 and each country‟s particular economic, social, and political situation. The 
main focus of this chapter is on the positions and positionings of women in nationalist 
movements. Yuval-Davis illustrates in her seminal work, Gender & Nation, that 
constructions of nationhood involve specific notions of „womanhood‟ and „manhood‟ and 
that it is necessary to analyse „womanhood‟ as a relational category.3 Although the focus will 
not fall on constructions of masculinities in nationalisms it is an essential aspect to consider 
when discussing constructions of „womanhood‟ – even when these two categories are not 
necessarily oppositional. 
           When considering most of the prevailing theorisations about nations and nationalism it 
is apparent that most of these texts have either ignored gender relations or considered them to 
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be irrelevant. This, of course, does not render them extraneous. However, considering the use 
of terms such as „production‟ and „reproduction‟ common to most of these works their 
inability to relate such terms back to women and their positioning within nationalist 
movements, referring instead to intellectuals or state bureaucrats, suggests an inadequate 
conceptualisation of nationalism. For Yuval-Davis this is remarkable as an earlier major 
school of nationalism, known as the primordialists, see in nations a “natural and universal 
phenomenon which is an „automatic‟ extension of kinship relations.”4 Simultaneously, 
scholars of nationalism such as Gellner and Smith stress the importance of intellectuals and 
bureaucrats in re-discovering collective memories and creating and producing new 
foundational mythologies and nationalist ideologies. However, it is not simply the 
intelligentsia and bureaucrats who produce nations; it is women who produce and reproduce 
nations biologically, culturally, and symbolically.
5
 This then leads to the question of why 
women remained „hidden‟ in earlier studies of nationalism. Several explanations may account 
for this. First, women (and the family) have traditionally been considered as occupying the 
private sphere which was not considered politically relevant. Yuval-Davis explains that as 
“nationalism and nations have usually been discussed as part of the public sphere, the 
exclusion of women from that arena has affected their exclusion from that discourse as 
well.”6 Second, Yuval-Davis citing Rebecca Grant, shows the shortcomings of early theorists 
of nationalism with the statement that Grant, 
claims that the foundation theories of both Hobbes and Rousseau portray the transition from 
the imagined state of nature into orderly society exclusively in terms of what they both 
assume to be natural male characteristics – the aggressive nature of men (in Hobbes) and the 
capacity of reason in men (in Rousseau). Women are not part of this process and are therefore 
excluded from the social and remain close to „nature‟. Later theories followed these 
assumptions as given.
7
 
It was not until the late 1980s and early 1990s that feminist scholars began to correct the 
theoretical displacement of women in nationalism studies. The work of scholars such as 
Enloe, Jayawardena, Yuval-Davis and Anthias influenced a change in the previously gender-
blind theorisations of nationalism studies which resulted in an eventual explosion of 
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contextual studies considering the roles and spaces assigned to and inhabited by women in 
nationalist movements.    
           While all nationalisms are contextual and all women experience these movements in 
different ways, it is possible to theorise about the relationship of women and the nation. This 
chapter will first analyse women and gender relations (in a very general sense) in order to 
establish some of the questions about constructions of gender that must be examined within 
the context of the gendered nature of nationalism. Second, continuing the discussion of 
nationalism in the previous chapter, the discussion here will focus on theorising state as 
separate from „nation‟ and „society‟ as the state often plays a crucial role in nationalist 
projects that are inherently linked to gender relations. Third, and most importantly, this 
chapter, informed by the work of Yuval-Davis and Anthias,
8
 will examine the links between 
nation and gender, which Yuval-Davis has captured with the phrase: “Nationed Gender and 
Gendered Nations”.9 In this discussion the five major roles of women in nationalist 
movements, as theorised by Yuval-Davis and Anthias, will be examined. It will look at 
women as biological reproducers of the nation, as symbols and signifiers of difference in 
male-dominated nationalist discourse, as transmitters and producers of cultural narratives, as 
reproducers of the boundaries of the nation, and as active participants in national movements 
through participation in armies, congresses, trade union activism and community 
organisations.
10
 This in turn will frame the discussions in the following two chapters focusing 
on the positionings of women in nationalist movements in South Africa in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. 
 
Analysing Women and Gender Relations 
Yuval-Davis insists that any discussion of the issues around women and nationalism has been 
informed by the three central – but crudely reduced – questions posed by feminist literature. 
First, why/how are women oppressed? This question has been shaped largely by the 
dichotomous constructions of social spheres such as the nature/civilisation and public/private 
domains, theories concerning patriarchy, the sex-gender system, and „gender regimes‟ which 
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determine the power relations between men and women.
11
 The second question, the 
sex/gender debate, concerns the differences between men and women, and whether these 
differences are a result of biological or social factors or a combination of the two which was 
questioned by the rise of postmodernist and poststructuralist frameworks of analysis that 
problematised the basis and the boundaries between the categories of „woman‟ and „man‟. 
The third question “concerns the differences among women and among men and their effects 
upon generalised notions of gender relations”12 which was initially raised by black and ethnic 
minority women and became part of feminist deconstructive postmodernist analyses. By 
briefly addressing these three central questions a discussion about women and nationalism 
can be built. 
           In both the private/public and nature/civilisation dichotomies women are positioned 
opposite to men. While women have generally been identified with the private domain of the 
family and with nature in social sciences literature, men occupied the public and civilised 
domain. According to Grant, the identification of women with nature is not the only cause of 
their exclusion from the public domain, but also why, in most cultures, women are socially 
less valued than men. Simone de Beauvoir argued that “[i]t is not in giving life but in risking 
life that man is raised above the animal: that is why superiority has been accorded in 
humanity not to the sex that brings forth but to that which kills.”13 Simultaneously, while 
women have the ability to create life naturally, men are forced to create culturally. As a result 
of this, women have, traditionally, also been more confined to the domestic sphere to raise 
children. Thus, as humans tend to value their cultural products above natural creations and as 
every culture is aimed at controlling and/or transcending nature, “women end up with an 
inferior symbolic position.”14 However, it is important to note that such generalised 
considerations assume specific western cultural values of „nature‟ being inferior to „culture‟. 
This assumption would detract from the “historically specific ways in which gender relations 
are constructed in different societies and the ways they are produced.”15 In addition to this, 
these generalised theories also do not consider the ways that different members of a society 
value themselves and other genders. Similarly, generalised theories of patriarchy must also be 
critiqued as the diverse forms of social relations must be differentiated as they often do not 
consider the power that women hold over some men and other women in different societies. 
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It is imperative that gender, ethnicity, and class are considered as being intermeshed and it is 
equally important to reject the notion that women‟s oppression can be reduced to biological 
sexual differences. As Yuval-Davis states: 
Contrary to what the notion of patriarchy suggests, women are not usually just passive 
recipients and non-participants in the determination of gender relations. Probably most 
importantly, not all women are oppressed and/or subjugated in the same way or to the same 
extent, even within the same society at any specific moment.
16
 
However, Yuval-Davis does note that this does not suggest that there are no hegemonic social 
discourses and practices within societies that relate “to the organisation of sexual difference 
and biological reproduction and establish forms of representation around these.”17 
Understanding that the social construct of gender, rather than the biological category of sex, 
has led to the sexual division of labour, power, and dispositions is central to feminist politics. 
Judith Butler adds that “when „gender‟ is understood to be constructed by „culture‟ in the 
same way that „sex‟ is constructed by „nature‟, then not biology but culture becomes 
destiny.”18  
           Ann Oakley addressed the cultural constructions of gender in her influential work Sex, 
Gender and Society.
19
 Oakley holds that there is little correlation between biology and gender 
and states: “If gender has a biological source of any kind, the culture makes it invisible.”20 It 
is generally assumed that biology determines gender and therefore the social differences 
assigned to gender. For Oakley gender roles and identities are the result of social stereotypes 
(perpetuated in the media and school textbooks) and parental models. This is established in 
the “mass of associations that have emerged between an individual‟s masculinity or 
femininity and socially determined norms of behaviour, attitude, expectation and role.”21 
However, assumptions about biology still shape women‟s lives – especially in nationalist 
rhetoric. The industrialisation of many societies resulted in the division of work and family, 
where previously, in many pre-industrial societies, work and family were the responsibility of 
all members of the family. The industrial revolution happened at a time where women were 
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often tied to the home as a result of frequent childbearing.
22
 This kept women in the home at 
a time when men were removed from it. Despite improvements in health and technology, 
very little has changed these assumptions about gender roles. Sex is an organising principle 
of social structure in modern society, despite popular belief to the contrary, and it plays a 
great part in determining social roles. Oakley indicates that in societies where this is the case 
the anxiety about even a temporary reversal of sex and gender roles in most acute.
23
 The 
Volksmoeder ideology, one of the building blocks of Afrikaner nationalism in South Africa, 
is one such response to anxiety about the reversal of „traditional‟ gender roles.24 However, 
what is of importance here is that gender clearly precedes sex and that the cultural 
constructions of “the social division of labour...and of meaning...is the very means by which 
sexual differences are constructed (and used) as natural and pre-social.”25 Thus, sexual 
difference or biological reproduction has no necessary social effects and therefore does not 
serve as a material base for gender. Furthermore, Yuval-Davis shows that, 
[g]ender should be understood not as a „real‟ social difference between men and women, but 
as a mode of discourse which relates to groups of subjects whose social roles are defined by 
their sexual/biological difference as opposed to their economic positions or their membership 
in ethnic and racial collectivities.
26
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She argues that that sexual difference should be considered as a mode of discourse, “one in 
which groups of social subjects are defined as having different sexual/biological 
constitutions.”27 Thus, both sex and gender can be analysed as modes of discourse, but with 
different agendas.
28
 The separation between these two discourses is essential; otherwise, as 
Butler has indicated, biology becomes destiny. Considering sexual differences as a mode of 
discourse is not to say that the body is merely a passive mediator of the cultural constructions 
of gender. The body is always sexed and never passive. As Yuval-Davis (following Donna 
Haraway) stresses, the self is always situated.
29
 But this situated knowledge does not only 
relate to gender relations, it also applies to all social relations. Sex (biological or discursive) 
or gender differences do not solely situate the body or the self. Larger, or macro, divisions 
such as class, ethnicity, „race‟, nation, age, and ability all influence where subjective 
identities are situated and they are always situated in relation to others and never confined to 
sex alone. These very distinctions imply that the category „women‟ cannot be a unified 
category unless these differences are suppressed. Denise Riley sees „women‟ as a fluctuating 
identity that has been “historically and discursively constructed always in relation to other 
categories which themselves change.”30 But this does not mean that these changing identities 
are simply proliferated. As Elizabeth Weed argues,  
The lack of reliable positive identity does not mean an endless proliferation of differences. It 
means, rather, that the very categories of difference are displaced and denaturalised through 
the articulation of those categories with the structures of domination in which they were 
historically produced.
31
 
Thus, these historical structures of domination determine which differences are considered to 
be socially and politically relevant.
32
 However, as Yuval-Davis illustrates, one of the most 
important differences amongst women is their membership of ethnic and national 
collectivities and these differences should be understood within structures of domination and 
as articulated by other social relations.
33
 This membership can affect the power relations 
between women in a specific society but also “the extent to which their membership in the 
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collectivity constitutes a „forced identity‟.”34 The concept of the „forced identity‟, a term first 
employed by Amrita Chhachhi,
35
 will become of interest when considering the many ways in 
which nationalisms employ specific images and notions of womanhood and femininity as 
well as the ways in which some women accept, adopt, and endorse these identities while 
others (such as the silent corpses or symbols which are the case studies of this thesis) are 
simply inscribed with these ideologies. 
  
State, Society, and the Family 
Nation and state are seldom, if ever, coterminous. Homogeneous societies are unlikely to 
exist within the boundaries of any modern state while the „nation‟ will often extend beyond 
the boundaries of the state. Every state will have within its boundaries members of different 
societies and ethnicities who might or might not consider themselves to be part of the 
„nation‟. It is the ability of different groups, even within the collectivity considered the 
hegemonic nation, to access the power resources of the state that indicates the separation of 
state and society. As Chapter 2 addressed some theories of nationalism that constitute the 
theoretical basis of this thesis it is not necessary to repeat these here. What this section will 
address is the need to differentiate analytically between state, society, and the family while 
considering them as separate but interrelated social and political spheres.
36
 This is, of course, 
inextricably linked to the questions around what makes a „nation‟ and how nationalist 
projects relate to the state and how the structure of the family influences nationalist 
movements.  
           Treating the state as completely autonomous or, reductively, seeing the state as merely 
serving the interest of certain economic classes (as some Marxist theories hold) results in 
considering it as merely a managerial structure or as dedicated to social control through force, 
coercion, and repression. This issue 
relates both to the boundary between the state and the economy and to that of civil society in 
as much as it leads us to ask who and what social forces construct the political project(s) of 
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the state and in what way or sense it is a neutral vehicle in itself which can be used as an 
instrument by various social forces.
37
   
However, before exploring this significant observation by Anthias and Yuval-Davis, it is 
essential to establish the importance of the state as a meaningful analytical category. The 
category of the state which has been eroded by Foucauldian and postmodernist paradigms 
fails to explain the continued struggles in civil society for access to the state and state power 
“or the extent to which the different positionings of men and women, kinship units and 
various ethnic collectivities...is determined by their differential access to the state.”38 For 
Yuval-Davis,  
[t]heorising the state as a sphere separate from both „the nation‟ and „the civil society‟ is vital 
for any adequate analysis of the relationships between gender relations and national projects, 
in which the state often plays crucial roles.
39
 
Developments in the conceptualisation of the state have broadened out from seeing it as a 
managerial structure or as dedicated to social control.
40
 Three noticeable trends are 
distinguishable. First, the shift has been to focus on the social analyses of the state as 
incorporating a number of different institutions that seemingly appear to be private and/or 
ideological such as schools, church, and the media. Second, in the Marxist tradition, the 
tendency is to focus on the state as the place where the global interests of capital are 
channelled through either capital accumulation, or as the state “co-ordinating the different 
interests and activities of fractions of capital.”41 Third, the Foucauldian and postmodern 
paradigms have rejected the idea of the unitary state and focus on the law, social policies, and 
institutional arrangements “and discourses as heterogeneous elements which are not reducible 
to „the state‟.”42 Although it is clear and accepted that the state is not unitary in its practices, 
intentions, or effects, it is important to retain the concept of the state. Social theorist Max 
Weber defined the state in terms of power. For Weber, the state is “an organisation that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”43 Anthias and Yuval-Davis expand on this and define the state as: 
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A body of institutions which are centrally organised around the intentionality of control with 
a given apparatus of enforcement (juridical and repressive) at its command and basis. 
Coercion and repression are then to be seen both as forms of control and as a back-up. 
Different forms of the state will involve different relationships between the control/coercion 
twin which is the residing characteristic of the state. Using this formulation, the state can 
harness a number of different processes, including ideological ones, through juridical and 
repressive mechanisms at its command.
44
 
Education and the media are the prime institutions for ideology production in the modern 
liberal-democratic state but are not always part of or even owned by the state as such. 
However, states differ in the extent to which their powers are concentrated in local or central 
state governments. Furthermore, states will also differ in their tolerance towards political 
projects that are in conflict with the hegemonic political projects of the state. 
           According to Yuval-Davis, the conflation of the state and civil society, and public and 
private domains allows for only a westocentric reading of states and societies.
45
 It is therefore 
important to differentiate between state institutions, civil society institutions, and the domain 
of family and kinship relations. Civil society “includes those institutions, collectivities, 
groupings and social agencies which lie outside the formal rubric of state parameters outlined 
but which both inform and are informed by them.”46 These may include institutions such as 
schools, the media, and trade unions which produce their own ideological content but can 
also be subjected to those of the state. Civil society may also include voluntary associations 
and the economic market. States differ in the extents to which they tolerate those forms that 
conflict with their own political projects. The domain of the family “includes social, 
economic and political networks and households which are organised around kinship or 
friendship relations.”47 All three domains produce their own ideological content and are 
informed by and inform one another, and have differential access to political and economic 
resources. 
           As was indicated in the previous section where gender relations are discussed, women 
in most Western and westernised societies are traditionally considered to occupy the 
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„private‟,48 or family domain. The nation and the family are closely interlinked. Smith has 
argued that the metaphor of the family is indispensable to nationalism as both evoke “strong 
loyalties and vivid attachments.”49 If the „nation‟ is synonymous with the public sphere, 
political participation and access to public life, women gained membership of the nation in 
different ways and at different times than men. This is relevant to understanding the 
connections between gender and nation and is indicative of the complex links between  
family structures, the private/public spheres, and the relationships of men to women [which 
are] carried over into the structure of the nation-state in ways which continue to be 
determinative.
50
 
According to Day and Thompson, in some respects, nationalism actually foregrounds these 
links. Analysing Mosse‟s work on nationalism and sexuality,51 Day and Thompson describe 
how the emergence of modern bourgeois society sharpened the distinctions between the 
proper realms of male and female activity, linking them to notions of respectability. Women 
were increasingly seen as belonging to the home, while men went into the public sphere 
engaging in politics and business affairs. The growth of strongly masculine fraternity groups, 
„hotbeds‟ of nationalist sentiments, added to the close association between sexuality and 
nationhood. If masculinity was the foundation of the nation, then women were accorded 
primacy as custodians and teachers of social traditions within the realm of the family, or at 
times, in the public sphere but through decidedly „proper‟ occupations befitting the married 
middle class woman such as charity work. The formation of modern nations and the social 
changes associated with this stimulated 
a firmer delineation of gender-boundaries, which coincided with the simultaneous rise of the 
bourgeois public sphere and the privileging of the patriarchal household as a microcosm of 
the social, economic and political order.
52
   
The strong images of the roles and duties of the mothers and fathers within this microcosm of 
the family were transferred symbolically to the nation. “Men and women were expected to 
fulfil national obligations in the same way as they conducted their household duties: by 
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carrying out distinct and complementary functions.”53 At its very crudest, this meant that 
women should „produce‟ the nation through childbirth while men were trained for combat, 
ready to protect the „womenandchildren‟ (a heavily laden phrase coined by Enloe)54 and thus, 
the future of the nation. This was conducive to promoting the view of the nation as a natural 
extension of family and kinship relations “which harmonised well with interpretations of the 
nation that stressed its organic, biological foundations.”55 This also allowed for definitions of 
gender to appear natural and fixed through the structural organisation of the family in society 
which were underwritten by the assumptions about the fixed biological and sexual nature of 
men and women. 
           Inserting the notion of „race‟ into the dynamics between nation, family, and gender, 
Balibar examines how the connections between them produce particular results.
56
 Genealogy, 
along with the relationships of marriage and descent that operate through the family, assumes 
“a central importance for placing people into their various ethnic, national and racial 
groups.”57 Systems of alleged natural differences are accompanied by conceptions of human 
„nature‟, including sexual schemas that comprise issues such as heredity and „interbreeding‟. 
The resulting acts of classification and hierarchy establishment that this entails “are 
operations of naturalisation par excellence or, more accurately, of projections of historical 
and social difference into the realm of an imaginary nature.”58 Thus, for Balibar, „racial‟ 
characteristics are always interpretable as metaphors for differences between the sexes. 
Sexual relationships and marriage normally form within the national population and the 
individual is embraced within the large family or kinship network of the „nation‟. Thus, the 
family is nationalised and so are the relationships between men and women. Although the 
family is considered to be in the „private‟ domain, the interest of the state in regulating family 
life blurs the distinction between what is public and what is private. The rise of the „nation-
state‟ saw the transfer of control over the family shift from religious institutions to central 
governments which keep records of, for example, family connections.
59
 The emphasis on 
connections of “family, blood and sexuality draws ideas of nations and race close together: 
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hence, every discourse on the „fatherland‟ or nation which associates these with defence of 
the family and birth rate is already ensconced in the universe of racism.”60 Furthermore, it is 
ensconced in the universe of sexism. Whilst McClintock points out that all nationalisms are 
gendered,
61
 Nagel adds the rider that, “the moral economy of nationalism is gendered, 
sexualised and racialised.”62 
            
Positions and Positioning of Women in Nationalist Movements 
There is no single nationalism, nor is there one narrative of the nation. Nationalisms are 
dangerous not simply because they should be opposed as Hobsbawm suggests, but because 
they represent relations to political power, and as indicated above, access to the coercive 
apparatus of the state.
63
 Furthermore, as McClintock argues, “no nationalism in the world has 
granted women and men the same privileged access to the resources of the nation-state.”64 
All nationalisms are at all times implicated in discourses of gender power and are dependent 
on powerful constructions of gender difference. The following discussions will explain how 
and why gender plays such a significant role in constructions of nations and how women are 
positioned and position themselves in nationalist movements. Women are by no means 
passive bystanders meekly accepting the ideological roles assigned to them by the men who 
serve as spokespersons for nationalist ideologies. Women will often fully engage with these 
social powers insofar as nationalist movements allow them and enforce conformity with 
nationalist ideologies of womanhood on other women. Anthias and Yuval-Davis argued 
against the links between women, the state, and ethnic/national processes taking any 
prescribed form but have identified five central ways in which women tend to relate to 
nationalism: women as the biological reproducers of national groups, as reproducers of the 
boundaries of ethnic/national groups, as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction 
of the nation and as transmitters of its culture, as signifiers of ethnic/national differences, and 
as participants in national, economic, political, and military struggles. Each of these 
categories will be briefly identified and analysed before being applied to the South African 
case in the following chapters. However, different historical contexts will construct these 
roles in different ways and the importance of each of these roles will differ. In other words, in 
                                                          
60
 Balibar and Wallerstein quoted in Day and Thompson, Theorising, p.120. 
61
 McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven”, p.104. 
62
 Joanne Nagel, Race, Ethnicity, and Sexuality, (Oxford University Press: New York, 2003), p.146. 
63
 The apartheid state is a notable example of this and will be expanded upon in the following chapter. 
64
 McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven”, p.105. 
95 
 
a South African context, different regimes facing unique political circumstances will select 
and apply the discourses of women and nation which it requires or deems necessary to re-
establish and bolster normative gender standards. 
 
Women as the Biological Reproducers of the Nation and as Reproducers of its Boundaries 
The combination of these two categories identified by Anthias and Yuval-Davis is not 
presumptuous. Considering women as the biological reproducers of the nation and as 
reproducing the boundaries of the nation can be connected through the attention nationalist 
movements accord to women’s reproductive rights. Whether it is to have more or fewer 
children, or with which men it is appropriate to have children, all national boundaries are 
constructed by sorting people into „us‟ and „them‟. Women, as the „biological‟ producers of 
children, are also the bearers of the collective within these constructed boundaries.
65
 Yuval-
Davis has expanded on the categories identified by Anthias and herself in her important book 
Gender and Nation, and it is upon this work that the following discussions will draw. Before 
embarking on a discussion of how nationalist discourses can construct women as the bearers 
of the collective, a word of caution is necessary in relation to the use of the term 
„reproduction‟. It is inconsistent in meaning (it can range from defining women‟s biological 
roles to explaining the existence of social systems over time), and has been criticised for 
being both tautological (assuming that „reproduction‟ takes place) and static (unable to 
explain growth, decline, and transformation processes while women act as both maintainers 
and modifiers of social processes).
66
 However, the term „reproduction‟ will be retained in the 
sense of human and social reproduction including the reproduction of national, ethnic, and 
racial categories.  
           Nationalisms place people into the categories of „us‟ and „them‟ and defines who 
belongs to the nation and who does not. Especially within ethnic nationalisms women‟s 
reproductive abilities and their presumed „natural‟ role of bearing children comes under close 
scrutiny. If those nationalisms also happen to have access to the state resources of judicial 
enforcement, women‟s reproductive rights can come under attack by laws seeking to control 
their bodies and often reduce women to „wombs‟. Significantly and immutably, it is almost 
exclusively women that face legislation determining their reproductive rights and access to 
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reproductive health care. Yuval-Davis argues that “women‟s positioning in and obligations to 
their ethnic and national collectivities, as well as in and to the states they reside in and/or are 
citizens of, also affect and can sometimes override their reproductive rights.”67 This section 
will focus on the „natural‟ role of women to produce children and how this impacts the 
construction of the nation and women‟s social positioning through firstly addressing the idea 
of ethnic or racial purity and belonging and what Yuval-Davis has identified as „people as 
power‟ or somewhat more simplistically: the pure power of numbers. This will be followed 
by a discussion of eugenicist and Malthusian discourses in establishing the importance of the 
„quality‟ of the nation, and population control to indicate how states can encourage and 
control, sometimes through legislation, how, when, and by whom the nation is reproduced. 
           The myth of the „common origin‟ plays a role in the construction of most ethnic and 
national collectivities and one usually joins the collectivity by being born into it. This would 
be the „purest‟ way of belonging to a collectivity. „Outsiders‟ can conceivably join the 
national collectivity through intermarriage but in collectivities preoccupied with the „purity‟ 
of the blood such „contamination‟ would not always be accepted. Nazi law stated that „pure‟ 
blood can be „contaminated‟ even if one eighth or one sixteenth is the blood of „others‟, while 
the „one-drop‟ rule, which has operated in the construction of the definition of „who is black‟ 
in the USA, are clear examples of a preoccupation with the „purity‟ of the „race‟.68 If there is 
a preoccupation with the „purity‟ of the „race‟ it is then also likely that there will be a 
preoccupation with the sexual relations between members of different collectivities. 
Apartheid legislation in South Africa included the 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act 
which forbade marriage and sexual relations between whites and members of other racial 
groups. This was repealed by the Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages 
Amendment Act of 1985 which would be the first significant step towards the abolition of 
apartheid by allowing whites and members of other racial groups to seek legal permission to 
marry. Furthermore, children of mixed marriages in South Africa would be considered a 
separate social category, or belong to the „inferior‟ collectivity – as during slavery – while in 
Mexico, children born of Spanish settlers and aristocratic Indians would belong to the 
„superior‟ collectivity, although this is somewhat rarer in colonial societies.69 Biology is not 
always the deciding factor in belonging to a collectivity. The membership of a child might 
depend on either the father‟s membership of a collectivity or cultural/religious order (such as 
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Islam), exclusively on the mother‟s membership of a collectivity (such as Judaism), or the 
child might have access to dual membership or voluntary choice membership dependent on 
applicable religious or customary laws. 
           With respect to nations constituted from several specific ethnic groupings, Yuval-
Davis indicates that „common destiny‟ rather than „common origin‟ might be vital in the 
constitution of the nation. Post-apartheid South Africa is undoubtedly a „nation‟ looking 
towards a common destiny. Yet, in such settler societies as the USA and Australia there 
would be an implicit, if not explicit, hierarchy of desirability of „origin‟ and culture “which 
would underlie the nation building processes, including immigration and natal policies.”70 In 
colonial and apartheid South Africa (although not a „settler society‟ in the true sense) there 
were similar hierarchies that have, to a certain extent, extended into the post-apartheid state 
with the „desirability‟ of certain origins and cultures changing within different historical 
contexts.  Furthermore, while the position of women as refugees, migrants, and immigrants 
can be affected by nationalist constructions of boundaries, all women are affected by 
differential natal national policies. 
           In the „people as power‟ discourse, the future of the nation is seen as depending on its 
continuous growth.
71
 This growth can include immigration (as in the case of colonies and 
some modern nation-states like Israel), or can be based on the reproductive powers of 
women. Yuval-Davis, citing Japan as an example, shows that, 
The need for people – often primarily men – can be for a variety of nationalist purposes, civil 
and military. They can be needed as workers, as settlers, as soldiers. For example, in Japan 
the government is currently offering a reward of 5000 yen a month for each child under 
school age and twice as much for third children. They are worried as the birth rate in Japan is 
now the lowest in its history... The official reason for this campaign is the welfare of „the 
nation‟: if Japan‟s population declines it will cause „labour shortages, sluggish economic 
growth and higher tax burdens to support social services for the elderly.‟ This campaign, 
however, has raised echoes of the coercive 1930s campaign to „breed and multiply‟ for the 
good of the Japanese empire.
72
            
In countries like Australia and Israel, selective and exclusive immigration was encouraged for 
„nation building‟ processes. While the sparse Aboriginal population in Australia could offer 
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no resistance to this immigration, the Palestinians resisted Jewish settlement, resulting in the 
militarisation of nation building shortly after the state formation of Israel by encouraging 
women to have more children by developing a variety of policies and declaring a „heroine 
award‟ for women who had ten or more children.73 This is indicative of the „demographic‟ 
race between Israel and the Palestinians and the elevation of motherhood to a political status. 
However, national conflict in a contested territory is not the only reason for a „demographic 
contest‟ to take place. Maintaining an ethnic majority is seen as crucial in retaining 
dominance of the hegemonic collective. Yuval-Davis shows how government in Bulgaria 
encouraged ethnic Bulgarian women to have more children in their „demographic race‟ with 
Turkish and Romani minorities who had higher birth rates.
74
 More recently, anxious public 
debate amongst right-wing groups in The Netherlands has placed focus on the immigration 
and birth rates of predominantly Islamic minority groups as a threat to ethnic Dutch 
hegemony.
75
 
           Yuval-Davis identifies national disasters such as the civil war and revolution in Russia 
which led to population depletion as a cause for nations to place pressure on women to bear 
more children while pro-natalist ideologies have also been connected to the aftermath of the 
Nazi Holocaust. In Israel, not having children or having children outside of the Jewish 
community has been seen as “contributing to a „demographic Holocaust‟.”76 However, Nazi 
Germany is considered as the height of coercion of women to breed children for the sake of 
the nation. With the Lebensborn programme, 
SS men were encouraged to father as many children as possible with Aryan women of „pure 
stock‟. The men were not expected to marry the women and the children would be brought up 
by the state.
77
 
However, while Aryan women were forced to have children, the Nazis forced others not to 
have them as part of a Eugenicist discourse on national reproduction. 
           The pseudo-science of eugenics is concerned not with the size of the nation, but its 
„quality‟. Eugenics attempts to predetermine the „quality‟ of offspring through selective 
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breeding. Once again, Nazi Germany would be a prime example of state sanctioned 
eugenicist policies aimed at selective breeding in order to produce not simply a „healthy 
nation‟ but also a nation of purported „superior stock‟ and biologised cultural traits. „Pure 
Aryans‟ were encouraged to breed while a forced sterilisation programme targeted those 
considered as Lebensunwurdiges (life unworthy of life).
78
  
           According to Yuval-Davis, “the effect of Malthusian79 policies is often highly 
gendered.”80 It is women‟s reproductive abilities that are targeted when states „set up shop‟ in 
their wombs and treat women as state property with laws controlling not only reproduction 
but also women‟s access to reproductive health care. Regulating and controlling women‟s 
reproductive abilities in the interest of „the nation‟ can be enforced through legislation, and 
customary or religious laws. As recently seen in the USA, women controlling their own 
bodies (through the use of various methods of contraceptives, access to abortions and other 
reproductive healthcare) can be seen by some men as a direct threat to their authority. By 
„shaming‟ women through employing customary and religious rhetoric, many women would 
hesitate to  
take any action which would be considered as a betrayal of sacred religious and customary 
laws... [R]eligious authority is being invoked in order to legitimate conflicting positions 
concerning women and their reproductive options.
81
  
In response to women entering the workforce and having more control over their bodies and 
reproduction, strong fundamentalist movements may arise to tighten the control over women 
and reproductive rights in the name of custom, tradition, and religion.
82
 Legislation 
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controlling women‟s reproductive rights sees women as continuously acted upon, and rarely 
seen as actors in their own right despite fierce resistance.
83
 Thus, it is not only states that 
reduce women to wombs, nationalist movements, ethnic nationalist movements, religious and 
customary groupings are influential factors in controlling women‟s reproduction. 
 
Women and the Ideological Reproduction of the Collectivity and as Transmitters of its 
Culture     
Women contribute in a variety of ways to the ideological reproduction and the transmission 
of the culture to the „nation‟. At the most basic level, women as mothers teach and transmit 
culture to their children as women continue to be the main socialisers of children. However, 
women as teachers, artists, writers, playwrights, and film makers can contribute to ideology 
(re)production and culture transmission and are often deeply involved in the reproduction of 
national narratives.
84
 Anthias and Yuval-Davis indicate that “[t]he role of women as 
ideological reproducers is very often related to women being seen as the „cultural carriers‟ of 
the ethnic group.”85 
           Culture has historically been conflated with ethnicity and race, explained in 
evolutionary terms or analysed from relativist perspectives. However, it is not the cultures 
per se that have been transformed but discourse analysis allows a more nuanced 
understanding of culture from a 
static reified homogenous phenomena common to all members of national and ethnic 
collectivities, into dynamic social processes operating in contested terrains in which different 
voices become more or less hegemonic in their offered interpretations of the world.
86
 
This means that cultural discourses are in constant conflict with one another and that cultural 
homogeneity is the result of hegemonisation rather than having a shared point of departure 
within the collectivity. However, cultural homogeneity is limited and more noticeable within 
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the centre of society than its margins, being affected by the social positioning of its carriers.
87
 
Gill Bottomley claims that, 
„Culture‟, in the sense of ideas, beliefs and practices that delineate particular ways of being in 
the world, also generates conscious and unconscious forms of resistance – to homogenisation, 
to devaluation, to marginalising by those who fear difference.
88
 
For Yuval-Davis this then raises questions about the persistence and continuity of cultures as 
well as the relationships between cultures. While Smith and Armstrong have argued for the 
enduring ability of cultural myths and symbols that are reproduced generation after 
generation, this apparent durability can be misleading. Yuval-Davis, labelling these myths 
and symbols as „cultural stuff‟ notes that we cannot be sure how much „cultural stuff‟ has and 
has not survived historical changes while also indicating that the meanings of those that have 
survived will most likely have undergone radical changes and often become symbolic 
markers of identity.
89
 Referring to Jonathan Friedman‟s work on cultural identity, Yuval-
Davis indicates that cultures are not just 
arbitrary collections of values, artefacts and modes of behaviour. They acquire, to a greater or 
lesser extent, „stabilising properties‟ which are inherent in the practices of their social 
reproduction. These practices of social reproduction are not just processes of cloning, but 
processes of social interaction in which motivation and desire play their part. As a result, 
cultural models become resonant with subjective experience. They become the ways 
individuals experience themselves, their collectivities and the world.
90
 
Thus, culture and the many ways through which it manifests (myths, artefacts, behaviour) is 
incredibly dynamic and constantly changing within different historical contexts. Yet, it 
contains stabilising properties within a context of the nation‟s common origin (whether 
invented or not) and its common destiny. It ultimately situates individuals within the 
boundaries of their collectivity as ethnic or national culture defines „us‟ in opposition to 
„others‟. 
           Religion bears a close connection to culture but cannot be reduced to it. Religion often 
becomes “incorporated into hegemonic traditions of the different collectivities and acquires 
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specific cultural signifiers which would associate it with those collectivities.”91 This is 
evident in the political landscape of the USA where political rhetoric often conflates religious 
and cultural discourse. The language framing the recent spate of laws targeting women‟s 
reproduction in several states appears indicative of a longing to return to „good old‟ American 
values which often represent this conflation of religion and culture.
92
 Religious and cultural 
discourse is always embedded concretely, and historically, in power relations. For Yuval-
Davis, 
[t]his is true not only in relation to hierarchies of power within the religious and cultural 
institutions and their relations to more general structures of class and power within the 
society, but also in relation to the religious and cultural imaginations and their hierarchies of 
desirability as well as constructions of inclusions and exclusions. Sexuality and gender are 
central in this.
93
 
This leads to the consideration of the importance of gender relations to the social 
reproduction of culture. Yuval-Davis argues that gender relations often come to be seen as 
“constituting the „essence‟ of cultures as ways of life to be passed from generation to 
generation.”94 Here, the construction of „home‟ is of particular importance, including the 
relations between adults, and adults and children in the family. Furthermore the „home‟ 
becomes a microcosm of the social reproduction of the national culture through the ways the 
family cooks and eats, divides domestic labour responsibilities, the bedtime stories that are 
told to children, and the type of games that are played, “out of which a whole world view, 
ethical and aesthetic, can become naturalised and reproduced.”95 As women are historically 
considered to be the „homemakers‟ and situated in the domain of the family, it is often 
women that reproduce culture within the home through assigned gender roles that in turn also 
become part of a learned world view that might be reproduced generation after generation. 
           It is not only within the confines of the home and the family that women reproduce 
culture. Women also reproduce culture through more public means. This does not always 
need to take the form of cultural propaganda as in the case of Leni Riefenstahl‟s famous film, 
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Triumph of the Will, but can be achieved in several different ways. As already indicated 
above, women as writers, artists, poets, film directors, and playwrights can reproduce cultures 
through their work, but women can also reproduce culture through enforcing culturally 
constructed modes of behaviour (often defined by men) on other women. This tends to occur 
at times where traditionally accepted gender roles are shifting as a result of various social, 
economic, and political historical changes. Culture, politically conflated with religion and 
identity, often becomes a rallying call for adjusting the behaviour of – what are considered to 
be – „deviant‟ women. This will become clear when discussing the Volksmoeder ideology of 
Afrikaner nationalism in chapter 4. 
           It is important to emphasise here that ethnicity cannot be reduced to culture. The 
tendency to conflate ethnicity and culture “leads to inability to attend to the political 
dynamics of ethnic difference.”96 Identity narratives are a major tool in ethnic projects 
struggling for specific positionings within the collectivities that exist within the boundaries of 
the state, or in the case of multicultural societies, the constructed „nation‟. Ethnicity is  
primarily a political process which constructs the collectivity and its „interest‟ not only as a 
result of the specific relations of those engaged in „ethnic politics‟ with others within that 
collectivity. Gender, class, political, religious and other differences play a central role in the 
construction of specific ethnic politics, and different ethnic projects of the same collectivity 
can be engaged in intense competitive struggles for hegemonic positions.
97
 
In addition, ethnic politics is not always enmeshed with the struggles of oppressed or 
minority groups. As Yuval-Davis indicates, the measure of success of hegemonic ethnicities 
is their success in „naturalising‟ their social and cultural constructions for which these 
projects employ a wealth of available resources (political, economic, or cultural – relating to 
customs language, religion and other cultural artefacts and memories).
98
 Differentiating 
between culture, ethnicity, and identity pre-empts debates on the notion of „authenticity‟. 
According to Yuval-Davis “[a]uthenticity assumes fixed, essential and unitary constructs of 
cultures, identities and groupings. „Authentic voices‟ are perceived as their „true‟ 
representatives.”99 The claim to „authenticity‟, especially in the identity politics of multi-
cultural societies, can become a political resource, but can also give rise to what Chhachhi 
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has called „forced identities, or, what Kubena Mercer100 has called the „burden of 
representation‟101 and it is women who are often the carriers of this burden. 
 
Women as Signifiers of the ‘Nation’ 
The symbolic image of the „nation‟ as a woman is not uncommon. Whether it is Mother 
Russia, Mother Ireland, or even a continent in the form of Mother Africa; states and nations 
can, at different times, use the image of the nation as a woman for different purposes.
102
 
Britannia, Germania, Columbia, Hibernia, Helvetia, and the Dutch Maiden are just a few 
female personifications of nations.
103
 Whether it is the „motherland‟, „homeland‟, or 
„fatherland‟, ideas of nation and gender appear to blend seamlessly together until they 
become indistinguishable. Women, who often bear the „burden of representation‟, are 
constructed as the symbolic representations of the nation‟s identity and honour “both 
personally and collectively”.104 As Yuval-Davis explains, especially in early peasant 
societies, the dependence of people on the fertility of „Mother Earth‟ has contributed to the 
association between collective territory, collective identity, and womanhood.
105
 Furthermore, 
women are connected with children in the collective imagination and therefore also with the 
national, or collective, and familial future; it is, supposedly, for the sake of the 
„womenandchildren‟ that men to go war. But it is not only in times of war that women come 
to represent the collectivity. In times of significant socio-economic changes that can affect 
constructions of gender and gender positionings within societies, it is often women that come 
to represent the honour of the „nation‟. Women, confined by „proper‟ behaviour and „proper‟ 
clothing, quite literally, embody the line that signifies the collectivity‟s boundaries.106 
                                                          
100
 Kubena Mercer, “Welcome to the Jungle: Identity and Diversity in Postmodern Politics”, in J. Rutherford 
(ed), Identity, Community, Culture, Difference, (Lawrence and Wishart: London, 1990). 
101
 Yuval-Davis, Gender, p. 45. 
102
 While some countries are referred to as „motherlands‟, many nations refer to „home soil‟ as the „fatherland‟ 
(whether this is the country of birth or the country of origin of diasporic communities or their ancestors). In The 
Netherlands, Queen Wilhelmina was known as the „Moeder des Vaderlands’ („mother of the fatherland‟) during 
her reign, reinstating the significance of the mother-image and the connections between the „nation‟ and the 
family domain in nationalist imagery. However, the term „Vader des Vaderlands‟ („father of the fatherland‟) is a 
term used for Prince Willem van Oranje-Nassau (William of Orange). 
103
 It is acknowledged that many nations employ male personifications and that often these personifications are 
„warriors‟ or in some way contain ideological ideals of honour and bravery so constructing traditional male 
gender roles considered favourable. But for the purposes of this thesis the focus will fall on female iconography. 
104
 Yuval-Davis, Gender, p. 45. 
105
 Ibid., p. 45. 
106
 Ibid., p. 46. 
105 
 
           When it is women that represent nations and their honour, and it is the 
„womenandchildren‟ that need protection, rape becomes a powerful weapon, especially 
during ethnic conflicts.
107
 Rape is an extreme example of the gendered effects of war and 
ethnic conflicts. The Geneva Convention defined rape as a “crime against honour”, rather 
than as a mode of torture and Yuval-Davis argues that this „honour‟ seemingly refers to that 
of the men and the community, rather than that of the women themselves.
108
 When women 
symbolise the honour of the nation, when a woman is „violated‟ by an „other‟, it is the entire 
„nation‟ that is violated by extension.109 In this way, rape constitutes the ultimate 
transgression of national boundaries. Women who belong to the collectivity represent the 
nation‟s reproductive potential, making them vulnerable. As Day and Thompson contend, in 
such situations the nation can be driven back to essentialising conceptions that insist upon the 
biological and ethnic foundations of nationhood and identity.
110
 Thus, women‟s material and 
symbolic importance to the nation exposes them to violence and „violation‟, especially in 
times of conflict. 
           Indicating the ambivalent position of women in the collectivity, Yuval-Davis argues 
that, although women symbolise the nation and the raison d’être of specific ethnic and 
nationalist projects, they are often excluded from the collective „we‟ of the body politic and 
retain an object, rather than a subject position.
111
 This implies that the construction of 
womanhood has a property of „otherness‟. Enloe argues that, 
The very experiences of a nationalist campaign...frequently harden masculine political 
privilege. If men are allowed to take most of the policy-making roles in the movement, they 
are more likely to be arrested, gain the status of heroes in jail, learn public skills, all of which 
will enable them to claim positions of authority after the campaign is won. If women are 
confined to playing the nationalist wife, girlfriend or mother – albeit making crucial 
contributions to a successful nationalist campaign – they are unlikely to have either the skills 
or the communal prestige to gain community-wide authority at a later time.
112
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The inferior power positions that women occupy in many societies are the result of strict 
cultural codes that determine what it is to be a „proper‟ woman. These cultural constructions 
of womanhood constrict women and discourage them from breaking out from such positions 
to avoid being considered as „deviant‟. Yuval-Davis holds that,  
[t]he collective „wisdoms‟ which are used to justify this state of affairs often sound very 
similar to other „common sense‟ notions which are used to exclude, inferiorise and subjugate 
„others‟ – such as „women are stupid‟, „women are dangerous‟ or „women are impure and 
could pollute us‟.113 
Contentions such as these become increasingly pertinent when considering the colonial and 
apartheid context that this thesis will address in the following chapter. While some 
nationalists have been the victims of racism and colonialism, others have been the 
perpetrators. Nationalist movements in a colonial context usually manifest in one of two 
ways: It can be an imperial nationalist movement that seeks to extend its cultural and 
religious hegemony or, in sharp contrast, the colonial project has the ability to unite members 
of the different subjugated ethnic groups to oppose colonial hegemonies. However, in both 
nationalisms women play a central role as symbols. The constructions of the „other‟ as seen 
through the gaze of the coloniser not only impacts on the colonised, but also the colonising 
women. Yet, colonised women bear a double burden of oppression: both of colonialism and 
of the masculine nationalist movements that seek to free them of colonial domination through 
employing the colonised woman as a symbol of colonial violation. Discussing the colonised 
woman, Enloe shows that they,  
have served as sex objects for foreign men... They have bolstered white women‟s sense of 
moral superiority by accepting their religious and social instruction. They have sustained men 
in their communities when their masculine self-respect has been battered by colonists‟ 
contempt and condescension... Women as symbols, women as workers and women as 
nurturers have been crucial to the entire colonial undertaking.
114
   
Yet, rarely do nationalist movements consider how women‟s experiences can lead to an 
understanding of how a people became colonised, or how it can lead to a rejection of 
psychological and material domination. Rather, “nationalism typically has sprung from 
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masculinised memory, masculinised humiliation and masculinised hope.”115 However, rather 
than addressing the position of women in society to address societal inequalities,   
nationalist movements rarely, if ever, take women‟s situation as their point of departure. On 
the contrary, nationalism often suppresses women‟s concerns, or puts them aside until the 
„more important‟ issue of the nation‟s fate is decided.116 
Despite this, it is women that serve as powerful unifying symbols for colonial and anti-
colonial nationalist projects. The „civilising‟ mission of colonial nationalism places women at 
the centre of constructions of „proper‟ behaviour. As Enloe argues, sexual relations between 
colonial men and local women were „winked at‟, whilst affairs between colonial women and 
local men were a threat to imperial order. Enloe continues:  
Ladylike behaviour was a mainstay of imperialist civilisation. Like sanitation and 
Christianity, feminine respectability was meant to convince both the colonising and the 
colonised peoples that foreign conquest was right and necessary. Ladylike behaviour would 
also have an uplifting effect on the colonising men: it would encourage them to act according 
to those Victorian standards of manliness thought crucial for colonial order. Part of that 
empire-building masculinity was protection of the respectable lady. She stood for the 
civilising mission which, in turn, justified the colonisation of benighted peoples.
117
  
„Ladylike‟ behaviour would also have a positive effect on local women while setting a 
„proper‟ code of behaviour was also meant to keep a distance between colonising women and 
local men (which ties in with notions of women as the biological reproducers of the nation 
and as symbolic of the boundaries of the collectivity). 
Enloe contends that women have not had an easy relationship with nationalism:  
Even when they have suffered abuse at the hands of colonialists and racists, they have often 
been treated more as symbols than as active participants by nationalist movements organised 
to end colonialism and racism.
118
 
According to Enloe, arguments about the proper roles of women in nationalist struggles and 
in the future nation-state have depended on five central assumptions about women. She 
argues that the ideological weight assigned to women‟s attire and sexual purity are the result 
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of women being viewed as: the community‟s most valuable possessions, the principle 
vehicles for cultural transmission, the bearers of the future nation, the members of the 
community most vulnerable to defilement and exploitation by foreign rulers, and as being 
most susceptible to assimilation and cooption by insidious outsiders.
119
 These assumptions 
reflect Anthias‟ and Yuval-Davis‟ identifications of the five central ways in which women 
are positioned and position themselves within nationalist projects. Women from oppressed 
national communities are at times conflicted by the connections between their national 
identity and their emerging political identities as women. With South Africa‟s colonial and 
apartheid past, like many other colonised nations, women who participated in anti-colonial 
struggles were faced with a two-pronged fight. Their struggle for women‟s rights was often 
overshadowed by nationalist interests as women were encouraged to focus on nationalist 
goals first.
120
 For some women participating in nationalist movements through the accepted 
roles as bearers of the nation‟s culture and children can prove empowering. Yet, women who 
choose to participate in other ways that takes them out of the home might meet with strong 
resistance from a husband or father or other male family member. Furthermore, when a 
nationalist movement comes under siege from outside forces women are often convinced to 
lay aside their grievances within the movement until the threat has passed.  
           Enloe states that “every time women succumb to the pressures to hold their tongues 
about problems they are having with men in a nationalist organisation, nationalism becomes 
that much more masculinised.”121 More than any other ideology, nationalism requires women 
to play an active part but women are often confined to symbolic roles of nurturing mothers, 
supportive wives, or honourable „maidens‟ who represent the honour and future of the nation. 
Women, especially in the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, have played active parts in 
nationalist movements through militaries, trade unions, and other political organisations. But 
even in these roles, women still interact with constructions of traditional gender roles 
sometimes imposed upon them by men and other women, or subjugate their gendered identity 
to the needs of the nationalist project. 
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Women as Active Participants in Nationalist Struggles 
Of all the categories discussed, this one probably requires the least explication and will be 
further contextualised in the following chapter. Women actively contribute to national 
projects in a multitude of ways: as combatants in militaries and other armed formations, or as 
active politicised participants in trade unions or political organisations. Yet, their vital 
contributions to nationalist struggles within armies or organisations are almost never 
accorded equal recognition to that of men. Their participation might give them some social 
and political status after a successful national liberation struggle but women rarely achieve 
the same level of recognition or political office as their male counterparts in national 
liberation groups.  
           Enloe argues that when a nationalist movement becomes militarised, male privilege 
tends to become more entrenched. This militarisation calls on communal unity in the name of 
national survival, “a priority which can silence women critical of patriarchal practices and 
attitudes; in so doing, nationalist militarisation can privilege men.”122 Notions of military are 
heavily masculinised but women also participate in militaries. However, this is never on an 
equal basis with men. Although women do not always participate in direct combat and are 
often excluded from it in both traditional armies and liberation forces (with certain 
exceptions) they, traditionally, have had specific roles in warfare: from producing and 
nurturing new (male) soldiers, feeding and harbouring combatants, as secretaries, decoys, or 
“to take care of the dead and wounded or to become the embodied possession of the 
victorious.”123 But women can become soldiers as well. Throughout human history, images 
of women as soldiers are not uncommon. The Amazons are the best-known example of this 
but women like Joan of Arc and Boadicea leading men into battle have also had lasting 
impressions in popular imagination. Yet, these images do not necessarily serve the purpose of 
demonstrating that women are just as capable as men of heroic conduct during warfare. 
Yuval-Davis argues that “[t]hese images usually have either enhanced the constructed 
unnaturalness of women as fighters, or been made in such a way to collude with more 
generalised notions of femininity and masculinity in the society from which the women 
fighters have come.”124 They have the ability to construct women fighters as somewhat 
„unnatural‟ or even romantic. Since the formal incorporation of women into the military, 
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however, romantic images of war heroines have become more common.
125
 During World 
War Two, the women in the workplace were typified by the iconic image of Rosie the Riveter 
in the USA, while famous female bomber pilots were iconised. Palestinian Leila Khaled has 
been elevated to the status of heroine for her involvement in the hijacking of American planes 
in the 1970s. Advancement in military technology has resulted in a decline in face to face 
combat, making differences in physical strength between men and women of less importance 
so allowing women a more equal footing with men in militaries. But the differential power 
relations between men and women in formal militaries have not been erased. Until recently, 
women in the U.S Army were not allowed to enter full combat while certain countries still 
bar women from the infantry and armour and special operations forces which are considered 
to be the most dangerous jobs.
126
 Moreover, women soldiers and combatants are frequently 
subjected to sexual harassment and rape in the military.
127
 
           In the case of revolutionary movements (which will apply to a South African struggle 
context), two distinctions can be made in the manner in which they incorporate women into 
the struggle and their position in society after a successful revolution. Yuval-Davis uses 
Valentine Moghadam‟s identifications of the two revolutionary movements:  
One which uses women as a symbol of liberation and modernisation, in which case women 
would be encouraged to participate actively in the military; and one which uses women as a 
symbol of the national culture and tradition which is to be reclaimed, in which case women 
are virtually excluded from formal participation, and the nature of their supportive roles is 
highly controlled.
128
 
Whether they are honoured as fighters or revered as mothers, once again, women remain 
symbols of a fight against oppression. Women‟s roles as soldiers in the ANCs military wing, 
Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), was limited and women were regarded with contempt by some of 
their male counterparts.
129
 However, their active participation in the struggle did contribute to 
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a post-apartheid dispensation that constitutionally guarantees gender equality.
130
 Statutory 
and non-statutory armies have subjected women to patriarchal and paternalistic power 
relations and employed women as images and symbols of their particular ideologies. This is 
not to suggest that women who participated in armed revolutionary movements did not 
contribute equally to their respective national struggles but rather demonstrates that women‟s 
positions and roles in armies are never free of particular cultural constructions of gender and 
its attendant power relations. 
           Trade Unions have provided an important platform for the social and political 
advancement of women within nationalist movements despite the dominance of men in the 
industrial sector. This is decidedly true for South Africa where, historically, trade unions have 
been an influential and powerful political force. In South Africa, women have entered the 
arena of politics through trade unions and often these trade unions have had a close, although 
somewhat controversial, relationship with nationalist movements. The Garment Workers 
Union (GWU) attempted to align the moral qualities of the Volksmoeder (mother of the 
nation) with those of mostly single, poor Afrikaans women working in factories during the 
1930s as these women were considered to be the most vulnerable to „loose‟ morals and a 
threat to the purity of the Afrikaner nation.
131
 In later years, as changing socio-economic 
conditions saw black women recruited into the GWU, women like Lilian Ngoyi and Helen 
Joseph started their political activities in the GWU through which they branched out into the 
politics of the anti-apartheid movements in which they became leading figures. Pass-carrying 
„Africans‟ (black men) were prevented from joining unions but black women were exempt 
from this rule. The increasing racial stratification in South African society after 1948, 
however, meant that class differences became secondary to racism. Many black women 
factory workers, fairly well paid compared to other black women, and well-established urban 
residents by the 1950s became staunch members and leaders of community and political 
organisations.
132
 However, the increasing threat of pass laws, forced removals, political 
repression and racially exploitative legislation (some of which targeted black women 
exclusively) threatened the stability of the lives of these women and their families leading to 
black women workers becoming increasingly political and more willing to enter political 
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organisations that fought against the repressive laws of the apartheid state.
133
 This illustrates 
the interaction between working class shop-floor and wider community concerns of which 
women bore a significant brunt. 
           No discussion of women as active participants in nationalist struggles and gender 
relations, whether this is as members of trade unions or participants in militaries, can be 
reduced to discussing „men‟ and „women‟. Notions of class, race, ethnicity, age, and ability 
all form contributing factors as to how women are positioned in such movements. This will 
become clear in the following chapter which discusses women‟s positioning within the 
different nationalist movements in South Africa in the twentieth century.           
            
Conclusion 
The five categories identified by Anthias and Yuval-Davis serve as a useful point of 
departure for categorising the ways in which women are positioned and position themselves 
within different nationalist movements. Of course, these categories are not shaped by solid 
boundaries and different women and different nationalisms will apply to a combination of the 
categories. Identifying how women are positioned within different nationalist movements 
allows for a further analysis of gender relations within certain collectivities. This can also 
serve as a platform for recognising where states may fall short, or improve upon, citizenship 
rights and the legislative treatment of women within their boundaries, despite cultural 
differences. This is imperative in multi-cultural societies where culture or „tradition‟ may be 
invoked to justify the differential treatment of different women.  
           Societal and cultural gender constructions inform how nationalist movements position 
women. The strong correlations between notions of the family and the „nation‟ inform these 
constructions of gender roles and how they are applied to women as symbols of the national 
collectivity. Often these constructions revolve around notions of femininity and womanhood 
which determine which women are „proper‟ and which women are not. In this way, 
nationalist movements have the ability to place certain women at the ideological centre of 
what constitutes the nation through their cultural control of women‟s behaviour. Women as 
symbols, martyrs, and heroines of the nation define what moral qualities should constitute the 
nation and how other women should behave. Women constructed as national „wombs‟, 
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depicted in roles as mothers, wives, teachers, artists, and soldiers, or portrayed as vulnerable, 
honourable, feminine, brave, and resourceful contribute to nationalist movements as symbols 
and active participants. At times these roles are embraced and enforced on other women, at 
other times these roles are rejected resulting in the construction of the „deviant‟ woman who 
is seen as the polar opposite of the female symbolic representation of the nation. In whichever 
way different women are positioned, or position themselves in nationalist movements, their 
relationship to the nation is always gendered. 
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Chapter 4 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
The Political Power of Motherhood: Women and Mourning in 
Afrikaner and African Nationalism 
 
If nationalism is not deeply informed, and transformed, by an analysis of gender 
power, the nation-state will remain a repository of male hopes, male aspirations, and 
male privilege.
 1
 
- Anne McClintock 
 
Introduction            
The caution issued by McClintock at the head of this chapter has direct application to the 
post-apartheid state. While women in post-apartheid South Africa enjoy full de jure access to 
equal citizenship rights, their de facto experience of citizenship in the democratic state has 
been less substantive. Women in South Africa have demonstrated great gender awareness and 
activism – significantly so in the transition years. This activism and mobilisation of women 
as women has an extensive historical trajectory forged in the histories of the nationalist 
movements in South Africa in the twentieth century and informs the present (problematic) 
positioning of women in South African society. This chapter will address how Afrikaner 
nationalism and African nationalism have positioned women and how women have 
positioned themselves in these movements. It will also show how the mourning of some of 
each movements‟ political and politicised women and other political activists not only 
becomes a platform for the dissemination of nationalist rhetoric and resistance to an 
oppressive regime but also becomes an important space for the consolidation of moral values 
and appropriate gender behaviour. This consideration of the intersections between women‟s 
positioning within South African nationalist movements and dead body politics is necessary 
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to allow for a continuity of discussion while also having profound implications on the present 
and the future of gender relations in South Africa. It will show how nationalist movements 
have employed women, the image of „woman‟ and discourses of motherhood for nationalist 
ideological purposes throughout the colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa and that the 
present official nationalist sentiments in this country have built on these representations albeit 
with a different agenda. The theoretical foundation laid in the previous two chapters informs 
the following chapters which examine the manifestations of post-apartheid nationalism in the 
past two decades. 
           While nationalism offers the possibility of collective agency for women, they are often 
restricted from exercising that agency to redress the power imbalances that exist between 
women and men. Discourses of nationalism tend to constitute women as mothers, biological 
reproducers of the nation and transmitters of its values rather than as rights-bearing citizens. 
Yet, this does not necessarily mean that the relationship between nationalism and women‟s 
liberation cannot be symbiotic as the trajectory of South Africa‟s transition to democracy has 
shown. However, while nationalism might, in some instances, be enabling for women, “the 
unchallenged authority of nationalism is a major barrier to feminism.”2 In South Africa, the 
power that motherhood as a political discourse permits within nationalist movements has 
been effectively exploited by women. Women‟s collective action, spurred on by their roles as 
mothers is characterised as „motherism‟ by Kaplan.3 Kaplan distinguishes between female 
consciousness and feminist consciousness. Female consciousness stems from women‟s 
recognition of their nurturing role in society and when the family or community are 
threatened women use collective action in the name of motherhood to fight such a threat. 
However, this female consciousness develops into a feminist consciousness once women 
harness this power to mobilise and force political change and alter the status quo. While 
women in South Africa have made great strides in ensuring equal citizenship in the post-
apartheid state, this equality is only enjoyed „on paper‟. By operating within the gender 
confines that the nationalist movements permit, it has been impossible to break down the 
public/private dichotomy that continues to persist in the modern state. While motherhood and 
„motherism‟ afforded women a political platform and agency during times of political 
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uncertainty and turmoil, it has become a „trap‟ in the present as it has served to reinforce 
gender stereotypes. 
           The notion of „woman‟ and all its attendant ideological constructions becomes 
amplified in colonial societies. As illustrated in the previous chapter, the colonising woman 
becomes a boundary marker of racial purity and „civilised‟ behaviour. The colonised woman 
becomes a symbol of oppression and colonial violation and thus one of the central rallying 
points around which anti-colonial nationalist struggles initially organise and continue to make 
recourse to for impetus. Each woman is a symbol for a different ideological project and 
different women represent different aspects of each nationalism. While Afrikaner and African 
nationalism have, more or less, the same historic vintage, they involve very different racial 
and gender components. In both Afrikaner nationalism and African nationalism in South 
Africa women are employed not only as symbols, but also as active participants, initially in 
ideology construction, but in the second half of the twentieth century, increasingly more in 
militant movements as the struggle against the apartheid regime became more pressing and 
violent. Despite significant ideological differences, each movement assigned women specific 
symbolic significance shaped by cultural constructions of gender and sex. One of the most 
significant aspects of womanhood that is defined by nationalist movements is that of 
motherhood. Both Afrikaner and African nationalism employed notions of motherhood in aid 
of the nationalist cause. But „motherhood‟ is not an unchanging concept and throughout the 
decades of the twentieth century different aspects of motherhood were highlighted. 
Moreover, nationalist interpretations of motherhood were not inflicted on passive, silent 
women. Women appropriated, enforced, contested, and amended man-made ideologies of 
motherhood and „mothers of the nation‟ for their own benefit. Although the content of 
„motherhood‟ as political discourse differs in Afrikaner and African nationalism, both notions 
are politicised and women are always constructed in terms of their relation to the family 
while „fatherhood‟ is inconsistently politicised excepting circumstances that require the 
reinforcement of male authority. There is an apparent tension between the power that the 
notion of motherhood accords women in nationalist movements and the powerlessness that 
women often experience in society. This tension is clearly articulated within women‟s 
position within the family. As Shireen Hassim argues, the family is at once the place of 
women‟s affirmation and their subordination.4 Similarly, within nationalist movements, 
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women are heralded as martyrs of the struggle and the source of the regeneration of the 
nation. Yet, they are often denied active leadership positions. Motherhood and ideologies of 
„mother of the nation‟ are still active in post-apartheid South African nationalisms and, 
although the context has changed and the rights of women are stressed by government 
policies, discourses of domestic femininity have been shaped and informed by nationalist 
ideologies. As a result, these policies continue to fail women in the private and domestic 
spheres. 
           This chapter will firstly consider how women were situated in Afrikaner nationalism 
through addressing the volksmoeder ideology and the multitude of ways this construction of 
ideal womanhood was acted upon and enacted by women. It will also look at how the 
mourning of the many women and children (to the exclusion of the men and black women 
and children) who died in the British concentration camps of the Anglo-Boer War became a 
catalyst that bolstered Afrikaner nationalist sentiment. The chapter will then continue to focus 
on the rise of African nationalism within South Africa after the creation of the Union and the 
growing involvement of women within the ranks of the political parties fighting against the 
oppressive apartheid regime. It will also consider how constructions of motherhood played an 
important part in women‟s resistance to and victimisation by the apartheid regime and how 
their role in this struggle was interpreted by their male counterparts.  
 
Afrikaner Nationalism and the Volksmoeder Ideology 
Although many early Afrikaans-speaking historians
5
 traced the spirit of Afrikaner 
nationalism back to the Great Trek of the 1830s, it is now accepted that Afrikaner nationalism 
as a cohesive social movement can be dated to the early 1920s and 1930s, while its roots can 
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be traced throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century.
6
 It was in these years 
that Afrikaans cultural organisations voiced the common myth of descent, shared history and 
culture, the association with South Africa as a territory and group solidarity that defined 
Afrikaners as an ethnic group. However, by the 1930s the political mobilisation of this ethnic 
group seeking to secure state power defined it as a „nation‟ and its social movement as 
Afrikaner nationalism. The previous existence of some kind of ethnic consciousness amongst 
a substantial portion of Afrikaners was critical for the emergence and success of this ethnic 
nationalism. However, a nationalist ideology grounded in language, culture, and religion 
which allowed for the early development of the nationalist movement was not sufficient for 
its eventual political aim: control of the state. This section will address the development of 
Afrikaner nationalism by examining how the public mourning of the Afrikaner women and 
children who died in the British concentration camps strengthened this social movement. It 
will then move on to a discussion of the volksmoeder ideology which, to a certain extent, 
drew on the constructions of womanhood from the Voortrekker women and the experiences 
of women in the camps to exemplify the strength and honour of the ideal Afrikaner woman in 
an urban industrial society. It will show that women interacted with and animated this 
ideology – initially propagated by men – and played a powerful role in the construction of an 
Afrikaner identity and nationalist following.  
 
The Vrouemonument 
On 16 December 1913 a monument was unveiled in Bloemfontein in memory of the 
Afrikaner women and children who had died in British concentration camps of the Anglo-
Boer War. In contrast to many war monuments across the world which tend to focus on male 
heroics, male patriotism, and male martyrdom, this was a statue of a woman holding a dying 
child and dedicated to women as victims, martyrs and heroines. Throughout the war 
Afrikaner women and children were removed from farmsteads and incarcerated in the camps 
in a British High Command strategy which intended to curtail the activities of Boer guerrilla 
fighters who continued to use the farms as bases and for continued supplies in their war 
effort.
7
 A staggering 27,927 Boers died in the camps as a result of poor administration, 
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neglect, incompetence and disease.
8
 Grundlingh states that this amounted to approximately 
ten per cent of the Boer population in the two Boer republics. Moreover, Grundlingh asserts 
that in terms of fatalities it was undoubtedly a women‟s war with fatalities in the camps at 
more than double the men killed in action on both sides.
9
 The deaths of so many women and 
children left behind a legacy of bitter memories for many Afrikaners and the decision to erect 
a monument to this memory only a decade after the event would certainly lead to a rise in 
tensions in the early years of Union.  
           This section will briefly look at how the changing cultural landscape of South Africa 
in the twentieth century altered and shifted the narratives and meanings assigned to the 
women‟s monument. Monuments (notwithstanding their wilful removal or destruction) 
remain present in the public landscape as touchstones of public memory but their meanings 
are never static and change as the historical contexts change. The public mourning of the 
deceased which is embedded in the women‟s monument would come to represent different 
political motivations as the Afrikaner nationalist movement grew, gained momentum, and 
eventually took control of the country through „constitutional‟ means. The intentions behind 
the erection of the monument differed vastly from the meanings extracted from it in the 
1920s and 1930s and shifted again once the nationalist movement was successful and attained 
its goal of controlling the state. Moreover, the gendered nature of the monument lent itself to 
a particular type of meaning manipulation that saw women cast as victims, martyrs, heroines, 
and as racial boundary markers for an entire nation. The Afrikaner woman as mother and 
wife, ideologically and physically, played an essential role in the success of the Afrikaner 
nationalist movement. 
           The unveiling of the monument on December 16
10
 1913 was a significant affair 
attended by approximately 20,000 people.
11
 Although ex-Free State President M.T. Steyn had 
called for the event to be a solemn occasion and most speakers adhered to a conciliatory tone 
in the spirit of Union, it was inevitable that bitter memories of the war would be raised. 
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Christiaan de Wet, a well-known bittereinder
12
 general, outlined the historical travails of the 
Afrikaners and questioned the progress that had been made since the war and asked whether 
it was progress in the „right direction‟ for Afrikaners.13 The favourable reaction of the crowd 
to de Wet‟s speech indicated that, unsurprisingly, under the surface of conciliation, bitter 
emotions and feelings of injustice remained amongst many Afrikaners. Grundlingh contends 
that it was only in later years that the monument provided a “vast reservoir of unexpressed 
emotions that could be channelled along nationalistic lines of common suffering, humiliation, 
and a need for retribution”14 and that political messages of nationalist intent did not dominate 
the proceedings of the unveiling. However, it is impossible to ignore the implicit politicised 
message contained within a statue commissioned barely a decade after the war that 
commemorates the senseless deaths of approximately 26,000 Boer women and children in 
British concentration camps. Certainly emotions were expressed and the response of the 
crowd to a stronger ethnic political message shows that people were already acutely aware of 
reading such a message in the monument. Furthermore, Steyn ensured that the British had no 
representation in the project rendering it, ultimately, exclusively an Afrikaner monument.
15
 
However, Grundlingh does indicate that these emotions would only be harnessed explicitly 
for nationalist purposes in the following decade and be made effective by the increased 
promotion of Afrikaner ethnic unity which did not yet exist at the time of the unveiling of the 
monument. 
           If the nationalist intentions for the monument only emerged later as a comprehensive 
ideology, what did this monument say about Afrikaner women at its conception and 
unveiling? Sabine Marschall is clear on the monument‟s portrayal of Afrikaner women, 
firstly, as victims.
16
 Women in nationalist movements often come to embody the „nation‟ and 
the pain and humiliation inflicted on the women of the „nation‟ is, by extension, inflicted on 
the nation in its entirety – perhaps being interpreted even more so as an affront to the men of 
the nation. Marschall refers to the central sculpture and is worth quoting at length here:  
The pathos of the entire monument is condensed and epitomised in Anton van Wouw‟s 
emotionally charged central sculptural group. Formally modelled on a conflation of the 
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Christian iconographic traditions of Anna Selbdritt and the Pieta, the group consists of a 
seated woman with bare feet and a look of sadness, despair, and exhaustion on her face. She 
is holding a dead child on her lap, clearly evoking the lamenting Mary holding the deceased 
Son of God. The implied message here is one of suffering and martyrdom, but also ultimate 
triumph. This is expressed through the standing woman next to her, upright and „properly‟ 
dressed in Voortrekker clothes, including the „kappie‟ or bonnet, which soon became the 
standard signifier of the traditional Afrikaner woman. With a determined look on her face, she 
gazes into the distance – spatial and temporal – expressing the women‟s resilience and 
determination to survive. Yet it is not so much her personal survival that counts, but the 
survival and ultimate triumph – through the will of God – of the Afrikaner nation.17 
Encapsulating the notions of suffering and martyrdom the statue comes to represent nearly 70 
years of Afrikaner hardships; from the Great Trek to defeat in the Anglo-Boer War. However, 
the determined stare into the future indicates the resilience of the Afrikaner nation, and 
despite its sacrifices, its willingness to rise again and survive and triumph. Shrouded in 
religious iconography this monument becomes a signifier of the inextricable links that existed 
between Afrikaner political and religious life, especially in the context of the growing 
Christian Nationalist movement. Moreover, it imbued the politicised messages ascribed to the 
monument with sacred and moral superiority through its association with Christianity, death, 
and martyrdom. 
           The monument not only made a statement about the Afrikaner nation but – even more 
so – would be assigned meanings that would come to make statements about women in 
Afrikaner society as the nationalist movement grew. Referring to Elsie Cloete‟s study of the 
commemorative publications on the National Women‟s Monument, Marschall outlines two 
central conclusions that emerged from this analysis. Firstly, before the successful completion 
of the nationalist movement‟s rise to power, “the rhetoric used was designed to confine the 
Afrikaner women even more tightly into the mythology of Afrikanerdom as submissive, 
docile emissaries of the volks-ideal.”18 Secondly, once political and economic power had 
been achieved, “women were quietly discarded as progenitors and nurturers of the volk but 
remained subject to a patriarchy that had simply modernised itself.”19 The monument, 
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signifying men‟s experiences even more so than the experiences of women,20 has, as 
Marschall significantly states, “served as an opportunity for Afrikaner men to make 
statements about women, thereby defining and confining their role in Afrikaner society.”21 
With the growing impetus of the Afrikaner nationalist movement, the deaths of the women in 
the camps was a „noble cause‟ quickly appropriated and exploited to further the nationalist 
cause. The affront to Afrikaner women was an affront to the Afrikaner nation as a whole and 
the „protection‟ of women meant the survival of the nation which would be further 
encouraged by the control of women‟s behaviour through the volksmoeder ideology. 
According to Liese van der Watt, the central sculpture of the monument is in fact one of the 
earliest visual representations of this ideology that associates women with the domestic 
sphere and situates women first and foremost as mothers in the realm of the home extends 
this metaphor to women as mothers of the Afrikaner nation and all the „responsibilities‟ that 
come with such a title.
22
 
           Yet, the portrayal of women as passive victims in the monument stands in stark 
contrast to the active roles Afrikaner women took up in various historical struggles and 
battles and even within the camps during the war.
23
 The emotional nature of the events in the 
concentration camps lent itself to exploitation by nationalist proponents and the statue itself 
encourages visitors to share in the mourning, sorrow, and the anger of a nation that was 
wronged through what was perceived as a cowardly victimisation of its women and children 
– those considered to be the most vulnerable and defenceless members of a nation. However, 
the resilience of the Afrikaner woman depicted in the monument implies martyrdom and 
heroism but the lack of identification of a single, or several heroines ensures that Afrikaner 
women are represented as types, not individuals. For Marschall, this means that the 
experience of women is universalised “to include not only Afrikaner women, but the entire 
Afrikaner volk.”24 This apt observation applies even more strongly as the volksmoeder 
ideology came to the forefront of nationalist doctrine in the 1930s where issues of racial 
purity were essentialised and women became the boundary markers of the racial purity of the 
nation. However, Marschall does show that during the emergent phase of the volksmoeder 
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ideal, “the emphasis was on patience and resilience in the face of suffering, which became 
institutionalised through the construction of the National Women‟s Monument.”25 The values 
and emotions visually represented in the monument were indicative of a time where 
Afrikaners, despite the positive sentiments of Union, still felt the bitter defeat of the war and 
no coherent nationalist movement had taken root to direct these emotions into a 
comprehensive ideological framework of intra-ethnic support and cooperation. For 
Marschall, the visual and textual signifiers of the monument serve to confine women “in a 
tightly defined role of suffering and victimisation”26 and referring back to Cloete‟s work, the 
textual references to the monument presents the reader with “role models of women who are 
patient, suffering, afflicted, frail, defenceless, tender, delicate, refined, and civilised.”27 
Grundlingh, analysing these brochures and other materials describing the symbolism of the 
statue published at the height of the nationalist movement, states that these documents 
increasingly 
depicted the role of women as singularly in service of male nationalism. It was often no 
longer a case of honouring women per se, but one of yoking them to another project in which 
they were represented as silent victims who sacrificed their lives on the altar of freedom and 
love of the fatherland.
28
     
Once the nationalist project had been successfully achieved, the Women‟s Monument would 
pale in its importance compared to the more celebratory and blatantly nationalist Voortrekker 
Monument. From the 1960s onwards the cultural terrain of the monument became a site that 
commemorated the war in more general terms. The „absent male‟ statue space was filled up 
with statues calling into remembrance men going on commandos, prisoners of war, and the 
bitterenders.
29
 Such additions shifted the focal point of the monument from remembering 
women (albeit be it in their many symbolic representations) to remembering the Anglo-Boer 
War. Women had served their purpose in achieving a nationalist victory for Afrikanerdom 
and their place in Afrikaner political mythology would be eclipsed by historical male heroes 
and martyrs. 
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Volksmoeders 
The volksmoeder ideology defies a concrete definition. At its most simplistic it positions 
(certain) women as mothers of the nation. Applied to the mythical homogenous category of 
„Afrikaner women‟ it represented the Afrikaner woman-mother as the cornerstone of her 
household and as a central unifying force for her people through her display of heroics, 
patriotism, and perseverance in adversity. The volksmoeder ideology was popularised in early 
Afrikaans literature written by men
30
 at a time of rising Afrikaner urbanisation. In its most 
conservative form, this ideology could be interpreted as men controlling women by “giving 
them a well-defined but circumscribed position within society, to which some status, honour 
and respectability are attached.”31 Yet, the attributes that define this ideology vary greatly. 
Early academic orthodoxy held that the volksmoeder ideology was forced on and accepted by 
hapless and submissive Afrikaner women by Afrikaner men. Subsequent studies have shown 
that women of different classes interacted with and shaped the contours of this ideology. This 
is not to deny that this ideology of motherhood formed part of a greater male-dominated 
nationalist movement (it clearly does), or even to reject the notion that women embraced this 
protean ideology in order to be considered „respectable‟ within a patriarchal society. It simply 
indicates that women were not the hapless victims of an enforced gendered ideology and 
shows that women embraced and helped to shape this ideology which allowed them greater 
independence and a „respectable‟ place in public life.  
           Gaitskell and Unterhalter have identified three historical phases in the way Afrikaner 
nationalism has employed discourses of motherhood.
32
 The first phase, the years directly after 
the Anglo-Boer War, correlates with the unveiling of the Women‟s Monument and saw 
women as silent victims while their strength during times of great suffering was represented 
as symbolic of sustaining the „nation‟ in its time of defeat. The second phase, roughly 
representing the years between the two world wars and the height of the nationalist push for 
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unity amongst Afrikaners, would be characterised by the volksmoeder ideology which saw 
motherhood as far more political, active, and mobilising. The home was an ideological sphere 
for raising children with a strong Afrikaner identity. Yet motherhood was also public, 
extending to the Afrikaner nation, and women were encouraged to move outside the home 
and uplift the nation as a whole. During the third phase, when the nationalist project was 
successful and Afrikaner political power was ensured, discourses of motherhood were 
dedicated to ensuring the „purity‟ of the white Afrikaner nation to assist in the survival of 
white domination in South Africa. 
           This section will briefly outline the history of the volksmoeder ideology and show how 
both working class and middle class Afrikaner women related to this ideology within the 
context of the broader nationalist movement. It will argue that, although the twentieth century 
image of the volksmoeder did emanate from a patriarchal society fearing changing gender 
dynamics as a result of industrialisation and urbanisation, different women took this historic, 
religious, and ultimately nationalist construction of motherhood and shaped it to work for 
them in many different ways. Working class women used this ideology to allay male (and 
female) fears of miscegenation as the nationalist movement sought to ensure the racial purity 
of the volk. These women applied the foundational mythology of female hardship and 
endurance to their situation as women and mothers working outside the home so asserting 
their „respectability‟ and membership of the Afrikaner nation. Middle class women used it to 
maintain their foothold in the public sphere without losing respectability in a patriarchal 
society that preferred to keep their women quiet and in the home. Although middle class 
women operated in a more narrowly-defined version of the volksmoeder ideology they would 
push the boundaries for „respectable‟ female public activity and political participation. For 
women of both classes things „domestic‟ and „womanly‟ would become both public and 
politicised through their interaction with this increasingly nationalist ideology of the 
volksmoeder. 
           The volksmoeder was an icon shaped by Afrikaans literature and inspired by the 
Afrikaners‟ history which enmeshed it in a foundational mythology of resistance, 
perseverance, and hardship. This literature, written by men, was prominently published after 
the unveiling of the Women‟s Monument and sought to give the newly urbanised Afrikaner 
girls and women an appropriate role model in the volksmoeder ideal.
33
 The Afrikaner women 
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of the Great Trek, (the Voortrekker women), were upheld as the embodiment of all the 
essential volksmoeder ideals. These women were represented as tough, self-sufficient, serving 
as doctors, nurses, teachers, and soldiers during the Great Trek, but they were also religious, 
freedom-loving, honourable, selfless, and incorruptible.
34
 While the „orthodox‟ version of the 
volksmoeder ideology represented the Afrikaner woman‟s highest calling and greatest 
fulfilment as being found in her own home, physically and morally reproducing the „nation‟, 
this ideology would be neither timeless nor unchangeable. As the Afrikaner nationalist 
movement became increasingly concerned with white poverty, the focus shifted from the 
private home to the role women could play in the moral and physical upliftment of the 
nation‟s poor. Vincent shows that “initially, it was expected that Afrikaner women would 
exercise the public dimension of their role as volksmoeders solely by way of charity 
organisations such as the Afrikaanse Christelike Vroue Vereniging (ACVV).”35 Although the 
ACVV never challenged male authority and initially set itself against the female suffrage
36
 it 
did claim a legitimate place for women in the public sphere and challenged conservative 
notions about women‟s roles.37  
           While the end of the Anglo-Boer War saw an increase in Afrikaner urbanisation, the 
rapidity of urbanisation increased as a result of escalating impoverishment of the rural white 
population in the years after World War I.
38
 As many Afrikaners moved to the cities, the 
burden to seek work and provide for families quickly fell onto the women. The farming and 
rural skills of the men meant they were ill-equipped for urban employment. Women‟s 
„traditional‟ skills allowed them to find work as teachers, nurses, clerks, typists, and as 
religious workers. However, one of the key areas in which recently urbanised Afrikaner 
women found employment was in the burgeoning manufacturing industry and the clothing 
industry in particular.
39
 Vincent points out that it was only at the level of mythical nationalist 
precepts that the category of „Afrikaner women‟ was homogenous.40 In the context of high 
infant and maternal mortality rates many Afrikaner women began to question the notion of 
motherhood itself. Furthermore, for poor women large families were unsustainable while 
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marriage was seen as a sacrifice of independence for young working women. The idealised 
image of the volksmoeder as a hard-working but refined housewife and charity worker was 
far removed from the reality of many working class Afrikaner women.
41
 Although many 
working women mostly supported the prevailing view that a woman‟s place was in the home 
raising her family their situations did not allow for this. As one garment worker commented 
somewhat sardonically: “Does it serve any purpose if we women work amongst the pots and 
pans and these are empty? Must we fold hands and wait until food falls into the pots 
automatically?”42 An investigation into the conditions in several industries found that the 
living circumstances of female employees was “saddening in the extreme”43 with many 
young Afrikaner girls living in squalid conditions. Rather than evoking sympathy amongst 
the middle class, the female factory workers were initially regarded as morally suspect. 
Vincent argues that “[r]ecently urbanised young women living in slum conditions in the 
backyards of Johannesburg‟s suburbs and removed from familial ties were seen as a threat to 
the ideological and racial „purity‟ of the volk.”44 As issues of racial purity and racial 
exclusivity became powerful tools for the nationalist project, leading women from the 
Garment Workers‟ Union (GWU) would publically challenge the notion of poor women as 
threats to racial purity through reinterpreting the volksmoeder ideology to appeal to working 
class women while also allaying nationalist fears of miscegenation.            
           The GWU emerged as a powerful voice in the South African labour movement in the 
1930s. Its membership consisted mainly of Afrikaner women and by the late 1930s most of 
the major office bearers within the union were Afrikaner women. Through magazines 
published in both English and Afrikaans (one in particular Die Huisvrou (The Housewife) 
addressed a female audience and allowed them to express their views) the GWU promised to 
forward the fight of garment workers for decent wages and improved standards of living. 
Through material and ideological support, the GWU sought to develop a strong sense of 
working class identity amongst its members. However, as Vincent indicates, “the union was 
not the only ideological contender for the hearts and minds of urban working class Afrikaner 
women.”45 The 1930s witnessed the contestation of the support of working class Afrikaner 
women and the “terrain upon which this battle was fought was Afrikaner nationalism‟s 
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gender ideology encapsulated in the notion of the volksmoeder.”46 With the image of the 
volksmoeder entangled in the romanticised scenic rural foundational mythology of the 
Afrikaners, working women had very little in common with this sentimentalised notion of 
ideal womanhood. Instead, they identified the hardships suffered by the Voortrekker women 
– the bread and butter issues – as the traditions of their people that they were bearing as 
urbanised, working women. Many of these women embraced their ethnic identity as 
Afrikaners and argued that their fight for a better life was, in fact, “the very best tradition of 
Afrikanerdom.”47 As the nationalist movement attempted to appeal to working class women 
and competed with their class identity, the volksmoeder ideology was reinterpreted by 
working class women and appealed to them as new arrivals to an urban centre where their 
ethnicity and religion formed the foundation for their identity. As Vincent argues, nationalist 
ideology had very little to offer these women, 
Yet, the idealised depiction of Afrikaner womanhood symbolised by the volksmoeder icon 
was in many senses a very attractive one, particularly to women whose social standing was 
somewhat shaky. Women had been given a central place in the most significant historical 
memories of the Afrikaner nationalism. Unsurprisingly, working class Afrikaner women did 
not readily surrender the image of themselves as resourceful, proud and morally 
unimpeachable. Leading Afrikaner women at the GWU were at pains to show how the 
positive characteristics associated with the traditional volksmoeder image were just as 
applicable to their new lives as factory workers. 
Thus, ethnic identity was never eschewed by working women in favour of class identity. 
Moreover, their insistence on their dignified and respectable place within Afrikanerdom 
unwittingly made them propagandist for cross-class ethnic unity which lay at the heart of the 
success of the nationalist movement. While the unions mostly ignored the importance of 
ethnic identity to its members the attack of nationalists on the „purity‟ of working class 
women meant that racial exclusivity became important to these women in order to be 
considered as „respectable‟ members of their volk. Questions of racial purity interacted very 
directly with the volksmoeder ideology. It was essential to the nationalist project that working 
class women voted as Afrikaners rather than as socialist workers once white women gained 
the franchise in 1930. The dismal failure of labour and socialist parties in the elections 
showed that ethnic identity remained of great importance to recently urbanised Afrikaners 
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who had no socialist traditions. It was also important that women raised their children with a 
nationalist rather than working class consciousness. It was through the volksmoeder ideology 
that these notions were popularised amongst working class Afrikaner women and led many of 
them to support a nationalist agenda rather than a socialist one. 
           As racism and racial purity became one of the most powerful anti-union tools of the 
nationalist movement, support for racial exclusivity became important for working Afrikaner 
women. It was the responsibility of the white Afrikaner woman to keep her race „pure‟. 
Afrikaner poverty was seen as a threat to this purity as young working girls would be away 
from the control of their families, working side by side with black factory workers and living 
in squalid conditions in „racially mixed‟ areas. This made working women vulnerable to 
accusations of degeneracy and delinquency. Their response was to turn to the appeal of the 
“ideological armoury of the volksmoeder to establish their credentials as members of the 
white Afrikaner volk”48 and they employed their supposed racial heritage to their advantage. 
There was initial resistance from middle-class Afrikaners to consider poor Afrikaners as 
anything more than a „fallen‟ section of their volk. But the numerical advantage of poor 
Afrikaners and the 1938 Great Trek centenary celebrations
49
 would contribute to the 
promotion of an Afrikaner nationalism that was inclusive and unified and working women 
were encouraged to take part in the celebrations not as a class, but as Afrikaners. Working 
women had taken it upon themselves to reinterpret their experience of poverty and hardship 
using an established gendered ideology that was part of Afrikaner nationalist iconography to 
gain respect and respectability. They would enthusiastically lay claim to a cultural heritage 
espoused by Afrikaner nationalists. In doing so they challenged ideas of the impropriety of 
women engaging in paid labour and promoted unity amongst Afrikaners at a time that the 
nationalist movement actively sought to gain political power. 
           For middle class Afrikaner women the nationalist movement‟s preoccupation with 
white poverty became a point of entry into the public sphere. As volksmoeders, women could 
enter public life through (often) church-aligned charity work helping to improve the lives of 
the poor. The ACVV,
50
 a national organisation dedicated to philanthropic work with close 
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ties to the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC), became a platform for many middle class women 
to engage in charitable work outside of the domestic sphere. Established in 1904, the 
formation of the ACVV was largely driven by increasing incidence of white poverty. 
Women‟s philanthropic work became an important part of shaping Afrikaner identity and 
nationalism as they initially acted outside the explicitly political realm and entered and 
affected the private lives of a constituency that would be vital to the victory of the nationalist 
movement.
51
 Sidestepping politics that were seen as fracturing Afrikaners, the ACVV would 
come to focus on the very definition of „Afrikaner‟.  
           Marijke du Toit‟s work on the ACVV shows that Afrikaner women initially drew on a 
maternalist discourse shaped in the late nineteenth century through DRC magazines which 
enmeshed religious and nationalist discourse. The early ACVV women attempted to ensure 
the independence of their organisation and maintain their foothold in the public sphere whilst 
also signalling their support for the dominant gender order.
52
 In the 1920s, the second 
generation of ACVV nationalist women created a politicised dominion of „women‟s issues‟ 
through taking up leadership positions in cultural, philanthropic, and party-political 
organisations. These women embraced motherhood, yet, also sought to influence and play a 
central role in formulating social policy.
53
 By focusing charity work on a specific definition 
of Afrikaner in terms of race, religion, and language, the racialised Christian charity in which 
these women engaged began to be fused with an Afrikaner nationalist mission.
54
 With ACVV 
leaders stressing the crucial role played by mothers and daughters in the survival of the volk, 
their identification with a pre-nationalist religious gendered discourse was increasingly 
moulded into “explicitly Afrikaner nationalist form.”55 Du Toit indicates that in the years 
following the founding of the ACVV the entanglement of religious and nationalist identity 
amongst Afrikaner women was apparent: “Working for kerk, volk en taal (church, people and 
language) – this was the ACVV motto – involved a crucial reshaping of the older discourse of 
maternal duty.”56 While women‟s duty to their church was initially emphasised, in later years 
their duty towards their volk was added to women‟s social responsibilities. The older 
religious discourse of motherhood and the new nationalist interpretation shared one central 
trait according to du Toit:  
                                                          
51
 du Toit, “The Domesticity of Afrikaner Nationalism”, JSAS, 29, 1, 2003, p.156. 
52
 Ibid., p.155. 
53
 Ibid., p.155. 
54
 Ibid., p.161. 
55
 Ibid., p.162. 
56
 Ibid., p.163. 
131 
 
the promotion of an idealised version of motherhood and an articulation of maternal duty that 
focused on the privacy of the home. Perhaps this emphasis and the familiar sight of women 
practising charitable work explain why Afrikaans female philanthropic societies such as the 
ACVV attracted few negative comments from those unused to women speaking or acting in 
public.
57
 
Furthermore, in the early years after its formation, the ACVV members would refrain from 
speaking at public events, instead allowing church ministers from the DRC to speak on their 
behalf and the organisation quickly positioned itself against the „unbiblical‟ suffragettes and 
feared that these women threatened domestic life.
58
 The praise the ACVV received for its 
„proper‟ behaviour suggests, for du Toit, an uneasy acceptance of women‟s public activities, 
especially in the context of the female suffrage movement and its indication of women‟s‟ 
understanding of their changing role in society. As the ACVV‟s projects became more 
extensive and its members became more active in the public sphere the “novelty of female 
speakers [became] subsumed in a discourse emphasising their maternal attributes and familial 
responsibility.”59 As the poor women of the volk needed upliftment, these women of the 
ACVV would step outside the home in order to „rescue‟ their people. While emphasising 
their femininity, the ACVV women would also stress that theirs was a committed and 
assertive womanhood that would rise to defend the interests of their language, church, and 
nation without transgressing the „traditional‟ boundaries of their culture.60  
           The 1920s marked a distinct shift in the leadership of the ACVV and saw the 
organisation take a new interest in party-politics and equating politics with matters of 
national interest. Prominent leaders such as M.E. Rothmann were aware that political issues 
pertaining to welfare and the economy were matters of women‟s interest. The ACVV 
established house-keeping schools to instruct poor young Afrikaner girls in domesticity and 
household duties and aid them in gaining respectable employment as domestic workers in 
middle class Afrikaner households. However, there was some reluctance to place these young 
girls in urban positions because of the perceived dangers of urban life. Concern was also 
given to uncaring employers forcing young girls into the „station of coloureds‟ through equal 
pay and treatment.
61
 The ACVV ran hostels for „factory girls‟ which were closely supervised 
as part of their mission to ensure the cultural upliftment of these young women. Within the 
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hostels recreational activities included reading groups, dancing lessons, drama, and 
compulsory church attendance.
62
 For the ACVV the lot of white working Afrikaner women 
was an important question to address and they feared that poor urban Afrikaners were 
“forgetting that they belonged to an exclusively white and culturally distinct volk.”63 This was 
perceived as a threat to the racial purity of the nation and it was important to protect those 
“uncertain edges of whiteness.”64 This emphasis on „whiteness‟ aided the nationalist 
movement in entrenching racial identity. The ACVV called on middle class Afrikaner women 
in their positions as wives and mothers to help the young working women of the volk to 
maintain their respectability in an urban setting.  
           Identifying the need for women to become active participants in defining social 
policies that related to the maintenance of Afrikaner identity and pride, ACVV leaders such 
as Rothmann became public supporters of the female suffrage movement. Referring to 
Rothmann and other leading ACVV members, du Toit shows that,  
She and her colleagues were vocal in the face of what they saw as an urgent task for 
Afrikaner nationalism – rescuing the „Afrikaner‟ poor from forgetfulness of their identity – 
and made no apologies for their public action. But what they offered were the variations of 
assertive women on the volksmoeder theme... As men‟s partners, their primary role was 
related to the family – a volksaak (national issue) often undervalued and unrecognised.65  
Rothmann, together with other prominent female Afrikaner nationalists, “constructed a 
maternalist discourse that drew on mainstream notions of women‟s primary role as mother 
and did not fundamentally challenge the idea of separate spheres.”66 Thus, through a 
reinterpretation of the volksmoeder ideology to include a heroic and mythic past of active 
female participation in defence of the volk that did not challenge the fundamental gender 
discourse, middle class Afrikaner women could claim responsibility for social spaces that 
existed outside of the domestic sphere and claim some power for women in those redefined 
spaces. While praising the virtues of domesticity and femininity, the women of the ACVV 
legitimised women‟s relationship to politics and the community in the public sphere and so 
carved out an acceptable and respectable space in which they could extend their public 
participation.        
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           Far from being „man-made women‟, as Elsabe Brink‟s argues,67 it is clear that 
Afrikaner women “participated in the construction and articulation of a gendered Afrikaner 
nationalism.”68 The image of the volksmoeder as an ideal version of womanhood found wide 
appeal amongst both middle class and working class Afrikaner women. Their engagement 
with a discourse of motherhood – initially articulated by men – coincided neatly with the 
male-dominated cultural and nationalist movement and ensured the identification of a 
narrowly confined Afrikaner identity that intersected with Christian-Nationalist discourse and 
racial privilege. What is clear is that rather than having this ideology thrust upon them by 
men, women shaped this ideology in order to extend their influence, both social and political, 
within a patriarchal society that feared changing gender relations. Drawing on the image of 
the formidable Voortrekker woman, both working class and middle class women were able to 
invoke the heroic mythology of the „Afrikaner‟ past and employ the exemplary characteristics 
of these idealised heroines to validate their present circumstances and positioning while 
simultaneously supporting a nationalist project that sought to entrench white Afrikaner 
hegemony.   
            
African Nationalism and the ‘Mother of the Nation’ 
Having gained control of the state through constitutional means, Afrikaner nationalists sought 
to prevent African nationalists from doing likewise. African nationalism in South Africa was 
a process of evolving means to gain rights for (initially) black Africans. This nationalism 
emerged in a state dominated by a white minority that sought to entrench its control of all the 
mechanisms of the state and the economy by denying access to these mechanisms to the 
black majority. The centrality of the „mother of the nation‟ and the ideologies of motherhood 
within African nationalism will be discussed in order to indicate the continuity of these 
ideologies in the current South African political climate as the ANC is seeking to stamp its 
mark, and indeed, its dominance, upon the new foundational mythology of the nation.  
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Mothers of the Nation, Politicised Motherhood, and the Struggle for Equality
69
 
Women‟s resistance to white hegemony has been a vital component of the success of the 
liberation movement. Through their mobilisation in the struggle against apartheid, women 
have sought to articulate their own political interests and their interests derived from the 
particular experience of gender oppression.
70
 Yet, it is important to note that acting politically 
as women does “not necessarily imply that the gender identities that are invoked are 
progressive, in the sense of seeking to eliminate the hierarchies of power.”71 Furthermore, 
women‟s activism in South Africa was born in the crucible of political resistance against 
apartheid. The autonomy of women‟s organisations was often diminished through their 
alliances to the internal resistance movement which sought to mobilise women as anti-
apartheid activists and not necessarily as women with a political platform of women‟s issues.  
Whether in supportive roles or as active participants in the nationalist struggle, women‟s 
contributions are always cast in a different hue and explained, remembered, and 
commemorated with the language of family and of the home. As in Afrikaner nationalism, 
the role of the black woman firstly as mother, has been highlighted in the struggle against 
apartheid. But, necessarily, the contribution that black women made to the trajectory of 
African nationalism took a significantly different course than that of white Afrikaner women. 
The „mother of the nation‟ discourse and notions of motherhood in African nationalism differ 
in content to the volksmoeder ideology and its political efficacy changed over time as the 
context of the liberation struggle changed. Women‟s participation in the struggle was not 
only a fight against white political, economic, and social domination, but, for some women, 
also a struggle against the male-dominated patriarchal structures that dominated the liberation 
movement for most of its active years.  
           While the ANC had, from its inception, put forward an ideology of national unity 
across racial lines, its make-up was, in fact, exclusively male, hierarchical, and influenced by 
an upper house of chiefs which protected patriarchal authority. Women had shown their 
political readiness early on with the march on Bloemfontein in 1913 to protest the extension 
of the pass-laws to women and faced arrests, imprisonment, and hard labour. Yet, women 
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were denied political representation, could only join the ANC as „auxiliary members‟ in a 
supportive role to men, and did not have the right to vote. But women‟s militancy could not 
be suppressed and the Bantu Women‟s League (BWL), affiliated to the ANC, was formed in 
1918 by Charlotte Maxeke, and was influenced by a small Christian educated elite. The 
BWL, much like the ACVV, was dominated by “welfarist models for women‟s public 
activities and restricted its activities to a narrow range associated with the „upliftment and 
education‟ of girls” which had little relation to the struggles against economic and social 
exploitation faced by women every day.
72
 However, its formation was followed by another 
pass protest led by women. Thus, as McClintock indicates: “women‟s first tentative steps into 
African nationalism stemmed less from the invitation of men than from their own 
politicisation in resisting the violence of state decree.”73 However, these politicised women 
remained confined within the boundaries of the domestic. McClintock continues: 
At this time, however, women‟s potential militancy was muted, and their political agency 
domesticated by the language of female service and subordination. Women‟s volunteer work 
was approved insofar as it served the interests of the (male) „nation‟, and women‟s political 
identity was figured as merely supportive and auxiliary. As President Seme said: “No national 
movement can be strong unless the women volunteers come forward and offer their service to 
the nation.”74   
However, these „services‟ were initially confined to provide the catering and organise 
entertainment at meetings and conferences.
75
 It was not until the ANC adopted a new 
constitution in 1943, and at the women‟s insistence, that women could gain full membership 
and voting rights within the organisation. However, women‟s roles within the movement 
remained subordinate, “confined to building a nation for their husbands and children.”76 
           In 1948 the BWL was renamed the ANC Women‟s League (ANCWL). Women‟s 
accelerated urbanisation as part of an increased need for secondary labour resulted in 
women‟s growing involvement in township resistance. The formation of the ANCWL 
provided a strategy by which to channel women‟s militancy into the national liberation 
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movement.
77
 The task of women activists, then, was to mobilise women within the broader 
struggle for liberation. Hassim argues that,  
...women won their new status in part as a consequence of the ANC‟s efforts to build up a 
mass membership, with women regarded as potential recruits, and in part in recognition of the 
need to „upgrade the status of women‟, part of the new modernising language of an emerging 
nationalism in the ANC.
78
 
However, the ANCWL retained its auxiliary status and constituted a substructure of the 
ANC. Women were mobilised as women less out of a concern of gender equality, however, 
and rather in the interest of mass mobilisation. Despite this, the formation of the ANCWL 
was highly significant and offered women the opportunity to expand the notion of equality – 
previously embedded in masculinist Africanism
79
 – to include gender as well as race. Walker 
states: 
A body aiming to represent the interests of the majority of South African women had been set 
up within the premier African political organisation – the ANC had finally come to 
incorporate women, one half of the people it claimed to represent, into its political frame of 
reference. A structure was created whereby African women could be channelled into the 
national liberation movement on a footing that was, at least theoretically, equal to that of 
men.
80
  
In the 1950s the ANCWL would thrive as part of the Defiance Campaign, the Congress 
Alliance and the formation of the multi-party Federation of South African Women 
(FEDSAW). The Women‟s Charter was formed at the founding of FEDSAW in 1954. This 
Charter called on all South African women as wives, mothers, working women, and 
housewives, regardless of race to stand together for the removal of laws that discriminated 
against women and refused them equal opportunities.
81
 It called for the right to vote, the 
abolition of child labour, land redistribution, worker benefits and union rights, universal 
education, and housing and food subsidies.
82
 Furthermore, it called on men to extend to 
women complete equality in law and in practice if they hoped to completely free themselves 
of the evils of discrimination and inequality. This placed the struggle against women‟s 
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oppression not only parallel to the struggle against apartheid, but was also a challenge to 
deeply entrenched gender hierarchies.
83
 In 1955 Oliver Tambo placed women‟s emancipation 
at the forefront of the liberation struggle, declaring that a strong movement could not be built 
without the full participation of the women. He also urged men to aid women in domestic 
chores so that women could be freed from their household duties and given the opportunity of 
being politically active.
84
 1956 would prove to be a significant year for women‟s political 
activity when a multi-racial alliance between the ANCWL and FEDSAW organised a protest 
march against passes for women that saw over twenty thousand women march to the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria. Women‟s political efficacy was proven and they would continue to 
play significant roles in the liberation struggle. But women‟s emancipation was a topic that 
would not be thoroughly addressed within the ANC until the late 1980s and until such time, 
the dominant position on women‟s emancipation within the ANC was that it was secondary 
to national liberation.  
           As in Afrikaner nationalism, women‟s political agency in African nationalism is 
embedded in historically contextualised discourses of motherhood. “Mother”, states Hassim, 
“became a central trope in national liberationist discourses on gender.”85 Winnie Mandela 
was long known, and to a certain extent still is known, as the „Mother of the Nation‟. 
Albertina Sisulu has been honoured with this title as well, and singer Miriam Makeba was 
affectionately known as „Ma Afrika‟. The ANC and its allies have placed a great deal of 
emphasis on the image of the „mother‟, especially in phases of mass mobilisation such as the 
1950s and then the 1970s and 1980s. As already indicated above, women‟s opposition to pass 
laws and repressive legislation aimed at or which included women, was usually voiced in the 
ideology of motherhood and the political language of „motherism‟ as Gaitskell and 
Unterhalter and McClintock show in statements made by FEDSAW and ANCWL women.
86
 
Often, the term „women‟ was used interchangeably with „wives‟ and „mothers‟ within anti-
apartheid women‟s organisations.87 „Motherhood‟ spoke to the common experience of 
women in rural and urban areas, working in formal or informal sectors. Furthermore it also 
appealed to white women to join the resistance to apartheid based on the shared experience of 
motherhood which was placed under threat by the violent apartheid state. The outrage against 
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the extension of passes to women found its focal point in the notion of motherhood arguing 
that, as mothers, black women deserved better treatment than that given to their male 
counterparts.
88
 Furthermore, black women used motherhood to justify their militant political 
protest action. McClintock explains that “African women have embraced, transmuted, and 
transformed [motherhood] in a variety of ways, working strategically within traditional 
ideology to justify untraditional public militancy.”89 Hassim reinforces this point, and argues 
that the 
immediate household struggles of women that derived from their gender roles as mothers and 
housewives shifted the conception of political onto terrain in which women had a direct and 
demonstrable interest and in which their political action was legitimated and applauded by the 
dominant political movements...
90
  
However, Hassim continues,  
On the one hand, women activists were able to leverage greater power for women with the 
nationalist framework through the privileging of motherhood as the central political identity 
for women – that is, by mobilising women in ways that were consistent with the gendered role 
definition on which nationalism is predicated. On the other hand, the emphasis on nationalism 
marginalised alternative discourses, in particular that of feminism.
91
 
Thus, initially, women‟s activism was accepted by the male dominated resistance movement 
if it arrived out of a concern for the domestic sphere and women acted on a political platform 
as mothers and housewives. Such a strategy attempts to overcome the divide between the 
public and private spheres as it affects the lives of women. However, this emphasis on the 
„universal‟ shared experience of motherhood, glossed over the varied experiences of 
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motherhood that emerged from different racial and class positions. Furthermore, „motherist‟ 
politics within a nationalist context could render discussions of reproductive rights, bodily 
autonomy, and sexual choice as apolitical “because addressing these issues required 
reconsidering the traditional identities of women and thus posed a serious challenge to the 
private sphere that could not be easily accommodated...”92 Political discourses of motherhood 
may have empowered women, but this “empowerment still takes place within the overriding 
confines of patriarchal authority and is thus of limited value as a basis for challenging gender 
oppression.”93 Wells has been critical of motherism as a limited force for political change and 
states: 
Motherism is clearly not feminism. Women swept up in motherist movements are not fighting 
for their own fights as women, but for their rights as mothers. . . . Motherist movements must 
be recognised as limited in scope, duration and success in achieving their goals.
94 
The exploitation of motherism by women had, however, strategic benefits in drawing white 
women into the struggle against apartheid so “denting the supposed unity of white support for 
apartheid.”95 Gender identity, articulated in „motherism‟ had the ability unite women across 
racial and class differences, and in the context of the apartheid state‟s attempts to regulate 
relationships between different races, such unity was considered to be politically progressive. 
Importantly, Hassim argues, the Women‟s League and the Federation, 
drew on a deep sense of „female consciousness‟, which develop[ed] from the „cultural 
experiences of helping families and communities survive.‟ Female consciousness impels 
women to political action and, while „emphasising roles they accept as wives and mothers, 
[they] also demand the freedom to act as they think their obligations entail.‟96 
In the first half of the twentieth century, women mobilised around a wide range of issues – 
working women‟s struggles, attempts by local state institutions to regulate women‟s 
economic activities, and the control of women‟s mobility through the extension of pass laws, 
and rural poverty. All these were issues taken up by a variety of organisations ranging from 
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the Communist Party of South Africa to trade unions and women‟s organisations. However, 
by the 1950s, Hassim argues, all these struggles had been subsumed and homogenised within 
the larger nationalist narrative of the struggle for liberation.
97
  
           Gaitskell and Unterhalter have identified the application of the ideology of 
motherhood as a shared experience and its appeal for a non-racial alliance with white women 
of the 1950s as the first phase out of three distinct phases of motherhood as a contested 
ideology within the African nationalist movement of the ANC and its allies. The banning of 
the ANC in the 1960s
98
 changed the political landscape for women‟s political involvement 
and it would be in the violence of the 1970s that the ideology of „motherhood‟ would be 
called on again albeit in a different context and with a different purpose. 
           The violence of the Soweto Uprisings of 1976 and more significantly, the state‟s use 
of violence against children re-invoked the totemic image of motherhood. In the aftermath of 
the uprising and in the 1980s, motherhood would come to represent strength, suffering, and 
sadness. Black mothers, in mourning and forced to bury their children who died as a result of 
state violence, became a central icon to the struggle. This period would raise the ideology of 
motherhood to include the image of militant strength; of women fighting for their „nation‟, 
for their sons and daughters, for their families, and standing tall in the absence of husbands 
imprisoned by the apartheid state. Women, as mothers of the nation, were lauded as the titans 
of the struggle as the violence of the state entered their homes and targeted their families and 
destroyed the public/private dichotomy. McClintock shows that  
Paradoxically, the sheer randomness of attacks by the South African Defence Force on homes 
and children has brought the war irrevocably into the lives of most women, deeply and widely 
politicising those who might otherwise have remained aloof. Women organise increasingly as 
the militant protectors of their communities and activist children, and as a consequence the 
image of the militant mother, the revolutionary and political mother, began to enter official 
ANC rhetoric.
99
 
The apartheid state would also target black women activists as mothers, exploiting their 
specific vulnerabilities as a means of political terror. McClintock continues,  
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The burden of parental guilt falls more cruelly on women activists than on men. All too often, 
women detainees under interrogation are tormented by the police who deride them as failed 
mothers, reminding them of helpless and unattended children at home, accusing them of 
„loose morals,‟ and playing on the wracking social contradictions in the women‟s lives 
between the vocation of parenthood and the vocation of activism.
100
  
The accusation of being a bad mother or parent for ending up in detention is an accusation 
unthinkable to level at men and is a burden laid almost exclusively on women activists. 
However, it was not only the state that would accuse black women of being bad mothers for 
„abandoning‟ their children. Winnie Mandela, long hailed as the „Mother of the Nation‟ faced 
significant criticism and lost prestige when vilified in the media for her alleged role in the 
murder of Stompie Sepei and the kidnapping and torture of four Soweto youths in her home. 
Despite being revered for her courage in fighting apartheid, her own incarceration, torture, 
constant harassment, and banning by the state, these events severely undermined her iconic 
status as the „Mother of the Nation‟.101 While women act within the prescribed roles of 
contemporary gender ideologies they can be honoured as mothers of the nation. But once 
women step outside of these boundaries, become torturers instead of simply enduring torture, 
become killers instead of accepting martyrdom, they come under intense scrutiny – perhaps 
more so than their male counterparts.    
           In the 1980s, the formulation of „triple oppression‟ had great currency in activist 
circles.
102
 Black women were seen as the most oppressed because of their threefold 
oppression as blacks, workers, and women. During this period the „rural black woman‟, in 
particular, assumed iconic status to “be invoked as the moral subject of the women‟s 
movement.”103 Gaitskell and Unterhalter have identified the increase in women‟s political 
activism during this period with a rise in women-headed households. Women‟s increasing 
wage employment, living without the support of male relatives, and their mobilisation in 
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trade unions, women‟s organisations, and civic associations all shaped the new perception of 
motherhood in ANC rhetoric as activist and as a dynamic force for change, rather than 
something that requires protection.
104
 However, as McClintock argues,  
exalting women for their maternal power alone has calamitous consequences, erasing and 
undermining the multifarious other forms of women‟s work, which come to be figured as 
temporary departures from women‟s manifestly maternal destiny, and are hence undervalued 
and underpaid... Exalting motherhood makes it very hard for women to stay single, to choose 
not to have children, to come out as lesbian or bisexual. The heterosexual family within the 
sanction of matrimony acquires the inevitability of destiny, and women are seen not as 
independent members of the national community, but as wives responsible to the nation 
through their service to men.
105
 
It is here that the prestige of motherhood essentialises heteronormativity and pressures 
women to remain subjected to the patriarchal structures of the male-headed household which 
extends to the metaphor of the nation as a family unit – especially once the nationalist 
movement has achieved its goal. However, women‟s empowerment and emancipation, at 
women‟s insistence, would appear on the agenda before the transition. Women‟s military 
participation in organisations such as MK and their political activity in general encouraged 
these debates within ANC structures. But male resistance to placing such issues at the 
forefront of the ANC agenda echoed the mantra that „women‟s issues‟ should take a backseat 
to the more important goal of national liberation as these matters were considered to be 
„divisive‟ and the women were simply being „difficult‟.106 Again, McClintock delivers 
insightful commentary: 
To ask women to wait until after the revolution serves merely as a strategic tactic to defer 
women‟s demands. Not only does it conceal the fact that nationalisms are from the outset 
constituted in gender power, but, as the lessons on international history portend, women who 
are not empowered to organise during the struggle will not be empowered to organise after 
the struggle.
107
 
The ANCWL had learned this lesson from other successful liberation movements in Africa 
that had failed to honour its promises to its women activists and thus attempted to ensure a 
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position of equality for women within the ANC and South Africa once the liberation struggle 
had been won. While women‟s organisations were numerous in South Africa, their alliances 
to the broader liberation movements restricted their autonomy and put the mobilisation of 
women for national liberation at the forefront of their agendas. While issues pertaining to 
women‟s private lives and bodily autonomy were discussed within such movements, they 
were considered to be secondary to national liberation. By suppressing such debates in favour 
of mobilising women for nationalist purposes, women were subsumed in the patriarchal 
discourses of nationalism and confined to acting within the confines of nationalist symbolic 
imagery of domestic femininity. The power of nationalism to symbolically „domesticate‟ 
women has had dire consequences for women‟s lived experiences in the post-apartheid state. 
While women are ensured constitutional equality, this equality does not extend to the private 
and domestic lives of many women and the new nation-building project further subsumes 
women in nationalist discourse within the democratic state. This issue emerges with the 
conflation of the woman-citizen of gender equality policy or the de-gendered individual 
subject of rights, and the mother-citizen of the nation who is called upon for political 
mobilisation or the nation-building project.
108
 As will be demonstrated in the following 
chapters, the nationalist discourse of „motherhood‟ continues to emerge in post-apartheid 
nationalist rhetoric and is lauded at events commemorating historic women‟s struggles and 
uprisings.  
           Shortly before liberation, the ANC had committed itself to gender equality and upheld 
this commitment into the democratic era. But this commitment was not easily won and had 
taken several years of relentless pressure from the ANCWL to achieve. Women‟s active 
involvement in MK – although excluded from traditional combat roles – changed debates 
around gender and equality within ANC structures. By 1991, women made up approximately 
twenty per cent of MK.
109
 While the militarisation of the struggle can be considered a setback 
for women as it favoured male activists, this presented an opportunity for women as the 
movement began to recognise their contribution to the struggle.
110
 It was under Tambo‟s 
presidency of the ANC that women gained significant opportunities within the organisation. 
Tambo selected women to serve as representatives of the movement abroad and this exposed 
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these women to the rising international tide of feminism. Thus, rather than thinking of a 
return to domestic „normality‟ after the struggle had been won, women within the ANC 
started to think about what liberation would offer them.
111
 As a result, women began to 
develop more effective strategies to integrate gender equality into the core principles of the 
ANC. Initially, women were met with antagonistic attitudes from male NEC members 
whenever they raised issues that concerned them. Tambo, however, was more willing to 
consider their proposals and created a space for women to place their grievances and 
concerns in the context of the liberation struggle as a whole. It was at the 1985 conference in 
Kabwe that the NEC formally recognised that “women‟s equality would deepen and enhance 
the quality of democracy itself.”112 Although women remained drastically under-represented 
in the NEC,
113
 the Interim Constitution of 1993 included the pronouncement of South Africa 
as a non-racial and non-sexist society. With the threat of women‟s (re)marginalisation in the 
new democracy looming,
114
 women‟s organisations (all located differently in South African 
society) understood that it was necessary to participate in women‟s-based politics to achieve 
a shared objective. The formation of the Women‟s National Coalition, made up of the 
ANCWL and a large variety of local and national organisations, in 1992, served the purpose 
of influencing the negotiations for transition in favour of women‟s equality in all spheres of 
social, economic, and political life. The Coalition drew up the Women‟s Charter for Effective 
Equality outlining, after significant research, the diversity of demands of women across the 
racial and class divides in South African society. This Charter edged towards considering 
women as rights-claiming agents within the democratic state rather than as gendered, 
maternalist anti-apartheid struggle participants. Yet, the Charter, despite being adopted in 
June 1994, was never truly drawn on for significant political action as the Coalition fell apart 
after many of its leaders entered parliament after the 1994 elections. The inclusion of 
„women‟ as a separate category in addition to „race‟ in the Interim Constitution was the result 
of women‟s insistence and relentless pursuit of equality after having participated equally with 
men in the struggle.
115
 Manicom argues that the category of „women‟ of the politics of 
transition,  
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was integral to the building of an emergent discourse of socio-economic and legal equality 
and rights-bearing citizenship... That strong emphasis on „women‟ expressed the politics of 
democracy and non-racialism... against other contending constructions of women-citizens...
116
  
The transitional category of „women‟ contested the marginalising categories of race and 
class. “Yet”, Manicom contends, “[r]esonating culturally in the signifier „women‟ is a widely 
held construction of women-as-mothers or maternal citizens, claiming their rights by virtue of 
their moral responsibilities in the family, community, and to the nation.”117 According to 
Manicom, this has resulted in this maternalist discourse being “powerfully embedded in 
popular perceptions of the place of women in the South African nation-state and often 
discernible in public speech of state actors.”118 Within a new post-apartheid nationalism and 
its attendant rise in sexual violence, the continued emphasis on women as mothers and the 
reduction of „woman‟ to a biological identity has done little to promote or protect the rights 
of women as equal citizens of the democratic state.  
           In the years that followed the transition women‟s rights and equal status have been 
enshrined in the Constitution of South Africa. Women have gained greater representation in 
parliament, in senior leadership positions within government, head up large and small 
businesses, and enjoy greater employment opportunities through affirmative action policies. 
Yet, at ground level, many women in South Africa remain embattled through the unrelenting 
obstacles of „tradition‟ and „culture‟, socio-economic positioning, and the high numbers of 
violent acts committed against women. Reactively, government‟s response to this was the 
formation of the Department of Women, Children, and Persons with Disabilities in 2009, a 
government department that seemingly „willy-nilly‟ grouped together three apparently 
homogeneous groups (which previously enjoyed their own departments and representation) 
which even on a surface level have no clear overlap of interests. Women are once again 
grouped together with children in a maternalist discourse reminiscent of the 1950s and, 
furthermore, womanhood seems to be synonymous with infantility and disability.
119
 Gouws 
argues that a “discourse of gender mainstreaming has contributed to depoliticising gender 
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activism and to turn gender into a technocratic concept.”120 Gender and gender violence has 
been depoliticised (placing it in the private/domestic sphere despite being deeply political
121
) 
and women‟s activism and women‟s rights seem to have been pushed aside as government 
funding for vital services such as rape crisis centres has virtually dried up. Women are being 
paid lip-service on the appropriate occasions and struggle heroines have their names plastered 
on state-funded public spaces. Exorbitantly expensive events are organised by government in 
the „memory‟ of these women who broke the glass ceilings of their time in order to provide 
future South African women with equal opportunities and equal rights. Yet, many girls and 
women in the present lack access to basic education that would allow them a chance at 
enjoying any of these opportunities and rights.     
           Despite the early politicised militancy of women against oppressive legislation and the 
continued fight against the triple oppression of race, class, and sex throughout the liberation 
struggle, women‟s rights to equality within the private sphere in South Africa are still under 
threat and this struggle continues well into the democratic era. Gouws laments the celebration 
of the constitutional guarantees of gender equality and non-sexism while a large portion of 
the population, mostly women, lack the effective right to dignity and bodily integrity.
122
 
While women protested in the 1950s against inequality from a basis of the shared experience 
of outraged motherhood this would shift towards an image of the militant mother fighting the 
apartheid regime for the safety of her family following the violence enacted upon children by 
the state in 1976. With the influence of international feminism women within the ANC 
engaged their male counterparts to ensure the emancipation of women after the struggle had 
been won. Yet, the significant gains made by women during the transition have been derailed, 
perhaps even reversed with the reassertion of ethno-nationalism and communal identity 
politics and the inability of gender policies to break down cultural barriers and localised 
patriarchies.
123
 The recent release of the Green Paper on Families
124
 seems to strengthen the 
reduction of women to „wifely motherhood‟ and attempts to entrench a return to conservative 
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values of „family‟ by entrenching heteronormativity through othering families that are not 
composed of a husband, wife, and their biological offspring. In the case studies that are 
addressed in later chapters the ideology of motherhood is an overriding theme whether the 
women in question were mothers or not and will be addressed in a context of the creation of a 
new foundational mythology built on the body politics of the deceased and the 
commemorated. Yet, in present commemorations of anti-apartheid heroines, the militant 
motherism of the 1980s has been cast aside and the pacifist tendencies of this discourse have 
become essentialised as the government faces increasingly violent uprisings in the mining 
sectors and protests against poor service delivery. Such commemorative events become 
powerful platforms for political rhetoric that at once glorifies the struggle past and invokes 
that „golden age‟ and its attendant moral qualities to address the violent socio-economic 
protests of the present.    
 
Conclusion 
A century of nationalist movements have shaped the history, present, and future of South 
Africa. The exclusively white male nationalism of the early twentieth century created a 
unified country of white privilege. Systematically invented, this white South African identity 
would not endure in the face of a history of Afrikaner resistance to British domination. The 
strength and momentum of the Afrikaner nationalist movement saw it rise to power within 
three decades. Aided by its ability to operate within the constitutional boundaries of the 
Union the movement‟s access to the mechanisms of the state would ensure white Afrikaner 
privilege for the following four decades. The exclusivity of the Afrikaner nationalist 
movement came at the expense of the political, social, and economic rights of a majority 
black population. The rise of African nationalism was a direct response to the two exclusively 
white nationalist movements of South Africa. It would take eight decades of negotiation and 
violence for the African nationalist movement to gain access to power. Increasingly unable to 
operate within the confines of the law and in the public sphere, the movement faced a violent 
response from the state. However, with changing international relations and growing unrest 
within the country the apartheid state had to enter into negotiations with leading organisations 
of the national liberation struggle and relinquish its privileged access to power. The success 
of the struggle has „set the scene‟ for the following discussions in this thesis as it did not 
endorse the racial or ethnic exclusivity that had shaped the white nationalist movements. 
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Rather, its focus on a multi-racial South Africa has allowed for a fairly peaceful and stable 
transition to democracy. This has been attended by the creation of a new South Africa 
nationalism and identity as a „glue‟ that would hold together a „nation‟ built on a wealth of 
cultural and ethnic differences and a history of violence, oppression, and exploitation.     
           Women had no place or representation in the colonial nationalism that created the 
conditions required for Union. It was created on the basis of white male privilege and the 
ensured continuation thereof, shaped by a common experience of a rugged masculine 
geographical setting, and wrought out of the fear of „native‟ discontent that threatened this 
privilege. In Afrikaner and African nationalism, however, the experiences of women would 
feature largely in creating a deeply emotional response from the collectivity. When the men 
of the collectivity are unable to protect their women from the abuses and violence of the 
„other‟, discourses of motherhood feature prominently in harnessing male anger and offence 
into the nationalist movement. Mothers of the nation represent commanding symbols of 
national boundaries and a national future but also represent appropriate female behaviour. In 
South Africa this ideology has been steeped in discourses of sacrifice, maternal strength, and 
martyrdom. Understanding the power that such ideologies can wield within male-dominated 
nationalist movements, women accepted these titles and moulded them to work for them and 
to push the boundaries of accepted gender behaviour. Of course, there were limitations as 
women‟s identities within nationalist movements are contingent on men, but women were not 
the hapless victims of a male nationalist agenda that defined their behaviour. For both 
Afrikaner and black women, „motherhood‟ became a powerful political resource. While 
Afrikaner women operated within a context of white privilege that afforded them some 
power, black women would call on shared experiences of womanhood and motherhood to 
cross racial boundaries and challenge oppressive legislation. Women‟s militancy arose early 
in the African nationalist movement and would remain a powerful force of social change 
throughout the struggle. Furthermore, it ensured the theoretical protection of women‟s rights 
and equality in the new Constitution of South Africa. Yet, „motherism‟ failed to challenge the 
patriarchal dominance of the national liberation movement. This has resulted in the 
private/public dichotomy being upheld with the result that women continue to experience 
forms of private powerlessness despite gender equality being constitutionally enshrined. 
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Clearly, citizenship in South Africa continues to be inextricably linked to „naturalised‟ social 
roles which legal rights cannot easily dislodge.
125
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Chapter 5 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Recreating a ‘Usable’ Past and Forging a Common Destiny: 
Reconciliation and Post-1994 Nationalism 
 
We, the people of South Africa, recognise the injustices of our past; honour those who 
suffered for justice and freedom in our land; respect those who have worked to build 
and develop our country; and believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, 
united in our diversity.
1
 
 
Introduction 
The history of the twentieth century in South Africa is a history of nationalisms: each 
nationalism inspired, informed, and spurred on its historical antithesis. The new nationalism 
of the post-apartheid state appears unaware of its historical roots and strong correlations with 
the nationalist movements that have gone before it. In an odd turn, the new state-sanctioned 
nationalism that followed the transition to a democratic dispensation finds itself drawing on 
similar notions of „nation‟ as Afrikaner nationalism but has employed the language of a 
revived Pan-Africanism,
2
 albeit altered to include minority groups in South Africa. Post-
apartheid South Africa, with its history of colonial and apartheid oppression had to find a 
common ground on which a new „South African‟ identity could be constructed. Meskell 
shows that,  
[b]uilding a new national history entails forging a national culture: a self-conscious fusion, 
combining shreds of regional cultural legacies and international symbols... [T]o be 
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compelling and successful it must form an assimilative tradition, drawing upon the knowledge 
of particular ethnic groups to enlarge them, thus creating a broader national embrace.
3
  
As the foundational mythologies of the past were constructed within specific ethnic 
nationalist contexts, South Africa needed a new foundational mythology that would unite its 
citizens rather than pander to one specific ethnic group. With no background of traditional 
unifying elements such as language, shared history, religion, culture, or ethnicity, the multi-
cultural state had to invent commonalities that would allow citizens to identify themselves as 
South Africans with a common destiny and loyalty to one nation-state. This is not unusual for 
the modern state which is almost always ethnically heterogeneous. But it is the state that 
seeks to create a nation out of the various ethnic communities by “adopting the ideological 
postulates of nationalism as its legitimation...”4 This has predominantly been a top-to-bottom 
approach in South Africa where government, political elites, and state institutions have 
actively engaged in nationalist identity creation which are reproduced in public events and 
spaces and the media. This entailed submerging potentially divisive issues under a discourse 
of peace, equality, and unity.  
           The reconstruction of a usable communal past has been essential in fostering a sense 
of national unity. The usable past, from an instrumentalist or functionalist standpoint, is a 
past (or pasts) whose uses are determined by the needs and preoccupations by present-day 
political elites.
5
 This past needed to serve the interests of political elites and thus the national 
past had to be tailored for mass consumption. Moreover, a usable past was an important 
factor in promoting and legitimising the post-apartheid state while also inspiring a new moral 
order through the heroes and heroines it selected to honour and commemorate. Yet, the 
usable past is malleable and remains open to reinterpretation as present needs shift and alter. 
National myths and symbols are powerful factors in constructing the usable past as South 
Africa is promoting a civic nationalism that is superimposed on existing ethnic and cultural 
identities. 
           Successive presidencies have added their own unique stamp to what it means to be 
„South African‟ in the post-apartheid state and have developed new notions of „nation 
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building‟ and what it will take to build a successful multi-cultural nation. This new national 
identity is expressed in a variety of ways and enacted at sporting, commemorative, and other 
mass spectacles. It is symbolised in a new national iconography carefully invented to 
showcase the inclusiveness of the new nation. It is articulated in eleven official languages, 
each protective over its place and future in the „new‟ South Africa. It is affirmed by 
celebrating the (often) violent events that contributed to the existence of the new state and 
honouring those martyrs, heroes and heroines that sacrificed families and lives for its 
formation. It creates a new moral order that legitimises the new state and its actions in 
opposition to the „evil‟ of the old order.  
           It is impossible to address post-apartheid nationalism without taking into consideration 
the work of the TRC and its contribution to the (re)construction of a new national history. 
The history of the TRC processes is well-known, analysed, and documented. It will be briefly 
outlined here in order to contextualise the „spirit‟ of the new South African nationalism that 
was shaped by the narratives that emerged at the TRC hearings. This section will show how a 
new nationalist movement was forged out of a divisive past and polarised population and 
imbued with a Christian theology fused with an idealised African philosophy. Furthermore, 
the TRC processes will be analysed in terms of a society dealing with a traumatic past and 
confronting loss. The work of mourning was performed on a public platform and narratives 
of painful loss were confronted as relatives of victims of disappeared and murdered 
individuals sought answers that would aid the completion of their mourning processes. It will 
also briefly outline the complexities that arose in women‟s testimonies to the TRC in a 
society steeped in patriarchal influence which confined the narratives that women were able 
to share on a public platform to what was considered „proper‟. By focusing on women‟s 
testimonies at the Human Rights Violations (HRV) hearings this section will show how the 
construction of „nation‟ was influenced by the narratives of mourning and loss spoken by 
women and how these testimonies reflected women‟s positioning within the new nationalism 
of the post-apartheid state.  
           Secondly, this chapter will address the formation of a new iconography for the nation-
state. The powerful symbols that emblematise the forces of nationalism such as flags, coat of 
arms, and the national anthem will be considered as a new iconography created to symbolise 
the multi-cultural nation. This will be followed by a discussion of how the state has 
reconfigured the national spatio-temporal sphere to aid its process of political legitimation. In 
this section the renaming of public holidays celebrated during the apartheid era, the addition 
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of new public holidays, the creation of new memorials and the changing meanings of old 
monuments and statues will be addressed. As indicated in chapter 2, memorials and 
monuments serve as linking objects and store painful memories in a public space where 
people can mourn and can be seen to be mourning – whether they were personally affected by 
the event represented or where people can share in a society‟s mourning. The memorials and 
memorial spaces of the post-apartheid state serve two basic functions: to aid national healing 
and reconciliation so creating a new South African identity based on a shared traumatic past, 
and to legitimise the post-apartheid political dispensation. Both time and space are 
reconfigured in the name of a new nationalism. This promotes national reconciliation but it 
also allows the governing party to legitimise its position as the ruling party of the post-
apartheid state by establishing a new moral order through the memorials and monuments it 
erects and the days it chooses to commemorate. The first section will place mourning in the 
context of a post-apartheid nationalism as the TRC processes transformed narratives of 
private and individual mourning into societal mourning through its public media platform. 
This societal mourning is further enacted through the symbolic reparations of memorials and 
monuments that were erected to honour those that had lost their lives as a result of their 
involvement in the struggle for liberation. The careful selection of those cases that featured 
prominently in national and international media for memorialisation elevated them into a new 
pantheon of heroes and heroines that would symbolise the moral order of the new post-
apartheid state. Thus, this chapter will contend that public displays of mourning and state-
endorsed societal mourning became important elements in shaping a new South African 
nationalism and identity.     
            
The TRC  
Shaped by the politics of compromise of the negotiated transition, the TRC, under the 
chairmanship of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, was established as a commission that would not 
only construct a comprehensive historical record but would also, through its pursuit of „truth‟, 
foster individual and national reconciliation as part of a new nation-building project.
6
 
Established under the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 its 
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objectives were to promote national unity and reconciliation by establishing as complete a 
picture as possible of gross human rights violations in the period of 1960 to May 1994, the 
granting of amnesty to political perpetrators of gross human rights violations who would 
make full disclosures of their actions, establishing local and national patterns of violence and 
violations, and to produce a report that would serve as a shared national history that was 
considered integral to nation-building.
7
 It would attempt to achieve this ambitious mandate 
through public hearings where victims could speak and perpetrators confess and operated on 
the assumption that the catharsis of speaking trauma, confession, and forgiveness would aid 
reconciliation between victim and perpetrator and by extension, heal the „nation‟. Focusing 
on landmark historical events that occurred within its thirty-four year mandate, the 
Commission hoped to unveil the „truth‟ about what had happened in the past so debunking 
the apartheid state‟s versions of these events and enabling the „nation‟ to move forward with 
a full understanding of why these events had occurred.8 This disclosure would ensure respect 
for and the continued protection of human rights in the future. The TRC linked „truth‟ with 
„reconciliation‟ and so established reconciliation as essential for overcoming division and 
creating a new national identity. 
           The TRC operated on the assumption that the telling of „truth‟ of the apartheid past 
would lead to reconciliation and unity in the „new‟ South Africa. This assumption has come 
under severe criticism as the narrating of trauma does not necessarily aid healing – private or 
societal.
9
 The TRC would attempt to aid the processes of nation-building and reconciliation 
through promoting individual and collective „healing‟ through the catharsis of exposing the 
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truth about human rights violations. The collection and interpretation of testimonies given at 
the hearings over a five year period has culminated in an aggregated „truth‟ that is seen “as 
the basis on which to pass informed, objective judgements on the past, in ways that can help 
to transcend the legacies of past conflict and prevent their recurrence.”10 This did not require 
the creation of detailed individual and community histories, rather a sample of the truth 
would suffice to exemplify the indignities of the past.
11
 This new shared history would 
navigate South Africa through the transition by acknowledging the violent atrocities of the 
past and seeking truth and healing for the future. Through testimonies collected from nearly 
22 000 victims, an „authentic‟ version of the past could be constructed and would debunk the 
distorted version of the past propagated by the apartheid government. The TRC hearings were 
meant to create a „safe space‟ for giving voice to the previously silenced victims of the 
apartheid state where their testimonies would shape the new history of the country. 
           The general public was confronted with carefully selected hearings on national 
television. Testimonies of victims and perpetrators entered the living rooms of many South 
Africans and “coupled as they were with the drama of catharsis and the rhetoric of 
forgiveness, [they] created neat, emotionally charged „sound bites‟ of truth... from which an 
aggregated impression was selectively extracted.”12 On a symbolic level, the objectification 
of representative samples of violation of personhood embodied the nation‟s suffering, thus, 
people who were previously excluded from the nation, could now be included.
13
 Posel and 
Simpson argue that the televised hearings tended to extract more general „truths‟ about the 
experience of apartheid victimisation, the remorse after confessing to such violations, and 
eventual reconciliation between victims and perpetrators “which undergirded the TRC as a 
strongly moral performance.”14 As Tom Lodge argues, the public hearings had a ritual 
function, they were more concerned with educating the public as to what happened from the 
perspective of the victims and attempting to promote communal reconciliation, rather than 
establishing a comprehensive „truth‟ about the past.15 In Tutu‟s view, the public hearings 
became a vehicle for healing and redemption which would morally cement the nation. Cast 
within a Christian framework, individual narratives of injustice, suffering, and redemption 
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were extended to the nation in a framework of compassion and forgiveness and were meant 
to reconstruct the nation from an ethnically divided citizenry. The TRC was one of the 
earliest sites for the enactment of the ideology of the Rainbow Nation and its recollection of 
the traumatic past was meant to serve as a vehicle that would allow the new nation to put that 
past behind it and move on, while rejecting amnesia about this past. Framed by the dominant 
context of „rainbowism‟ this meant that the TRC had, 
to demonstrate its sensitivity to divergent viewpoints on the past, its capacity to recognise and 
affirm diversity, yet produce a moral framework and historical narrative that combined these 
differences into a harmonious larger whole.
16
  
Despite this, the TRC produced a binary version of the past framed in terms of victims and 
perpetrators, making little allowance for the consideration of „grey‟ areas or categories. It 
attempted to pass moral judgement on the past but in ways that reconciled a divided society. 
From a nation-building perspective the details of moral ambiguities of the politics of 
collaboration and complicity had no place to be explored on this platform. All that was 
important from the TRC‟s version of the national past was that that the past had to be 
acknowledged, „truth‟ had to spoken, and that „good‟ had prevailed in the end. This implied 
that the nation could now move forward, assured of the protection of human rights as national 
amnesia about the violent past had been adequately circumvented by the creation of the TRC 
archive and the publishing of its reports once the hearings had been completed. It became 
clear that reconciliation was not only a useful concept applied throughout the hearings, but a 
priority that rapidly assumed primacy.
17
 It used personal memories to construct a national 
history that tied into a framework of reconciliation and nation-building. As Lars Buur argues, 
the “making of official history through the telling of personal narratives was orchestrated in 
order to construct a sense of common destiny.”18 Yet, as Meskell argues,  
While the implicit strategy in South Africa is one of incorporation and a willing amnesia, 
which has effectively ameliorated the threat of violence and revenge in a post-apartheid 
setting, what has been compromised is the accurate reflection of deep historical events and 
their ultimate repercussions... In South Africa, political rhetoric in a climate of confession and 
                                                          
16
 Posel and Simpson, “Introduction” in Posel and Simpson, Commissioning the Past, p.9-10. 
17
 Janet Cherry, John Daniel and Madeleine Fullard, “Researching the „Truth‟: A View from Inside the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission”, in Posel and Simpson, Commissioning the Past, p.26. 
18
 Buur, “Monumental Historical Memory”, in Posel and Simpson, Commissioning the Past, p.76. 
157 
 
forgiveness asks that certain pasts are kept alive, others are glossed over, and still others are 
relegated to the shadows of prehistory.
19
 
Despite attempting to avoid the pitfalls of historical amnesia, political resistance to some of 
the TRC‟s findings meant that certain aspects of the apartheid past had to necessarily be 
glossed over, neglected, and forgotten in the name of constructing the nation. Furthermore, 
by identifying certain people as victims and others as perpetrators, the TRC effectively 
ignored issues of white complicity and structural violence in sustaining the apartheid system. 
It placed the blame for human rights violations on a small group of perpetrators and so 
absolved the white population from responsibility and culpability which allowed them to join 
the new nation. Narratives of communal suffering and loss can be more powerful than a 
history of victories in uniting a nation.
20
 For Lodge, this has led to the creation of a new 
South African identity which included the dimensions of suffering and oppression: the 
„national victim‟.21 By addressing violence committed across the political spectrum a 
narrative of victimhood was extended to all South Africans – suffering was the lot of all the 
people of South Africa as a result of an oppressive apartheid system.  
           Samuelson aptly describes the TRC as a ritual venue for national mourning.
22
 
Testimonies of victims were filled with narratives of loss and trauma from which the new 
history of the nation would be constructed. By focusing on trauma, which is event-centered, 
the TRC relegated suffering to the past and failed to adequately address the everyday 
violations and violence of the apartheid system and its continued legacy in the present. 
Samuelson states that “[t]rauma is a form of mediation, connecting past and present through 
the pain of memory, the material expressions of loss, and is monumentalised through the 
cultural productions of shared histories.”23 The ritual enactment of mourning at the TRC 
hearings was instrumental in the invention of the new South African nation. National 
narratives of redemption were shaped by individuals sharing their loss on a public platform. 
The recall of their memories, guided by commissioners, was a return to a traumatic past in 
search of healing in the present. Trauma and loss, sacrifice and redemption were powerful 
themes that shaped the creation of an official history for the „new‟ South Africa. Trauma, in 
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essence, became a foundation for national identity in South Africa through the 
“institutionalised remembrance of traumatic experiences and the associated cultural practices 
of historical mourning.”24  
 
Constructing ‘Nation’ from Women’s Testimonies of Trauma and Loss  
It has been said that a nation that does not accord a human status to its womenfolk is 
a nation that lacks integrity and that does not belong to a future. Such an assertion 
can never be more true than in a country such as South Africa where the pain that has 
been felt by a whole nation has been felt even more by our mothers, our sisters, our 
aunts, our daughters, our women....
25
 
Maintaining the focus of women‟s positions and positioning in a larger nationalist context, it 
is of significance to address women‟s narratives at the HRV hearings. Women‟s narratives 
were shaped by their subjective positionings within South African society and the TRC failed 
to effectively give voice to women whose human rights had been violated in more numerous 
ways than the narrowly confined bodily harm that the TRC defined as gross human rights 
violations. This defines the lack of acknowledgement of gender as a central component of 
colonial and apartheid oppression and reflects the persistence in women‟s continued human 
rights violations in the present as violent and sexual crimes committed against women 
continue to be tragically commonplace.
26
 Moreover, by constructing women predominantly 
as victims, women‟s active agency in the struggle was constructed in terms of a patriarchal 
nationalism that could silence women in the post-apartheid state – and, to a certain extent, has 
subsumed women in a patriarchal social discourse perpetuated in the most senior leadership 
positions in government in the present. This consideration of a South African nationalism „in 
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the making‟ through placing women‟s narratives of loss at the centre of discussion will 
inform the following chapter as it sets out to define the contexts that shape political and 
politicised women‟s state-sanctioned memorialisation and commemorations in the present. 
           Women‟s testimonials at the public hearings at the TRC were at the centre of the 
process of reconstructing the nation. As a result of the TRC‟s narrow definition of human 
rights violations, restricting this to bodily harm at the expense of more quotidian harms 
experienced by men and women on a daily basis, women approached the TRC primarily as 
mother-witnesses.
27
 While women generally suffered more restrictions under apartheid and 
suffered more in economic terms than men, women predominantly addressed their own 
experiences of harm and activities of resistance to the apartheid state indirectly, speaking 
mainly of men‟s suffering.28 By assuming what Ilse Olkers has identified as a „gender neutral 
truth‟, the TRC failed to recognise gender as a powerful feature in determining violation.29 In 
response, four months after the first of the HRV committee hearings, the TRC announced it 
would add special hearings for women as it had become clear that, while women testimonies 
dominated the HRV hearings, they were rarely about their own experience of violations.
30
 
Mothers, wives, grandmothers, and sisters became the main transmitters of the memory of the 
traumatic apartheid past.
31
  Testifying to the TRC, these women narrated the loss of children 
and family and informed by a teleological context of Christian sacrifice, produced a national 
narrative of sacrificial redemption. While such narratives downplayed the roles that women 
played during the struggle against apartheid, motherhood became the subject position through 
which women could claim a place in the new official history of the country. The restrictive 
TRC mandate resulted in the construction of a struggle past that consisted predominantly of 
male heroics, resistance and the violent repression thereof. Ross importantly states that by 
focusing too closely on bodily experience,  
we run the danger of failing to attend to the experiences of which women speak. A focus 
solely on the body and its violation fixes experience in time, in an event, and draws attention 
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away from ways of understanding that experience as a process that endures across bodies and 
through time.
32
  
The testimonies of women activists were few compared to their male counterparts. The 
Commission inadvertently equated human rights violations inflicted on women with sexual 
violations. This often called on women to speak of sexual violations that mitigated women‟s 
testimonies on a platform that was incredibly public and discourses of shame, victimhood, 
and trauma effectively silenced women.
33
 Women were expected to testify about sexual 
violence; men were not. However, very few women testified about rape or sexual violations. 
Researchers attributed women‟s „silence‟ about sexual violations to a general stigma that 
attaches to women in a society that regards rape as „private‟. “Yet”, Ross argues,  
in the context of political violence or detention rape may be deliberately public. What is at 
stake is not the privacy or otherwise of the act but how society acknowledges it as a form of 
violence and makes provision for its recognition as injury.
34
 
Sexual violence was represented in the hearings as a defining feature of women‟s experiences 
of violence and women could and should testify about such experiences. Yet sexual violence 
was not restricted to women or the apartheid past and was not as commonplace as the TRC 
reports determine. As Ross shows, rape and sexual violence remain widespread in South 
Africa and the “focus on women‟s experiences of sexual violation, while important, precludes 
a wider understanding of the ways in which power may work in gendered ways.”35 
Furthermore, some horrors simply cannot be articulated and silence can be a legitimate 
discourse on pain. For Ross “there is an ethical responsibility to recognise it as such.”36 
However, the public platform of the TRC demanded the narration of pain, loss, and trauma 
for it to be recognised and acknowledged. The silences at the TRC spoke volumes about the 
gendered nature of silence and pain. Stories that were not primarily about sexual violence 
were reinterpreted by the Commission in a manner that emphasised sexual violence and, 
Russell argues, by focusing on sexual violations committed against women their political 
activism was marginalised, or became secondary to, their sexual violation.
37
 Samuelson 
expands on this when she argues that,  
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[w]hen rape is spoken in the prevailing discourses of gender and nation during the political 
transition, women are produced as vulnerable victims in need of male protection, as objects of 
property and exchange, as reproducers of the future, and as markers of national boundaries.
38
 
 
Thus, the violations committed on women‟s bodies renders them as victims – a shame on the 
men who failed to protect them. When women‟s agency, independent subjectivity, and 
activism displayed and „tolerated‟ by men during times of violent political upheaval, are 
reduced to narratives of victimhood and male shame in the present democratic order, women 
are re-subsumed into the patriarchal discourses of the past that are inherited in the present.  
           Women‟s active roles in resistance activities were restricted while many women were 
specifically targeted by the apartheid state for their maternal status as the mothers of activists. 
Samuelson states that as these women testified at the TRC, 
they bore powerful witness to the nation‟s traumatic past and played instrumental parts in the 
revision of national history, challenging the erstwhile dominant narrative with their memories. 
At the same time, female testifiers also performed gendered subjectivities – overwhelmingly 
as bereaved mothers and wives.
39
  
Ross shows how a mere fourteen per cent of women testified about their own experiences of 
human rights violations under apartheid while forty per cent testified on behalf of their 
sons.
40
 The TRC did acknowledge that this was problematic but it was their very definition of 
human rights violations that cast women into the role of mothers and witnesses and tended to 
depoliticise the „private‟ or „domestic sphere‟ under apartheid rule rendering violence 
committed against women as „private‟ rather than political. Yet, women‟s testimonies often 
detailed their domestic worlds and times and this points to the extent of the state‟s intrusion 
in these private spheres.
41
  
           While women‟s political mobilisation around discourses of motherhood and the family 
have been interpreted as conservative and unchallenging of the patriarchal systems that 
support and construct these discourses in South Africa, “women who opposed apartheid did 
so specifically through their understanding of the damage caused by apartheid to family 
                                                          
38
 Samuelson, Remembering the Nation, p.122. 
39
 Samuelson, Remembering the Nation, p.161. 
40
 Ross, Bearing Witness, p.17. Furthermore, men rarely testified about violations against women while women 
were more likely to testify about men. Seventy-nine per cent of women testified about violations committed 
against men. 
41
 Ibid., p.43. 
162 
 
life.”42 For many women, the destruction of family life was the most grievous crime of 
apartheid. By reducing women to „secondary victims‟ and the under-representation of female 
activist testimonies, it implied that women suffered as victims in their roles as wives, sisters, 
and mothers, denying the power of the political mobilisation of motherhood and that women 
also acted as leaders and important sources of strength in their communities and as 
perpetrators of violence.
43
 It rendered women safe and passive. Samuelson argues that 
casting women in this role was both restricting and enabling as, 
It presented women with a subject position from which to speak, while that speaking voice 
was always already produced as that of the suffering mother. At the same time, such gendered 
patterns consolidated the national narrative of sacrifice and redemption, and underwrote the 
TRC‟s goals of reconciliation and nation building.44 
Women were portrayed as secondary victims through this process but it was through their 
role as mothers that they were given a platform to address the nation and narrate their 
accounts of trauma, loss, and mourning. Ross describes the testimonies given by mother-
witnesses as lamentations, forms of sorrowing and grieving. But Ross also indicates that not 
all women‟s testimonies took this format of describing the violent apartheid past. The 
testimonies of women members of liberation movement and anti-apartheid organisations, 
while seldom given before the HRV hearings differed as their testimonies “shed light on the 
Commission‟s ideological effects, the sites of cruelty, and cruelty‟s effect on the constitution 
of the self.”45 According to Ross, “activists tended to speak more directly of pain, its agents 
and its consequences than did women who were not politically active.”46 They would speak 
of detention and torture, some in explicit detail and framed their narratives in terms of an 
enduring and coherent commitment to political ideologies and resistance to the apartheid 
state. They would often name those responsible for their torture and that of others and 
demand answers from perpetrators while speaking powerfully about their encounters with the 
power of the apartheid state. While this differs from the testimonies given by mother-
witnesses, women activists rarely referred (directly) to their political activities. For Ross, this 
may be the result of women resisting yet another incursion by the state through their silence; 
despite the state now being benevolent, it remains an incursion.
47
 In detention, women‟s 
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bodies became the sites of their humiliation and loss of privacy and self. While detained, 
mothers would face having the bond that exists between a mother and her child – presumed to 
shape women‟s identities – used against them. Motherhood, then, becomes wholly political as 
the state wielded its power against women through targeting their reproductive abilities, their 
bodies, and the dominant societal discourses of motherhood.   
          Saturated with theological and Christian discourse in particular, women‟s testimonies 
of loss and mourning for their children were subsumed in the imagery of the mourning 
mother of Christ – the Mater Dolorosa or Mother of Sorrows.48 Samuelson argues that 
women gained voice through their tears – that the power of women‟s voices was inaugurated 
by their tears. Samuelson elaborates, 
Similarly, within the TRC, the tearful act of bearing witness became the mode of performance 
through which women gained a voice, and female testifiers were conventionally depicted 
weeping. Subjected to the gender ideal of the Mater Dolorosa, women were able to enter and 
speak within the public realm while being produced as passive, weeping, secondary victims, 
and producing national history – the narrative of the sacrificial son – as redemptive.49  
Ross argues that these narratives of loss were recast as narratives of „sacrifice‟ by the 
Commission as women testifiers were often thanked for the sacrifice of their kin: 
In Commission hearings, the experience of violation was often recast as „sacrifice‟. 
Commissioners frequently identified their task as being to alert the populace to the loss, 
couched as sacrifice, of childhood and youth, life opportunities, and, in some cases, lives, for 
the struggle. Women testifiers were thanked for the „sacrifice‟ of their dead or injured kin and 
testifiers were frequently told that their sacrifices... had redemptive power for the national 
body. Suffering and sacrifice, heavily predicated on a Christian model, were depicted as 
constitutive of the foundational order of „the new South Africa‟.”50 
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These stories of sacrifice and the manner in which they were told and interpreted were 
influenced by the TRC and “thus did it shape both the subjects who bore witness before it and 
the nation produced during its hearings.”51 It constructed a national narrative of sacrifice 
which led to national redemption through testimonies of loss and mourning given by women. 
Mothers had to bear witness to the nation about the sacrifice of their sons and husbands 
which would regenerate the nation through testimony and tears. Individual suffering and loss 
was given meaning by inserting the testimonies of loss given by women “into a teleological 
narrative of sacrificial national liberation that „created heroes and martyrs in a new 
mythology of the state.‟”52 These narratives would culminate in forgiveness, unity, and 
reconciliation in order to give meaning to sacrifice.  
 
A New Iconography for the Nation 
When a government of national unity came into power in 1994 the country required new, 
strong symbols to foster nation-building and a new national identity constructed around the 
notion of a „rainbow people‟ emerged. The new state had to abandon the symbols of the past 
order and establish a national iconography that would demonstrate the moral order of the 
post-apartheid nation. Yet, this new iconography had to symbolise the unity of the South 
African nation despite the strong divisions that continued to exist. The construction of a post-
apartheid iconography of „unity in diversity‟ was indicative of a preoccupation with nation-
building that seemingly superseded a critical engagement with persistent socio-economic 
inequalities. „Unity in diversity‟ is a phrase that harks back to the apartheid era; a discursive 
resource that was refashioned in the post-apartheid era. While this phrase was echoed in the 
iconography of the new state, conformity was expected with a South African identity that was 
steeped in invented „traditionalism‟, patriarchy, and exclusivity. This sought to integrate 
multiple identities with a single national identity that would be caught up in a utopian nation-
building project that has no tenable possibility of completion.  
           This section will briefly analyse the iconography of post-apartheid South Africa within 
the context of a new state seeking to affirm and legitimise itself. By addressing the new flag, 
national anthem, and coat of arms, it will show how these powerful symbols reflect the 
construction of a South African identity shaped by the national focus on nation-building, 
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reconciliation, and constructing the Rainbow Nation out of a historically divided society. It is 
understood that any successful nationalist movement requires potent symbols around which 
to rally the „nation‟ and this discussion does not criticise the construction of this iconography 
per se. Rather, a critical analysis of these symbols will reveal not only their symbolic efficacy 
as nationalist iconography, it will also show the political context that shaped them into 
markers of a new, moral order.  
           „Ubuntu‟, a philosophy which influenced TRC proceedings, became the signifier for 
the moral order of the post-apartheid state. Ubuntu is a shortened version of an isiXhosa 
proverb, Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, which means „A human being is a human being only 
through its relationship to other human beings‟.53 It was intended to signify a uniquely 
African form of community orientation, a pre-colonial concept of „traditional‟ African 
communalism that was suppressed and contested by Western individualism. Proclaimed to be 
a special African heritage, “Ubuntu was elevated into a central element of a new cultural 
nationalism.”54 Despite this elevation to a central place within nationalist rhetoric, “no 
historical evidence has been produced to substantiate this alleged community culture and it 
appears to be little more than an invented tradition. Instead, general references to „tradition‟ 
are made to suffice.”55 Yet, it became a powerful force in nation-building rhetoric. It can be 
considered to have impacted on TRC processes as victims of human rights abuses who 
refused reconciliation would, by extension, refuse nation-building which in turn was 
purportedly „un-African‟. Simultaneously, social reforms initiated by government that aided 
desperate communities were considered as reparation and rehabilitation measures made in the 
spirit of Ubuntu and further delayed the individual reparations that the TRC had 
recommended to government. As the government supposedly received its mandate from 
Ubuntu as the new moral order that had opposed the evil of apartheid, this philosophy was 
employed to undermine any criticism of government actions. If apartheid was „evil‟, the 
present government that had opposed apartheid and was imbued with the spirit of Ubuntu, 
must therefore be „good‟ and „moral‟. The importance of citizens‟ attitudes, opinions, and 
convictions were elevated as vital to the project of nation-building and anyone who opposed 
or criticised nation-building rhetoric or governmental actions was not part of the „nation‟ and 
opposed to reconciliation – an emotional accusation in a country where nation-building is 
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enacted in all public spaces and platforms. Christoph Marx indicates that social problems 
were [and continue to be] increasingly viewed through a nationalist lens in the „new‟ South 
Africa and nation-building has taken precedence “over necessary reforms and the 
democratisation of society.”56 This is a clear indication of political and moral legitimisation 
through the use of the historical mythology of Ubuntu and the struggle against apartheid. 
Marx accedes that it was the “synthesis of reconciliation and nation-building during the TRC 
process [which] prepared the way for the transformation of Ubuntu in the foundational 
formula for an integral nationalism.”57 Marx continues to critically explain what an Ubuntu-
inspired citizen would be: 
The Ubuntu-inspired African is not just a warm-hearted fellow-human who, through the 
enigmatic essence of being African, is immunised against violence, capitalism, xenophobia 
and sexism. He is, first and foremost, a conformist, who renders government and chief what is 
due to them. If she is unlucky enough to be female, the African personality does not revolt 
against the traditionally sanctioned power of males, because their power can only be 
benevolent and beneficent – because of Ubuntu, of course.58  
Ubuntu came to lay the foundation for a new national identity based on an imagined 
„traditional‟ African egalitarian communality. That this is nothing more than a fallacy 
becomes increasingly obvious with the powerful Traditional House of Leaders continually 
resisting homosexuality as „un-African‟ and continuing to infringe on the constitutional rights 
of women in (especially rural) South African societies. The position of „Chief‟ has been 
removed from its historical context and treated as a timeless African cultural tradition by 
rebranding the position as „traditional leader‟. Tradition and culture are repeatedly invoked to 
legitimise discrimination against women and LBGTI individuals despite having a constitution 
in place that protects the rights of all citizens. Simultaneously, by according automatic 
respect for government and political leadership positions – equating them with traditional 
African leadership – the government places itself above criticism, and as indicated above, 
criticism becomes defined as un-African.
59
 Yet, criticism and conflict are normal occurrences 
in democratic societies and this is where the connotations of cultural nationalism become 
clear. Marx significantly argues that while “[c]onflict is a basic principle of democratic 
                                                          
56
 Ibid., p.54-55. 
57
 Ibid., p.58. 
58
 Ibid., p.58. 
59
 More recently, the term „counter-revolutionary‟, imbued with discourses of racism, has been increasingly 
applied to critics of government which absurdly situates any criticism of government actions in a context of an 
historical support for apartheid and resistance to anti-apartheid movements. 
167 
 
practice... an African authoritarianism in the guise of Ubuntu places emphasis on unity, 
integration, reconciliation and harmony.”60 Essentially, “Ubuntu is an invented tradition, 
whose task it is to minimise historical chasms and fractures.”61 And while this appears 
harmless on the surface level, it is the undermining of the rights of certain sections of the 
population through the guise of „tradition‟ and the intolerance of criticism that renders such 
cultural nationalism dangerous. 
           Flags are powerful national symbols for any state, perhaps even more so for countries 
facing drastic political transitions. It is the function of national flags and anthems to inspire a 
sense of pride in its citizens.
62
 National pride is often displayed through the public display of 
national flags at sporting events, days of national significance, and various international 
events. As nation-building was key in the first few years of democracy, the country‟s new 
iconography had to encapsulate all the elements central to this project. One of the first 
symbols of the new political dispensation was the new flag of South Africa. First used on 27 
April 1994, the flag was designed by former state herald, Fred Brownell, after a nation-wide 
competition for its design failed to produce a suitable replacement for the flag of the „old‟ 
South Africa. As a six-coloured flag, it became an appropriate symbol to represent the 
Rainbow Nation. While the government officially states that the “[i]ndividual colours, or 
colour combinations represent different meanings for different people and therefore no 
universal symbolism should be attached to any of the colours”,63 it does place importance on 
the central design of the flag:  
The central design of the flag, beginning at the flagpost in a 'V' form and flowing into a single 
horizontal band to the outer edge of the fly, can be interpreted as the convergence of diverse 
elements within South African society, taking the road ahead in unity. The theme of 
convergence and unity ties in with the motto Unity is Strength of the previous South African 
Coat of Arms.
64
 
Thus, as a whole, the flag is meant to symbolise national unity and, like many national 
symbols in post-apartheid South Africa, invokes Ubuntu. It seeks not to disregard the past, 
but rather to make it, and the white population, part of a new inclusive nationalism that is 
inadvertently continuous with the previous nationalist movement. But while the previous 
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nationalist movement was exclusively white and Afrikaans, the new one is meant to unite all 
South African citizens under the banner of the Rainbow Nation. 
           Aspects of rainbow nationalism and nation-building can also be found in the national 
anthem of the post-apartheid state. The national anthem, like the interim government, was the 
result of compromise. Combining the past and present, the new national anthem would carry 
the „new‟ South Africa into the future. In 1994 it was declared that South Africa would have 
two national anthems, Die Stem van Suid-Afrika and  Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika but by 1997 the 
two anthems had been shortened and combined to form one national anthem of unity. The 
combination of five of the eleven official languages, including Afrikaans into the new 
national anthem, indicated the new government‟s commitment to the Rainbow Nation where 
everyone, regardless of race or historic power relations, would enjoy equal access to the 
socio-economic opportunities that the country had to offer.     
           Despite the powerful symbolism of the national flag and anthem and their prominent 
presence at international sporting events, a study by Valerie Møller et al, shows that most 
South Africans situate their national pride more prominently in the symbolism of the 
„Rainbow Nation‟ labelling this „rainbow-ism‟ a „civil religion‟, significantly so in the first 
few years of the fledgling democracy.
65
 The pride in the notion of the Rainbow Nation attests 
to its symbolic efficacy as an inclusive „civil religion‟ and creates a sense of a national 
identity that purportedly maintains respect for ethnic and cultural identities. The phrase, first 
coined by Desmond Tutu, was quickly picked up by politicians and then took on a life of its 
own. Rainbow nationalism has persisted throughout the two decades of democracy but found 
its potency within the first years after transition as the state sought to define its vision for the 
future and establish socio-political stability in the country. It was the strong unifying symbol 
of the Mandela presidency that cemented the transition to democracy but would later take a 
backseat in political rhetoric to Mbeki‟s African Renaissance philosophy. The symbol of the 
rainbow intended to represent the coming together of different cultures and ethnicities within 
the confines of a whole. It represented a multicultural nationalism that placed „South 
Africanism‟ first as national identity but took pride in and celebrated the diversity of the 
people that make up South Africa. With no „colour‟ having dominant status within this 
rainbow, it was a symbol that every South African citizen could relate to. Non-racial 
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citizenship as a popular identity was essential for a stable transitional process.
66
 It presented 
an effort to overcome the racial divisions of the past and create a feeling of common loyalty 
to the state that ushered in this time of racial equality and equal opportunities. But an all-
inclusive dominant South African identity had to contend with ethnic and racial identities 
that, through apartheid legislation, had become deeply entrenched and were readily available 
to people as primary identities.
67
 However, the focus on issues of race and on rainbow 
nationalism operates on the very basic assumption that race has been the principal dividing 
element in South African society. In many ways, by promoting rainbow nationalism and 
cloaking it in a strong moral patriotic sentiment, government was able to place focus on racial 
harmony rather than face criticism for slow economic transformation. Thus, while rainbow 
nationalism aided the creation of a stable democracy and a unique but mythical South African 
identity, it undermines criticism and public scrutiny of a government that has failed its 
constituency in many socio-economic respects. Furthermore, while issues of race become 
irrelevant within a Rainbow Nation, government policies such as affirmative action and a 
continued focus on racial classification counter the myth of the unified Rainbow Nation. 
Rainbow nationalism created the myth of the symbolic united nation which evoked feelings 
of belonging after a violent and exclusive past. In the absence of a shared glorious national 
past it created an impression of a common destiny towards which all South Africans should 
strive. 
           The coat of arms of the „new‟ South Africa is imbued with the symbolism of nation-
building. Without going into too much detail, the coat of arms displays two figures – an 
image taken from a famous Khoisan rock painting – in an attitude of greeting, two 
„traditional‟ weapons symbolically lying in repose, and topped by a Protea, diamond, and 
secretary bird – all important national icons. Underneath all this is the new motto taken from 
the extinct /Xam language: !Ke e: /xarra //ke which, in official translation means „Diverse 
people unite‟. The new coat of arms was launched on Freedom Day, 27th April 2000. Then 
President Mbeki declared it as evoking the past, the present and the future and paying 
homage to the past, embracing the indigenous belief systems of „our people‟, and 
demonstrating the “respect for the relationship between people and nature, which for millions 
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of years has been fundamental to our self-understanding of our African condition.”68 Mbeki 
invokes Ubuntu when he states of the figures: “They are depicted in an attitude of greeting, 
demonstrating the transformation of the individual into a social being who belongs to a 
collective and interdependent humanity.”69 Furthermore, according to the South African 
government website, the spiritual act in which the figure (in duplicate) is engaging, allowed 
for the healing of divisions within society.
70
 The focus on the Khoisan, officially 
acknowledged as First Nation People of South Africa, is meant as a unifying symbol. The 
official government description echoes Mbeki‟s words and states:  
The Khoisan, the oldest known inhabitants of our land and most probably of the Earth, testify 
to our common humanity and heritage as South Africans and as humanity in general. The 
figures are depicted in an attitude of greeting, symbolising unity. This also represents the 
beginning of the individual‟s transformation into the greater sense of belonging to the nation 
and by extension, collective humanity.
71
 
As South Africa had no recent harmonious or „golden age‟ to reach back to and on which to 
build a new society, the often romanticised and purported egalitarian society of the 
„Khoisan‟72 would form the basis of a „golden age‟: a common humanity established in South 
Africa as “one of the birthplaces of humanity itself.”73 Despite many claiming Khoisan 
ancestry, the „Khoisan‟ no longer exist (in fact, have never existed) in South Africa as a 
homogeneous group that continues to live in this romanticised manner.
74
 Alan Barnard claims 
that it is perhaps because of this status that the Khoisan were chosen to “embody the mythical 
charter of the new South African multicultural nation.”75 They are, as it were, a neutral 
territory on which the new nation could be constructed. Those claiming Khoisan ancestry in 
South Africa have little political clout to contest or benefit from such symbolic capital and 
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the historic Khoisan people thus become a neutral community with no history in recent 
apartheid conflict. Rather, the history of Khoisan genocide is downplayed
76
 and situated in 
the distant past – a past far enough removed for any living South African to recall. As 
Barnard states:  
The images evoked are of antiquity without the stigma of the primeval, and of autochthony 
without the practical problem of large-scale land restitution. Khoisan people are „good to 
think with‟ and in South Africa...safe to think with.77 
The motto itself, written in an extinct language and calling on diverse people to unite, 
promotes a commitment to “value life, to respect all languages and cultures, and to oppose 
racism, sexism, chauvinism, and genocide.”78 This is all contained within an idealised 
Ubuntu, but this commitment remains severely lacking in practice. 
            
Reconfiguring National Time and Space: Public holidays and Memorials 
The significance of burying dead bodies to the nationalist reconfiguration of time and space 
will be addressed in the following chapters. What will be discussed here is a brief overview 
of how the physical presence of memorials and monuments – a material culture of historic 
trauma – in the public landscape reconfigure both the nationalist time and space. Moreover, it 
will show how the celebration of public holidays that remember and commemorate carefully 
selected events adds to this shift in perception and meaning as histories are overwritten, 
created, and altered. As indicated in Chapter 2, monuments and memorials function as 
important linking objects, or can be seen as “material storehouses for an archive of feeling.”79 
They play a special role in societal mourning after collective losses. Their physical presence 
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in the landscape and assumed indestructibility signifies them as psychological touchstones 
that can be accessed at any time.
80
 For Marschall,  
They mediate between the daily reality of the present and the memories and internal worlds of 
those who directly experienced apartheid violence. For the younger generation, such 
memorials constitute a link with the past and assist in vicariously sharing the experience of 
those directly affected. Beyond the immediately affected communities, such memorials are 
offered to the general public, the nation, and even the international community, as objects and 
sites of contemplation and identification in a collective process of historical mourning.
81
 
Within the context of national reconciliation and nation-building, such memorials are 
important as they are believed to assist in the process of reconciliation after violent conflict. 
They serve as symbolic markers of the official recognition of pain and suffering that was 
experienced in the past. The legacy of the inequalities of the past is still strongly present in 
South Africa today and the philosophies of rainbow nationalism and „Unity in Diversity‟ are 
merely a thin veneer that attempts to promote reconciliation despite deeply ingrained 
economic and social divisions. Meskell argues that the materiality of memorials and 
monuments “provides the bedrock for psychological healing, proffers a form of recognition, 
represents social values, and consolidates the role of victims within the new nation.”82 But 
government‟s increased focus on symbolic gestures rather than service delivery, and the 
continued reluctance to pay financial reparations for victims who testified at the TRC,
83
 
“suggests a certain unwillingness or inability to take more substantive steps in the socio-
economic transformation of the country and to address the material needs of its populace in 
general and victims specifically.”84 In an environment where the inequalities generated in the 
past persist, the enthusiasm for erecting memorials and other symbolic gestures of 
acknowledgement might not be sufficient in restoring a sense of justice and dignity for those 
who were affected by apartheid and continue to suffer socio-economic inequalities as a result 
of its legacy. 
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           Claiming the national time and space is an important element not only for the creation 
and dissemination of nationalist sentiment but also serves as a tool for political legitimation. 
This reconfiguration allows an officially-sanctioned history to be propagated in public spaces 
and national time. This official history is not uncontested but “it is considered to be official 
until someone from within its own domain contests it.”85 As such, this official history, 
steeped in the mythology of the struggle against apartheid, seeks to legitimise the current 
order whilst encouraging nation-building as an essential tool in achieving the common 
destiny envisioned by rainbow nationalism. Following on the work of the TRC, this official 
history presents a narrative of a common destiny and community for the nation, sanctioned 
by the state, in public spaces and time. This collective identity within the parameters of the 
nation is significant in establishing a shared sense of nationhood. Larry Ray, employing 
Eviatar Zerubavel‟s formulation of mnemonic communities,86 argues that “[t]he nation is a 
mnemonic community whose raison d’être derives from both remembering and forgetting, 
especially where the past poses a threat to the unity of the nation.”87 The ritualised 
performances of such identities in calendar time and nationalised spatial coordinates is what 
creates a sense of nationhood amongst previous divided communities. Buur states,  
When the experiences of different individuals are related to calendar time and nationalised 
spatial coordinates, they are reduced to the same formula. Temporal and spatial simultaneity 
is a precondition for the birth of the „imagined community‟ of the nation-state.88  
While not everyone has experienced the past in the same way, it is possible to invoke and 
imagine a common past. By placing the officially sanctioned version of history within a new 
temporal frame and imposing it on public space the „nation‟ can relate to a past that is shared. 
Essentially, the significance of space is altered while history is re-written. The TRC processes 
were essential in establishing a sense of a shared past through narratives of victimhood. 
Furthermore the recommendations by the TRC for symbolic reparations to victims of 
apartheid made significant headway for creating a public space for the officially sanctioned 
history to be enacted. New memorials remembering and commemorating anti-apartheid 
heroes, heroines, victims, and events, erected in public spaces served as important linking 
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objects in the process of the societal mourning of a traumatic past. By acknowledging those 
who died as a result of their opposition to apartheid, claiming them as sons, daughters and 
mothers of the nation, a tie of kinship is extended to them as being part of the national family. 
The victims of and significant events in the struggle against apartheid commemorated by 
public memorials and public holidays are a new moral order, contrasting sharply with the old 
one. Often, these genealogies of the political and politicised dead (often enshrined in a trope 
of individual suffering that is extended to the nation) are so efficiently integrated into public 
space, time, and historical consciousness that they come to be considered as „ours‟. 
Furthermore, it meant that this version of the past, a history of good versus evil, was to be 
one from which the future nation would be built. The particular meanings ascribed to 
physical monuments and memorials, and symbolic public holidays by political elites and 
cultural brokers saturate national time and space with powerful emotions and have the ability 
to bind people to their national territory through the nationalisation and sacralisation of time 
and space.
89
 Blame is appropriately situated in a removed and – as a result of TRC processes 
– apartheid past marked by individual perpetrators. New public holidays celebrating and 
commemorating events considered to be essential for the formation of the new state were 
instituted. Some of the public holidays of the apartheid state were significantly renamed and 
inscribed with new meanings of reconciliation in a form of temporal iconoclasm in the name 
of nation-building. This rendered the old order immoral and legitimated the new state in its 
historic opposition to apartheid. The public holidays of the post-apartheid state commemorate 
and glorify specific events that become historical markers for the foundational mythology of 
the new nation. Sharpeville, the Soweto Uprisings, the 1956 Women‟s March, the first 
democratic elections, the contributions of trade unions to the struggle, the importance of the 
heritage sector all form part of a reconfigured temporal nationalist space. Moreover, 16 
December, previously celebrated as Dingaan‟s Day by the apartheid state, was given a new 
meaning when it was renamed „Day of Reconciliation‟ and recalls both the old – the Battle of 
Blood River – and the „new‟ – the formation of MK, the military wing of the ANC. In a spirit 
of reconciliation it is meant to honour the „struggle traditions‟ of both the Afrikaners and the 
liberation movement.
90
 Heritage Day, celebrated on 24 September, was an invented public 
holiday and has informally become known as „Braai Day‟, celebrating a popular South 
African „tradition‟, commonly shared across ethnic and racial lines, of the outdoor barbeque. 
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Despite this reduction of a common, shared heritage to something as trivial as outdoor 
cooking, it is a day where all South African ethnicities and cultures are celebrated through an 
extraordinary array of events. But the significance of a shared heritage of „Braai Day‟ seems 
to be growing in importance and has the potential to become a significant marker of some 
type of shared tradition that all South Africans can claim relation to, so establishing itself as a 
central part of a new foundational mythology and post-apartheid identity marker.  
           The TRC recommended that memorials be built as a form of symbolic reparation for 
the victims of apartheid violence and their families and to promote nation building. Besides 
being a symbolic gesture that allows individual families to mourn their loss (significantly so 
if the bodies of loved ones could not be recovered), the physical presence of memorials in the 
public landscape means that they are “addressed to a wider audience and become interwoven 
with larger, public processes of commemoration and societal discourses about the past and its 
relationship to the present.”91 This wealth of new memorials and monuments would stand 
side by side with those of previous regimes; South Africa saw no forced removal of statues or 
the iconoclastic moments seen in Iraq or the former Eastern Bloc countries. The erection of 
new memorials commemorating previously silenced histories was, in many ways, South 
Africa trying to reinvent itself and rewriting its history.
92
 Drawing on Marschall‟s discussion 
of considering “memorials as a public acknowledgement of suffering and loss, which can 
restore a sense of personal dignity and lead to societal healing”,93 it becomes evident that the 
state-sanctioned memorials of the post-apartheid state inscribe a new, previously silenced 
history onto the public landscape which is grounded in a societal mourning process in the 
present. Inspired by testimony given at the TRC hearings, the memorials “give a public voice 
and lasting representation in the official memory landscape to people who have been 
marginalised and humiliated for most of their lives.”94 Moreover, monuments and memorials 
have the ability to restore dignity through allowing victims of apartheid to „assert mastery‟ 
over their traumatic pasts as their trauma is recognised and cast into lasting objects. 
Monuments and memorials can also celebrate achievements and leadership, and validate 
cultural practices and values so encouraging reconciliation.
95
 Despite this, the political 
legitimation project involved in the plurality of meanings inscribed on such monuments and 
memorials cannot be ignored. As Meskell states, “these sites enshrine sanctioned memory, 
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they are cultural edifices that sediment certain versions of the past and serve as an anchor for 
specific memory practices.”96 The foundational mythology of the nation can be deployed by 
the political elite to preserve its power by ensuring that its actions cannot be challenged as the 
power of the myth enshrines it in a guise of uncontestable moral worth.
97
 Marschall continues 
her line of argument that “the state supported process of memorialising the victims of 
apartheid violence is also propelled by an ideologically-driven political dynamic that involves 
a hierarchical ranking of victims, and the convenient forgetting of others.”98 For Marschall 
then, this is the result “of the „necessity‟ to celebrate heroes and recount inspiring narratives 
in support of the nation‟s myth of origin and newly defined identity discourses.”99 What is 
essential to the project of nation-building is not necessarily what happened in the past, but 
how the past is interpreted and presented to the „nation‟. State sanctioned memorials are 
always skewed, politically motivated representations of the past and governments hold a 
political stake in maintaining certain mythological accounts of the past that have the ability to 
legitimate their rule.
100
 Of course, the official narratives inscribed on state-sanctioned 
memorials do not go uncontested. Often family members of those commemorated or 
participants of celebrated historical events will contest the meanings assigned to them or 
oppose government rhetoric that claims such heroes, heroines, or events as its own. Despite 
this, official rhetoric tends to determine the meanings that such memorials signify in public 
discourse and subaltern histories are inclined to remain silenced in cases where public 
memorials commemorate significant events and/or people that are vital to legitimation 
politics. As Marschall indicates, public memorials have the ability to promote societal and 
individual healing after a traumatic past but it is vital that these memorials are designed in 
consultation with the victims of this violent history.
101
 Yet, officially sanctioned narratives of 
the past are often represented in public memorials, etching their existence into the physical 
landscape. Marschall illustrates that, 
Officially endorsed public memory, moulded and interpreted by the forces of political 
necessity, always withholds recognition from alternative narratives and can contradict private 
memories, thereby de-authenticating and invalidating them.
102
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More unpleasant aspects of the past, such as the „necklacing‟103 of suspected apartheid 
government informants and the torture and murder of other victims by the liberation 
movement or in the name of the struggle for freedom are not officially acknowledged in the 
physical landscape of memorials and monuments as it is “considered counter-productive to 
the government‟s goals of attaining reconciliation, unity and nation-building on the basis of 
pride in a shared history of resistance.”104 Despite the government drawing on the mandate 
from the TRC process in its efforts to memorialise and honour the victims, heroes, and 
heroines of the liberation movement, it clearly falls short in acknowledging all victims who 
were affected by the struggle between apartheid government and anti-government forces. As 
Marschall indicates,  
...the government-supported practice of memorialisation is implicitly based on a distinction 
between „good‟ and „bad‟ victims, a hierarchical ranking of casualties in terms of their 
symbolic significance or „usefulness‟ to support specific value systems and governmental 
agendas.
105
 
In South Africa it has become clear that dominant political narratives of the past subsume 
local or individual narratives and often sideline stakeholders in commemorative processes in 
order to promote one official narrative that legitimates the current political dispensation.  
 
Exempla Virtutis: A New Pantheon of National Heroes and Heroines 
The creation of a new pantheon of national heroes and heroines is an essential aspect of 
nation-building – especially following drastic political transitions. Heroes and heroines of the 
past are effective tools in „moral education‟ as their stories often display a strong affective 
aspect of values. They are set apart from average citizens through relentless self-sacrifice and 
heroic deeds in the face of extreme hardships and persecution. The myths of heroes and 
heroines and the „heroic past‟ have the ability to become powerful narratives that are 
employed by cultural entrepreneurs, political elites, and governments in the service of nation-
building.
106
 The heroes and heroines that are honoured and commemorated by the new nation 
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come to exemplify all that is moral and good and come to personify the positive qualities that 
should be emulated and nurtured by the nation in order for the nation to be successful – their 
lives are the compass that points to the future. The post-apartheid state, with its foundation 
mythology firmly placed in the years of the struggle against apartheid, has no shortage of 
national icons. The names of these heroes and heroines are commemorated as street names, 
public squares, hospitals, schools, universities, clinics, ships, informal settlements, 
metropoles and a variety of other public buildings and spaces. Their lives and sacrifices are 
recounted in school textbooks – inspiring a sense of patriotism in a new generation – and they 
are immortalised through statuary and memorials that occupy visible public space. The 
average South African is confronted with the icons of the nation on a daily basis. When a 
living hero or heroine dies, depending on their public stature and value as political currency, 
large state-funded public official funerals are held where politicians, struggle comrades, and 
family members have a public (and sometimes televised) platform where the deceased‟s 
moral values and achievements are praised, often within the constricted political context of 
the present. It is at this point, when their voices are silenced in death, that their entry into a 
pantheon of national icons is truly established.
107
 While South Africa has several „living 
legends‟ that are steeped in struggle mythology these icons retain the ability to speak for 
themselves. When these heroes and heroines die, their silences allow their bodies and 
legacies to be inscribed with new and continuously shifting politicised meaning while their 
status as national icons will either grow, fade, or be called upon when social, political, or 
economic contexts require their legacies to inspire, motivate, and legitimate. 
           The post-apartheid nation needed new common heroes and heroines to establish the 
moral compass of the post-apartheid state. These individuals had to be able to represent 
reconciliation and be recognised by the entire nation as heroes and heroines. After all, the 
main goal of the new state was to promote reconciliation in the wake of a divisive past and 
negotiated transition. Therefore, the new national icons that would promote reconciliation 
while simultaneously legitimating the new regime had to be carefully considered. Reaching 
back into the „heroic age‟ of the struggle against apartheid would prepare the modern South 
African nation for its future. The qualities of its heroes and heroines intended to recreate the 
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glory of the past in the present. But this does not mean a return to that past or a longing for it, 
merely the recreation of its reconstructed (sometimes invented) heroic qualities in the present. 
           An interesting aspect of constructing a new pantheon of national heroes and heroines 
is the selection process. These icons had to be symbolically and emotionally accessible to a 
heterogeneous population while simultaneously legitimating the new state and its 
government. With South Africa‟s divisive and violent colonial and apartheid past common 
heroes and heroines were difficult to identify. However, with the new foundational 
mythology situated in the struggle against apartheid and the old regime represented as an 
historical evil, it was apparent that the nation‟s new icons would have strong struggle 
credentials or legacies of resistance to oppression. Simultaneously, these icons had to be 
heroic, not violent; martyrs, not aggressors; symbols of national unity, not the divisive past. 
More difficult aspects of the lives of these icons are glossed over, altered and forgotten in an 
attempt to present them as archetypal heroes and heroines to the nation. Meskell argues that a 
trend in South Africa exists that rather than “addressing the harsh specificities of the past, 
there is a strong seam of reworked and re-imagined pasts that run through these new 
narratives of nationalism.”108 This is not only the case for historic events, but, as will become 
increasingly clear in the following chapters, with post-apartheid icons too. Women often 
feature predominantly in national pantheons as mothers, or are constructed as mothers. The 
uneasy parts of their stories are edited, ignored, and forgotten while constructions of 
motherhood (even if they were not mothers in life) domesticates women who acted outside of 
the traditional gender roles and motherhood is presented as a patriarchal institution and 
national emblem.
109
 Samuelson indicates that “[r]epresented as maternal figures, these 
women reflect back to the nation its imaginary wholeness and unity.”110 Around these 
national mothers, a family of icons is amassed as sons and daughters of our soil, and as 
fathers of the nation. Chris Hani has frequently been referred to as a son of the soil while 
Nelson Mandela is affectionately and popularly referred to as „Tata‟ (father).  
           One of the first icons of the new nation was not a struggle heroine but a figure situated 
in the distant past of the first Dutch settlement of the Cape. Eva/Krotoa was a Khoikhoi 
woman who served as a translator between the early Dutch settlers and the Khoi people of the 
Cape region. She married a Danish surgeon who was employed by the Dutch East India 
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Company (DEIC) and their children grew up as part of Cape Dutch society.
111
 Despite the 
tragic end to Eva/Krotoa‟s life, her story became part of the foundational mythology of the 
new nation. During the transition, the story of Eva/Krotoa has been the subject of a vast 
amount of historical revisionist writing, genealogical claims, and fictional reconstructions.
112
 
Reduced to and cast as a „founding mother‟, our „rainbow mother‟, Eva/Krotoa represents the 
first meeting and coming together of the colonists and the colonised – an icon of unity. As 
Samuelson argues, “Krotoa-Eva is the most evocative emblem of this cross-cultural 
contact.”113 During this period, the cultural texts produced by white South Africans claiming 
identification with Eva/Krotoa indicated a claim to belong to the new Rainbow Nation and 
carving out a “sense of national belonging as „pale natives‟...”114 Essentially, claiming 
Eva/Krotoa as a „foremother‟ legitimated the entry of white South Africans into the Rainbow 
family. Samuelson argues that, 
The positing of the „foundational subject‟, in this case Eva-Krotoa as rainbow Mother, asserts 
the naturalness of the current nation, and of white South Africans‟ place therein, and denies 
their contingency. Krotoa-Eva‟s story is inserted into a narrative that... sees all past events as 
events in the becoming of the [South African rainbow] nation.
115
 
The more difficult aspects of Eva/Krotoa‟s narratives are carefully neglected and forgotten 
and her role as a mother of the nation emphasised reducing her to her womb as a 
representation of the crucible in which Europe and Africa first met.
116
 However, as Coetzee 
argues, rewriting a South African history that situates itself in the history of early Dutch 
settlement perpetuates the myth of 1652 as the founding moment of South Africa.
117
 Meskell 
also identifies a point of contention and argues that the “desire to fabricate and reinterpret 
colonial history, whether in the name of racial harmony or the creation of a more progressive 
future, can lead to the tendency to forget or embellish past atrocities, retaining the spectre of 
potential slippage.”118 Yet it is the ability to shape the biography of Eva/Krotoa into a 
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narrative of unity and reconciliation between races and cultures that drives her symbolic 
efficacy.  
           While finding popularity in the years immediately following 1994, the narrative of 
Eva/Krotoa has been subsumed by a greater official focus on struggle heroes and heroines. 
While the biographies of women such as Sara Baartman found political currency during 
Mbeki‟s presidency and his focus on African Renaissance philosophy, in recent years the 
importance of (predominantly) ANC-affiliated struggle icons has been emphasised. This can 
possibly be attributed to the ANC government coming under increased criticism for its lack 
of service delivery and accusations of corrupt activities within the highest ranks of 
government. The need to publicly recognise the heroes and heroines of its struggle past 
symbolically legitimates the ANC government‟s position as the moral compass of South 
Africa as it ensures the public recognition of its „glorious past‟.119 By honouring the moral 
and glorious past of its organisation and its iconic members in a public context the ANC is 
creating an official history that situates the organisation at the centre of the struggle against 
apartheid – often at the expense of other liberation organisations. Furthermore, it legitimates 
the ANC despite its failing record of service delivery in the present. Although not all the 
icons of the post-apartheid state were card-carrying ANC members, their state-funded 
commemoration enfolds them into a larger ANC-dominated narrative of the past. Important 
icons such as Hector Pieterson and Steve Biko were not affiliated to the ANC yet they are 
part of the upper echelons of the newly constructed pantheon of heroes and heroines and form 
an essential part of the new foundational myths. Often, surviving family members or 
descendants of important individuals that are selected by government for public 
commemoration complain that the government has, in fact, „hijacked‟ the memory of the 
commemorated individual.
120
  This is not unusual but speaks to the fact that the state claims 
ownership of the legacies of iconic individuals at the expense of personal histories and 
memories. However, the official history and foundational mythology of the post-apartheid 
state serves as a “sticking plaster for the social order, and as such it reinforces social cohesion 
and functional unity by presenting and justifying the traditional order.”121 Moreover, the 
medium of the heroic narrative becomes an essential tool in identity transfer in South Africa. 
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It allows a new South African identity to be superimposed on existing ethnic and cultural 
identities. While difficult, it is possible for myths of citizenship to transcend ethnicity.
122
 The 
official narratives endorsed by the state about these national icons attributes special qualities 
not only to the heroes and heroines themselves, but by extension, the nation. After all, those 
heroes and heroines were part of and fought for the nation – their qualities are embodied in 
the nation that produced them. Their tales and sacrifices construct a narrative about what is 
unique and special about the nation as a whole and so, in turn, construct the boundaries of the 
nation.  
 
Conclusion 
Expressions of nationalism can invoke a deeply emotional response. Perhaps even more so in 
a country such as South Africa where violence and trauma have been relatively recent 
experiences. Yet, a tentative South African identity has been moulded out of a divisive past 
that has the potential to (temporarily) „unite‟ South African citizens. This was observable 
during the 2010 FIFA World Cup which was hosted in South Africa, and, more tragically, the 
public mourning of Nelson Mandela. However, there is little doubt that the construction of a 
comprehensive nationalist movement has been an instrumental aspect of promoting a stable 
transitional process in South Africa. While this has been the result of a concerted „top to 
bottom‟ effort in creating a new South African identity, its success – while not completely 
measurable – tends to be displayed at a variety of events where the national flag, national 
anthem, or celebrating aspects of a South African identity feature prominently. Furthermore, 
a brief glance at national internet forums and comments on national news websites often sees 
discussions of emigration or negative attitudes towards any aspect of South African society 
reduced to accusations of unpatriotic or „un-South African sentiment‟ – a sentiment echoed in 
government‟s response to its critics. Logos such as „Proudly South African‟ display a sense 
of national pride in South Africa‟s achievements as government rhetoric has constructed the 
nation as unique in its ability to move forward despite its apartheid past.  
           In order to achieve a peaceful transition, South Africa had to confront its past and the 
TRC processes, despite its many shortcomings, aided this project by presenting the nation 
with an official history of trauma followed by moral redemption. Women‟s testimonies 
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played a significant role in constructing „nation‟ out of trauma and violence but the format of 
their testimonies, guided by the TRC, also displayed the powerful gender discourses at play 
that were informed by the past, but would, and do, continue to be exhibited in the present as 
nationalist ideologies continue to employ women and their bodies in the projects of nation-
building and political legitimation processes.  
           Once a usable past has been presented as official history, this is bolstered by the 
construction of a new national iconography, the political reconfiguration of national time and 
space, and the construction of a pantheon of national heroes and heroines. The extensive 
symbolic iconography created by the post-apartheid state established a foundational 
mythology that simultaneously reached back to an imagined golden age of pre-colonialism, a 
history of colonial contact cast as a founding moment, and the heroic age of the struggle 
against apartheid. All the events of the past, despite their traumatic legacies, were cast as 
events that led to the creation of the South African „nation‟ in the present. In South Africa, 
the fragile nature of this mythology requires its constant reinforcement through its enactment 
in public space and time. Building a future on a past of trauma through a present of mourning 
is achieved by forging a shared history of suffering – however tentative the invention of this 
„shared‟ past may be – which especially finds resonance in a white population that was 
complicit in maintaining the apartheid order. Of course, the nation-building project allowed 
for a sense of hope in the future during times of socio-political uncertainty amongst citizens. 
It allowed people to grasp on to a valid identity as a citizen of a „new‟ South Africa, 
regardless of race and the atrocities of the past. While it cannot be denied that there are 
politicians and government officials (and, of course, citizens) who continue to feel a genuine 
and passionate connection to the nation-building project and have a yearning interest in 
seeing the fulfilment of a truly non-racial, unified South Africa, it is impossible to separate 
the current functionalist approach of government to the struggle past from official 
commemorative efforts that are becoming increasingly factional. With the initial euphoria, 
positivity and hope that accompanied the 1994 elections and the Mandela presidency having 
long since waned and a growing sense of frustration at unchanging socio-economic 
inequalities amongst citizens is emerging, the official nation-building effort has seen a 
decrease in genuinely altruistic motives as it necessarily becomes more utilitarian. 
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Chapter 6 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Remembering, (Re)creating, and Commemorating the ‘Midwives of 
Political Emancipation’: State Sanctioned Histories and SAHRA’s 
Women’s Legacy Project 
 
 
Heritage is sometimes equated with reliving the past; more often, it improves the past 
to suit present needs... We dwell on mythic fables rather than specifics, consolidate 
history into a generalised past, and revamp a legacy in line with what we think the 
present is or want it to be.
 1
 
- David Lowenthal 
 
Heritage is… seen by its critics as ‘a project’, if not a conspiracy or plot then at the 
very least a strategy, ‘a complex and purposely selective process of historical 
recollection.’ It is ‘a bid for hegemony’, a way of using knowledge in the service of 
power. It shores up national identity at a time when it is beset by uncertainties on all 
sides.
 2
 
- Raphael Samuel 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have established the context for a discussion of the many ways in 
which political and politicised women and their legacies are moulded to form part of the post-
apartheid nation‟s foundational mythology. This chapter will form the bridge between a 
discussion of general methods of commemorating women considered important to the post-
apartheid state to the case studies that will follow in subsequent chapters. Prompted by the 
recent effort of the South African Heritage Association (SAHRA), this chapter will consider 
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the framework of an ambitious project titled „Honouring and Celebrating Women‟s Sacrifices 
and Roles as Midwives of Political Emancipation‟. This project seeks to honour and 
commemorate South African women spanning the colonial and apartheid eras and who have 
in some way contributed to resistance to oppression whether through political activism, art 
and culture, or through subversion of the old order. Three of the women discussed in the 
following chapters are a significant part of this project and the commemorative efforts 
planned for their graves have already commenced.
3
 Despite a recent restructuring within 
SAHRA and a reported „lack of capacity‟ which placed the proposed legacy project on the 
backburner, a renewed effort has been made to realise this ambitious venture with a 
significant portion of the funding having been approved by the Department of Arts and 
Culture (DAC).
4
 The proposal of this project counters the current predominant 
commemoration of male struggle heroes and male politicians in the South African public 
commemorative landscape yet still inadvertently domesticates women within a post-apartheid 
hegemonic patriarchal social system. 
           This chapter will briefly address the strong top-down state approach to the heritage 
industry in South Africa to indicate the importance of SAHRA‟s new legacy project within 
the public space. It will place special focus on the ways in which women, deemed important 
enough to be honoured and celebrated in post-apartheid South Africa, are commemorated in 
public spaces and the ways in which their legacies are interpreted, shaped, and eventually 
displayed in a way that informs and supports the foundation myth of the nation. The 
discussion will move on to outline the SAHRA project and focus on its selection of the 
women who are to be commemorated and especially its focus on the declaration of graves as 
national heritage sites. Through the (re)construction of the martyrdom, sacrifice, and 
domesticity of women across time and race this project becomes a significant part of 
government attempts at fostering a sense of national unity and envisioning a unified South 
African identity of which respect for gender equality is a purportedly significant component. 
Yet, it has become clear in the two decades of democracy that political equality does not 
ensure the establishment of women as “full, free and rights-bearing members of a democratic 
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polity.”5 The broad variety of women selected for this project allows identification with anti-
colonial and anti-apartheid activists and their efforts across the historic racial divide. 
Furthermore, the language used in the title of the project strongly resonates with the previous 
political dispensations‟ language of sacrifice, motherhood, and domesticity when 
commemorating women in public spaces. The declaration of the graves of Helen Joseph, 
Lilian Ngoyi, and Charlotte Maxeke as national heritage sites in 2010 launched this legacy 
project. The more recent 2012 declarations of the graves of Rahima Moosa and Adelaide 
Tambo (as part and parcel of the declaration of her husband, Oliver Tambo‟s grave as a 
national heritage site), thus far indicate continued government focus on struggle history as the 
bedrock for the foundation myth of the post-apartheid state. Furthermore, government 
rhetoric and predominant government funding for these projects and the media attention 
given to such declarations ensures the creation of a government-sanctioned official history 
enacted in the public space and serves to legitimate the current political dispensation while 
also defining national identity through a newly envisioned heritage.     
            
Post-Apartheid Heritage 
Ingrid de Kok observes of the South African transition that “[s]ince the past had to meet the 
present through settlement, not revolution, it needed an accompanying rhetoric about how to 
process the future: and that process was divined as the act of nation building.”6 The advent of 
the first democratic election saw a renewed interest in the heritage industry amongst the 
public as, reportedly, the Presidency and the Minister of Arts and Culture were flooded with 
letters from organisations and individuals requesting official tribute to those who had made 
sacrifices for the struggle against apartheid and the recognition of important sites and 
previously marginalised communities.
7
 It is not uncommon in post-colonial societies for 
heritage and cultural tourism to be considered by governments as a “magic bullet”8 to 
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revitalise sluggish economies and lead to economic development in impoverished and 
undeveloped rural and urbanised areas. The South African government understood the need 
to recognise and present the histories of such communities, individuals, and the significant 
events that occurred during the years of resistance in the public space to counter the official 
commemorative markers of the colonial and apartheid eras that dominated the public 
landscape.
9
 As Marschall indicates, heritage “emerged as a prominent discourse in the 
political and public arena, one of the principal sites for negotiating issues of culture, identity, 
and citizenship.”10 Official representations of what would come to represent a new post-
apartheid South African heritage would form an important part of nation-building, 
showcasing the country‟s racial and ethnic diversity, creating employment opportunities in 
undeveloped communities, and lead to social reconstruction.
11
 This indicates that for the post-
apartheid government, heritage served a very specific social and political function of 
redressing the past, building the „nation‟ socially and economically in the present, and 
creating a new official iconography and social repository for the future. Government initially 
launched the National Legacy Project which identified several high-priority, and indeed, 
high-profile heritage development sites which would form the cornerstones for the grand 
narrative of the foundation myth of the post-apartheid nation.
12
 Nine high-priority sites were 
selected and included the commemoration of the Zulu warriors at the battlefield of Blood 
River, a monument for the women of South Africa at the Union Buildings in Pretoria, an 
inclusive commemoration of the Centenary of the South African Anglo-Boer War, 
Constitution Hill, the commemoration of sites identified with Nelson Mandela and his youth 
in Qunu in the Eastern Cape, a memorial for Samora Machel, the former Mozambican 
president, on the site where his plane had crashed, the restoration of the home of Albert 
Luthuli in Kwa-Zulu Natal, the establishment of a Khoi/San heritage route, and the creation 
of the ambitious Freedom Park complex near Pretoria.
13
 Marschall shows that, although these 
projects were seemingly legitimised from „above‟ and „below‟ (through the „floods of 
requests‟ from grass-roots level and its official endorsement from government), the requests 
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received from civil society were condensed and channelled into a few high-profile projects. 
History and its representations are invariably contested terrains and certain voices are 
privileged in the public space. Walkowitz and Knauer show that “local and national 
participants in these struggles have not only divergent agendas but also unequal reserves of 
financial, political, and cultural capital with which to advance those agendas.”14 Building 
upon this observation, Marschall argues that rather than being the result of critical debate, 
consultation and engagement, the memorial landscape that emerged was not a reflection of 
what „the people‟ valued about the past or how they would like to see their heroes and 
heroines celebrated, but a “highly institutionalised form of commemoration sponsored by the 
national government in pursuit of specific aims and intentions.”15 The sites identified for 
development would embody narratives of resistance against apartheid, colonialism, racism, 
and oppression which were morally superior qualities with which the post-apartheid South 
African nation was imbued. These narratives of resistance and trauma which lie at the heart 
of South African official history would be institutionalised and preserved through officially 
sanctioned forms of remembrance in monuments and public statuary. This intended to inspire 
a new national identity while congruently legitimating the new political order through the 
selection of official accounts of the past that tend to privilege ANC activists and sites of 
memory associated with the struggle. This indicates the need for institutional authority for 
firm and reliable accreditation. Paul Connerton argues that institutional authority needs such 
accreditation retrospectively and prospectively: “Retrospectively, authority needs to be able 
to point to a proper descent... it must be able to justify its existence by reference to legitimate 
ancestors... Prospectively, authority needs to be remembered appropriately...”16 It was 
expected that the state-funded public commemoration of certain events, locations and 
individuals would allow official narratives of the past to constitute some form of „public‟17 
memory in years to come as their presence in the public landscape would infiltrate the 
historical consciousness of the „nation‟. For Assman, it is the framework provided by the 
foundation myth within which selected narratives and their associated heroes, artefacts, and 
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places are embedded and from which they derive their meaning.
18
 Following Barthes‟ 
definition of myth as a form of depoliticised speech, the foundation myth simplifies, clarifies, 
and orders an unruly multivocality of political narratives to produce a single moral and 
political story that defines the post-apartheid nation. Marschall has identified four interrelated 
„foundational pillars‟ on which the foundation myth of the post-apartheid nation rests: the 
meta-narrative of the struggle for liberation; resistance against all forms of domination and 
the disenfranchisement of the marginalised, the notion of triumph over oppression, and 
Ubuntu.
19
 The identification and official celebration of political and politicised individuals 
and sites in the post-apartheid state are driven by these four „pillars‟. Although most 
narratives of resistance are stories of collective loss and mourning, each one becomes a 
narrative of triumph and celebration in the context of the post-apartheid state. Moreover, it is 
the superior moral qualities that developed as a result of centuries of loss and suffering that 
are celebrated in the new heritage landscape, or what Lowenthal, in the context of the 
„heritage of victims‟, has referred to as national “traits forged in the crucible of loss.”20 In 
their entirety, these commemorative objects, spaces, and events establish a single, larger 
foundational myth that attempts to obfuscate oppositional and ambiguous narratives.
21
 For 
Walkowitz and Knauer complicated and untidy histories are unjustifiably simplified to serve 
state policy, and “complexity is sacrificed for the sake of soundbites.”22 Speaking within the 
context of post-9/11 USA their argument that any critical examination of deconstruction of 
the past is equated with being anti-patriotic rings true of South Africa in the present where the 
term „counter-revolutionary‟ is frequently heard being uttered by politicians on news reports 
when referring to critics of ANC policies. However, with reconciliation as the initial focus of 
the post-apartheid state, the establishment of commemorative objects and events that 
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celebrated the new democratic order had to avoid being perceived as divisive. Within a spirit 
of reconciliation, the meta-narrative of the struggle against oppression and its celebration is 
represented as benefitting the nation, conceived as a homogeneous entity, in its entirety. As 
Marschall shows, 
[m]embers of the white minority, it is intimated, can also celebrate the advent of freedom and 
the achievement of the new democratic order, as they have been liberated from the moral 
burden of benefitting from racial injustice; from the constraints of living in an environment 
controlled by principles of social engineering; and from the stigma of belonging to a nation of 
white oppressors.
23
  
Thus, nation-building and reconciliation is facilitated by presenting and reconstructing the 
struggle as a shared national history – however constructed, or invented, this version of the 
past may be. Robins argues that such collective narratives of trauma and suffering tend to 
serve nationalist agendas and this will become increasingly apparent for the South African 
case in the following chapters.
24
 Essentially, each officially-sanctioned heritage project 
“celebrates a foundational element or symbolically expresses integral, constituting values of 
the new nation as conceptualised by the government.”25 Moreover, as Marschall asserts, 
government‟s decision to invest in the Legacy Project, has “turned the state into the main 
promulgator and interpreter of history.”26 This is demonstrated by “[t]he increased 
involvement of the state in the shaping of „public history‟ and the government‟s 
encroachment and restructuring of public space through symbolic interventions and the 
strategic usage of heritage for the purpose of political and societal policy goals...”27 Since the 
initiation of the development of the nine high-priority sites, a significant number of smaller 
(although not necessarily less valuable or costly) commemorative efforts have sprung up in 
the heritage landscape. By 2002, six further sites or projects of importance had been 
identified which included the Sara Baartman memorial. What has become increasingly clear 
is the focus on commemorating extraordinary leaders or individuals as opposed to collective 
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experiences. The “notion of identifying heroes and celebrating implicit „founders of the 
nation‟”, argues Marschall, “plays an increasingly prominent role not only in the Legacy 
Project, but also in the wider post-apartheid commemorative effort as it has been unfolding 
over the past years.”28 Marschall has shown that the individuals celebrated and 
commemorated in official heritage projects are overwhelmingly male while women‟s 
contribution to freedom and democracy tends to be commemorated symbolically and, more 
often than not, women are commemorated as a group rather than as individuals. “Moreover”, 
Marschall argues, “patriarchal attitudes that diminish the contributions of women and 
prevailing criteria for defining heroic action and „worthiness‟ tend to work against paying 
public tribute to women.”29 Marschall continues, 
 
The concern for women‟s equality has historically been marginalised and subsumed under the 
discourse of national liberation, and even feminist art-making in South Africa... was only 
acceptable if it overlapped with socio-political commentary. Today, the new landscape of 
memory enshrined by the democratic order is foremost concerned with the representation of 
liberation heroes and invariably male-dominated episodes of resistance history in which 
women are not considered, because they usually do not „make the grade‟ according to the 
parameters of this discourse.
30
 
The Sunday Times Heritage Project, a private-sector initiative, resulted in seven public 
memorials in honour of women – all with their attending problematic representations of 
womanhood. However, the recent proposal of a five-year legacy project by SAHRA and 
funded by DAC focuses exclusively on commemorating specific women and their resistance 
to colonial and apartheid oppression through politics, art, literature, and education. 
           Since 1999, the management of South Africa‟s national heritage sites has mainly fallen 
to SAHRA. The establishment of this agency in 1999 would allow for the effective 
identification, declaration, protection, and management of heritage sites and objects at local 
and national levels. It would set the norms and standards for heritage management in the 
country in close collaboration with the local communities and, of course, DAC by whom 
many new heritage projects are initiated and funded. SAHRA was established with a strong 
drive to harness the power of heritage to promote unity and reconciliation and to create a new 
South African identity while – idealistically and somewhat ironically – guarding against the 
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use of heritage for “sectarian purposes or political gain.”31 SAHRA itself would be 
responsible for the management of Grade I heritage sites – those deemed to be of national 
importance, while local bodies would maintain heritage sites of lower grade stature indicating 
a clear heritage hierarchy in identifying what is most important to remember and present to 
the nation and tourists. Burial grounds and graves form an important aspect of SAHRA‟s 
missive and within the National Heritage Resources Act (1999) that established the agency, it 
is indicated that within the first five years of its existence, SAHRA had to present a list of 
graves of individuals associated with the liberation struggle and those who died in exile to the 
Minister of Arts and Culture for approval for their protection as national heritage sites.
32
 
Furthermore, for those struggle heroes who died outside of South Africa, the act makes 
provision for their re-internment in a place of prominence in the capital.
33
 The importance of 
the graves of struggle heroines that are considered to be of national significance is reflected 
in the Women‟s Legacy Project as all identifiable graves of women nominated for 
commemoration have been recommended for declaration as Grade I National Heritage Sites.   
 
The Legacy Project 
Honouring the roles that women played in the struggle against apartheid has become 
increasingly prominent in recent years. The official focus on women‟s activism appears to 
have gone hand in hand with an increase in the media attention given to the ever-rising level 
of sexual and physical violence against women.
34
 This violence is especially highlighted 
during Women‟s Month events where female icons are honoured and commemorated. 
Furthermore, the ANC as the current ruling party has become under increased criticism for its 
lavish spending of state resources on non-essential services and the extravagant lifestyles 
enjoyed by some of the organisation‟s top ranks in a country where poverty remains a central 
social issue.
35
 The ANC has countered this criticism in official commemorative efforts such 
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as Sisulu‟s funeral and its recent year-long centenary celebrations by focusing on discourses 
of sacrifice and martyrdom as embodied by the ANC and its members as a struggle and 
liberation party. Both notions of sacrifice and martyrdom tend to be discourses encountered 
in nationalist narratives of female political activism and female anti-colonial and anti-
apartheid activists have become „safe‟ icons to commemorate in the current political context. 
Conceivably, it could also be an attempt to counter the negative patriarchal and misogynist 
perceptions that arose from the influential supporters of then deputy-president, Jacob Zuma, 
during his rape trial (at which he was found not guilty). Furthermore, President Zuma‟s 
„traditional‟ and conservative values seem to ideologically counter government rhetoric and 
legislation promoting gender equality in South Africa. Whatever the motivation for the 
increased efforts for commemorating South Africa‟s past struggle heroines might have been, 
it is a positive move that has the ability to put women being subjected to violence the 
forefront of government legislation that could change the lives and living circumstances for 
many. However, rather than seeing a marked improvement in government funding for 
essential services for initiatives such as rape crisis centres and places of safety for women 
who have suffered violence and displacement (and by extension – often their children), it has 
been the present political capital gain that can be achieved by promoting and honouring 
certain struggle heroines that has been at the forefront of most commemorative efforts. 
Davison articulated  this, albeit in a different context, when she wrote that “[f]unding is a 
powerful agent of change, and it has been made clear that financial support will be awarded 
to those heritage projects that contribute to transforming national consciousness.”36 Very few 
of the recent commemorations for struggle heroines, or National Women‟s Day celebrations 
for that matter, have been accompanied by the unveiling of government programmes to help 
and improve the lived experiences of South African women and girls. Rather, lavish state-
funded parties attended by the upper echelons of government are given to mark the 
occasions.
37
 What has become clear is that the political usefulness and gain of 
commemorated struggle heroines is at the forefront of efforts to „honour‟ them as the 
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government is seen to be failing to adequately protect its women citizens in the present. 
While the lives, legacies, and efforts of many of these women serve as markers of value 
systems that should be supported and remembered in the present it is lamentable that this 
does not necessarily translate into government activism to change women‟s lives for the 
better – which is, after all, what many of these iconic women fought for in their lifetimes. 
           The previous chapters have established how women‟s bodies come to signify „nation‟ 
within a general theoretical and historical context and in the performative context of women‟s 
TRC testimonies. In the case of South Africa‟s traumatic history, this embodiment of the 
long-suffering nation has produced a very specific category of „woman‟ which is performed 
in the public official mourning rituals of iconic post-apartheid heroines. Samuelson argues 
that nations are imagined through gendered tropes and argues that in post-apartheid South 
Africa, “women bear the symbolic weight of nationalism; their bodies are contested sites on 
which national identities are erected and national unity is forged.”38 The political efficacy of 
dead bodies in ideology production can be attributed to their inability to contest the narratives 
that are inscribed on their remains. As the following chapters will demonstrate, the heroic 
female dead body, often defined by discourses of sacrifice, martyrdom, and motherhood, 
becomes the ideal vehicle for nationalist ideology production. Samuelson indicates that,  
In search of tractable symbols with which to express their ideals of homogeneous unity, 
national and ethnic claims commandeer women‟s bodies and deny the more messy aspects of 
their legacies that cannot be neatly enfolded with the nationalist script. Through acts of 
amnesia and foreclosure, or „disrememberings‟, women are shaped into the ideal forms that 
reflect the desired national body – usually that of Mother, or simply Womb.39   
If the nation-state, then, is a “repository of male hopes, male aspirations, and male 
privilege”40 and female reproductive discourses reflect the desired national body which is 
ideologically produced by men, women necessarily remain trapped in discourses of 
normative domestic femininity. This leaves little space for the production of a foundational 
mythology in which women operate as actors rather than as subjects.    
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Representing Struggle Heroines           
In recent years some effort has been made towards presenting the role of women in the 
struggle to the public. Freedom Park, the most ambitious, grand, and extensive post-apartheid 
memorial and museum in South Africa, unveiled its plans for a Gallery of Leaders, carefully 
refraining from using the terminology of the heroic. Established with the vision of emerging 
as an international icon for freedom and human rights, the mission of Freedom Park is  
To provide a pioneering and empowering heritage destination in order to mobilise for 
reconciliation and nation building in our country; to reflect upon our past, improving our 
present and building our future as a united nation; and to contribute continentally and 
internationally to the formation of better human understanding among nations and peoples.
41
 
While its core function, 
...is the creation of a memorial that will narrate the story of South Africa‟s pre-colonial, 
colonial, apartheid, and post-apartheid history and heritage, spanning a period of 3.6 billion 
years of humanity, to acknowledge those that contributed to the freedom of the country and 
managing the Freedom Park as a cultural institution.
42 
The Gallery of Leaders meant to include national, continental, and international icons that 
embodied the values described in the mission statement of Freedom Park. A part of the larger 
S‟khumbuto43 memorial that commemorates the major conflicts that shaped South Africa and 
those that sacrificed their lives for humanity and freedom,  
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The Gallery of Leaders pays tribute to some of the many people whose leadership qualities 
and achievements have been pivotal in the struggle for humanity and freedom nationally, 
continentally and internationally. These leaders have been selected because of the way in 
which they have brought about change and development and influenced the course of history. 
They are in the Gallery of Leaders to serve as exemplary role models who are worthy of being 
emulated.
44
 
A list of twenty-four names was presented with fourteen iconic South African anti-colonial 
and anti-apartheid resistance leaders, a further seven African leaders, and three international 
icons of resistance to oppression. The display is situated in a large hall with images of the 
leaders selected for inclusion printed on banners hanging from the ceilings in a larger-than-
life display that instils a sense of sacred heroism in the observer. What seems somewhat of an 
afterthought is the inclusion of only two women into this list, Helen Joseph and Lilian Ngoyi. 
These two exceptional women stand as giants in the post-apartheid pantheon of heroes and 
heroines and their iconic status as struggle heroines is uncontested. While the Gallery of 
Leaders is international in its approach to honouring icons of resistance to oppression, the 
complete lack of inclusion of prominent women leaders from outside of South Africa is 
conspicuous. Arguably, the inclusion of Joseph and Ngoyi in this male-dominated list feels 
like a necessary token gesture to acknowledge women‟s involvement in the struggle in South 
Africa. An acknowledgement of the contribution of prominent women to international 
struggles for human rights is completely lacking. Furthermore, the reference to martyrdom 
through the association with S‟khumbuto and its reverence towards those who sacrificed their 
lives for freedom lends a sense of the sacred to the leaders commemorated in the gallery. 
           A year-long exhibition at the Red Location Museum in Port Elizabeth funded by the 
National Heritage Council reflects a more direct attempt at honouring the roles of women in 
the struggle. Honouring prominent Eastern Cape women activists, the focus of the exhibition, 
titled „Yesterday‟s Heroines, Today‟s Inspiration‟, appears to have been the propagation of 
the glorified values of the past in the present as indicated on the museum‟s flyer for the 
exhibition:  
The work done by these women should inspire today‟s women as the battle is not over, 
though the issues may have changed. Contemporary women are facing, amongst other things 
                                                          
44
Ibid., at 
http://www.freedompark.co.za/cms/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25&Itemid=31&phpMy
Admin=17b790ef730b81da09a13c43c12692b2 accessed 2 February 2013. 
197 
 
– HIV/AIDS, unemployment and drug abuse. Through the likes of women who contributed 
their all for a better life for others, today‟s women are encouraged to be inspired and to take 
the noble baton from „Yesterday‟s Heroines‟ and to be actively engaged in present day issues.  
Once again, women‟s roles are phrased in terms of noble sacrifice for a cause. Marschall also 
touches on official remembering of women‟s political activism and contributions to 
democracy as often being framed in the discourse of sacrifice – a traditional female role.45  
The accompanying article to the exhibition in the local regional newspaper, The Herald, 
reinforces the domesticity noted in the leaflet by emphasising how women sacrificed and 
forfeited the comfort of their homes and the difficulties faced by women as single mothers as 
husbands were more actively involved in resistance activities.
46
 This is not to deny the 
importance of the politicised nature of the domestic sphere during apartheid or to fail to 
acknowledge that for many women in the twentieth century (and, indeed, today), the care of 
household and family were and still are primary tasks. It is, however, problematic that 
women‟s active contributions remain phrased in a discourse of the domestic in as it serves to 
reinforce discourses of femininity and womanhood in notions of domestic passivity and 
sacrifice.  
           The exhibition ran from 29 November 2011 until 30 November 2012 and 
commemorates five struggle heroines from the Eastern Cape region; Florence Matomela, 
Nontuthuzelo Mabala, Zodwa Sobukwe, Nosipho Dastile, and Lillian Diedericks. Matomela 
was known for her involvement in the ANCWL and FEDSAW and died under banning 
orders. Mabala and Diedericks were also involved in the ANCWL and participants in the 
1956 Women‟s March. Sobukwe was known for her „behind the scenes‟ work during the 
struggle years and staying out of the public eye. Her experience was typical of the wives of 
prominent political anti-apartheid activists and she and her children faced repeated police 
harassment despite her husband‟s absence in the home. Dastile was a founder of the UDF in 
Uitenhage, the first president of the Uitenhage Women‟s Organisation, chairwoman of the 
ANCWL in Uitenhage after the organisation‟s unbanning in 1990, and served as one of the 
first councillors in Uitenhage‟s transitional local council from 1994-1999. Sobukwe and 
Diedericks are the only surviving women honoured by this exhibition. While the museum‟s 
official explanatory statement fails to acknowledge violence against women as one of the 
greatest struggles faced by women in the present, Diedericks recognises this as the new battle 
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when she states, “At the time, women were fighting against atrocities of the apartheid 
government, today‟s women are fighting a different cause. They are fighting against women 
trafficking, rape, poverty, drug and alcohol abuse.”47 Despite a workshop organised for young 
women by Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University to educate them about the contributions 
of these five women to the advent of democracy, no other community outreach programmes 
accompanied the exhibition. Furthermore, the exhibition itself is a simple display of digitally 
printed images of the women accompanied by their brief biographies and some artefacts 
associated with their lives. The simplicity of the exhibition echoes official and also private 
commemorative efforts to honour women which often embody notions of humility and 
understatement, perhaps to counter traditional statuary and monuments which tend towards 
grandeur and the monolithic. While simple, the informative effort made to educate the public 
about the activism of several local women and its attempt to promulgate these values into 
present day activism stands in contrast to the more traditional pantheonic heroism presented 
by the Freedom Park display in its Gallery of Leaders. 
 
Honouring the ‘Midwives of Political Emancipation’ 
A more concerted and comprehensive effort to commemorate several remarkable women 
deemed heroines in the present has emerged in recent years. The project, envisioned by 
SAHRA and approved and largely funded by DAC, proposes a five-year Legacy Project plan 
entitled „Honouring and Celebrating Women‟s Sacrifices and Roles as Midwives of Political 
Emancipation‟. It followed the 2010 declaration by the Minister of Arts and Culture of the 
graves of Charlotte Maxeke, Helen Joseph, and Lilian Ngoyi as national heritage sites. The 
initial declaration would only involve the declaration of the graves of Joseph and Ngoyi, yet a 
special interest and push from within SAHRA would allow for the inclusion of the less 
publically known Maxeke‟s grave.48 The project plan projected a five-year span from 2010-
2015, but due to “internal re-structuring” within SAHRA very little happened after the initial 
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declarations.
49
 The recent 2012 declaration of Rahima Moosa‟s grave as a national heritage 
site indicates a revival of the project and a renewed effort towards its completion.  
           The scope of the project is extremely large and it remains to be seen if every aspect of 
the project will be addressed. Ranging across a time-period spanning the colonial and 
apartheid eras and identifying women in roles as diverse as queens, activists, artists, and 
writers, their works and sites and objects associated with women‟s resistance to oppression, 
its full and timely completion appears ambitious at best. The guiding principle for identifying 
individuals for this project is determined by their “cultural significance due to a strong or 
special association with the life or work of a person, group or organisation of importance in 
South Africa.”50 Whilst referred to as „unsung heroines‟, many of the women identified for 
this project are well-known personas within the new foundational mythology and their 
names, and indeed statues and memorials to them, are present in the public domain. Others 
are women famous for their contribution to South African literature and art and are certainly 
not „unsung‟. The project aims to embrace “national transformation imperatives...to promote 
reconciliation, understanding and respect, and contribute to the development of a unifying 
South African identity.”51 Moreover, it aims to ensure that the women it has selected to 
commemorate become part of the national heroic canon. The project identifies its central role 
as the “mobilisation of content challenging the silences in the general education band of the 
role of women as midwives of political emancipation in the different areas of life.”52 
Furthermore, at the “heart of the project” is the “promotion of governmental imperatives such 
as – social cohesion, nation building, rural development, job creation, and the promotion of 
reconciliation etc.”53 In addition to the palpable employment of women‟s legacies of 
resistance to oppression for nationalist ideology and political power struggles, the strong 
gendered language of the project title which identifies women as „midwives‟ of political 
emancipation reflects the dominant gendered nature of post-apartheid nationalism. This 
continues to assign women and their political roles maternal or feminine title-roles. This 
confines their „unnatural‟ activism and militancy to the safe domestic sphere, rendering them, 
ultimately, harmless. Women‟s activism in the struggle is often phrased in terms of sacrifice 
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and martyrdom, more so than men‟s roles in the struggle which is enshrined in the narrowly, 
often male-dominated, definition of the heroic. This renders women‟s activism nearly passive 
while men are presented as active participants. This is especially poignant when the 
continued influence of the House of Traditional Leaders, the lack of true parliamentary 
engagement with horrendous levels of violence against women, and a lack of leadership and 
role-models within government that pay more than lip-service to gender equality, are taken 
into consideration. The continued public confinement of women to traditional constructs of 
gender roles within post-apartheid nationalism shackles public perception of women to their 
roles within a domestic sphere. Women who are seen as acting outside of the accepted gender 
roles become vulnerable to gender driven violence. Furthermore, a complete lack of (or 
perhaps unwillingness in the face of strong traditional and patriarchal concepts of masculinity 
being valued within the highest ranks of government) governmental engagement with 
constructions of masculinities in South African society stunts any true progress in addressing 
and fighting the increasingly sadistic nature of attacks on women.  
           Helen Moffett addresses the rising levels of sexual violence, and more specifically, 
rape, in the post-apartheid state in her sagacious article that attempts to discern the rationale 
for this rise in sexual violence committed against women in the democratic state.
54
 Linking a 
rise of cases of sexual violence during times of more benign political change, Moffett 
suggests that a case can be made  
for arguing that during periods of overt nationalist fervour, political regeneration, 
emancipation, and other arguably more laudable forms of political restructuring, the rates of 
sexual violence against women and children also rise alarmingly, often for reasons that have 
to do with the immediate past.
55
 
The inadvertent „racing‟ of rape in post-apartheid South Africa occurs by causally placing 
discourses of rape in a context of apartheid oppression. This means that any official 
discussions about rape are subsumed in narratives of race and class. These assumptions about 
rape, held at the highest political levels, ensure that gender and the aetiology of rape are 
“almost never directly addressed.”56 Yet, the current focus on apartheid as a justificatory 
narrative for rape in the post-apartheid state inadvertently lays the blame for rape solely at the 
feet of those oppressed, dominated and emasculated by the apartheid regime: black men. 
                                                          
54
 Moffett, “‟These Women”, JSAS, 32, 1, 2006. pp.129-144. 
55
 Ibid., p.131. 
56
 Ibid., p.135. 
201 
 
This, while continuing to hijack the current debates on rape, also, argues Moffett, “serves as a 
counter-transformative narrative, one that maintains and nurtures fear and suspicion in 
communities that are already historically or culturally divided, or prompts a return to 
conservative values and traditions.”57 This, in turn, may lead to a re-embracing of 
„traditional‟ values which advocate the subordination of women. Moffett locates the cause of 
sexual violence in the construction of dominant masculinities found in all patriarchal social 
systems. She shows that apartheid‟s legacy of dominating and controlling the powerful and 
dangerous Other through extreme and punitive violence has led to a social anxiety in the 
present where women have become the Other – a powerful unstable subclass that must be 
kept in place. She unequivocally states that “[t]here is indeed a link between South Africa‟s 
recent history, and the failure of its citizens under democracy to respect women‟s rights to 
bodily autonomy and integrity.”58 In the public and political spheres, as has already been 
shown, South Africa has one of the most progressive affirmative action programmes in 
favour of women. Women‟s active roles as guerrilla fighters, leaders, and political strategists 
in the struggle smoothed the way for their participation in a democratic order. Yet,  
these rights were crafted in a country contending not only with a legacy of racism, but one of 
manifest sexism, homophobia and xenophobia… It can thus be argued that political space (on 
all sides of the spectrum) for women in South Africa has invariably been carved out in ways 
that do not undermine the variety of interlocking patriarchies in society.
59
  
Women‟s equality in the public space clearly does not translate into equality within the realm 
of the domestic which remains, for the greater part, hierarchical and stratified. The transition 
to democracy has readily absorbed the entrenched forms of patriarchy that flourished under 
apartheid, and given that much of this patriarchal heritage has remained intact “the newly 
democratic South African state can be suspected of trying to site women as holding equality 
only some of the time and in certain spaces.”60 Moffet concludes,  
So a devil‟s bargain has been struck; women are widely accepted as having equal political 
status, even within structures like parliament, as long as they remain subordinate in the 
private and domestic realms.
61
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The domesticating language encountered in the project document seems to reinforce the 
notion of political equality yet subsumes women, once again, in discourses of acceptable 
gender norms. It is clear that during the transition from apartheid to democracy the “rhetoric 
of equality and rights tend[ed] to mask the reconstruction of patriarchal power.”62 Women 
were militant activists, acted outside of the domestic domain, displayed independent 
subjectivity, it seems to say, yet they did so within a context of womanly sacrifice, as 
mothers, as wives, as sisters for the good of the „nation‟ whose „birth‟ they aided through the 
sacrifice of their safe domestic havens. But now that democracy has been safely delivered, 
women must return to that domestic haven and nurture it through passing on the values of the 
new democratic order to their offspring. 
           While the project genuinely attempts to highlight the significant and often under-
represented contributions of women to the achievement of democracy in South Africa, it 
frames these contributions within a context of nation-building and reconciliation. It situates 
women‟s resistance within a simplified context of resistance to political oppression and 
unjust government. It fails to acknowledge that many women who partook in resistance 
activities often did so from a platform of women‟s emancipation and gender equality. 
Significantly, the project subsumes women‟s activism for women‟s rights within the larger 
narrative of the struggle as it extends this canonical history over four centuries.
63
 
           As already indicated above, the project plan is extensive in its attempt to encapsulate 
four centuries of women‟s resistance to colonialism and apartheid. The objectives the project 
plan outlines are broad but tend to focus on identifying sites, buildings, individuals and 
objects and honouring them through erecting statuary and declarations of national heritage 
sites – somewhat empty tokens for the communities from which many of the women came. 
This speaks to a wider context of monumental heritage, where the icons, martyrs, heroes, and 
now too, heroines, of the new political dispensation are physically commemorated in the 
public landscape with statues and monuments, leaving behind a monumental legacy, that, for 
many, are the true markers of heroic commemoration. Marschall argues that the 
representations of humility and understatement often present in post-apartheid memorials 
erected to women could be misconstrued by a public whose concept of the importance of a 
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monument is measured by its monumentality and grandeur.
64
 The project objectives are 
outlined as follows:           
To honour the forgotten and unsung heroines on the formation and consolidation of earlier 
South African states through the declaration of buildings, sites and/or graves associated with 
them. 
To honour and celebrate heroines of anti-colonial resistance campaigns by declaring 
buildings/sites or graves associated with them as national heritage sites. 
To honour iconic leaders of Women‟s resistance campaigns and political formations through 
serial nominations and declarations of their burial sites as National Heritage Sites; 
To develop project plans to incrementally identify a beacon of sites associated with women‟s 
struggles at different regional locations and leaders in different provinces. 
Develop an integrated participatory approach that engages provincial and local authorities in 
identifying sites associated with individual leaders and the collective Women‟s movement. 
To incorporate women of different generational and periods of resistance politics  across the 
broad spectrum of cultural, anti-colonial, anti-apartheid resistance inclusive of the arts, 
literary writing, performing arts, education and social upliftment transcending across racial 
and political associations. 
To declare heritage objects and collections of national significance associated with the 
women‟s liberation struggle.   
Identification of other icons across the broad cultural/ urban –rural divide focusing on those 
who contributed to the struggle in different periods of the liberation struggle and forms of 
resistance such as political banishments, in combat and in detention deaths and extra judiciary 
executions. 
Identification of ordinary women who played an active role in mobilisation of women‟s 
participation in defiance of unjust laws and struggles at local level such as beer riots, rent and 
consumer boycotts.  
The project is intended to culminate in 2013 with a launch in Bloemfontein on 6 June with a 
march to the Mayor‟s office marking Maxeke‟s march “in her footsteps”, where the first 
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Women‟s monument will be unveiled. On International women‟s day 8 March 2014 a 
monument of the 1956 march will be unveiled at the Union Buildings.
65
 
While these objectives appear standard with most other large-scale legacy projects in the 
post-apartheid state, the apparent proposal of another monument for the 1956 Women‟s 
March at the Union Buildings in Pretoria are puzzling as a „monument‟, albeit problematic, 
neglected and somewhat inaccessible, already exists at the Union Buildings. Yet, on further 
clarification SAHRA wishes to “enhance” the current presentation of the monument at the 
60
th
 anniversary of the 1956 Women‟s March after it has drawn criticism from “different 
formations.”66 This will be attended by the declaration of the Union Buildings as a national 
heritage site. However, as indicated above, women‟s activism is situated within the larger 
official narrative of resistance to colonial and apartheid oppression and unjust laws. The brief 
attention given to ensuring that women across racial and political associations are recognised 
falls with reconciliation ideologies and ensures broad-spectrum identification. Yet, it is clear 
that the central focus of this project is an extension of all women‟s resistance history into the 
official narrative of „The Struggle‟. The process by which this project is to be achieved 
involves the issuing of public calls for the identification of “sites of collective of [sic] Painful 
Memory of Women‟s struggle... for interpretation and representation of individual 
struggles.”67 This involves traumatic histories associated with prisons, labour bureaus, and 
demonstrations in general which were addressed during the TRC hearings. SAHRA also 
hopes to complement their declaration of graves as national heritage sites with a “serial 
nomination of other sites.”68 „Supportive‟ memory projects proposed by SAHRA involve 
memorial lectures, documentation, and exhibitions which “will assist in the mobilisation of 
critical research content for educational initiatives.”69 What is suggested here is to enter the 
data collected in the wider process of this project into publically accessible mediums. To 
expand on this, SAHRA suggests the  
Identification of a permanent Memorial space for a scroll of names, repositories of archival 
materials, display of heritage objects (Women‟s charter, photographic material, women‟s 
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organisations) and sustainable supportive programmes for women‟s socio-economic 
development projects through other institutions of government.
70
 
Reminiscent of heritage projects across the world, the suggestion for a scroll of names is not 
unique and, more surprisingly, a Wall of Names already exists at Freedom Park. However, 
the suggestion here appears to call for a memorial site exclusively dedicated to women‟s 
resistance in order to counter a currently male-dominated narrative of the struggle. 
Unfortunately, it seems to wash its hands of any effort towards truly engaging in projects that 
would be able to change the lives of South African women who face violence, abuse, 
exploitation, and poverty every day. The vague suggestion of “supportive programmes for 
women‟s socio-economic development” echoes the empty condemnations of the staggering 
levels of violence committed against women in South Africa issued from parliament and 
offers no concrete plans or suggestions. However, if such a memorial site were to be erected 
the hope remains that programmes that can affect and change the lives of women and girls in 
its surroundings will be instituted. Finally, the project process suggests the development of a 
“three way approach for the Women‟s Project… through incorporation of Women into other 
heritage projects relating to the specific areas of their historical and cultural contribution at 
national and international level (Women‟s month, international Women‟s day and heritage 
month).”71 This would suggest a more general focus on women‟s historical resistance during 
nationally and internationally recognised time periods set aside for honouring women and 
their contributions to society and promoting global gender equality. While Women‟s Month 
is celebrated in South Africa in August as an extension of the 9 August Women‟s Day 
celebrations, no mention is made of how this project could also attach itself to the Sixteen 
Days of Activism for No Violence Against Women and Children Campaign. For this project 
to have a truly lasting legacy and to make changes in the lives of citizens today, rather than 
focusing on, and creating political capital out of past achievements, it needs to build on the 
legacies of the women who made significant changes in their lifetimes and emulate these 
achievements in the present. 
           The draft programme of action suggests seven categories that the project hopes to 
address. While including women from the more distant colonial past, the majority of women 
selected for commemoration are situated in the resistance politics of the twentieth century. 
While the project refers to these women as „unsung heroines‟, many have been honoured with 
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some type of memorialisation in the public space in the last two decades. Yet, it must be 
acknowledged that while some names are well known (especially those featuring in recent 
struggle history), other, relatively unknown women can be considered somewhat obscure and 
publically acknowledged to a lesser extent as their political capital is minimal. The first 
category is labelled “Royal Women” and includes Chieftainess Madinoge and Hoho and 
intends to declare their graves as national heritage sites. Queen Mother Lobatsheni is 
included in order to acknowledge her contribution to the founding of the SANNC in 1912. 
The graves and royal palace sites of Princess Mkabayi, Queen Mother Nandi, and Princess 
Magogo (mother to current IFP leader Manghosutho Buthelezi) are to be declared national 
heritage sites. And finally, the graves and “associated sites” of the Rain Queens Krotoa, 
Mantsopa and Manthatisi (who has a submarine named in her honour) are to be declared 
national heritage sites. In addition, perhaps the focus on women‟s traditional leadership in 
rural areas and their support of anti-colonial and anti-apartheid uprisings counters the silences 
that place rural struggles in the shadow of the larger and better officially acknowledged urban 
uprisings.  
           The category for artists includes Bessie Head (who has a post-apartheid mosaic 
memorial in her honour at a Durban school), Irma Stern (the Irma Stern Museum already 
exists in Cape Town), Jane Alexander (who is still alive and active as an artist), Gladys 
Nomfanekiso Mgudlandlu, Olive Schreiner, and Ingrid Jonker and intends to declare their 
works as heritage collections and will republish their “significant writings” through DAC 
institutions. A general category for heritage objects and collections and their declaration as 
national heritage collections includes “significant heritage objects belonging to women, 
associations and groupings such as photographs etc.”72 Furthermore, a category for heritage 
buildings and sites seems to focus on women‟s prisons and intends to declare Kroonstad, 
Lock Street and Fort Johannesburg Women‟s Prison as national heritage sites through their 
connection with struggle heroines identified in a section that will be discussed below. As sites 
that embody both personal and collective narratives of violence and trauma that were the 
result of encounters with colonialism and apartheid their inclusion within a larger heritage 
project situates them within comprehensive nationalist narratives that effectively silences and 
reconfigures any personal and fragmented accounts of experiences of violence and subsumes 
them within a disembodied discourse of triumph.   
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           The following three categories contain the names of women that are well-known icons 
of apartheid resistance. The category named “International Icons” contains only four names 
of female anti-apartheid activists of the twentieth century: Cissie Gool (who has a memorial 
in her honour in central Cape Town), Madie Hall, Amy Biehl, and Dulcie September. While 
Hall and Biehl were U.S. citizens, and September an ANC representative in Paris, their 
labelling as „international icons‟ is somewhat unclear. Moreover, the „difficult‟ narrative of 
Biehl‟s murder has meant that up until now, no official commemorative efforts have been 
made. Biehl was murdered in the turbulent years preceding the 1994 elections by four 
attackers aligned to the PAC who would later seek amnesty from the TRC. A white Fulbright 
scholar working at the University of the Western Cape Community Law Centre in 
preparation for the 1994 elections, Biehl was beaten and stabbed to death in Gugulethu 
township in 1993 when driving home black friends in her car. Her violent death resulted in a 
great deal of negative publicity about the „new‟ South Africa in U.S. and foreign media.73 
Casting a negative shadow on the morality of resistance to oppression, Biehl‟s death has, thus 
far, received very little official recognition or commemorative attention. In Gugulethu, two 
memorials have been erected on the same street. One, a small, privately sponsored memorial 
to Biehl, the other the grand, official memorial commemorating the Gugulethu Seven.
74
 In 
comparison to the large Gugulethu Seven memorial, Biehl was initially commemorated by a 
small stone cross inscribed with the words “Amy Biehl Memorium” situated at the entrance 
to a petrol station.
75
 Reinforcing the notion of an un-usable past, Marschall states in relation 
to Biehl‟s initial private memorial marker,  
The lack of any further explanation, the informality of the marker, as well as its undignified 
placement, all reinforce the unofficial nature of this memorial tribute to an extraordinary 
young woman whose tragic death cannot be officially acknowledged in the emergent memory 
landscape, because it casts a shadow over the inspiring grand-narrative of the liberation 
struggle endorsed by the state... But the government-supported practice of memorialisation is 
implicitly based on a distinction between „good‟ and „bad‟ victims, a hierarchical ranking of 
casualties in terms of their symbolic significance or „usefulness‟ to support specific value 
systems and governmental agendas. 
76
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While the Amy Biehl Foundation
77
 (founded by Biehl‟s parents) can be considered to be the 
living memorial to Biehl, the lack of official commemoration thus far fails the TRC mandate 
of acknowledging all victims of apartheid and its associated struggles and violence. It is clear 
that the „uncomfortable‟ narrative of Biehl‟s murder holds no political capital in the current 
political landscape and it will be interesting to follow the developments around the proposed 
memorialisation of Biehl which includes the declaration of sites associated with her memory. 
Biehl is the only woman within this project whose story is truly problematic to the grand 
narrative of the struggle that is being concretised in the present memorial landscape and is 
part and parcel of the mandate of this project. Thus far, no concrete plans have been 
announced and, while at this point being merely speculative, it remains to be seen if her 
memorialisation will be cast in terms of the notion of reconciliation so strongly associated 
with her family‟s forgiveness and granting of amnesty to her murderers or if her story will be 
„sanitised‟ through a self-serving process of denial, dis-remembering and manipulation. In 
2010, a new memorial was erected and funded by the US Embassy in Pretoria and the 
Fulbright Foundation, which attributes her death to political violence and honours her as a 
“tireless human rights activist”.78 However, no official efforts to commemorate Biehl have, 
yet, been made.   
 
           The penultimate category contains the names of “Combatants, Detainees, Banned 
Activists”. This list is extensive and contains the names of women that are hardly „unsung‟ in 
the current political dispensation. Ranging from a variety of anti-apartheid political 
affiliations these women have their roots in trade unionism, women‟s rights, and anti-
apartheid activism, several of whom, like Dulcie September, died as the result of politically 
motivated assassinations. This category includes women who, often, stepped outside of 
accepted domesticity and gender norms and took part in militant resistance to apartheid. 
Furthermore, most of these women have been commemorated in some form through the 
naming of streets, hospitals, clinics, naval vessels, schools, municipalities, or university 
residences or the erection of physical memorials in their honour. Rahima Moosa, Josie 
(Mpama) Palmer, Ruth (Slovo) First, Victoria Mxenge, Frances Baard (who has a municipal 
district named in her honour), Coline Williams (who has a memorial dedicated to her in 
Athlone), Florence Matomela, Sonia Bunting, Molly Fischer, Ray Alexander, Ntsikelelo 
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Cothoza, Lindiwe Mthembu, Nonkosi Mini, Phila Ndwandwe, Makhosazana Nyoka, Dorothy 
Nyembe, Molly Blackburn, Anne Silinga,  Mantwa Kwape, Helen Suzman, Nokuthula 
Simelane (who has a life-size statue erected in her honour), Linda Dlodlo, and Bozwana 
Notemba are the women whose graves will be identified for declaration as national heritage 
sites and their names for inclusion in the proposed Memorial Centre. Furthermore, the 
women‟s prisons associated with the detention of several of these women (Kroonstad, East 
London and Fort-Johannesburg Women‟s Prison) will also be declared national heritage sites. 
The selection of names contains several women who were murdered by the state as a result of 
their anti-apartheid activism. Moreover, these women and their status as martyrs make a 
powerful contribution to the sacralisation of the narrative of the struggle and its canonisation 
in the present. Martyrdom appears to be a strong, reoccurring theme in officially-sanctioned 
commemorations that honour struggle heroines, whether it was the sacrifice of lives, or of 
their time, homes, and families and attests to the point made above that women‟s activism in 
South Africa and struggle history is often enshrined in terms of sacrifice. While notions of 
„sacrifice‟ lend a strong sense of the sacred and virtuous, it also restricts women‟s activism 
within these almost passive terms while male activism is often regarded as heroic, brave, and 
active – a male, patriotic duty rather than an unusual stepping out of the regular boundaries of 
family life.  
           The final category focuses on the centenary celebration of the 1913 Women‟s March 
led by Charlotte Maxeke. It intended to declare Wilberforce College a national heritage site, 
re-enact the 1913 March to Bloemfontein culminating in the unveiling of a Women‟s 
Monument and the erection of „markers‟ in Winburg and Bloemfontein. While this was 
intended to take place in 2013, the „internal restructuring‟ of SAHRA that resulted in a two-
year long hold being placed on the project has meant that this date was no longer feasible. In 
addition, with the head of the Burial and Graves department, Troy Phili, who was 
instrumental in the inclusion of Maxeke in this project, having since left SAHRA it is unclear 
to what extent this phase of the project will be carried out. Maxeke fits the prominent profile 
of having been instrumental in women‟s mobilisation within the ANC that stands at the 
forefront of current politicised commemorative selection. 
           This new project represents a welcome effort to commemorate women‟s roles in the 
founding of South Africa‟s democratic order in the public space and, undoubtedly, there are 
officials and politicians who are genuinely committed to this project and its dedication to 
honouring women‟s political activism. Yet, there appears to be a tendency within the Legacy 
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Project to rewrite and reconfigure women‟s personal narratives of resistance, trauma, and 
suffering into a collective experience in the aid of a grand narrative that serves both the state 
as it confronts challenging social issues in the present and the continued effort for the 
creation of a foundational mythology for the new nation. Following a common nationalist 
trend of equating violence inflicted on women‟s bodies (as in the cases of women 
imprisoned, tortured, and assassinated for their resistance) with violence inflicted on the 
nation,
79
 personal narratives of violence and trauma become little more than metaphors of 
nationalist ideology informed by discourses of sacrifice and martyrdom. Furthermore, the 
violent histories of women‟s prisons and the state-sanctioned torture and assassination of 
women which form a central part of this project indicate how women‟s „dis(re)membered‟ 
bodies are readily appropriated for the collective project of nation building that is currently 
deeply embedded in discourses of sacrifice and martyrdom. Inevitably, women‟s activism 
and militancy is reduced to women‟s victimisation by speaking the violence that has been 
inflicted on their bodies. By focusing on traumatic histories, women are effectively silenced 
and domesticated, reduced to victims rather than survivors; resigned to the domestic despite 
their active roles in resistance to oppressive regimes.  
 
Conclusion 
While the interest and drive that initiated the Women‟s Legacy project seems to have waned 
in recent years the current political and media climate appears to be fertile ground for a 
renewed impetus towards its resurrection and completion. Although the project is a welcome 
change in the largely male hero worship-dominated heritage landscape, creating an awareness 
of women‟s activism in the past and encouraging its emulation in the present, it remains 
framed within a context of normative domestic femininity and recasts women‟s personal, and 
often violent, encounters with colonialism and apartheid as nationalist rhetoric that could 
erase the fragmented nature and silences of embodied experiences of violence.
80
 The 
immense scale of the project and its significant government support indicates its centrality to 
the development of a South African nationalism founded on the pillar of resistance to all 
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forms of oppression, racism, inequality, and subjugation. Addressing the lack of 
representation of women in the public heritage landscape through official government funded 
projects will invariably result in a heavily politicised message being attached to any public 
memorial, commemorative building or object. While this message will be grounded by the 
meta-narrative of „The Struggle‟ and post-apartheid unity, it is also likely to be informed by 
present day socio-political issues. Women‟s lives and lived experiences will be moulded and 
shifted in such memorialisations to fit contemporary socio-political contexts and will 
continue to endure the writing of new socio-political narratives on their legacies as 
anniversary celebrations recall their historic contributions into the present. The state‟s 
functionalist approach in its selection of who and what to remember and commemorate is 
indicative of a deliberate effort towards constructing a new foundational mythology for the 
post-apartheid state that had to contest the grand narrative of the previous regime whose often 
monumental statuary has remained a part of the public heritage landscape. The chapters that 
follow will be indicative of how shifting socio-political narratives are inscribed on the bodies, 
legacies, and commemorations of prominent post-apartheid heroines who no longer have the 
ability to speak for themselves. Some, like Sara Baartman, are completely silent. All that 
remains is a tragic legacy whose narrative was fitting not only for an emerging post-colonial, 
post-apartheid nation, but also for ethnic claims and agendas, and presidential philosophies. 
Maxeke, Joseph, Ngoyi, and Sisulu all left a remarkable vocal legacy, yet their activism and 
legacies have more recently been employed at commemorative events and, in the case of 
Sisulu, at her funeral, to address certain socio-political issues within South Africa and 
represent government‟s need to find more „silent‟ role models whose contributions can be 
shaped for short-term political gains.  
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Chapter 7 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Witnessing Death: Burying “Our Mother, Our Leader”, Albertina Sisulu 
 
We are each required to walk our own road...and then stop, assess what we 
have learned and share it with others... It is only in this way that the next 
generation can learn from those who have walked before them, so that they 
can take the journey forward after we can no longer continue. We can do no 
more than tell them our story – it is then up to them to make of it what they 
will.
 1
 
- Albertina Sisulu 
 
Introduction 
Albertina Sisulu has long been representative of the iconic image of the powerful 
mother/struggle heroine of the „golden years‟ of the history of resistance to apartheid. Always 
represented as „Mother/Activist‟, she had become a living legend in the pantheon of South 
African post-apartheid foundational heroes and heroines. Her sudden but quiet death at the 
age of ninety-two in June 2011 in her home, surrounded by some of her children and 
grandchildren, seemed a fitting and peaceful end to the life of a woman who has long been 
hailed as the „Mother of the Nation‟ and as an icon of humility and dedication in a country 
where the political elite is often portrayed as having very little of these admirable qualities. 
On 11 June 2011, Sisulu was laid to rest next to her husband, famous ANC anti-apartheid 
activist, Walter Sisulu. The day long official funeral was televised on state-owned national 
broadcaster SABC2. News correspondents at select locations delivered short informational 
segments on Sisulu‟s life and presented interviews with the „ordinary‟ people and well-
known South African political figures present at her official funeral service at Orlando 
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Stadium whose lives were touched by the revered anti-apartheid activist affectionately known 
as „MaSisulu‟.  
           A short week before, the nation was informed of her sudden passing through a variety 
of media resources and leading public figures paid tribute to the legacy that Sisulu left behind 
and which was thrust back into the spotlight as the nation mourned the loss of one of its great 
women struggle icons. As the funeral progressed, a romantic narrative unfolded about the 
sacrifices of the heroes and heroines of the struggle years, Albertina Sisulu‟s dedication, 
loyalty, discipline, her family life and marriage, and above all, her maternal influence on 
many of today‟s leading political figures. Sisulu was cast as the archetypal „Mother‟ – both in 
a political and familial sense. Sisulu‟s life was delineated as one to be emulated above all; her 
legacy untainted by the accusations of corruption and self-enrichment facing several ANC 
leaders today. Throughout the official funeral it became clear that political commentary, 
tributes, and even funerary eulogies linked the legacy of Albertina Sisulu to contemporary 
political and socio-economic issues. Sisulu passed on during a period that saw a sharp rise in 
violent service delivery protests in many under-developed communities and strong political 
discord between the ANC main body and its „ill-disciplined‟ Youth League. What emerged at 
the funeral services was a strong emphasis on Sisulu‟s dedication to the ANC, her family, 
community and the nation, her unwavering discipline, and the many sacrifices she made to 
further the cause of the struggle – in short, her selflessness.  
           This chapter will focus on Albertina Sisulu and the public mourning rituals that were 
imparted with nation-building rhetoric. This reflected the establishment and reinforcement of 
an ANC-immersed foundational mythology as the reputation of the ruling party and some of 
its leaders came under scrutiny due to slow socio-economic transformation processes. As an 
ANC stalwart whose reputation of dedication and service was above reproach and, indeed, as 
a figure who has been hailed as the „Mother of the Nation‟ for three decades, Sisulu‟s legacy 
was an ideal narrative through which the „golden years‟ of the struggle could be recalled into 
the present, emphasised, and employed in contesting criticism levelled against the ANC. This 
chapter will first give a brief outline of Sisulu‟s biography as it establishes the historical 
framework for her iconicity in the present. It will contextualise the time period of Sisulu‟s 
death against a backdrop of service-delivery protests in South Africa, accusations of 
corruption and self-enrichment levelled at the ANC, and the internal discord within ANC 
structures which determined the tone of her funeral. The chapter will then continue to analyse 
the oration given by President Jacob Zuma at Sisulu‟s funeral while also briefly considering 
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the tributes delivered by prominent political figures in order to indicate how Albertina 
Sisulu‟s legacy as a „Mother of the Nation‟ has already permeated post-apartheid 
foundational mythology and continues to be (re)invented to remain a frequent point of 
reference for confronting prominent social issues in present South Africa. This, in turn, will 
allow for an examination of the positioning of the official representation of Albertina Sisulu 
as a foundational figure for the post-apartheid state.     
 
“A History Worth Emulating”2 
While Sara Baartman‟s death and politicised constructions of martyrdom determined her 
iconic status as a national heroine, Albertina Sisulu‟s3 long life of dedication to the struggle 
and to the ANC ensured her proclamation as „Mother of the Nation‟. It is for this reason that 
Sisulu‟s biography will be addressed more extensively in this chapter. Furthermore, Sisulu‟s 
life has been well documented and forms an intrinsic part of the „golden era‟ of the struggle 
that is so celebrated and revered in present South Africa. She has also been a „living legend‟ 
in the post-apartheid state and an icon that has graced the nation with her living presence and 
who is still remembered as a politically active individual by the generations of the nation 
born before the advent of democracy. Sisulu‟s biographer, daughter-in-law, Elinor Sisulu, 
noted that the lives of Albertina and Walter Sisulu are a biographer‟s dream; an epic saga of 
“persecution, bitter struggle, and painful separation. It is also one of patience, hope, enduring 
love, and ultimate triumph.”4 At the time of Albertina Sisulu‟s death it became clear that this 
narrative of the „epic saga‟ and the prominent themes that feature in many of the world‟s 
heroic epic sagas, would determine the official representation of her legacy in the post-
apartheid state.  
           Albertina‟s political life began when she decided to take up nursing and she was 
accepted as a trainee-nurse at Johannesburg Non-European Hospital at the end of 1939. She 
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 Thandi Modise, Premier of the North West Province, “Albertina Sisulu – Always a Mother”, 
http://www.citypress.co.za/you-say/albertina-sisulu-always-a-mother-20110610/  accessed 6 October 2013. The 
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4
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left her hometown Xolobe for Johannesburg in January 1940. Sisulu details how Albertina 
took to nursing “like a duck to water. Her upbringing, which had inculcated high standards of 
cleanliness, discipline, and a strong work ethic, stood her in good stead. Her compassionate 
and empathetic nature made it easy for her to relate to patients.”5 Albertina‟s dedication to 
her career as a nurse and its associated values of care giving and nurturing would also 
influence the shaping of her iconicity in post-apartheid South Africa and inform the 
discourses of motherhood that determined her „Mother of the Nation‟ status. It was during her 
training that Albertina had her first real confrontation with institutionalised racism. Although 
aware of the reality of a segregated society, Albertina and her family had always been treated 
with respect in Xolobe. At the hospital, Albertina tried to tolerate racism as par for the course 
in a segregated society. Yet, a horrific accident at Park Station in 1940 would change this. As 
the hospital‟s non-European ward was swamped with critically injured patients, some had to 
sleep on the floor while beds in the „European‟ section of the hospital stood empty as only 
few of the injured were white. When senior black medical staff requested that black patients 
be allowed into the „European‟ section of the hospital their pleas were ignored. Sisulu shows 
that this incident,  
had a profound effect on Albertina. To deny patients the best possible medical care because of 
the colour of their skin, in her eyes, was a violation of the sacred duty of the medical 
practitioner to do everything possible to preserve life.
6
 
Yet, Albertina settled into her life in Johannesburg and she met Walter Sisulu in 1941 
through a mutual acquaintance. According to Sisulu it was during their courtship that 
Albertina developed an interest in politics as Walter was already deeply involved in the ANC. 
Sisulu shows that “the couple spent much of their time together discussing political issues 
and attending meetings... At that time, the burning issue for Walter was the formation of a 
Youth League.”7 From this point onwards, Albertina‟s life is inextricably linked to the life of 
Walter Sisulu.
8
 Albertina was the only woman present at the inaugural meeting of the 
Congress Youth League in 1944 but she attended in a supportive role for Walter, and never 
considered becoming a member herself as the Youth League was very much considered to be 
a „young men‟s organisation‟. Ellen Kuzwayo, the only women who would become active in 
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the Youth League, remembers Albertina as the “smiling and pleasant wife of Walter Sisulu, a 
kind hostess who served the committee members of the Congress with tea after long and 
intense meetings.”9 This was not an unusual observation as most women were perceived as 
fulfilling supportive roles within the ANC, even after 1943 when they could gain full 
membership to the party.    
           Albertina and Walter Sisulu were married on 15 July 1944. Anton Lembede made a 
speech at the wedding celebrations and in his famous warning to Albertina he cautioned her 
that she was marrying a man who was already married to the nation.
10
 This established the 
long tradition of Albertina and Walter being constructed as the archetypal „parents of the 
nation‟ – a perception they would cultivate over the following five decades. By the end of 
1944, Albertina and Walter had become foster-parents to Walter‟s sister‟s child, Gerald, and 
in 1945 their first child, Max, was born. Albertina transferred to Orlando Clinic in order to 
work close to her home allowing her more time with her family. In 1948, a second son, 
Mlungisi, was born, and Albertina‟s youngest sibling, Flora, had also come to live with the 
family in Johannesburg.
11
 In 1947, Walter had decided to fully dedicate himself to ANC 
work. Albertina and Walter had discussed this and Albertina was happy to take over as sole 
breadwinner for the family. Walter was elected to the position of Secretary General of the 
ANC and one of the fierce supporters for the proposed Programme of Action. He realised that 
the burden of mobilising the movement would fall on him and that this would be a fulltime 
commitment. Despite criticism from Professor ZK Matthews who asked Walter: “How do 
you aspire to lead the nation if you cannot even provide for your own family?”12 Walter 
would become the first full-time Secretary General of the ANC. Matthews‟ criticism of 
Walter‟s choice partly reflects the strong familial structure of nationalism and the nation and 
its concomitant constructions of masculinities and patriarchy but the mutual decision made by 
Albertina and Walter is indicative of their famous and inspiring partnership and equality in 
marriage which was still considered fairly unusual for this time period. In 1950, at the ANC 
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annual conference greater emphasis was placed on the accountability of leadership and 
collective decision-making, a view very much in keeping with that of Walter and Albertina 
and which would re-emerge during the days following Albertina‟s death and funeral in 2011 
in a wholly different context. Walter‟s obligations to his political work meant that he would 
spend long periods of time away from his family. For Albertina this was a small price to pay 
for the elimination of unjust and oppressive laws.
13
 The Sisulu home became a safe haven for 
political activists so even when Walter was at home there was little time for a quiet and 
peaceful moment with the family. However, Walter, like Albertina, never felt a sense of 
conflict and knew that the path he had decided to take was the only one to ensure a decent 
future for his children in South Africa. 
           1952 marked the beginning of the Defiance Campaign. Around this time Mandela was 
banned for six months and the police were looking for Walter Sisulu in order to serve him his 
banning orders. The Working Committee felt it was important for the Secretary General to be 
present at the ANCs annual conference in December of that year and urged Walter to go 
underground to avoid being banned. Even Albertina did not know where Walter would be 
hiding. After the intense months of the Defiance Campaign there was a lull in Congress 
activities and Walter was served a six-month banning order which prohibited him from 
attending any gatherings and confined him to the magisterial district of Johannesburg. In May 
1954 the first daughter, Lindiwe, was born. Sisulu makes a point of showing that “like many 
children with parents in the Congress Alliance, the Sisulu children grew up seeing their 
parents interact constantly with people of all races. Their home was a non-racial island in a 
segregated society and they all mixed freely on equal terms with children of other races.”14 
           In September 1955 the police raided the Sisulu home in one of the most sweeping 
police raids in the country‟s history. This marked the beginning of a series of house raids for 
the Sisulu family. A significant invasion of their privacy, lives, and feelings of security, these 
raids would intensely affect all the members of the Sisulu family. The later years of the 1950s 
also marked Albertina‟s increasing involvement in political activities within ANC structures. 
Throughout the 1940s her involvement in politics had been in a supportive capacity as her 
salary had been the family‟s main source of income. Albertina would develop a sense of 
dedication to liberation as unshakable as that of Walter. She combined her home visits to 
patients with distributing leaflets about the Congress of the People and encouraging women 
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to join the newly-launched Federation of South African Women (FEDSAW). With her 
unwavering belief in the importance of education, Albertina threw herself into the 1955 
campaign to boycott the Bantu education system. Sisulu shows that “Albertina Sisulu 
certainly felt anger and revulsion to the depths of her being at the idea of a system of 
education deliberately designed to emphasise ethnic differences among black children, and to 
train them to occupy an inferior position in life.”15 There was immense support for the 
campaign and the ANCWL and FEDSAW played a large role in organising alternative 
schools for children. Albertina also became involved and the Sisulu home became the venue 
for one of the alternative schools and the Sisulu children were also withdrawn from school to 
attend home schooling. However, the home schools were unsustainable in the long run with 
frequent police raids and harassment and were compelled to close. When the government 
threatened to close all boycotting schools, the boycott campaign collapsed. Many church 
schools refused to hand over control of their schools to the Bantu Education Department and 
some continued to run as private institutions. The Sisulu children were sent to one of the 
privately-run church schools despite the heavy financial burden this placed on Albertina. 
           In 1956 the historic Women‟s March on parliament took place. Protesting the 
extension of pass laws to black women, twenty thousand women marched on the 
parliamentary buildings in Pretoria. Albertina Sisulu was one of the leaders at Phefeni station 
buying train tickets to distribute to women travelling to Pretoria by train to attend the march 
after it became known that the police intended to stop women in groups of ten or more in 
buses from travelling to Pretoria. In December 1956 the security police carried out large scale 
raids and Walter was arrested again on 12 December and charged with treason. On 21 
October Albertina was part of a women‟s protest against the ongoing removals from 
Sophiatown. After three days of demonstrations 2000 women had been imprisoned, including 
Albertina Sisulu. During her incarceration, Walter ensured that he brought food to the prison 
every day. Mandela and Tambo arranged for bail for the women and eventually they were all 
released. Women‟s organised resistance had earned them increased respect within the ANC 
and led to a resolution for men to get rid of their passes and link up to the women‟s 
campaign. 
           Political repression mounted in South Africa following the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 
March 1960 and police harassment took its toll on activists and their families. As it became 
                                                          
15
 Ibid., p.186-187. 
219 
 
clear that Walter was likely to face a lengthy prison sentence, he decided to go underground 
as full-time leader of MK and he took leave of his family in April 1963. On 1 May 1963, 
government intensified its repressive laws and passed the General Laws Amendment Act 
which allowed the state to hold suspects for ninety days without charge. Albertina became the 
first female victim of this law and was arrested at work on 19 June 1963. Her imprisonment 
was a harsh and lonely time. Police interrogated her to discover Walter‟s whereabouts, but 
when it became clear that they would not obtain any information from Albertina, she was 
placed on spare rations of porridge and locked in a small, bare room. The police continued to 
play on her anxieties about the welfare of her younger children by threatening their removal 
from the Sisulu home and giving false reports of illness and hospitalisation. Yet, Albertina 
remained silent and refused to betray the struggle.
16
 While Albertina was in detention, one of 
the defining moments of the Sisulus‟ lives occurred when Walter was arrested in the Rivonia 
raid on 11 July 1963. Albertina was only informed of the arrests three weeks later. Her 
refusal to make a statement to the police despite her husband‟s arrest cost her another week in 
detention. She was eventually released, without warning, on 6 August. As the Rivonia trial 
commenced, Albertina ensured that she worked night shifts so that she could attend the trial 
and see Walter during the two visits per week that she was permitted.
17
 As the trial continued 
into 1964, Sisulu reveals that Albertina spent many nights agonising about the future:  
Albertina had always dealt with emotional trauma by immersing herself in practical action. 
She was the strong one and people relied on her. When her parents died, she had focused her 
energy on taking care of her siblings. When Barbie [Walter‟s sister] died, she focused on the 
practical arrangements for Beryl‟s [Barbie‟s daughter and Gerald‟s sister] future. During the 
trial, her lifeline was the Women‟s League. She may have spent her nights worrying, but 
during the day she had little time to reflect and agonise. She threw her energies into activities 
surrounding the trial. There was the need to give moral and practical support to the families of 
the accused.
18
       
It was this work ethic and care for those around her that would become central points of 
reference for political rhetoric in the weeks after her death. Her belief in displaying strength 
despite deep personal turmoil also extended to Walter. She was incredibly proud of his 
performance in the witness box during the trial, but on her last visit to him before sentencing 
after the guilty verdict was issued, she “asked him to be strong and to not show any emotion 
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if the death sentence was passed: „Please, do not disgrace us.‟”19 The evening before 
sentencing, ANCWL members gathered at the Sisulu home to prepare banners for display 
outside the courts the following day where a sentence of life imprisonment would be passed 
on the six accused. Walter was taken to Robben Island and this marked the beginning of 
Walter and Albertina‟s many years of separation. 
           On 5 August 1964, Albertina received her first five-year banning order. The banning 
order listed several of Albertina‟s political activities as justification for the banning and it was 
believed that placing Albertina under banning orders would deal a heavy blow to the ANC.
20
 
Albertina was placed under Group B restrictions which meant that she was confined to the 
magisterial district of Johannesburg. The banning order severely restricted her movements 
and communications as she was not allowed to attend any social or political gathering (any 
venue with more than three people present), and she had to report to the Commanding Officer 
of Orlando Police Station every Wednesday. However, Albertina – with much effort – 
obtained permission to visit Walter on Robben Island for one brief thirty minute visit. 
           Financial troubles continued to worry Albertina and she took on small sewing jobs and 
sold eggs to supplement her income which had to support four children in boarding school. 
She was able to get by with the support of neighbours and relied heavily on credit to buy 
groceries. “‟Those were bad times‟, Albertina would later recall, „but the community did a lot 
to help me. The importance of community, of belonging and of caring for one another was 
again reinforced in me.‟”21 Furthermore, the children all managed to get bursaries for their 
schooling, greatly relieving the financial pressure on Albertina. In addition to financial and 
familial troubles, Albertina also continued to suffer repeated police harassment as one of the 
few remaining activists within the country. Despite the constant police surveillance and the 
uneasy balance between keeping a low political profile while maintaining some semblance of 
ANC underground machinery, Albertina still managed to continue her political work through 
innovative methods and the help of her neighbours.
22
 She managed to set up an underground 
cell and develop a formal working committee with the help of John Nkadimeng, one of 
Walter‟s long-time political associates and ex-political prisoner also under banning orders. 
Their main activity was to facilitate the passage of ANC members attempting to leave the 
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country for education or military training.
23
 Despite some setbacks, Albertina felt that they 
had made some headway in rebuilding the underground structures of the movement.
24
 
           As the 1960s drew to a close, Albertina was informed that her banning orders had been 
renewed for another five years and she was placed under partial house arrest. Despite the 
pressures of family, politics, and work taking a toll on her health, Albertina continued to 
immerse herself in all activities. Albertina‟s daughter-in-law, Sheila, observed of her mother-
in-law:  
She just never seemed to rest. She would spend her weekends doing laundry and constantly 
cleaning the house. She was fussy about the cooking and cleaning and feeding of people. The 
house had to be spotless and everyone who visited had to be served tea. At that time things 
were not easy financially, so the amount of food we cooked, especially meat, was just enough 
for the family. Then someone would come to visit, obviously about political business and 
MaSisulu would shout from the lounge, „Aren‟t we eating?‟ and all of us in the kitchen would 
groan „Oh no!‟ because there just was not enough to feed an extra mouth. When we would 
ask her later how she could put us in that position, she would say „Awu, so the food was not 
enough? You should have told me, then I could have done without.‟25 
This observation about Albertina‟s selflessness summarises several of the themes that 
characterised the statements made about Albertina Sisulu in the media and by politicians 
shortly after her death.  
           The events of June 16 1976 would cause significant turmoil and tragedy in Soweto and 
the youth‟s militancy and anti-white sentiments were a constant source of anxiety for 
Albertina.
26
 The post-1976 period saw Albertina become involved in facilitating the departure 
of many young activists from South Africa while the women‟s movement had grown 
significantly after many black mothers had witnessed and suffered the abuse and death of 
their children at the hands of the police force during the uprisings. In 1979 Albertina‟s 
banning orders were renewed a fourth time for another two years. 
           In 1981, Albertina‟s banning orders came to an end and she was able to enjoy freedom 
of movement and association for the first time since 1964. She had been banned for eighteen 
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years, longer than any other person in South Africa.
27
 Albertina was inundated with requests 
to speak at meetings and gatherings. Always actively involved in rebuilding the women‟s 
movement she was now able to work more openly. Working together with other veteran 
activists she recruited young female activists to organise women in the ANC underground.
28
 
She would also become a political mentor to many young women from different communities 
and her intentions, according to Jessie Duarte who at that time was involved in the student 
movement in the coloured community, were to “develop what she termed a „petticoat‟ layer 
of women leaders that would take over when the older women were not there.”29 Albertina 
became actively involved in many aspects of resistance politics and was considered to be an 
ANC veteran who embodied the principles of the Freedom Charter.
30
 However, as Sisulu 
shows, many of the gatherings that Albertina addressed were the funerals or memorial 
services of slain activists as the government became increasingly ferocious in response to the 
resurgence of ANC activity in South Africa. 
           Walter had to undergo minor surgery in 1982 and Albertina travelled to Cape Town to 
support him through his hospitalisation. This was the first time since Walter‟s imprisonment 
that the couple was not separated by a glass barrier and the moment was overwhelming for 
both. The strength of their marriage and Albertina were lauded in messages sent to 
congratulate Walter on his seventieth birthday later that year. Several months before her 
assassination, Ruth First wrote of Walter:  
He is committed to the liberation of all people. He is committed to the liberation of the 
African women. In his family Albertina is a fine leader in her own right, but her capacity to 
lead and her political strength is also the product of a good marriage, a good political 
marriage that is based on genuine equality and on shared commitment.
31  
Walter and Albertina‟s marriage would be continuously commented upon throughout the 
decades as a great source of inspiration and emblem of gender equality within marriage. At a 
time when families were torn apart through death, detention, exile, and banishment, the 
connection between Albertina and Walter remained strong despite their separation. Their 
prison letters, often quoted by Sisulu in her biographical account of Walter and Albertina, are 
indicative of their continued support for, pride in, and love of one another. In the weeks after 
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Albertina‟s death, her marriage to Walter was described as “the great South African love 
story”,32 reinforcing the romantic imagery of the epic heroine. A public artwork created by 
Marina Walsh depicting Albertina and Walter was unveiled in 2009 in the Johannesburg 
CBD. Its inscription attests to their status as the archetypal parents of the nation: “Walter and 
Albertina Sisulu married in 1944. Through their enduring love and dedication they became 
parents to the nation.”33  
           As political assassinations by the state intensified, Albertina, together with the other 
mourners, was again arrested at a memorial service for victims of covert state violence. 
However, no one was charged and they were fingerprinted and photographed and released at 
midnight. Shortly after this incident, Albertina was served with a two-year banning order 
after a year-long respite. In May 1982, the President‟s Council submitted its proposal for a 
new constitution, at the heart of which was the creation of a tri-cameral parliament which 
included the existing all-white parliament and suggested the creation of separate coloured and 
Indian parliaments which would all sit separately but whose executives would sit on the 
President‟s Council. The deliberate exclusion of black South Africans was intended as a 
method of creating a racial divide within the resistance movements; instead, it created a 
greater sense of unity and there was united resistance and low voter turnout at the election for 
the coloured and Indian parliaments. The call to oppose the new constitution created support 
amongst the plethora of resistance organisations to create a united front. Albertina was 
approached to drive the organisation of such a united front. The United Democratic Front 
(UDF), consisting of regional executives, was nationally launched in 1983. Albertina‟s 
banning order had unexpectedly expired by the introduction of the new Internal Security Act 
and she was able to be actively involved in the movement. Although the Ministry of Justice 
immediately wanted to place new banning orders on Albertina, it was decided to monitor her 
activities. Her activities in the UDF were, however, considered to be a threat to state security 
and Albertina was arrested on 5 August 1983. While in police custody, Albertina was elected 
as President of the Transvaal UDF executive and outrage at the arrest of the „Mother of the 
Nation‟ was expressed at the meeting.34 Albertina was sentenced to four years imprisonment 
pending appeal and released on bail. 
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           Albertina started working as a nurse in the clinic of Abu Asvat, the health-secretary for 
AZAPO. Despite the animosity between the UDF and AZAPO, Albertina and Asvat had an 
excellent relationship and understood the need to work together to aid the plight of the poor 
and homeless in their community. Albertina also continued to work on the revival of 
FEDSAW and, despite her initial resistance to the organisational tactics of a younger 
generation of women activists, she came to see the benefits of a new approach to reviving the 
women‟s movement. Her change of heart was considered to be a sign of her strength and 
willingness to accept new methods and embrace them if it meant it would benefit the 
resistance movement.
35
 This ability to accept when she wrong and to work with the collective 
to ensure progress is another characteristic that would be lauded at her funeral and employed 
in political rhetoric surrounding ANC internal discord in 2011. 
           During this period Albertina continued to be in great demand as a speaker at meetings 
and other political events and rallies. She would especially call on the powerful metaphor of 
motherhood to strongly denounce the apartheid government and its constitution and to inspire 
unity amongst women of all races. With a jail sentence already hanging over her head, 
Albertina was arrested on treason charges in 1985. She was released on bail with her co-
accused, but due to the restrictions placed on her bail conditions, she was unable to continue 
her political work. However, the state‟s case crumbled and after a short trial the charges were 
withdrawn against twelve of the sixteen accused, including Albertina Sisulu. Albertina 
returned home during a period of increasingly violent state repression. A State of Emergency 
had been declared in 1985 and the youth had become more militant and attempted to render 
South Africa ungovernable and apartheid unworkable.
36
 Albertina had always been 
concerned about the double-edged sword of „ungovernability‟ and the potential of such a 
policy to encourage criminal behaviour in young activists. She had also always been openly 
critical of the slogan „Liberation before Education‟ and was concerned about the disrupted 
education of some of her grandchildren. Albertina continued to work at the surgery during the 
day, and in the evenings would meet with activists and journalists. Sisulu identifies 
Albertina‟s ability to calmly work through any situation without complaint as one of her 
admirable qualities.
37
 However, with the extension of the State of Emergency and the 
restrictions placed on the UDF and nearly all of its leaders, it became nearly impossible for 
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the UDF to operate despite Albertina‟s exhortations.38 Yet, she remained optimistic and 
stated in an interview in 1987 that she believed freedom was attainable in the next five 
years.
39
 
           As the 1980s drew to a close, Albertina had gained wide national and international 
acclaim. She was a respected struggle veteran and admired for her integrity, stability, 
courage, and commitment to the progress of her community, equal education, the struggle 
against all forms of injustice and inequality and she was widely regarded and hailed as the 
„Mother of the Nation'.40 In 1989 Albertina received invitations from U.S. President G.W. 
Bush to discuss the situation in South Africa and from Danielle Mitterrand (human rights 
activist and wife of French President Francois Mitterrand) as she had been selected by the 
International Federation of Human Rights as one of ten women to be honoured for their fight 
for human rights.
41
 Albertina was able to obtain a passport and left for Europe on 16 June 
1989 accompanied by several FEDSAW colleagues and friends and she would be joined for 
the American leg of the trip by other UDF leaders. Throughout her international travels 
Albertina addressed several conferences and meetings and met with a variety of international 
leaders, politicians, dignitaries, and journalists. After her successful visits to Europe and the 
US, Albertina travelled to Lusaka to touch base with the ANC, and especially the ANCWL, 
in exile. After her return to South Africa, she arranged to visit Walter in Pollsmoor prison on 
10 October 1989 – the same day that President F.W. de Klerk would announce the release of 
several prominent political prisoners, including Walter. 
          Walter returned home on 15 October 1989. While the reunion was a happy one, the 
couple would commence a whirlwind journey of meetings across the country and 
internationally as the government entered into negotiations with the liberation movement. 
The ANC, PAC, and SACP were unbanned in 1990, and the government announced the 
imminent release of Nelson Mandela. Albertina also continued to be active within the 
ANCWL and focused on issues of gender equality in South Africa and the future South 
African parliament. After the negotiations, political violence and assassinations, danger and 
loss that marked the first years of the 1990s, the 1994 democratic elections were a 
momentous occasion for Albertina for whom the years of sacrifice, loss, and hardship had 
finally come to gain great significance. 1994 also marked Albertina and Walter‟s fiftieth 
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wedding anniversary and they celebrated by renewing their wedding vows. Furthermore, 
Albertina was elected to South Africa‟s first democratically elected parliament. Sisulu 
observes that for veterans like Albertina, parliamentary work was particularly taxing. In a 
democratic dispensation she would have served in parliament at a significantly younger age.
42
 
Yet, Sisulu indicates that Albertina Sisulu was extremely diligent about her parliamentary 
work and, for fear of being accused of „getting on the gravy train‟, waived many of the 
parliamentary benefits to which she was entitled. Besides her parliamentary duties, Albertina 
was also elected as the President of the World Peace Council and hosted the assembly of the 
World Peace Council in 1995. Walter retired from his post as ANC Deputy President in 1994 
but continued to work on organisational issues and policies within the ANC. His health went 
into decline from 1998 and Albertina officially retired from politics in 1999. She dedicated 
much of her time to family and charity work. Walter passed away at home in 2003 and was 
accorded a special official funeral. Albertina resumed a quiet life at home after Walter‟s 
death but the political legacy of the family was continued by their children and grandchildren. 
On 3 June 2011, Albertina passed away quietly in her home in Johannesburg. 
           While often the result of an unrelenting romanticisation of the „golden years‟ of the 
struggle and the deeply admired generation of ANC activists that inspired it, Albertina 
Sisulu‟s biography as constructed in the public domain reads as the narrative of a life lived in 
dedication and devotion to her family and the nation. Albertina Sisulu‟s life is inextricably 
entwined with the political life of Walter Sisulu and her politicised children rendering it 
nearly impossible to present her biography without the connections that ultimately resulted in 
her being presented as the archetypal „Mother‟. As a result, no biography of Albertina Sisulu 
herself exists, with the exception of the biography written of her and Walter by daughter-in-
law, Elinor Sisulu. Albertina Sisulu, like Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu, became part of 
the pantheon of living legends and founding figures of the South African nation. A generation 
that was already well past the age of when politicians would normally assume strenuous and 
demanding positions in parliament, Albertina Sisulu was part of a political dispensation 
during a period filled with the heady hope represented by the rainbow nationalism of the 
Mandela presidency while her retirement came just as that celebratory mood was starting to 
be replaced by the sobering social experiences of slow socio-economic transformation. Thus, 
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despite the small hiccough that occurred during the TRC processes,
43
 Sisulu retired from 
political life with an unblemished reputation of service, discipline, dedication and sacrifice. 
           The events and themes that this short rendition of Albertina Sisulu‟s life has addressed 
were selected to reflect the central themes that dominated the statements made by prominent 
politicians, the media, social activists and ordinary South African internet users after the 
announcement of Sisulu‟s death. Elinor Sisulu‟s biographical work also remains a deeply 
romantic and epic narrative of the lives of her mother and father-in-law. This illustrates how 
effectively the construction of the heroic imagery of the founding „Mother‟ of Albertina 
Sisulu‟s legacy has permeated the foundational mythology of the post-apartheid state. The 
following discussion will illustrate how this powerful and popular imagery was reinforced 
and re-written to address political and socio-economic issues in the present. 
 
Contextualising 2011: Service Delivery Protests and ANC Internal Discord
44
 
Throughout 2011, South Africans had been confronted in the media with images of violent 
service delivery protests, accusations of corruption within governmental structures, self-
enrichment, and nepotism against municipal councillors and high level politicians, faced with 
the (often outrageous) public statements made by ANCYL president, Julius Malema, a 
pending high-profile election for the ANC-presidency, local municipal elections, and debates 
around the „Green Paper on Families‟45 which would be released to the public for 
commentary in October 2011. All of these themes would be directly and indirectly touched 
upon in the official speech and tributes delivered at the funeral of Albertina Sisulu on 11 June 
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2011. It was clear that, although the nation was in mourning at the loss of its „Mother‟, the 
platform that her official funeral presented would be employed to address issues around 
perceived and real failures by government, elected officials, and government policies. 
Albertina Sisulu‟s long life of dedication to the ANC and the struggle for democracy held an 
epic and heroic narrative on which new (official) meanings could be inscribed that could 
legitimise and breath new vigour into the failing image of the ANC and some of its leaders, 
officials, and policies as it came under increased criticism for its continued failure to address, 
especially, economic inequality nearly two decades into the democratic dispensation.   
           The first democratically elected government, led by the ANC, inherited a system of 
service delivery that, through its deliberate neglect of the majority of the population through 
racially motivated social development policies, left large communities infrastructurally 
underdeveloped. The South African government proceeded to attempt to extend delivery of 
basic services to those previously excluded through apartheid policies. Establishing a „culture 
of delivery‟46 was attempted through three distinct phases and policies. Post-1994 
reconstruction through the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was instilled 
with the euphoric optimism of rainbow nationalism and working together to build a „better 
South Africa‟. It attempted to institutionalise “the principles of sustainability, people-driven 
processes, peace and security, nation building, democratisation, and reconstruction and 
development.”47  In this manner, the extension of service delivery to previously marginalised 
sections of the population was a principal part of post-apartheid rainbow nationalism. Mc 
Lennan identifies equal and universal service delivery in South Africa as a driving factor in 
nation building while also improving the legitimacy of the new government.
48
 However, the 
“mobilising symbolism” of these policies failed to meet targets and citizens “began to 
demand the benefits of democratisation.”49 The Growth, Employment, and Redistribution 
Policy (GEAR), focused on delivery in order to rapidly build the economy, create 
employment, redistribute income, and provide social services. The new government elected 
in 1999, under the presidency of Thabo Mbeki, declared its intentions to put appropriate 
delivery systems in place. The privatisation of certain services which were the result of an 
increased focus on professionalism and decentralisation saw the citizen increasingly referred 
to as a „customer‟ or „client‟. However, privatisation, commercialisation and outsourcing did 
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not necessarily lead to better service delivery and frustrations with delivery led to the 
emergence of social movements and protests around access to water, land, housing, and 
electricity. The previously marginalised sectors of society remained under-serviced despite 
the democratic change, and disillusionment with rainbow nationalism quickly emerged. More 
demands were made on the state to provide basic services to underdeveloped communities, 
both rural and urban. The government then attempted to contain “the politics of delivery 
through partnership or decentralisation... In this way, delivery is legitimised through local 
participation and engagement.”50 Yet, the state continued to decide what was in the interest of 
citizens and citizens “[were] not engaged in any significant way in the decisions which 
affect[ed] their lives and livelihoods.”51 Richard Pithouse expands on this and argues that 
“there is a pervasive sense that the state disrespects people by lying to people at election 
times and by failing to listen to them at other times.”52 Pithouse indicates that where 
councillors or official representatives are present in underdeveloped communities they “most 
often function as a means of top-down social control aiming to subordinate popular politics to 
the party.”53 Furthermore, councillors and other locally elected officials, when present in their 
constituencies, are often seen to engage in forms of self-enrichment and to lead „fat-cat‟ 
lifestyles‟ – a charge brought against many ANC officials and which was one of the themes 
addressed during Albertina Sisulu‟s funeral. Locally organised protest action against 
continued failure of service delivery placed demands on  
people who hold or benefit from political power (which includes, but is not limited to, local 
politicians). These have emanated from poorer neighbourhoods (shack settlements and 
townships rather than suburbs)... They have included mass meetings, drafting of memoranda, 
petitions, toyi-toying, processions, stay-aways, election boycotts, blockading of roads, 
construction of barricades, burning of tyres, looting, destruction of buildings, chasing 
unpopular individuals out of townships, confrontations with the police, and forced 
resignations of elected officials.
54
 
During Mbeki‟s presidency, protest action became a prominent feature of South African 
political life yet increased significantly once Jacob Zuma was elected President. As 
Alexander indicates on the basis of figures collected by a private research company 
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investigating service delivery protests in South Africa, there were more service delivery 
protests in the first seven months of the Zuma administration than there were in the last three 
years of the Mbeki administration.
55
 Alexander explains this sharp increase in protest action 
as the result of the public perception of Jacob Zuma as being more representative of and 
interested in the „plight of the poor‟ than his predecessor. Zuma‟s charisma and connections 
within the labour movements made him more „approachable‟ and likeable to the greater ANC 
support base while Mbeki‟s intellectualism and long absences from South Africa created the 
perception that he was removed from, or even unsympathetic towards the everyday life-
experiences of a vast majority of ANC supporters. It was hoped that the timing of the protests 
would result in pro-active response from a government that was perceived as being „pro-
poor‟.56 
           With protest actions in 2004 in the Free State indentified as a watershed moment from 
which violent service delivery protests snowballed in South Africa,
57
 the years following 
Jacob Zuma‟s ascendancy to the South African presidency in 2009 have seen increased 
protest action around issues such as access to clean water, electricity, housing, sanitation, 
poor roads, and corruption (real or perceived). Alienation from the institutions of local 
democracy amongst neglected communities led those affected to turn to protest to supplement 
their call for improved access to basic services. Moreover, with political parties placing 
„service delivery‟ at the top of their political agendas, and the increased visibility and action 
of public servants and prominent politicians during periods of unrest, the usefulness of 
(violent) protest was affirmed.
58
 Communities incorporated protest into their political 
participation “given the limitations they discovered in the ability of formal democracy to 
ensure service delivery.”59 However, municipal election results have shown that loyalty to the 
governing party in most of the affected areas, the ANC, has not wavered and voters did not 
turn to opposition parties to voice their dissatisfaction in these communities.
60
 However, 
voter loyalty to the ANC has assumed a more critical and challenging dimension to ensure 
better service delivery and protest appears to be seen as a way in which to directly engage 
with their party. Thus, it becomes clear that “critical and challenging forms of loyalty have 
taken the place of blind loyalty” which characterised the first few years of democracy. Gillian 
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Hart argues that precisely “because nationalist calls are linked to histories, memories, and 
meanings of freedom struggles, redress for the wrongs of the past and visions of a new 
nation, they are vulnerable to counter-claims of betrayal…”61 As a result of its continued 
failure to deliver and increased police violence to counter violent service delivery protests, it 
can be deduced that by focusing on heroic ANC stalwarts like Albertina Sisulu and their 
superior qualities (real or (re)invented and re-written and reinterpreted), the ANC attempted 
to remind the nation of its legitimacy as a ruling party due to its prominent role in the 
struggle, and the morally superior qualities it was imbued with in its historic resistance to 
apartheid. Thus, despite its failings, it had the moral „right‟ to rule the country for whose 
freedom the organisation and its members had sacrificed so much.  
           While service delivery protests were at the forefront of party politics, accusations of 
corruption and self-enrichment at the expense of the average South African citizen were also 
making media headlines in 2011. High profile cases such as that of National Police 
Commissioner and ANC stalwart, Bheki Cele, who was facing charges of corruption for 
which he would be dismissed later in the year and the Minister of Public Works who was 
suspended for accusations in the same scandal were media headlines. Moreover, the often 
opulent lifestyles and lavish government-funded events were under constant criticism as 
people were protesting in the streets for access to basic services such as clean water and the 
dignity of enclosed toilets. Simultaneously, outspoken and controversial ANCYL President, 
Julius Malema, was facing disciplinary charges for bringing his party into disrepute, and 
despite having enjoyed a close and supportive relationship with President Jacob Zuma in 
previous years, had recently fallen out of favour with the older generation of ANC leaders as 
he had publically insulted several of his party‟s political seniors. With the backing of 
members of the ANCYL, a public standoff between the ANCYL and the ANC NEC ensued 
and caused a generational divide between the „old guard‟, and a new generation representing 
an increasingly militant youth with bleak educational and employment prospects in the 
democratic state and who demanded „economic freedom‟. Democracy had been achieved but 
the economic divide had not yet been conquered and a generation of township youths, many 
of whom were born post-1994, understood that despite living in a democratic dispensation 
that had promised extensive change, their economic prospects remained poor at best as 
government policies tended to favour the few. Moreover, Malema‟s political rhetoric, often 
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violent and marked by hate speech, invoked a new nationalist struggle that rejected the 
harmonious symbolism of the Rainbow Nation and reconciliation ideology. His public calls 
for the nationalisation of South Africa‟s mines and the seizure of white-owned land and farms 
without compensation had to be quelled by senior ANC government officials. Furthermore, it 
can be assumed that the loss of Malema‟s support for his re-election in the ANC leadership 
elections the following year, Zuma‟s eventually successful attempt to have Malema 
disciplined and expelled from the party, influenced the decision to take control and silence 
the leadership of the ANCYL. The ANCYL and its leaders have a historic reputation for 
being „king-makers‟, inciting more revolutionary policies, and often clashing with senior 
ANC leadership. Yet, it appeared that within a democratic dispensation and a somewhat 
stable economic climate, public displays of disunity within ANC structures and the public 
„disrespect‟ shown by ANCYL leaders towards their political seniors would not be tolerated 
by the NEC.
62
  
 
Bidding Farewell: The Funeral of Albertina Sisulu 
You raised your voice when it was dangerous and unfashionable to do so. You unselfishly 
raised and mothered your children and many other South African children.  
Your tireless pursuit of freedom and equality in South Africa bore fruit and we are happy that 
you lived to see the day. 
Your life was fulfilling, purposeful, and noble.  
Your life’s work will always be a part of South Africa and of those who come after you.  
You will be remembered for the love of your country, and the sacrifices you made for the 
liberation of our motherland.  
You were an honest mother and comrade, who religiously adhered to the constitution and 
processes of the ANC. 
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Now you are deservedly rested and quiet.  
But your voice reverberates across South Africa and the world through your good work. 
Your voice surely serves as a conscience to us who remain behind.  
Thank you for your sacrifices and love for all of us. A history worth emulating.  
Your legacy is being kept alive by your children and comrades, and will continue to inspire 
many for generations to come. 
You truly were a woman who gave her life to many South Africans. May you rest in eternal 
peace. You were truly altruistic. 
Rest in peace, Mama!
63
 
-  Thandi Modise, Premier of the North West 
This tribute written for Sisulu by Thandi Modise, Premier of the North West Province and 
member of the ANC NEC, encapsulates the creation and entrenchment of Albertina Sisulu as 
a central foundational figure for the post-apartheid state within a party-political context. 
Discourses of motherhood, martyrdom, heroism, and patriotism are invoked to create a 
powerful, perfect, and romantic image of the „Mother of the Nation‟, who, in death, becomes 
infallible and sanctified. The tributes to „MaSisulu‟ given by politicians, religious and 
community leaders, members of the public, and famous South Africans all tended to reflect 
the sentiments expressed in Modise‟s words indicating that the establishment of Albertina 
Sisulu as a founding mother had already occurred in post-apartheid society. However, her 
death allowed for this legacy to enter the realm of the sacred, while her funeral became the 
platform where the sacred legacy became entrenched in nation-building and party-political 
legitimisation processes.  
           As the news headlines of the first months of 2011 remained a topic of conversation in 
the public sphere, the funeral of Albertina Sisulu created the space for the official 
(re)construction of a foundational mother-figure – one whose positive qualities were 
important to be emulated by the nation to counter the perceived present „plagues‟ that were 
damaging the hope and optimism that had accompanied the democratic transition and the 
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formation of the Rainbow Nation seventeen years earlier. The oration given by President 
Jacob Zuma at the funeral of Albertina Sisulu, albeit short, touched on many of the themes 
that were topics of public outrage and commentary by June 2011 while also reminding the 
nation of future possibilities. Discipline, humility, human dignity, the importance of the 
normative family unit, diligence, and service became powerful themes that were not only 
present in Zuma‟s oration at the funeral, but were present in the public tributes delivered by 
all those interviewed by the SABC for the broadcast of the funeral. The construction of an 
official counter-narrative of optimism emerged to offset the negative media attention given, 
especially, to failing service delivery and internal discord within the ANC. For opposition 
parties in South Africa, often known to berate the governing party in the public media, 
Albertina Sisulu‟s legacy of selfless service and unrelenting opposition to apartheid during 
the years pre-dating ANC-rule, allowed them to praise and contribute to the construction of 
this „Mother of the Nation‟, while maintaining an oppositional stance. In certain instances, by 
acknowledging Sisulu‟s projected (and clearly, accepted) moral superiority over the younger 
generation, opposition leaders were able to criticise present ANC shortcomings. Most tributes 
delivered by politicians became indicative of the employment of the legacy of the „founding 
mother‟ to further party-political agendas. In tributes and statements made by ANC members 
and leaders it became clear that the legacy of Albertina Sisulu would be inextricably linked to 
ANC internal politics and regime legitimation in the present. In the official statement of 
tribute to Albertina Sisulu, the ANC reminded the „nation‟ that Sisulu,  
inspired a generation of leaders who have since swelled the ranks of the democratic 
movement and our government... As South Africans we owe it to this pedigree of 
revolutionaries who defined the course and tempo of our struggle. Indeed we can without 
equivocation say that as South Africans, we today enjoy the freedom and democracy because 
of her selfless contribution.
64
 
In a special tribute to Albertina Sisulu, ANC Today, an online publication of the ANC, the 
main body reiterates this sentiment and emphasise her ANC membership:  
Because she walked this long walk to freedom as one of us, her head held high, holding our 
hands, her strength made us even more stronger. Mama's death challenges us to return to 
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those values of selfless service and humility. In honouring her memory, we re-dedicate 
ourselves to those values that Mama espoused and embodied.
65
 
Although faced with public criticism and internal conflict, the governing party reminds the 
nation that the values represented in the iconic image of Albertina Sisulu are what inspired 
the ANC in its struggle against colonial and apartheid oppression and that it will rededicate 
itself to upholding these values in the present despite the challenges to its public image. 
Moreover, in its public statements the ANC ensured that the nation was aware that this 
struggle icon and „Mother of the Nation‟, to whom the nation owed its freedom, belonged to 
the ANC and that the values that this national heroine espoused as presented in official 
rhetoric are an inherent part of the ANC‟s legacy and will continue to influence the 
organisation‟s future.   
           The funeral of Albertina Sisulu was assigned as a category one special official funeral. 
This meant that she was acknowledged as a distinguished person as designated by the 
President of South Africa and that Sisulu would be buried with full military honours. The 
morning of 11 June 2011 commenced with a valedictory ceremony at the Sisulu family home 
in Orlando West attended by relatives and close friends. From here, Sisulu‟s casket, draped in 
the ANC flag, was transported to Orlando Stadium where the official funeral ceremony was 
officiated by Minister Jeff Radebe. The streets en route to the stadium were closed off for the 
event and the hearse carrying Sisulu‟s remains was attended by members of the ANCWL. 
The official funeral was divided into two segments. First a brief ceremony led by the ANC 
took place where the organisation could bid farewell to one of its most dedicated and iconic 
leaders. Once this segment was concluded, the state took over proceedings, the South African 
flag replaced the ANC flag covering Sisulu‟s casket, and President Jacob Zuma delivered his 
oration on behalf of the people of South Africa. Free train transport was provided to the 
stadium for the general public to attend the funeral ceremony. The ceremony commenced 
with the national anthem of South Africa and a brief opening prayer. As Sisulu was a member 
of the Anglican Church the ceremony was conducted following Anglican/Christian scripture 
according to its funerary rites and officiated by Anglican Archbishop Thabo Makgoba. Once 
concluded, family and close friends would make their way to Croesus Cemetery in Newclare, 
Johannesburg where Albertina Sisulu was laid to rest next to Walter Sisulu and her headstone 
unveiled. 
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           SABC2 televised the day-long funeral proceedings reflecting the importance assigned 
to the struggle icon in the post-apartheid state. Before the official funeral proceedings 
commenced, the broadcaster televised the tributes delivered to Sisulu by several of South 
Africa‟s most prominent political figures. It is in these interviews that the legacy of Albertina 
Sisulu as a living legend now elevated to founding figure and national heroine can be 
discerned. In brief sound bites that preceded the funeral the iconic image of Sisulu as the 
archetypal mother figure, „Mother of the Nation‟, national heroine, and as the embodiment of 
the founding values of the post-apartheid state was established. Former president Thabo 
Mbeki and Jacob Zuma praised her as a mother of the struggle while members of the political 
opposition parties paid tribute to Sisulu‟s dedication and discipline. For Democratic Alliance 
leader Helen Zille, Sisulu represented everything that is the best about South Africa,
66
 while 
Joe Mcgluwa from the Independent Democrats stated that Albertina Sisulu did not only give 
birth to her own children but was also responsible for the birth of a democratic South 
Africa.
67
 Tributes for Albertina Sisulu were issued by all political parties, ANC alliance 
partners and unions. Tributes from within ANC ranks reiterated her status as ANC member 
and „Mother of the Nation‟ while also reflecting the internal discord within ANC ranks. 
Thandi Modise in a brief interview with an SABC2 reporter bemoaned the „younger cadres‟ 
of the ANC for not “imbibing the values of the ANC”68 as they were embodied by ANC 
leaders such as Walter and Albertina Sisulu in an apparent rebuke of the ANCYL members 
then at odds with the ANC main body.  
           During her lifetime, Albertina Sisulu was a living legend whose legacy was built on a 
lifetime of dedicated resistance to apartheid oppression in all its social aspects. In death this 
legacy was magnified in official discourse and she became a symbol not only of past 
struggles but of social and political struggles in the present. Her official funeral became the 
platform for this symbolic image to be highlighted and then entrenched in post-apartheid 
foundational mythology. 
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“May Her Soul Rest in Peace, but her spirit must live on amongst us!”69 An Analysis of 
President Jacob Zuma’s Oration 
President Jacob Zuma‟s oration on behalf of South Africa and all its citizens at the funeral of 
Albertina Sisulu constitutes not only a reflection of the social issues facing South African 
society and the ANC in 2011, but the terminology employed in the speech exhibits the 
official discourses of shaping a (ANC) foundational mythology for the nation. Zuma‟s 
speech, as the President of the country that was mourning the loss of a „Mother of the 
Nation‟,70 was a highlight of the funeral ceremony and it was his public tributes to 
„MaSisulu‟ that were often emphasised and quoted in media reports in the week leading up to 
the funeral. As such, it was the official rhetoric issued by the Presidency that shaped 
representations of Albertina Sisulu in the media and thrust her legacy and life back into the 
public sphere. The analysis of Zuma‟s speech will reflect the sustainment of a foundational 
myth that has been in the making for the past two decades. Through the public mourning 
rituals enacted before and at the funeral of Albertina Sisulu, the state was given a platform 
from which it was able to project Sisulu‟s contribution to this foundational mythology in the 
social symbolism of the sacred state of death and burial lending it a political efficacy that 
could not be achieved in honouring the living individual. While contributing to and re-
enforcing a larger, existing foundational myth, the speech is indicative of regime 
legitimisation through its indirect, but obvious, references to and reflections of present 
political and societal discourses. The physical loss of Albertina Sisulu to the nation created an 
opportunity for the state to produce new meanings for her legacy in the present, and indeed, 
the future. The analysis below will show an officially-sanctioned foundational mythology 
creation at work that draws on the nationalist movements of the post-apartheid era while 
simultaneously legitimising the present regime with a clear indication of a focus on the future 
and a (re)creation and attainment of a projected „golden era‟, based on that of the 
romanticised legacies of the past.             
           “We have gathered to celebrate the life of an outstanding patriot whose name has 
become synonymous with our struggle for freedom, justice, human rights, and human 
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dignity.”71 Jacob Zuma commenced his oration by identifying Sisulu as a shared national icon 
who embodied the founding principles (or foundational pillars as identified by Marschall)
72
  
of post-apartheid South Africa. Identifying Albertina Sisulu, as an ANC stalwart, as a 
champion of human dignity within the context of the founding principles of the post-
apartheid state serves to legitimise the ANC, despite its failure to uphold some of the 
principles on which the organisation attempted to build a new nation as the governing party. 
Zuma continued:  
One of the most steadfast, dignified and disciplined pillars of our struggle has fallen, an era 
has ended, and the nation is devastated, but we are proud to be associated with Mama 
Albertina Nontsikelelo Sisulu. 
Albertina Sisulu‟s dedication to the ANC was unwavering and Zuma‟s reference to her 
lifetime of service to the ANC and the struggle in terms of her steadfastness, dignity, and 
discipline is not unfounded. With the death of Sisulu, Zuma intones, an era has ended – an era 
that saw the rise of the „great‟ leaders of the struggle for democracy such as the Sisulus, 
Mandela and Tambos; an era often identified as the „golden years‟ of the struggle. It was 
defined by leaders that, in present official discourse, are cast as selfless, fearless, dedicated, 
and above all, disciplined. These leaders (exclusively male) would also be honoured in 2012 
during the ANC‟s year-long centenary celebrations which involved honouring its past leaders 
and the declaration as national heritage sites of locations and sites identified with the ANC 
and its involvement in the struggle against colonialism and apartheid. What stood in stark 
contrast to the leaders of the past was the media attention given to the failings of the ANC 
leaders of the present and the allegations of the emergence of a „culture‟ of self-enrichment, 
nepotism, corruption, and fraud that is perceived to have developed within all ranks of the 
governing party. Once again, ensuring that the nation is reminded that such dedicated and 
selfless individuals as Albertina Sisulu are inextricably linked to the present democratic 
freedoms enjoyed by its citizens serves to legitimise the current regime. Although the present 
ruling party is beset by allegations of self-enrichment at the expense of the citizens of the 
state, it attempts to legitimise its position as governing party by its past contribution, and the 
contribution of some of its most famous leaders, to the fairly recent advent of democracy in 
South Africa. Moreover, the deeply sacred nature of death and the sorrowful state of loss and 
mourning is called upon to render this legitimisation process as being above critical 
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questioning or analysis. If the nation as a whole is devastated by the loss of a mother figure 
such as „Mama Sisulu‟, criticising this loss or those associated with her legacy renders those 
critics as being outside of the „nation‟ and leaves their criticism, ultimately, invalid.  
           When Zuma continued, he spoke of Sisulu as a „Mother of the Nation‟ and „national 
heroine‟: 
We are laying to rest a stalwart and mother of the nation, who combined resilience and 
fortitude in fighting colonial oppression and apartheid, with compassion for the poor and the 
downtrodden. We are bidding farewell to a national heroine who produced many cadres of the 
liberation movement, and shaped our political thought and action in many ways.
73    
Further asserting Sisulu‟s „Mother of the Nation‟ status by neatly encompassing the assumed 
feelings of the „nation‟, Zuma claimed that “Women, workers, youth, the homeless, 
professionals, the rural poor, the nursing fraternity and ordinary folk – all declare that she 
was their mother and their leader.”74 Sisulu is officially elevated to a „Mother of the Nation‟ 
within a context of militant motherhood that has become so emblematic of official 
representations of female ANC activism during the struggle years. Moreover, although Zuma 
indicated that Sisulu fought oppression, she was still imbued with the feminine qualities of 
compassion and as a „producer‟ of the generation of politicians that lead the country today. 
Despite her activism, she is officially and politically domesticated as „Mother‟ and is 
positioned as a woman who ideologically reproduced the collectivity and transmitted a 
culture of selflessness and compassion to her political offspring – now the political leaders of 
the state and members of the ANC.
75
 Zuma‟s reference to the importance of motherhood is a 
theme apparent throughout his oration. He declared that “Mama Sisulu also viewed 
motherhood as strength and used it to organise women”76 and indeed, motherhood was an 
important aspect of Albertina Sisulu‟s life. Cherryl Walker makes a pertinent observation 
about the respect and authority accorded to women in the public sphere by virtue of their role 
as mothers: 
Men speak admiringly of the role their mothers play in their lives, but the praises of their 
mothers fall strictly within the boundaries of traditionally defined women's roles. These men 
appear to be prepared to acknowledge the power of women in a restricted situational and 
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locational sense: women are powerful within the home, and in situations involving the 
nurturing or protection of other people… but there is often little respect for women's power 
outside of this sphere.
77
 
While reminiscent of the powerful role played by discourses of motherhood to unite women 
across racial boundaries against the apartheid government and its policies, Zuma‟s emphasis 
on motherhood can also be interpreted as referring to the personal significance attached by 
the head of state on the importance of traditional family values, the normative family unit, 
and equating womanhood with motherhood (with notable little commentary of the 
importance of fatherhood). This focus on motherhood and his stereotyping of women in the 
traditional role of „mother‟, would become significantly more poignant when, just over a year 
later (ironically during Women‟s Month), Zuma declared in a television interview that it is 
not „right‟ for a woman to remain unmarried, that single women are a problem in society and 
that the bearing and raising of children gives women „extra training‟78 – reminding the 
country that, although official policy pushes gender equality, within the home (and especially 
the home of the „First Family‟) this is often not a reality for women in South Africa as the 
country remains influenced by strong patriarchal values and practices. Moreover, during this 
time, the government was drafting its Green Paper on Families which would only be 
officially released to the public in August 2012 despite having been released already in 2011 
to allow for consultation with relevant stakeholders. The timing of its re-release was an 
attempt to defend Zuma‟s public statements. Yet, once publically released, the paper was 
criticised for its conservative approach to the term „family‟ and lambasted as reproducing the 
„myth of the family‟ as consisting of a nuclear family made up of a mother, father, and 
children.
79
 This finds particular resonance with Zuma‟s polygamy: a practice deeply 
entrenched in patriarchy and defended in terms of culture and tradition – terms which all 
defined the Green Paper on Families. The Green Paper on Families was also indicative of 
political leaders rarely questioning family patterns that treat women as the primary providers 
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of child and family care and housework and of the assumption of male authority within the 
family.
80
  
           The positioning of a female icon such as Sisulu as a bearer of culture and ideologies 
fundamental to the nation within a South African nationalism is reinforced by Zuma‟s 
references to the lessons the nation must learn from this national heroine‟s life and the 
lessons she had taught:  
We must learn from Mama Sisulu the need to continue promoting non-racialism, social 
cohesion and inclusiveness... She taught us to rise above political differences and focus on the 
good of the country and its people... She taught us so much about leadership and Ubuntu. She 
upheld many values that we must internalise in our own lives and behaviour.
81
  
Perhaps this emphasis on social cohesion, Ubuntu, and leadership can also be a tempering of 
the social divisions invoked by Julius Malema. Zuma continued to remind the nation that 
there are many lessons “this wise and wonderful stalwart has left for us... From her we 
learned that you can be a leader and still respect others in actions and deeds regardless of 
their station in life or status.”82 Her undeniable importance to the nation as a valuable 
member of the ANC is reinforced by Zuma when he stated that it was not only “leaders of 
opposition parties [who] made the time to sign condolence books to declare their respect for 
this remarkable leader”83 but that all these messages “confirm what our father, President 
Nelson Mandela said about Mama Sisulu. She was „wise and wonderful‟.”84 Invoking the 
powerful and iconic name of Mandela in the familial terminology of nationalist ideology, not 
only affirms the importance of Sisulu, but also reminds the nation of Mandela‟s association 
with the ANC – not only was the „Mother of the Nation‟ a fiercely loyal ANC member, the 
„Father of our Nation‟, Mandela, was too. Mandela‟s mythology has repeatedly been a 
commanding tool in regime legitimation for the ANC and is undoubtedly likely to remain so. 
Zuma continued to promote the ANC as the organisation from which great leaders like 
Albertina Sisulu emerged:  
In just a few months, the liberation movement that was so dear to Mama Sisulu‟s heart, the 
ANC, will celebrate its centenary... The celebrations will remind the world of a century of 
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selfless struggle. When we speak of the organisation‟s selfless struggle, Mama Sisulu‟s name 
stands out as a shining example.
85
  
The centenary celebrations would be a year-long event that commemorated monthly the most 
influential male leaders of the organisation and involved the declaration as national heritage 
sites of the locations associated with them and the ANC itself. Trading on the past glories of 
the organisation, the celebrations could be considered as a somewhat shameless foundational 
mythology creation exercise that placed the ANC at the centre of the liberation movement to 
the exclusion of many other organisations that played a vital role while, controversially, also 
drawing on public funds to fund certain aspects of the celebration in the name of „national 
heritage‟.86 Further reminiscing of the „golden years‟ of the ANC, Zuma employed a well-
known ANC slogan and states that “[w]hen we say working together we can do more, we are 
endorsing lessons from leaders such as Mama Sisulu.”87 Zuma continued: 
The passing of Mama Sisulu, soon after that of Ntante Henry Makgothi, is a stark reminder 
than an outstanding, dedicated, committed and illustrious generation is departing. They have 
played their part and led us to freedom. In their memory and honour we have to realise the 
vision of building a truly non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa. 
It is the youth, first and foremost, that should take note of the lessons to be learned from these 
ANC stalwarts, according to Zuma, especially within the context of June as „Youth Month‟ 
and the commemoration of the thirty-five year anniversary of the June 16 Soweto Uprisings.  
Zuma stated: 
The message of the 2011 youth month is that the political freedom that has been achieved 
must now translate into economic emancipation, so that we can eradicate inequality, poverty 
and unemployment that continue to afflict our people. In memory of Mama Sisulu, our youth 
must use the available opportunities to obtain education and skills that will enable them to 
take forward the struggle for true economic and social emancipation. Our youth must strive 
for excellence and progress so that they can be rightful beneficiaries of Mama Sisulu‟s legacy 
and that of all heroes of the South African revolution. We also urge the youth to learn from 
Mama Sisulu the values of respect for the next person, selflessness, patriotism and 
commitment to making this country a better place.
88
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Within the context of ANC-ANCYL internal divisions this message may serve as a rebuke to 
the ANCYL for its „disrespect‟ of the organisation‟s leaders and its disciplinary structures.  
More importantly, however, the future of the nation – its youth – are requested to take the 
teachings of, and values most admired in Albertina Sisulu, a “selfless pillar of our struggle”,89 
and emulate them in order to create a future „golden age‟ of „economic freedom‟ and realise 
the vision of a non-racial and non-sexist society inspired by the generation that had fought for 
democratic freedoms of the present.             
           A critical analysis of Jacob Zuma‟s oration has shown how Albertina Sisulu‟s death 
and funeral became an occasion not only for nation-building but also to address current and 
future challenges faced by the „nation‟ (rather than the state, government, or individual 
politicians). As Sisulu was an important political icon for the post-apartheid state, her official 
funeral was typically politicised. As her body was laid to rest, it was her legacy that 
remained. It is this legacy that was drawn on by politicians such as Zuma to construct a 
narrative that legitimated the current political order through addressing present societal issues 
but reminding the „nation‟ that in the emulation of Sisulu‟s legacy lays the possibility of a 
future golden era. While reconstructing Sisulu‟s legacy as a source of inspiration for the 
future, the foundational mythology of the post-apartheid state is reinforced by the political 
focus on the contribution of an ANC member who was part of a golden generation of ANC 
activists whose characters are constructed and often presented as being above reproach. 
While Sisulu‟s ANC membership is made clear, the nation is also ensured that she belonged 
to all. The continued reference to Sisulu as the „Mother of the Nation‟ and as a „national 
heroine‟, and the reiteration of her dedication, selflessness, humility, loyalty, and patriotism 
constructs the image of the foundational heroic figure who, although physically lost to the 
nation, should inspire through her legacy as it is narrated and presented in official discourse. 
Furthermore, the gendered language of nationalism employed in Zuma‟s speech sought to 
assess and entrench official discourses around domestic femininity, family, and motherhood – 
discourses for which Sisulu is constructed as the perfect icon. Undoubtedly, Sisulu‟s 
contribution to the creation and formation of a democratic South Africa cannot be dismissed 
yet it becomes clear that the official discourses that informed and shaped public mourning 
and the remembrance of her life were mediated by political rhetoric that reconstructed and 
employed this legacy to endorse the dominant political ideologies of the current political 
dispensation.       
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Conclusion 
As „The Struggle‟ forms the epicentre of the foundation myth of the post-apartheid state, the 
official rhetoric issued at the time of Albertina Sisulu‟s death and funeral elevated her to one 
of its most prominent heroines and icons. By granting an official funeral with military 
honours, the state recognised her importance as one of its founding figures while informing 
the nation that it had lost one of its most virtuous heroines and that this sense of loss should 
be shared and publically acknowledged. Official rhetoric, informed by mourning and 
funerary rituals, clearly illustrated how the history of the struggle and its heroes and heroines 
was being assessed and remembered in the present. Sisulu‟s life and legacy were cast as a 
romantic narrative that encapsulated the foundational values of a democratic South Africa. It 
was clear that the largely uncontroversial biography and history of Albertina Sisulu, recast 
and re-interpreted from the present, was a powerful political tool, not just in aid of a larger 
nationalist project of nation-building, but also in regime legitimation at a time when 
government was faced with growing criticism. As the officially-sanctioned narrative of 
Sisulu‟s legacy entered the larger foundational mythology, her name would grace a new 
highway in 2012, while in 2013 a health and leadership programme was launched in her 
name. While the official narrative of Sisulu‟s legacy informed the shaping of a larger 
foundational mythology, the evident discourses of motherhood which tended to form the core 
of official rhetoric were indicative of the gendered nature of nationalism and the multitude of 
ways in which this particular South African nationalist movement positions women. 
„MaSisulu‟ was presented to the nation in official rhetoric as the iconic Mother/Activist 
figure of the struggle and a transmitter of its culture and values – both personally and 
politically – and represented the experiences of many South African mothers under apartheid 
rule.
90
 This perceived shared experience of motherhood, sacrifice, and suffering leading to 
ultimate triumph allowed the nation to identify with „MaSisulu‟ and to perceive that it had 
lost something valuable and important in the departure of this „Mother of the Nation‟ from 
the realm of the living. Yet, now elevated as a „national heroine‟, her legacy and the physical 
presence of her remains in the South African landscape renders her, supposedly, eternal. The 
presence of her name and all its concomitant values in the public landscape serves as a 
constant reminder of this national heroine‟s legacy and honoured place in the country‟s 
pantheon of heroes and heroines.   
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           The death and funeral of Sisulu allowed for a multiplicity of meanings to be inscribed 
on her remains. While overtly embodying the values of nation-building in South Africa in 
official discourse, more subtle and specific power struggles were enacted at her funeral and in 
the many tributes issued by prominent politicians. This demonstrates the political efficacy of 
the named and famous dead while also indicating the protean meanings that can be assigned 
to a single deceased and thus silent individual. Laying claim to this legacy, the ANC wielded 
the political power inherent in dead body politics. The ANC thus indicated its own alleged 
subscription to the moral values that the image of Albertina Sisulu invoked, bolstered its own 
public image, and secured its status as a liberation movement whose glorious past legitimated 
its position as ruling party in the present. 
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Chapter 8 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Burying the Sacred Remains: Rendering the Victim Triumphant and 
Sara Baartman’s Iconography in Post-Apartheid South Africa1 
 
Among the Immortals... every act (and every thought) is the echo of others that 
preceded it in the past, with no visible beginning, or the faithful presage of others that 
in the future will repeat it to a vertiginous degree. 
                              - Jorge Luis Borges
2
 
History repeats itself, first as a tragedy, second as a farce. 
                                                                                                                 - Karl Marx
3
 
 
Introduction 
In the small citrus farming community of Hankey in the Eastern Cape, Sara Baartman‟s 
remains rest in a grave situated on the small hill, Vergaderingskop (Assembly Hill), 
overlooking the Gamtoos River Valley. Her remains were returned to South Africa from 
France on 2 May 2002 after six years of official negotiations between the two governments.
4
 
The return of Baartman‟s remains were imbued with great symbolic significance that 
transcended former presidents Mandela‟s rainbow nationalism and Mbeki‟s African 
Renaissance philosophies. Baartman‟s physical remains and biography, always symbolic to a 
vertiginous degree, were meant to serve as a symbolic closure to South Africa‟s traumatic 
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colonial and apartheid pasts. For both presidencies and their attendant nationalist ideologies, 
the burial of Baartman‟s remains in African soil were to form part of the creation of a 
foundational mythology that spoke of national healing and its resultant nation building. The 
dead body politics of Baartman‟s remains were indicative of the transitional politics of the 
newly created post-apartheid state and its search for tractable symbols. Baartman, always 
represented as victim and theoretically and physically reduced to „body‟, was the perfect 
silent figure on whose body and legacy the foundational mythology of the „new‟ South Africa 
could be inscribed.  
           Over the past decade the gravesite has undergone several minor changes but its 
significance in the current political landscape has waned. Despite this, developments for the 
site have been in planning phases for the last twelve years occasioned by sporadic high-
profile visits by government representatives over this time period to assure the community 
that the planned developments will, indeed, go ahead. What has become clear is that in the 
years immediately following South Africa‟s democratic transition, Baartman featured 
strongly in the search for new tractable icons that would embody the spirit of first, the 
Rainbow Nation, and in the years of Mbeki‟s presidency, also African Renaissance 
philosophy. The processes engaged in to ensure the return of her remains and her eventual 
burial in the soil of a country significantly changed since her departure would become strong 
symbolic moments of transition. Baartman was hailed as the „(grand)mother of the nation‟, a 
symbol of unity and reconciliation and of dignity and humanity restored. She was a historic 
figure with a tragic biography distanced by centuries that did not directly imply the racial 
violence of the recent apartheid past and allowed South Africans to identify with her life 
without any sense of immediate guilt.     
           Despite Baartman‟s symbolic efficacy for the post-apartheid nation, the overwhelming 
sense of hope and closure that accompanied her return and burial have faded. Promised 
developments for the gravesite and its surrounding areas have stalled and Baartman‟s 
prominence as an icon of nation-building has taken a backseat as the country faces new 
challenges which call for a different set of icons. This chapter will briefly outline Baartman‟s 
biography and the processes that ensured the return of Baartman‟s remains to South Africa. 
This will be followed by a discussion of the creation of Baartman as a foundational icon for 
the post-apartheid state within a context of the TRC processes and a rendering of a victim 
(re)turned triumphant and the ambivalent relationship between victim/heroine. This was an 
essential aspect of the many ways in which Baartman‟s legacy was re-imagined and re-
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written in the narrative of nation-building and African Renaissance ideologies and ensured 
her position as a powerful symbol in the foundational mythology of a „new‟ South Africa. 
This chapter will also address the developments around Baartman‟s gravesite in Hankey and 
will show that it is clear that as Baartman‟s symbolic currency has lost value, so has the 
urgency to initiate and complete proposed plans that have the potential to create employment 
in an underdeveloped part of the country, lost impetus.  
           Baartman‟s tragic life story and the repetitive casting of her legacy, body, and life as a 
symbol renders any discussion of her as potentially sensitive. As a woman whose personhood 
has been denied or glossed over for centuries and whose agency as a KhoeKhoe woman in 
colonial South Africa must be questioned, any discussion of Baartman necessarily needs to be 
traversed carefully and heeding Abrahams‟ caution that “[e]ven as a symbol of resistance of 
triumph, she is still a symbol, and even a positive symbol is still a thing, not a person.”5 This 
chapter will outline and analyse Baartman‟s casting as a symbol and icon within the 
foundational mythology of post-apartheid South Africa and show how her biography has 
been subsumed in the socio-political landscape of a transitional South Africa that understood 
the symbolic efficacy of her life experiences in establishing a new moral order. This chapter 
does not intend to denigrate the traumatic events that characterised Baartman‟s life or to 
discredit the genuine empathy and sympathy that many officials, Khoisan people, and other 
stakeholders felt for her plight. Rather this serves as a critique of how her body and legacy 
were once again subsumed by symbolic imagery that served a variety of political projects and 
cast Baartman as an iconic foundational figure for the post-apartheid state in the transitional 
period. Baartman‟s original KhoeKhoe name is unknown and it is necessary to refer to her by 
the Afrikaans name given to her by her employers. The diminutive version of her name, 
„Saartjie‟, found popularity amongst Khoisan descendants as a term of endearment for a 
revered ancestor. Various spellings of Baartman‟s name are in use and the official spelling of 
her name, „Sarah Bartmann‟, reflects the Anglicised version which appears on her baptismal 
certificate and represents the period of her life where she would have been on display and 
will therefore not be used. The choice for spelling in this thesis reflects the name that would 
have been used by her employers in the Cape.  
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Brief Biography 
While this chapter is not meant to serve as a biography of Baartman, her iconic status in post-
apartheid South Africa is the result of a politicised re-imagining and re-writing of her life-
story to form a supporting pillar in the narrative of nation-building.
6
 Thus, to allow for 
adequate contextualisation a brief outline will be given here. Sara Baartman, a KhoeKhoe 
woman, is believed to have been born in the Gamtoos River Valley in 1789.
7
 She was taken 
to Cape Town and became the indentured „servant‟ of the Cesars family where she was 
noticed by Hendrik Cesar‟s employer, English staff surgeon and medical superintendant of 
the Cape Slave Lodge, Alexander Dunlop. Dunlop persuaded Cesars that the exhibition of 
Baartman in England could be a lucrative prospect and they sailed to England in 1810. In 
London, Dunlop initially attempted to contract Baartman to naturalist William Bullock who 
ran the famous Liverpool Museum at 22 Piccadilly. However, Bullock refused and Dunlop 
and Cesars decided to display Baartman themselves. They secured the location of no.225 
Piccadilly and started advertising for the exhibition of the „Hottentot Venus‟ as an ethnic 
curiosity. Her dress on stage was contrived to display Baartman‟s body in its „natural‟ state 
by the use of a tight fitting garment whose seams were concealed by carefully arranged 
jewellery. Baartman‟s garments on stage were meant to represent the dress of her entire 
ethnic group and for the first time in the history of the display of blacks in England, had 
sexual connotations.
8
 Baartman‟s exhibition proved popular and several satirical cartoons and 
caricatures of Baartman appeared in newspapers. However, concern did arise amongst 
members of the public who expressed concern about Baartman‟s agency and the „decency‟ of 
the exhibition in letters to newspapers. Cesars was charged by abolitionist group, the African 
Institution, for slavery and the use of obscenity in the exhibition of Baartman. Baartman was 
interviewed during this trial with a translator present. However, Cesars was present and while 
this is the only time that Baartman‟s voice appears on record, this voice is compromised by 
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the power relations at play in this interview. The charges of slavery were ultimately 
dismissed and the trial focused on the decency of Baartman‟s exhibition for which Cesars 
received a warning. With the exhibition‟s reputation damaged after the trial, the „Hottentot 
Venus‟ exhibition continued to be on display in the English countryside. Baartman was 
baptised in Manchester in 1811 but then disappears from public records until she resurfaces 
in Paris in 1814. In Paris, Cesars sold Baartman‟s contract to an animal trainer named Reaux 
who continued to exhibit her in France. Here, she excited the scientific curiosity of famous 
anatomist George Cuvier. Cuvier struck an agreement with Reaux that Baartman would be 
subjected to a three day „observation‟ by a scientific team led by Cuvier in March 1815 at the 
Jardin du Roi. Baartman, under pressure from Cuvier, was persuaded to pose nude. However, 
she refused to drop the handkerchief with which she covered her genitals from the gaze of the 
scientists. During this „observation‟, artists employed by the Musée de l’Homme, painted 
portraits of Baartman which would later be published in a volume about the studies of 
mammals.  
           Baartman died in December 1815 and her body was given to the Musée de l’Homme 
where it was dissected by Cuvier. The cause of Baartman‟s death is unknown although it has 
been attributed to smallpox,
9
 syphilis, or tuberculosis.
10
 Yet, this is more likely to be part of 
the imagery of the ailing prostitute in the nineteenth century. The media in South Africa, in 
the months before the return of her remains, often asserted that Baartman was a prostitute in 
her last few months in Paris. Although there is no evidence to support this assertion, it is 
possible that Reaux sold Baartman‟s sexual services to selected clients in order to provide an 
income as Baartman was too ill to perform in the first few months of 1815. Cuvier attributed 
Baartman‟s death to an „eruptive illness‟ and never made any references to syphilis in his 
study of her remains. Cuvier removed Baartman‟s skeleton and preserved her brain and 
genitalia while a complete body cast was created. His study of Baartman was published in 
1817 in the Histoire naturelle des mammiferes. Baartman was the only human represented in 
this study of mammals. This study marked the beginning of the development of a racialised 
science that focused on the characteristics of the biological body in order to classify the races. 
Baartman, as a representative of the KhoeKhoe people, was represented as a „sub-human‟ by 
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Cuvier‟s inclusion of her in his study of mammals. Baartman‟s remains and body cast 
remained on display at the Musée de l’Homme in Paris until the 1980s. 
 
Returning the Sacred Remains 
Framed by a context of petitions for Khoisan indigenous rights in South Africa, and of 
course, reconciliation and nation building, genealogist Mansell Upham (who claims to be a 
direct descendant of Krotoa/Eva), initiated the process to return Baartman‟s remains – 
consisting of her skeleton and preserved brains and genitalia – to South Africa. In Baartman‟s 
physical remains, Upham perceived “the plight of indigenous people, and a story of 
dehumanisation and the tragedies befalling black women in colonial societies.”11 The 
requests of the Griqua National Conference (GNC) to the Musée de l’Homme for the return of 
the remains were ignored and consequently the GNC approached the South African 
government to request their direct negotiations with the French government. French law 
dictated that objects owned by French museums could not be permanently returned to their 
country of origin and Baartman‟s remains were French patrimony. The French government 
was reluctant to make an exception for the repatriation of Baartman‟s remains as it could 
result in requests from other countries for the return of historical artefacts or human remains 
from French museums. However, with pressure from the South African government 
emphasising Baartman‟s unique importance as a symbol of oppression and colonisation and 
the fact that her remains had a known identity and had parts of her life recorded it was 
considered that her repatriation would not necessarily cause an exponential growth in calls 
for the return of other historical artefacts.  
           On 21 February 2002, the French National Assembly unanimously passed the bill for 
Baartman‟s return.12 Baartman‟s remains were handed over to the South African ambassador 
to France, Thuthukile E. Skweyiya, after two months and returned to South Africa with a 
delegation led by then Minister of Arts and Culture, Brigitte Mabandla, on 2 May 2002. 
Although initiated by the GNC, the necessity for the involvement of the South African 
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government in securing the repatriation of Baartman‟s remains led to Baartman becoming a 
South African icon, rather than an exclusive icon for Khoisan rights in South Africa. Over ten 
million Rand was spent in returning Baartman‟s remains to South Africa and the South 
African government, in search of tractable symbols for the post-apartheid state, understood 
the symbolic significance of the repatriation of Baartman‟s remains to a democratic South 
Africa. Baartman had been transformed from a symbol of colonial oppression and scientific 
racism thoroughly addressed in academic writings, to an icon for Khoisan indigenous rights 
in post-apartheid South Africa. Her appropriation by the South African government gave her 
an iconic status of nationalist importance. Eng and Kazanjian indicate that “the return of a 
lost body to its „native soil‟ allegorises nationalism‟s aspirations to the kind of absolute return 
by which a foundationalist identity is produced.”13 Baartman‟s return to African soil, for the 
South African government, embodied an important aspect of the symbolic closure of 
colonialism, apartheid, racism, and sexism; a restoration of dignity to the people of South 
Africa and the dawning of a new era for the country, the „nation‟, and the continent.  
    
Burying the Sacred Remains 
One and a half months after Baartman‟s return to South Africa, Mabandla created a 
„Reference Group‟ to consider the burial of Baartman‟s remains. Several factors such as 
when, where, and under which religious orders Baartman would be buried had to be 
addressed by this group. The Reference Group consisted of thirteen members amongst whom 
there were government representatives, the deputy chairperson of the Human Rights 
Commission, academics, and Khoisan representatives.
14
 Initially, the Company‟s Gardens in 
Cape Town was suggested as the site for internment. Not only was this the city in which Sara 
Baartman lived, it is also a popular tourist destination. However, as some Khoisan beliefs 
dictate that a person should be interred as near as possible to the place where their umbilical 
cord is buried, it was decided that Baartman would be laid to rest in the Gamtoos River 
Valley – the area believed to be the place of her birth.15 Furthermore, it was hoped that the 
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burial in Hankey of a national icon who had received extensive international media attention, 
would lead to an influx of tourists into the impoverished area and present employment 
opportunities and further economic development. 
           The date for Baartman‟s internment was decided by the Department of Arts and 
Culture (DAC) and fixed for 9 August 2002 which coincided with National Women‟s Day 
and International Indigenous Peoples‟ Day. This decision, made by government, was initially 
met with some Khoisan resistance. Firstly, Khoisan burial practices dictate that Baartman‟s 
funeral should take place at the full moon.
16
 Secondly, an opinion was expressed that 
combining the funeral with a national holiday such as National Women‟s Day was an insult 
that would create the impression that the government had „hijacked‟ Baartman from her 
individuality and her descendants. The Khoisan representatives felt that Baartman deserved 
“a day that belongs to her alone... She deserves a day that we will remember as the day that 
our Great Foremother has been buried.”17 Furthermore, they insisted that Baartman was a 
“Khoisan...icon, as she symbolised to us the abuse that our great foremothers were exposed 
to... Ms Baartman deserves the peace that was never given to her spirit.”18 Despite Khoisan 
protests, the South African government continued with its plans to stage the funeral as an 
international event; especially since it had spent 10,350,000 Rand returning the remains to 
South Africa and creating the Reference Group.
19
 In addition, the government had found in 
Baartman a figure that could be employed as an important icon for nation building and 
reconciliation. Crais and Scully, having gained access to an internal document of the 
Reference Group after a three year long process, show how Baartman became this icon. They 
quote,  
It would be difficult... to over-rate both the national and international importance to South 
Africa of this event. It was a victory over colonialism, racism and sexism. It very visibly and 
publicly restored the dignity of a South African woman exploited and humiliated in her 
lifetime. It brought together and united South Africans of all backgrounds in seeing justice 
done.
20   
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By linking Baartman‟s return directly to the unification of “South Africans of all 
backgrounds”, she became part of a nationalist agenda rather than an exclusively ethnic 
agenda. Baartman was returned to the South African nation, not just to Khoisan descendants. 
Samuelson establishes the important connection between the grand scale of Baartman‟s 
funeral and the political funerals of the struggle years and states that Baartman‟s funeral was 
an instance in which individual suffering was appropriated by the collective – the nation – to 
express a redemptive national narrative.
21
 This reinforced sentiment amongst several Khoisan 
leaders that the burial of Baartman had been „hijacked‟ by government.22 It was felt that 
Khoisan interests in Baartman as an ancestor became tangential in the process of her 
becoming national „property‟ as politicians, rather than the local Khoisan, made the final 
decisions regarding Baartman‟s funeral.23 By deciding on a national holiday for the date of 
Baartman‟s funeral, Baartman became synonymous with women‟s struggles and resistance to 
oppression. Through the synthesis of Baartman‟s biography with National Women‟s Day she 
was appropriated for a comprehensive nationalist agenda. It placed Baartman in the realm of 
the „national‟ and national commemorative events, such as National Women‟s Day, that are 
intrinsically part of nationalist movements and foundational mythology creation. Moreover, 
the burial of Baartman on National Women‟s Day, rather than giving her a day of her „own‟ 
reveals the emergence of the constructed political culture of nation building and 
reconciliation in South Africa. It maintained a particular official version of history that the 
state wanted to cultivate so to affirm the identity of the „new‟ South Africa. Simultaneously, 
it gave a diversity of meanings to a past of which the legitimacy and pertinence was 
construed to remain valid in the present.
24
      
           In an atmosphere of internal Khoisan disagreements and Khoisan discontent over 
overwhelming government influence in the decision-making processes, it was decided to bury 
Baartman in a ceremony that recognised both her Christian faith and KhoeKhoe heritage. On 
4 August 2002, at the Civic Theatre in Cape Town, a ritual „enrobement‟ ceremony of the 
naked body cast took place to prepare Baartman for burial. Once this ceremony, which 
symbolically restored the dignity of Baartman by covering the image of her naked body, was 
completed, her remains were flown to Port Elizabeth from where they would be transported 
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to Hankey.
25
 The funeral took place on 9 August 2002. It was a highly publicised event with 
the SABC televising the day-long event live. The cost of the funeral was 1,132,000 Rand.
26
 
The occasion comprised cultural displays, a Khoisan traditional
27
 internment practice and a 
church service after the internment to acknowledge Baartman‟s baptism into Christianity. The 
speeches at the funeral emphasised that Baartman‟s burial restored dignity to the African 
people and to South African women. Furthermore, hope was expressed that Baartman‟s burial 
and grave site would bring much needed development through tourism to the area identified 
as her place of birth.
28
 
 
“Our Khoi heroine”: Constructing an Icon for the Post-Apartheid State  
When Nelson Mandela called for the return of Sara Baartman‟s remains in 1994 a media-
hype erupted. Documentary films were produced and national newspapers regularly featured 
articles concerning the progress of the government in their attempts to return the remains to 
South Africa from France. This era in South Africa is characterised by a focus on the 
processes of reconciliation in order to come to terms with a past of gross racial inequality and 
violence. It is against the background of reconciliation and rainbow nationalism that Sara 
Baartman gained prominence as a symbol of the new democratic South Africa and the 
repatriation of her remains became symbolic of several different struggles in this country. Her 
restitution became a triumph over gender-based violence and oppression, and racism.
29
 The 
official emphasis initially fell on her significance to the restitution of dignity to the women of 
South Africa once her return was secured by the ANC-led government.
30
 The return of 
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Baartman‟s remains to South African soil was construed as symbolising an end to the sexual 
exploitation that she had suffered during her life and after death. Baartman, previously treated 
as object would now be remembered as subject. However, by emphasising Baartman‟s 
„victory‟ over abuse and exploitation at a time where violence against women was on the 
increase there was a consequential downplaying of the experiences of women in the present.
31
 
Furthermore, Baartman‟s return to South Africa was also symbolic of an assumed triumph 
over slavery, racism, and scientific racism and signified the end of these ideologies within the 
context of post-1994 South Africa.
32
 Baartman‟s experiences as a black woman from 
southern Africa, exploited and paraded in Europe as an „ethnic oddity‟ and later as a scientific 
curiosity, became synonymous with the experiences of colonial Africa and its people as a 
whole; her return, then, was a symbolic triumph over colonialism and apartheid.
33
 Mbeki 
declared this in his speech at Baartman‟s funeral when he stated that the “story of Sarah 
Bartmann is the story of the African people of our country in all their echelons.”34  
           Baartman‟s re-casting from victim into triumphant victor in the present has allowed 
her to become emotionally appropriated heritage that served the emergence of a new post-
apartheid nationalism in South Africa. Returning Baartman‟s remains to South Africa and the 
assumed accompanied restoration of her dignity had been employed in official discourse as a 
foundation myth that allows South Africans to come to terms with the country‟s traumatic 
past by declarations of „closure‟ in the present. Baartman represents the ambivalent 
relationship between victims and heroes/heroines and triumph/trauma in South African 
transitional political ideology. The victims of the previous regimes became the heroes of the 
present democratic order as a “new universalism of mourning patterns the public rituals of 
national identity.”35 Her position as victim/heroine and the constitution of her ability to shift 
between these positions in official rhetoric illustrates the transitional years of South Africa‟s 
movement between apartheid and democracy and the important work done by the TRC to 
address the traumas of the past and link them to the victories of the present. Furthermore, it 
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delineates the new social construction of boundaries and their continuous reaffirmation 
through narratives of trauma and triumph and victims and heroes/heroines. Giesen indicates 
that “[b]oth the hero as well as the victim are presented as ultimate reference points for the 
human constitution and both are located beyond the profane and mundane everyday activities 
of the regular social reality.”36 Baartman‟s lived experiences are presented and remembered 
as trauma, and the violence inflicted on her body reminds the nation of its mortality. In 
contrast, the representation of triumph inserted into the narrative of the return of Baartman‟s 
remains to her „native soil‟, “represent[s] the feeling of sovereign life, of crisis and transition, 
of a new beginning, and thereby [it] represent[s] the moment of birth.”37 Through official 
rhetoric, Baartman‟s trauma and „triumph‟ is symbolic of the trauma of the colonial and 
apartheid eras of South Africa and the triumphant birth of the democratic post-apartheid state 
in 1994.   
           Baartman‟s life experiences were recast and reinvented in order to be linked to South 
Africa‟s transitional period and to women‟s historic and present experiences of violation in 
general. In the initial years after the call for the return of Baartman‟s remains was issued this 
was characterised by a deliberate misremembering and the publishing of a great many 
assumptions of the final years of Baartman‟s life. Historical accuracy was disregarded by the 
media and in official statements made by government as emphasis was placed on Baartman‟s 
death as a result of syphilis contracted during sex work, despite strong evidence to the 
contrary.
38
 Samuelson attributes this focus on Baartman as a prostitute as a “symbol of the 
shame of colonial penetration. The ritualistic covering of Bartmann‟s body cast re-figures her 
from icon of national degradation to Mother of the Nation, symbol of the nation redeemed, 
and of national wholeness.”39 While the enrobement ceremony in which the cast of her naked 
body was covered became symbolic of the restoration of her personal dignity, for Baartman 
the national icon it meant the redemption of the South African nation after the dehumanising 
effects of colonialism and apartheid. While Giesen argues that national heroes are fragile 
constructions as it is easy to erode or dismantle their monumentality through the presentation 
of the profane or mundane details of his or her life, Baartman appears to be an exception to 
this rule.
40
 For Baartman‟s construction as a heroine for the post-apartheid state it is these 
profane and mundane details that make her an icon with which the South African nation can 
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identify. By presenting Baartman‟s personal life experiences as symbolic of the history of 
colonialism and apartheid and the violence enacted upon many women in the past and 
present, she becomes a heroine that represents an encompassing collectivity. This collective 
identity symbolised in Baartman as national heroine is founded not simply on her story, it 
includes the identification of “the storyteller who identifies with the hero‟s perspective, and, 
most importantly, it includes the audience – the readers, listeners and spectators, who feel 
sympathetic with the hero.”41 Government officials representing the official ideological 
stance through official statements and speeches represent the „storyteller‟; they are the 
narrators (and creators) of Baartman‟s story in the post-apartheid state. The „nation‟ is the 
audience to whom this story is presented and constructed for in such a manner that it is an 
identifiable story with a central actor, Sara Baartman the heroine. Importantly,  
the narrative construction of the hero‟s triumph merges three positions: the hero, the 
storyteller and the audience. The bond of identification that embraces the three positions is 
based on the triumph of the hero over mundane regards and earthly matters. It appeals to a 
particular imagination of the sacred.
42
  
Baartman‟s importance as a symbol for nation building and creating unity amongst South 
Africans of all backgrounds was voiced repeatedly in official government speeches, 
statements, and documents.
43
 Not only was Baartman a signifier of the historical suppression 
of black South Africans, she also became a symbol of how the ANC-led government was 
addressing and correcting this past, and indeed, the violent experiences of many women in 
the present. Giesen shows that,  
The tension between the imperfection of the present and the ideal order located in the future 
or in the past – or in other words: the sacralisation of the future or the past – can be turned 
into a strong collective thrust to change the present situation by historical action. Accelerating 
the present into a utopian future or restoring an ideal past are commonly considered as the 
prime motives for historical action that transcends the limitations of an individual‟s life.44 
At Albertina Sisulu‟s funeral, discussed in the previous chapter, the sacred „golden age‟ of 
the struggle years and Sisulu‟s dedication was called upon in order to initiate a „strong 
collective thrust‟ in the context of poor service delivery in the present with an implication 
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that once the nation unites and takes action (that is legal and within the accepted order) an 
ideal future can be achieved. In the case of Baartman, the return of her remains and their 
burial in South African soil has been constructed as a symbolic action that brings closure to a 
traumatic past and addresses present societal obstacles to an ideal future for the nation. Both 
Mbeki and then Deputy Minister of Arts and Culture, B. Sonjica relayed the importance of 
returning Baartman to South Africa as an opportunity to affirm government‟s “commitment 
to non-racism and non-sexism and the restoration of the dignity of all Africans”45 while also 
being constructed as a correction of human rights violations in South Africa.
46
 Baartman 
came to represent „Mother Africa‟,  
the fecund and bountiful Mother, symbol of wholeness and unity, nurture and sustenance, 
whose re-membered body reflects both the rich land of the Gamtoos River Valley and the 
unified national body.
47
 
Baartman‟s female black body became „mother‟, „nation‟, and „Africa‟. Nomathamsanqa 
Tisani, a member of the ministerial committee for history wrote,  
Her return heals us, her children, who have been spiritually deprived of an ancestor. She 
symbolises all the women who were wrenched from their families and could never provide 
the warmth and comfort mothers give. We are at peace as she comes home to live, forever, in 
the embrace of Mother Africa, with the Gamtoos singing her to sleep.
48
 
Baartman, firstly as a woman, and secondly as a KhoeKhoe woman was an ideal non-
threatening “tragic victim”49 figure to serve the role as a mother for the new South African 
nation; she was a strong representative symbol of the colonial abuse of the female black body 
and, by extension, of the colonial violence inflicted on Africa itself. Her physical body 
became the site of symbolic closure of racism and racial oppression and violence in South 
Africa while her ethnicity recalled a past distant enough not to be a cause for further racial 
division. Her status as „victim‟ of an oppressive colonial regime and of the racist scientific 
discourses of the nineteenth century made her apparent „triumphant‟ return to the country of 
her birth – now supposedly also free of racism, oppression, and sexism – even more 
significant, especially within the context of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which 
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was active at the time of the ongoing negotiations to have Baartman‟s remains returned. But 
Baartman‟s construction as the „silenced victim‟, inescapably constrained by her gender and 
ethnicity, denies her any agency, both in the past and in the present and conclusively renders 
her as a sanctified female icon of South Africa. 
           The TRC established an ideology of national healing that was built on the public 
acknowledgement of narratives of personal traumas. The call for Baartman‟s return took 
place during the height of the TRCs highly publicised Human Rights Violations hearings. 
Accordingly, the story of Baartman was narrated in the language of the TRC hearings in 
official statements. But Baartman‟s story was constructed as a narrative of both personal 
redemption and as national closure, healing, and victory in a manner reminiscent of the 
trajectory of the televised TRC hearings. Her reburial in the soil of her motherland restored 
Baartman‟s dignity and humanity; implied closure to a lifetime of exploitation and violation. 
With the return of her remains to a democratic South Africa free of a racially oppressive 
regime, she was a victim no longer. Instead, by completing her two-hundred year journey 
across time and space to a „new‟ South Africa, she returned victorious – as a heroine. Her 
oppressive experiences of sexual exploitation, exhibition, and scientific racism were rendered 
a closed chapter as she arrived on South African soil. Sara Baartman could now rest in peace, 
her dignity and humanity purportedly restored by government‟s efforts to secure the return of 
her remains. Baartman‟s mythography and its purpose in the post-apartheid state was created 
and established during these initial years of democracy, and the correlations between the 
trajectory of her life and death and the deeply emotional narratives of personal trauma that 
emerged at the TRC hearings were drawn. Samuelson also argues that even Baartman‟s 
funeral itself, like the TRC, “returns to a traumatic past in search of present healing... [it] was 
a ritual event through which the transitional narrative of redemption was performed. The 
ritual gave birth to a nation as it buried Bartmann.”50 As a result, the narrative of Baartman‟s 
life, and indeed, Baartman herself, became inextricably linked to the transitional politics of 
post-apartheid South Africa. As a victim of colonialism, sexism, oppression, and scientific 
racism, Baartman‟s story and remains were symbolically „dug up‟ from an oppressive past 
and brought out into the public realm – her trauma was uncovered and became known and 
acknowledged by the nation while her burial ensured the (re)birth of the nation, cleansed and 
united. Just as the TRC attempted to restore some form of dignity to apartheid‟s victims 
through the official and public acknowledgement of their personal traumas, Baartman‟s 
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dignity was purportedly restored by similar processes. She was the quintessential transition 
icon. Baartman came to symbolise the national body as a whole; her story of trauma was that 
of South Africa‟s past, the restoration of her dignity that of the South African nation. 
Baartman‟s iconicity claimed her place in the post-apartheid pantheon of heroes and heroines, 
so the nation was constructed as sharing in her victory over an oppressive past.
51
 However, 
David Lloyd critiques this analogy between individual and societal suffering as he suggests 
that the period of public commemoration functions as a way to allow the “dead to slip away 
without the trace of a wake behind them”,52 thus indicating that the emphasis does not 
necessarily fall on dealing with loss or trauma, but rather on how public mourning can 
accomplish social healing in the present. By professing closure and victory over colonialism 
and oppression in order to attain a peaceful transition there exists the danger of reproducing 
the conditions and attitudes that have supposedly been overcome. For Lloyd this is the ethical 
failure of national mourning rituals. As South Africa attempts to transcend its traumatic past 
through public mourning rituals such as the TRC processes and the public state funerals of its 
heroes and heroines, professing closure on the conditions that produced these narratives can 
deflect from the continued influence of these discourses in the present and from the ongoing 
problems besetting the nation.  
           While the final report of the TRC was completed several years before Baartman‟s 
return and burial, its lasting impact on public consciousness remained during much of the 
Mandela and Mbeki presidencies. While the prominent political ideology shifted from 
reconciliation and nation building to Mbeki‟s African Renaissance after he replaced Mandela 
as president, government focus on reconciliation ideologies never truly disappeared in the 
initial decade after the advent of democracy. Mbeki, more than any other South African 
president, focused on Sara Baartman as an icon for both political ideologies as he straddled 
the watershed moment of following Mandela and rainbow nationalism, with a more Africa-
focused ideology that was meant to take the country, and the continent, forward. Yet, South 
Africa was still a relatively new democratic state that continued to face great racial and 
economic inequality, and the ideology of reconciliation could never be fully abandoned in 
this crucial transition period. This amalgamation of reconciliation and African Renaissance 
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ideologies was made explicit by Mbeki at the 51
st
 National Congress of the ANC when he 
stated in his address: 
The fact that we have gathered here together as compatriots, in conditions of freedom and 
peace, the descendants of Sarah Bartmann and Simon van der Stel... make[s] the statement 
that all South Africa has embarked on an unstoppable journey toward its rebirth
53   
Daniel Herwitz argues that the African Renaissance envisioned by Mbeki “eschews a vision 
of Africa based on race and gender... It forms an entirety of history out of the panoply of 
shards of the South African...past, thus creating the history of a people...”54 Mbeki‟s famous 
“I am an African” speech, given in 1996 at the adoption of South Africa‟s new constitution, 
which assigned the status of „African‟ to all those who lived on the continent, regardless of 
race or heritage forms the basis of his ability to integrate two ideologies seemingly at odds 
with one another: one an inclusive ideology attempting to create and bring together a „nation‟ 
out of a divisive past, the other a philosophy that reiterates exclusivity and „African-ness‟.    
           The address given by then President Mbeki at the funeral of Baartman illustrates the 
employment of Baartman‟s iconic mythography to push the official agendas of reconciliation, 
nation-building, and his African Renaissance ideologies. He makes it clear that the story of 
Baartman is the story of the “African people”55 in South Africa and makes a direct 
comparison between Baartman‟s experiences under colonial rule and apartheid ideologies. He 
continued to suggest that the restoration of Baartman‟s human dignity is inextricably linked 
to transforming South Africa into a non-racial, non-sexist, prosperous society. Importantly, 
he presented Baartman as a martyr as the “changing times tell us that she did not suffer and 
die in vain.”56 In Judeo-Christian tradition acts of martyrdom function – historically and 
presently – as vehicles for the inculcation of certain sets of values and it is through the telling 
and the re-telling of these stories that they become effective narratives for those who share 
these very same values.
57
 Moreover, even in a more secular modern society, it is nearly 
impossible to dispense with the “heroic sacrifices of individuals in order to construct a sacred 
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bond of collective identity.”58 While her death and dissection gave testimony to the 
dehumanising effects of scientific racism, Baartman never sacrificed herself for any greater 
cause and the construction of her death as such not only echoes the celebration of the iconic 
martyrs of the anti-apartheid struggle popularly celebrated and commemorated in South 
Africa, but elevates her legacy to that of the sacred. Baartman, presented to the nation as an 
innocent victim of „evil‟ external forces, is sacralised through her „sacrifice‟ which is 
constructed in the present as symbolic for the birth of the new nation; death is transformed 
into life, trauma into triumph and “the trauma of death can be revealed as the path to 
triumphant immortality.”59 At the occasion of the official celebration of Heritage Day on 24 
September 2006, several years after Baartman‟s burial, Mbeki reiterated Baartman‟s assumed 
agency in her „martyrdom‟ when he labelled her as “our Khoi heroine.”60 Baartman‟s 
continued prominence as a shared national historical heroine reinforces her importance to the 
nationalist movements that marked Mandela‟s and Mbeki‟s presidencies. Through the 
continued focus on Baartman‟s story and „sacrifice‟ in the first fourteen years of democracy, 
the values assigned to her life and death by the post-apartheid ruling party became inculcated 
into South African society and solidified those values as the building blocks of the 
foundational mythology of the new state.   
           Mbeki‟s presidency was adversely characterised by his disastrous unwillingness to 
accept the dominant medical paradigm of the definite link between HIV/AIDS and his 
challenge of the important use of antiretroviral medications (ARVs) to combat infection rates 
and treat patients. His questioning of the medical links between HIV and AIDS and sympathy 
towards a policy of HIV/AIDS denialism was based on the research of a minority of dissident 
scientists which has been largely discredited by the medical community. This stance appeared 
to be strongly influenced by his African Renaissance philosophy and the African continent‟s 
history of colonialism and racism and the influence of „Western‟ medical science and its use 
in Africa.
61
 Baartman‟s nineteenth-century experiences of „Western‟ medical science were 
invoked by Mbeki in order to berate modern understandings of HIV/AIDS in Africa and to 
dispute the accepted medical understandings of the disease and its treatment as being 
influenced by racist ideologies. Crais and Scully, as well as Holmes have addressed Mbeki‟s 
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deployment of Baartman and her history as part of his diatribe against science and the 
„West‟.62 At his speech at the funeral of Baartman Mbeki questioned the validity of modern 
science as the once accepted racialised science of the nineteenth century has been proven as 
unfounded. He condemned the prominent Western scientists when he stated: 
Among the truly monstrous were the leading scientists of the day, who sought to feed a rabid 
racism such as the distinguished anatomist, Baron George Cuvier... Sarah Bartmann was 
sucked into evil purposes pursued by those who defined themselves as a „man par 
excellence‟, with a manifest destiny to enlighten and to tame.63 
Mbeki proceeded to pronounce (in the language of a distinctly „Western‟ renaissance) how it 
was, in fact, Baartman‟s people who were enlightened about the barbarism of these men „par 
excellence‟. In the context of Baartman‟s experiences and the subjection of her remains to 
racist scientific observation, this scathing criticism of the „West‟ and one of its revered 
historic scientists is justifiable. Although never made explicit in his speech at Baartman‟s 
funeral, it is the implied denigration of „Western‟ science that was created by a context of 
Mbeki‟s African Renaissance philosophy and his hostility towards accepted medical 
knowledge that was made apparent. 
           As Baartman was once a symbol for black female sexual alterity, she now became a 
symbol for the nationalist and political ideologies that shaped South Africa in the years 
following the first democratic elections. The attending depersonalisation of Baartman in the 
democratic era has been criticised extensively in academic writing.
64
 Abrahams argues that 
“[t]he lives of black women are still determined by their race and gender, to the detriment of 
their humanity. There is a sense in which the iconisation of Sarah Baartman, post-2001, 
obscured her true self.”65 Although the agendas of Baartman‟s symbolisation differ vastly 
from the nineteenth century colonialism of her lived experience to post-apartheid South 
Africa, she perpetually remains a symbol. Hailed as the (grand)mother
66
 of the South African 
nation, Baartman engenders the nation-building, reconciliation, and African Renaissance 
                                                          
62
 Crais and Scully, Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus, (2009). Holmes, The Hottentot Venus, (2007). 
63
 Mbeki, “Speech at the Funeral of Sarah Bartmann”, 2002. 
64
 Abrahams, “Gender and Locality”, in Oliphant, Delius, Meltzer (eds), Democracy X, (2004). Crais and Scully, 
Sara Baartman and the Hottentot Venus, (2009). Kerseboom, “‟Our Khoi Heroine‟ (MA thesis, Stellenbosch 
University, 2007). Samuelson, Remembering the Nation, Dismembering Women?,(2007). 
65
 Abrahams,: Sarah Bartmann in the Present”, in Oliphant, Delius, Meltzer (eds), Democracy X, p.152. 
Extensive biographies of Baartman, chronicling her life only appeared after 2006. 
66
 Mbeki, “Address of the President, Thabo Mbeki, at the Opening of the 51st National Conference of the 
African National Congress”, 2002.  Nealroy Swarts quoted in Abrahams, “Gender and Locality”, in Oliphant, 
Delius, Meltzer (eds), Democracy X, p.177. 
265 
 
ideologies that marked her as a national icon and assigned her the respectful status of a shared 
(grand)mother and shaped her as a symbol of unity and victory over a traumatic and divisive 
past.  
           Baartman‟s declaration as the (grand)mother of the South African nation can be 
attributed to her KhoeKhoe ancestry. Officially assigned First Nation Status in South Africa, 
as a KhoeKhoe woman, Baartman represents an idealised „shared‟ ancestor of a unified 
nation. Moreover, the title of grandmother, which tends to be employed more frequently than 
the term „mother‟ in Baartman‟s case, could be postulated as desexualising Baartman‟s 
historically and overtly sexualised legacy, ultimately rendering it as harmless and past. As 
colonialism uncovered and sexualised Baartman‟s body, post-apartheid nationalism has 
covered and domesticated and cast her as the maternal icon. Samuelson argues that by 
returning to the maternal discourses reminiscent of empire and apartheid, “the nation finds 
itself entrapped within the discourses to which it responds, as the desire for national unity and 
authenticity is expressed through the figure of the domesticated Mother.”67 As the colonial 
endeavour presented the image of the pure, covered, domesticated European woman in 
opposition to the „savage‟, naked sexuality of the female black body, so the post-apartheid 
government has through its covering ceremony of the body-cast, in a manner, „recovered‟ 
Baartman‟s body and „civilised‟ and „domesticated‟ her legacy. For Samuelson rather than 
deconstructing the binary of “domesticated (white) versus sexualised (black) 
femininity...current discourse has focused instead on the task of shifting Bartmann from one 
category to the other, without destabilising the terms themselves.”68 Moreover, the covering 
of Baartman‟s body-cast “re-figures her from icon of national degradation to Mother of the 
Nation, symbol of the nation redeemed, and of national wholeness.”69 Thus, the shame of the 
colonial violence inflicted on Baartman‟s body, symbolic of the colonial violation of the 
African continent, is covered and dignity restored to Baartman and the nation. As Samuelson 
argues, the gender implications around the restoration of Baartman‟s „decency‟ and the 
discourses of domesticity that were inscribed on her body (and body-cast) are striking. 
Domesticity and „respectability‟ were the terms of struggle for women and their access to 
political rights in the colonial era. The rhetoric of Baartman‟s return to post-apartheid South 
Africa implies that women‟s rights continue to be “marshalled around claims of respectability 
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and decency (and, by extension, domesticity)”70 rather than rejecting these terms of struggle 
that were established by the colonial encounter. Moreover, it appears to „cover‟ “over 
continuities between past and present violations of female bodies”71 which are essential to 
understanding gender relations in South Africa in the present. Samuelson also indicates the 
importance of the continued emphasis in official rhetoric on bringing Baartman back home. 
The first concern noted is the naturalisation of the nation as a domestic, familial unit. As 
shown in previous chapters, the “rhetoric of the nation as family legitimates gendered 
hierarchical structures and casts women as Mothers, who reflect national unity.”72 Another 
important correlation that Samuelson establishes is that the narrative of a return home,  
shapes Bartmann‟s story in accordance with one of the defining narratives of the movement 
from apartheid to post-apartheid South Africa: exile and the return home. This is the 
redemptive story of the political elite, whose loss of home during the years of resistance was 
repaid with the political victory of 1994.
73
 
As has been argued in previous chapters, the struggle has become the central foundational 
mythology for the post-apartheid state. Here, this is reinforced through its symbolic 
correlation with the narrative of a highly emotive homecoming and the sacred nature of the 
funereal rites for the remains of an iconic female figure who was hailed as the grandmother of 
the nation. 
 
Dignity Restored? Baartman’s Grave as National Heritage Site 
While Baartman carried immeasurable political value in the years between the call for her 
return to South Africa and her eventual burial in Hankey, her political significance has 
notably dwindled after Mbeki‟s resignation as President of South Africa in 2008. While vast 
amounts were spent ensuring the return of her remains and arranging the funeral, the grave 
itself, twelve years after the actual internment, has been neglected. Consisting of large cement 
and pebbled square, Baartman‟s grave lies at the edge of the small hill and overlooks the lush 
Gamtoos River Valley (figures 1 & 2). Surrounded by indigenous flora, the grave itself is 
covered in small stones, some (still) bearing faded, worn and torn black and white printed 
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images of Baartman‟s face (figures 3 & 4).74 Grave-markers and information boards have 
come and gone, each bearing different inscriptions and vandalised at different points and all 
bronze plaques removed within a few days of placement (figures 5 & 6). Undoubtedly 
problematic, the only constant over the years has been the large “temporary”75 metal fencing 
surrounding the grave placed there in order to protect the grave from vandals. The imposing 
green fence is eerily reminiscent of Baartman‟s display as the „Hottentot Venus‟ in Piccadilly 
but appears to be the most cost-effective way of protecting the grave while further 
development of the site is pending. Goats roam the littered area surrounding the site which 
has been set aside for the largest sundial in South Africa. What is immediately apparent is 
that Baartman‟s ideological political capital superseded the need to maintain her dignity once 
it had purportedly been „restored‟. A „display‟ of Baartman, even interred, will always remain 
an ethically problematic terrain to traverse. However, plans for development of the site into a 
larger Khoisan cultural and educational centre have been in place for many years but have, as 
yet, failed to become a reality. 
           Commemoration and representation is displayed in rituals of remembrance enacted at 
times and spaces that are identified as significant by the local and national community. 
“There are no private heroes”, Giesen states.  
As lonely as they might be in their moment of heroism, they are carried by a community that 
defines them, tries to follow their example and commemorates their lives. Even if not all 
heroes are dead, their heroism lives only in the community‟s acts to represent them.76  
In Baartman‟s case, the physical presence of her remains in the landscape renders that space 
as sacred and identifies her grave as a significant site at which to stage commemorative 
events. At the funeral of Baartman, President Mbeki announced the intention to have her 
grave declared as a national heritage site.
77
 This was a process that took six years to 
complete; the declaration was made official on 25 April 2008.
78
 Declared as a Grade I 
heritage site under the National Heritage Resources Act of 1999, the grave was considered to 
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have qualities so exceptional that is was of special national significance.
79
 The eleventh draft 
document for the declaration of the grave as a national heritage site issued by SAHRA in 
2007 relates the significance of the grave and makes an exorbitant claim of closure: 
The return of Sarah Bartmann speaks of healing from oppression, suffering, sadness and loss 
for her as an individual and the KhoeKhoe. The site returned dignity to her and her ancestors. 
The site is a symbol that redefines our identity as the nation of South Africa, repairs our sense 
of community and brings back what we as South Africa and the world had lost about our 
humanity.
80
 
The document continues to outline the importance of the site for its ability to contribute to 
nation building as it embodies South Africa coming to terms with its traumatic past, its 
potential to contribute to a greater understanding of the country‟s cultural heritage, and its 
symbolic encompassing of a “new era” for the nation.81  
           Until its official declaration in 2008, the grave remained under the provisional 
protection of SAHRA which meant that no developments or changes could be made to the 
site during this period leading up to the official declaration. With the exception of the 
placement of the protective fence around the grave and the removal of a Sentech 
communications tower, very little has been done to alter the site. Despite the remote location 
of the grave, there has always been intent to develop the site as a potential tourist destination 
with the objective of much needed socio-economic and infrastructural development in the 
area. In 2006, before any official declaration of the site had taken place, SAHRA donated 
three million Rand to the Reference Group in order to initiate a development programme for 
the grave. This was in response to Mbeki‟s request that the project should be under way by 
2007.
82
 With additional funding from SAHRA and the National Lottery the Reference Group 
purchased a large section of land adjacent to the grave where a 168 million Rand Khoisan 
cultural centre is planned to be built.
83
 A competition was launched on 7 March 2009 for the 
Sarah Bartmann Centre of Remembrance by the Gamtkwa Khoisan House, the Khoisan 
Reference Group and DAC and overseen by the Department of Architecture at Nelson 
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Mandela Metropolitan University (NMMU) in Port Elizabeth.
84
 The winning design for the 
centre was unveiled on 22 August 2010 by the Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulama 
Xingwana. It was also affirmed that a Human Rights Memorial in honour of Sara Baartman 
would be established in Cape Town as the place that connects her with her European journey.  
            Connecting the proposed centre with larger heritage projects and themes in South 
Africa, Xingwana stated: 
One of the main objectives of this project is to reaffirm the marginalised history thus 
redefining the South African heritage landscape. As a cultural institution, the Sarah Bartmann 
Centre of Remembrance will provide interpretive space in the memory of the life of Sarah 
Bartmann.  Importantly, it will serve as a repository of the material and intangible heritage of 
the Khoi and San Communities. The Centre will strengthen existing initiatives aimed at 
recognising the rich Khoi and San heritage such as the Xam inscription in our National Coat 
of Arms and the use of the word Xapo// for the museum at Freedom Park. The word Xapo// 
means „a dream is not a dream until it is shared by the entire community‟. As I see the Centre, 
it is an important social cohesion project which should bring us together and make us cherish 
and realise a common dream and vision.
85
 
While Khoisan heritage is at the centre of this project, it is recognised that it serves as an 
important „social cohesion‟ project that will allow the nation to build a brighter future. 
Xingwana reiterated Baartman‟s importance in present South Africa: 
The lessons we have learnt from Sarah Bartmann‟s life is that we must not allow gender 
oppression, de-humanisation, objectification of women, stereotyping or racism to occur. Her 
history affects us all as women, because of the severe exploitation she underwent. Sarah 
Bartmann has become an icon of South Africa as representative of many aspects of our 
nation‟s history. The proposed Centre will therefore serve a very important function in our 
lives as an institution that interrogates all these aspects and provide us with a shared national 
understanding of how we consciously affirm a human rights culture at all times. 
Xingwana concluded with the important pronouncement of the employment opportunities this 
centre would present for members of the Hankey community:  
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In the construction phase, the Centre will present business and employment opportunities to 
the Hankey community and its surroundings. After its completion it will be declared a 
national cultural institution with a Council, Chief Executive Officer, professional and support 
staff. In this way the centre will provide sustainable job opportunities. Beyond these prospects 
the Centre will change the face of Hankey through the development of heritage and tourism 
infrastructure and programmes. In the medium term the Centre is envisaged to form part of 
the Khoisan Heritage Route. In the long term the Centre‟s heritage value will be strengthened 
by exploring the declaration of the site as a World Heritage Site because the story of Sarah 
Bartmann is the story of the world. The memory of Sarah Bartmann is the memory of the 
world. I want to take this opportunity to appeal to the community of Hankey to provide safe 
custody and pay respect to this important cultural property. It is the property which the nation 
and the whole world have placed in your hands for protection. 
The gravesite has already served as a space for communal ritual acts of remembrance. The 
Gamtkwa Khoisan House annually celebrates Baartman‟s burial and National Women‟s Day 
on 9 August with performances by local Khoisan dance groups and Christian prayers at the 
grave with an invitation to attend extended to the larger Hankey community.
86
 Other acts of 
remembrance are staged with the ritual planting of trees on National Arbour Day,
87
 but 
National Women‟s Day remains the most significant date associated with Baartman in the 
national calendar. The Sarah Bartmann Centre of Remembrance is imagined as a site to enact 
national (rather than local) rituals of remembrance of Khoisan culture and history, of the 
historic background of the foundational values of the post-apartheid state as embodied by 
Baartman, and of Baartman herself. Built around remembering the legacy of the national 
heroine, this space and the rituals of remembrance it proposes to exhibit, emphasise three 
elements about Baartman: it marks her place in South African society, it recalls her „voice‟ or 
her story, and it represents her face to both the nation and to outsiders.
88
 Baartman‟s place in 
the imagined South African community is marked by the veneration of her remains and burial 
site. While her remains have been treated with great dignity and respect, thus far, the grave 
itself has not been managed as a venerated site but the proposed development indicates that it 
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is intended to be used as such. As Giesen indicates, every community that is centered on a 
hero/heroine will attempt to mourn the dead hero/heroine in the places most closely 
associated with them; where they lived, died, or performed extraordinary deeds. As in the 
case of Baartman, if the remains of the hero/heroine are present within the community, the 
grave will become the centre of these mourning rituals and the presence of these (im)mortal 
remains constitutes the site as sacred. The presence of the heroine‟s remains inspires a sense 
of piety; her remains, although invisible, are still with „us‟, and as the human remains of the 
heroine are mortal, it renders the spiritual presence more palpable.  
           Secondly, the centre will narrate Baartman‟s story to the national community and to 
outsiders. As Baartman‟s voice is lost to history and she will always remain „silent‟, the 
centre will narrate the official version and interpretation of her life as it relates to the values 
of resistance to oppression and the values of the post-apartheid nation as it seeks to speak for 
one of its heroines. Giesen shows that the community knows the importance of the hero as 
part of the nation‟s mythology and therefore this centre will not simply transport information 
about Baartman‟s life. “Instead”, Giesen suggests,  
it brings the myths again to the attention of the public, it modifies and reinterprets it according 
to the situation of the day, it adds colour and refinements to the basic story, it embodies new 
elements representing the contemporary challenges to the community, it invents new stories 
linked to the surroundings of the hero.
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It is the constant reification of Baartman‟s story of trauma and „triumph‟ that will ensure her 
staying-power as a foundational mother of a democratic South Africa.  
           Giesen also identifies the presentation of the „face‟ of the hero as an important element 
in the rituals of remembering. While for Giesen this face is represented in its most basic form 
through heraldic signs which symbolise “the collective identity of followers who partake in 
the charisma of a hero”90 (whether this is a warrior, saint, or even a sports club), in the case of 
Sara Baartman, the representation of her face is considerably more literal. Defined by her 
body during her lifetime and in most academic literature, the South African government has 
focused on her face as the official image representing her. Seen on small printed black and 
white images attached to stones placed on her grave and in official imagery produced for 
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National Women‟s Day celebrations, it is Baartman‟s face, as painted by an artist during her 
exhibition at the Jardin du Roi, that has come to represent her in post-apartheid South Africa.    
           The importance of the establishment of the Sarah Bartmann Centre of Remembrance 
lies in its ability to become a significant institution that forms the building blocks of the basic 
educational aspect of foundational mythology creation. Children who learn at school about 
the founding events of the post-apartheid nation and its founding icons, as part of their 
education as citizens, are often brought to visit the memorial sites of the nation, and, as 
Giesen argues, images on the internet or school textbooks are no substitute “for the local 
presence of the sacred as embodied in the remainders of the hero”91 or its embodiment in 
particular objects and places. The Apartheid Museum, the Hector Pieterson Memorial 
Museum, and Freedom Park already form part of the itinerary of school tours and tourist 
visits and are central to how South Africa‟s past and its vision for the future are presented to 
its young citizens and outsiders. While the Sarah Bartmann Centre of Remembrance will not 
be located in any of the larger cities or near any significant tourist destinations in South 
Africa, it could become an important educational site for schools within the Eastern Cape. 
Furthermore, with plans to promote the nearby Baviaanskloof Mega-Reserve Nature Park and 
the government declaration to make this centre an important part of a Khoisan Heritage Route 
and its projected declaration as a World Heritage Site,
92
 there is potential for this centre to 
become part of the most influential educational facilities that narrate and build the post-
apartheid nation‟s foundational mythologies.  
            In early March 2009, the DAC hosted a series of events in honour of Baartman as part 
of International Women‟s Day celebrations. These events included an academic colloquium 
with a focus on gender oppression, the de-humanisation and objectification of women, 
stereotyping, racism and genocide, the launch of the Sarah Bartmann Centre of Remembrance 
architectural competition and a „cultural evening‟.93 These events apparently represented a 
renewed interest in developing Baartman‟s grave and reviving her legacy in post-apartheid 
South Africa. Initially, construction for the Sarah Bartmann Centre of Remembrance was set 
to start in 2012. However, DAC commenced the construction of the Centre with a ground 
breaking ceremony on 2 May 2014 and reiterating the official narratives of trauma and 
triumph inscribed on Baartman‟s remains, describes the site as a “place of Memory, Healing, 
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Hope, and Celebration!”94 It is projected that the Centre will be completed in the next two 
years.
95
 According to DAC, the Centre will include 
the declared gravesite, a museum, archives, story-telling pits, a healing pond, a symbolic and 
productive garden, a reception building, retail spaces, workshops, restaurant, multipurpose 
hall, auditorium, classrooms, accommodation, parking, a road underpass and walkways. The 
museum will consist of two sections, one dedicated to the Khoi-San and the other to Sarah 
Baartman. Visitors will follow a route depicting a narrative about Khoi-San history in order to 
contextualise Sarah Baartman's life.
96
  
Significantly, the construction phase of the Centre will create 1960 semi-skilled and skilled 
job opportunities for local Hankey residents while 134 jobs will be created after its 
completion.
97
 This centre and the proposed Sarah Bartmann Human Rights Memorial form 
part of the Sarah Bartmann Legacy Project, one of nine major projects identified by DAC. 
Yet, the Reference Group has not met in over a year despite the importance of their input in 
ongoing plans for construction, while the Gamtkwa representatives of the Hankey Khoisan 
community appear to have been sidelined in further development of the Sarah Bartmann 
Centre of Remembrance when a community meeting was called by developers in May 2013 
but the Gamtkwa representatives were not informed of this important meeting.
98
 There is a 
stark contrast between the strong move to return Baartman‟s remains to South Africa and the 
organising of her grand, public funeral, and the ongoing processes of the developments 
promised by then president Mbeki which have proverbially „dragged feet‟ over the past 
twelve years. The national heroes and heroines that pre-date the struggle years but were of 
great political significance to the reconciliation ideologies of transition have slowly faded in 
importance as party political agendas push their struggle icons to the forefront of current 
commemorative efforts amidst a growing sense of disillusionment with the post-apartheid 
socio-economic order. 
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Conclusion 
Sara Baartman‟s journey through time and space has seen her represented as ethnic oddity, 
sexualised object, scientific curiosity, victim, heroine, (grand)mother of the nation. Always 
has she remained as a symbol and a prominent icon of post-apartheid South Africa and she is 
likely to remain symbolically laden. Her story in the post-apartheid era has seen her elevated 
to a national icon who embodies a country‟s traumatic history of colonial violation and 
apartheid violence and reflects the violence inflicted on women‟s bodies throughout the past 
and present. However, her status as a victim of great traumas is mediated by the post-
apartheid government‟s efforts to return her remains to native soil. Her return to the 
„motherland‟ after two-hundred years was constructed as the triumph of the nation over the 
oppressive apartheid past; a closure of the traumas of the past. Baartman was a victim turned 
heroine: her return in death gave birth to a new nation free of the traumas that were inflicted 
on her body and legacy, her sacrifice the ultimate martyr act. Baartman‟s personal history of 
trauma and triumph became synonymous with the trauma and triumph of the nation in official 
rhetoric and was narrated in the language of the TRC, nation-building, reconciliation, and 
African Renaissance. Ideologically, Sara Baartman was the ideal foundational female figure 
on which to inscribe notions of the nation in the making of transition politics. She was a 
symbol of unity and reconciliation; the (grand)mother of the democratic nation. While 
ideologically celebrated and her remains physically venerated, the current ideational 
positioning of Baartman in South African society is waning. Pressing socio-economic issues 
supersede the reconciliation and nation-building rhetoric of the transition years and these new 
challenges are countenanced with a different set of heroes and heroines whose legacies (as 
constructed and narrated through official discourse) are more suited to contend with potential 
societal discord of a different nature than those faced in the years immediately following the 
1994 elections. This could serve as an explanation for the figurative „dragging of feet‟ in the 
commencement of the building of the multi-million Rand Sarah Bartmann Centre of 
Remembrance in Hankey. Promised in 2002 and reaffirmed in 2009, plans have progressed 
but have yet to be implemented. The gravesite has remained in the same state of neglect for 
several years apart from the basic upgrade of an information board once held up with metal 
wiring, to a large boulder bearing an engraved inscription but the bronze plaque was stolen 
within several days of its unveiling. As Baartman‟s remains are silent, her mythography in 
the post-apartheid state has been fuelled by the inscription of nationalist ideologies, 
philosophical ideals, ethnic claims, and party-political agendas upon them. Once again, 
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Baartman is subsumed in a myriad of symbolic imageries that have come to represent her. 
Yet, her immortality is assured by the presence of her sacred remains in the public landscape 
and those who continue to claim a stake in the development of her gravesite. As a strong 
foundational icon who featured prominently in the transition years that set South Africa apart 
from many other nations that underwent drastic socio-political shifts, her continued presence 
in society is secured; even if not annually celebrated or commemorated, her name is present 
in discourse and her remains are present in the public landscape. A marine patrol vessel was 
named in her honour in 2005,
99
 the Saartjie Baartman Centre continues to aid women and 
children who are faced with and have experienced violence, a recent announcement has 
revealed that the Cacadu District Municipality (the municipality in which Baartman‟s grave 
lies), will be renamed to Sarah Baartman District Municipality.
100
 This presence appears to 
remove the burden of continued commemorative efforts in honour of Baartman from the 
South African nation. She has become an integral part of the dissemination and inculcation of 
the new moral order of the post-apartheid state through the display of her name in the public 
landscape and the thoughts and values that her name invokes.    
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Figure 1: The grave in 2007 
 
Figure 2: The grave in 2013 
277 
 
 
Figure 3: The official image of Sara Baartman.
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Figure 4: In the service of nationalist ideology and foundational myth-making.
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Figure 5: The grave-marker in 2007               Figure 6: The grave-marker in 2013 with the      
                                                                        bronze SAHRA plaque removed.
103
 
 
 
 
                                                          
103
 Photographs 1, 2, 5, 6 taken by author. 
279 
 
Chapter 9 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Commemorating Women’s Political Activism: Remembering and 
Recreating the Heroines 
 
They marched for all of us. They opened the road to a new reality.
1
 
 
Introduction 
As the heady celebrations of the 2010 FIFA World Cup had come to an end and many South 
Africans had seemingly found a renewed sense of pride in their national identity, official 
celebrations held during Women‟s Month of August that year sought to inspire the nation 
with a new sense of pride in the heroines of its past. Initiating the “Midwives of Political 
Emancipation” Women‟s Legacy Project launched by SAHRA and DAC, the graves of three 
of South Africa‟s most prominent female political activists of the twentieth century were 
declared as national heritage sites. Three women whose names were synonymous with 
women‟s resistance to pass-laws in South Africa were honoured: Charlotte Maxeke, Lilian 
Ngoyi, and Helen Joseph. Perpetuating the official tendency to equate and reduce women‟s 
resistance to oppression in South Africa to the anti-pass campaigns, this commemorative 
event celebrated not only the lives and contributions of these three women, but recalled their 
active participation in the 1913 and 1956 anti-pass protests into the present as the centenary 
celebration of the 1913 anti-pass campaign was fast approaching. The 1913 and, even more 
so, the 1956 campaigns have come to form an integral part of the foundational mythology of 
the post-apartheid state as both events marked watershed moments in women‟s political 
mobilisation against racial oppression. 
           As the South African government officially attempts to increase the visibility and 
recognition of women‟s political activity in the struggle against apartheid the 
                                                          
1
 Lulama Xingwana, “Speech by Minister Lulu Xingwana Commemorating Charlotte Maxeke, Lilian Ngoyi and 
Helen Joseph at Nancefield Avalon Cemeteries and Kliptown, Walter Sisulu Square, 20 August 2010. At 
https://www.dac.gov.za/speech-minister-ms-lulu-xingwana-commemorating-charlotte-maxeke-lillian-ngoyi-
and-helen-joseph-0 accessed 25 March 2011. 
280 
 
commemoration of these three „giants‟ of canonical South African resistance history 
represented a clear and obvious choice of heroines. Ngoyi and Joseph are well known 
struggle icons in South Africa and their names can be found in a myriad of public spaces. 
Their prominent involvement in the 9 August 1956 women‟s march is commemorated 
annually in official Women‟s Day celebrations. Maxeke, although not as iconic as Ngoyi and 
Joseph in official representations as her political activity pre-dates the anti-apartheid 
movement which forms the grand narrative of South African foundational mythology, holds a 
prominent place in this mythology as one of the first ANC associated female icons to 
mobilise women in a mass movement and as the founder of the Bantu Women‟s League. 
While the 1913 women‟s anti-pass campaign has not been accorded the same significance as 
the 1956 campaign in official discourse or in South Africa‟s public landscape, its inclusion in 
2010 Women‟s Month official commemorative celebrations indicated an understanding of the 
possible political capital that its centenary in 2013 offered. 
           Firstly, this chapter will give an outline of the 1913 and 1956 anti-pass campaigns to 
allow for their socio-historical positioning and expound the importance of Maxeke, and 
Joseph and Ngoyi to their respective movements. Discussion will then proceed to illustrate 
the importance of women‟s anti-pass protest action in the present political dispensation 
through their public commemorative memorials and celebrations. Some of the individuals 
associated with these historical events are already considered as foundational icons; 
established in this position through the official importance accorded to the „foundational 
events‟ in which they took part. Once these events and individuals have been contextualised, 
this chapter will address the declaration of the graves of Maxeke, Joseph and Ngoyi as 
national heritage sites and position this declaration within the Women‟s Legacy Project 
launched by SAHRA through this event. As a project intended to recognise the „unsung 
heroines‟ of political emancipation, it conversely selected three of the most distinguished 
female foundational figures to launch this campaign.   
           The political efficacy of witnessing death and burial for foundational mythology 
creation has been addressed in the previous two chapters. Here, the focus will fall on the use 
of the past in the present through the power of commemoration and commemorative events. 
Commemorative events, in this particular case study, serve to combat public indifference or 
forgetfulness about individuals or events that the government deems to be essential for 
regime legitimisation and nation-building. Public commemorative events such as the 
declaration of these graves which are firmly controlled and fashioned by official ideological 
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agendas, celebrate official concerns rather than public ones and are intended to stimulate 
loyalty to the existing political structure and to stress the desirability of maintaining the 
present social order.
2
 Official discourse was deployed through the celebration of three 
foundational heroines during Women‟s Month which commemorates a founding event – the 
1956 Women‟s March. This chapter will address the commemoration of Maxeke, Joseph, and 
Ngoyi on 20 August 2010 and the official declaration of their graves as national heritage 
sites. It will indicate how this commemorative effort attempts to bring women‟s political 
resistance to oppression through mass mobilisation into the forefront of public consciousness 
while simultaneously entrenching these women as important foundational figures. Despite the 
positive impact such a focus on women‟s active participation could have on a South African 
society dominated by strong patriarchal tendencies, women‟s activism and heroism continues 
to be framed in discourses of femininity, martyrdom, and motherhood in official narratives of 
historical women‟s political participation. Officially selected individual women continue to 
be presented as representative of all women and their experiences under apartheid just as the 
anti-pass campaigns continue to form the central narrative of women‟s resistance in post-
apartheid foundational mythology. In this chapter, then, it will be argued that despite the 
importance of emphasising women‟s participation in establishing a democratic dispensation 
in officially sanctioned representations of the struggle, its socio-political salience is negated 
through re-enforcing popular mythologies which enshrine female political activism in 
discourses of motherhood and femininity. This ensures the entrenchment and (re)positioning 
of women‟s activism in the domestic sphere and fails to challenge the violent gender 
dynamics currently at play in South Africa.  
 
Organising Women: The Anti-Pass Campaigns of 1913 and 1956 
The 1913 anti-pass protest in Bloemfontein and the 1956 women‟s march to the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria represent not only defining moments in women‟s organised resistance in 
South Africa but also within the broader resistance movement. Pass laws have come to 
symbolise one of the crucial mechanisms of state control of the black population in South 
Africa in the colonial and apartheid eras and women have, historically, overcome the 
divisions of class and race to unite in political resistance to these laws.  Although the 1913 
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anti-pass campaign could be considered more successful in attaining a relaxation of pass laws 
pertaining to women it continues to be overshadowed – officially and academically – by the 
official recognition given to the 1956 women‟s march. While the 1956 march represents one 
of the largest gathering of women in protest to passes, another credible explanation for the 
apparent official neglect of the historic event of 1913 is the acute present day focus on „The 
Struggle‟ against apartheid as the foundation myth for the post-apartheid state. While the 
ANC was formed in 1912 and black resistance to colonialism reaches back to the seventeenth 
century, the focus remains predominantly on the recent (memorable) and „usable‟ past that 
still has several of its living heroes and heroines present to remind the nation of that 
victorious struggle against an oppressive regime. The declaration of the graves of 
distinguished struggle heroines Ngoyi and Joseph as national heritage sites was an obvious 
choice to commence the Women‟s Legacy Project and celebrate Women‟s Month which, 
after all, commemorates the 1956 women‟s march. Rather than an official promotion by DAC 
it was Troy Phili (the previous head of Graves and Burials at SAHRA), who had a personal 
academic interest in Maxeke, who insisted that her grave be included for the declaration in 
2010.
3
 The narrative of the 1913 campaign and Maxeke as an extraordinary woman and 
leader, however, slotted in with the commemoration of the 1956 march and it was possible to 
create a seamless portrayal of women‟s organised resistance to pass laws in South Africa to 
celebrate Women‟s Month in 2010. 
           The 1913 and 1956 resistance campaigns share a theme of organisation against pass 
laws based around insults to female dignity and motherhood. Both men and women were 
quick to argue that the extension of pass laws to women in their domestic roles as wives and 
mothers made it especially repugnant as arbitrary arrests and imprisonments could result in 
children being left unattended and that families would suffer as a result. Furthermore, passes 
were also seen as endangering women‟s virtue and cases of violent abuse and rape of women 
by officials under the pretext of checking for passes were reported.
4
 The invocation of the 
emotive slogan of „womenandchildren‟ as an argument against passes could have been 
considered a particularly powerful political phrase to brandish. “Nevertheless”, as Walker 
states, “they were deeply felt by those on whom the burden of the laws rested. The arguments 
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attested to the vital role that women did play in the home, as well as the strength of the 
ideology that kept them there.”5 
           However, as Julia Wells argues in her comparative study of the 1913 Bloemfontein 
and 1958 Johannesburg campaigns, there was significantly more at stake for some of these 
women than simply the dignity of womanhood.
6
 Wells states that the women‟s anti-pass 
campaigns were “essentially a struggle against full proletarianisation. In both cases the 
resistance proved to be strongest among those women who had achieved a balance between 
responsibilities to family and generating income.”7 The 1913 campaign was marked by the 
strong determination of its participants illustrated by their eager and voluntary 
imprisonment.
8
 Moreover, the 1913 campaign also saw the participation of a wide variety of 
black and coloured women whose livelihoods had come under threat as a result of a 
combination of stringent pass laws and a changing economic climate in the Orange Free State 
(OFS). The OFS was the only province in South Africa in 1913 that required urban 
residential passes for blacks and „coloured‟ women.9 Women had unsuccessfully protested 
these passes in 1898, but the formation of the SANNC in 1912 inspired new hope. Two 
months after the formation of the SANNC, OFS women resident in locations had circulated a 
petition throughout the OFS towns and collected five thousand signatures in protest against 
women‟s passes.10 They had been inspired by the formation of the SANNC and were 
motivated and guided by Charlotte Maxeke, the first black South African female university 
graduate and whose involvement with the SANNC through her husband‟s membership dated 
to its formation. Despite assurances from the Minister of Native Affairs of the government‟s 
sympathy for their case and promises to take action to eliminate pass regulations, a year later 
no changes had been made in pass law enforcements in the OFS. The women had begun to 
act independently of the all male black political organisations and would face some criticism 
from within these organisations. After an escalation in pass arrests in May 1913 following the 
formation of the South African Police Force (SAP), location women pledged to refuse to 
carry passes and expressed their willingness to face imprisonment in defiance of the pass 
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laws.
11
 Following a mass meeting in Waaihoek and commencing the passive resistance 
campaign, over two hundred women marched into the centre of Bloemfontein to inform the 
mayor of their campaign. However, the mayor was not present and a smaller delegation 
confronted him the following day. Insisting that he could not change the laws, women faced 
the police at the local police station and tore up their passes. Eighty women were charged for 
not having passes. The following morning saw a march of six hundred women and a violent 
confrontation with the police.
12
 The mayor promised to suspend further arrests for pass 
violations by women but two weeks later the location police attempted to arrest one woman 
for being without her pass. A brawl broke out between the police and a crowd of angry 
women. Thirty-four women were arrested on charges of public violence. They refused to pay 
fines and were imprisoned for two months with hard labour under appalling conditions.
13
 
Women persisted in defying the pass laws for the rest of the year but tended to serve shorter 
jail sentences.
14
 
           Wells indicates that as the campaign was under way, the women did not rely on the 
SANNC or other black political organisation for support. Instead, they formed the Orange 
Free State Native and Coloured Women‟s Association to raise material aid for resisters and 
their families and to advocate the cause to the public.
15
 Walker theorises that the organisation 
was likely to have been formed by the wives of leading members of the SANNC and the 
African People‟s Organisation (APO).16 The passive resistance campaign undertaken by the 
women was largely influenced by an elite stratum of women who were forced into leadership 
positions in the campaign as a result of strong and direct economic pressure.
17
 Wells explains 
that despite differential pass requirements existing for men holding property or who had 
acquired a certain level of education, black women were not entitled to such exemptions. The 
lack of differentiation made between the elite strata of black women and the masses was 
considered a serious affront to their sense of dignity and social status.
18
 As laws limiting 
black economic activity placed pressure on previously well-to-do families, these women had 
to seek work previously done exclusively by women of a lower economic stratum. Non-elite 
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women provided extra income for their families through informal-sector opportunities. By 
1913, however, the townships had seen a substantial population decrease as a result of the 
labour demands of the mining industry and less stringent pass laws in other provinces. The 
decline of economic opportunities forced many women into laundry work and full-time or 
part-time domestic service in white homes. Part-time work was preferred as it allowed 
women time at home while live-in domestic work often isolated women from family, friends, 
and community. Simultaneously, as  
whites experienced shortages of domestic workers, the black women were no doubt in a 
stronger position to negotiate terms to their own liking, such as doing take-out laundry and 
not living in, not to mention better wages and shorter hours.
19
   
Wells argues that the “effect of passes undermined the advantages they were gaining on the 
open market of supply and demand for domestic services” and that this may in part explain 
why the laundry women, in particular, were the most militant.
20
 Persistent police raids on the 
municipal wash house in the township included the harassment of elite women who had been 
forced to take on laundry work to supplement the family‟s income. The Bloemfontein Post 
reported on 29 May 1913 that it was the police raids on “‟the better class of native women‟ 
leaving the laundry house which ultimately triggered off the decision to take a course of 
passive resistance.”21 The resistance campaign gained significant national media coverage 
through the OFS Women‟s Association and won the sympathy of Union government officials 
in Cape Town. This resulted in a relaxation of pass law enforcement for women in the OFS 
“and the eventual exclusion of women from pass laws on a national basis in 1923.”22 
Moreover, the vigour of women‟s political activism was harnessed and led to the formation 
of the SANNC affiliated Bantu Women‟s League by Maxeke in 1918 and is identified by 
Walker as the most tangible result of the 1913 resistance campaign.
23
    
           In 1955, the government announced its intention to extend passes to women on a 
nation-wide basis from January 1956. Wells shows that the “combined pressures of domestic 
labour shortages, farm labour shortages and black/white competition in urban areas all added 
up to the demand that the black population be further controlled by bringing women under 
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pass regulation.”24 Aimed at enforcing influx control and regulating the number of blacks 
allowed to work in the city, an inability to qualify for a pass could mean ejection from the 
urban areas. The most vulnerable categories were single women and female heads of 
households “especially if they supported their families through informal sector activities and 
only casual employment.
25
 Threats against motherhood and the family became a central 
theme that united women of different races and classes in protest. Wells expounds: 
There can be no doubt that all African women dreaded the notion of passes. It implied being 
stopped and arbitrarily arrested for not having the right document at the right moment, the 
inconvenience of overnight imprisonment, the risk of being sexually assaulted by the police, 
the cost of fines, or worse, receiving sentences which included jail or farm labour – all 
without the knowledge of one‟s family left at home, simply wondering and waiting. This fear 
was particularly emotive and certainly fuelled the enthusiasm for the large anti-pass 
demonstrations of the mid-1950s.
26
   
However, the anti-pass campaign of the mid-1950s, unlike its predecessor in 1913, tended to 
be spearheaded by women who did not suffer a direct threat from the pass laws and Wells 
argues that “it must be assumed that their involvement came from a high level of political 
commitment and maturity in the struggle for national liberation.”27 But, while the 
spokeswomen of the movement might have come from a more elite and sometimes more 
educated class, the mass support that the campaign enjoyed came from diverse women from 
different economic backgrounds.  
           M. Bahati Kuumba indicates that in “gender-integrated movements and organisations, 
patriarchal assumptions are often superimposed on the hierarchical leader-follower 
conception of leadership.”28 The formation of FEDSAW allowed women to organise 
semiautonomously “because of these same types of limitations on the contributions that 
women were allowed to play in the official anti-apartheid organisation.”29 FEDSAW had 
overcome most of its organisational issues by 1955 and as part of the Congress Alliance 
launched one of the most militant and sustained anti-pass campaigns that would peak 
between 1955 and 1959. The federation, with Ngoyi as its president and Joseph as national 
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secretary, functioned as a non-racial coordinating body to which different women‟s 
organisations affiliated. This national organisation of women was “formed for the purpose of 
uniting all women in common action for the removal of all political, legal, economic and 
social disabilities”30 and adopted a Women‟s Charter in which it was recognised that true 
liberation could not be achieved unless women were accorded unqualified equality in practice 
and in law. Although the Charter‟s tenets were firmly located in the anti-apartheid struggle, it 
also sought to address the specifics of women‟s oppression.31 It was a progressive document 
for its time and it staked a claim for “full equality between the sexes and began to search for 
answers to the questions about how best that could be achieved in a society where gross racial 
discrimination obscured all other forms of oppression and exploitation.”32 
           In response to the government‟s announcement in 1955 a multi-racial crowd of two-
thousand women united by a common political purpose and led by FEDSAW leaders Helen 
Joseph, Lilian Ngoyi, Rahima Moosa, and Sophie Williams, peacefully protested at the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria on 27 October 1955. This event enhanced the prestige of women‟s 
organisations within the Congress Alliance
33
 and was a major morale booster for FEDSAW 
“that firmly established its credentials as a serious political organisation.”34 Walker identifies 
this period as a new phase in the history of FEDSAW and states that the 1955 announcement 
of passes for women 
gave it a focus of action; the anti-pass campaign that followed, an identity. From late 1955, 
passes for African women dominated all other issues. For the next four to five years most of 
[FEDSAW‟s] energies were directed into the anti-pass campaign. The demands of the 
campaign were such that there was little time for sustained energy in other spheres, and 
inevitably many of the [FEDSAW‟s] more general aims for improving the position of women 
in South Africa were neglected. Nevertheless, as the [FEDSAW] realised, this was the major 
issue confronting the majority of South African women and, as such, it took precedence.
35
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In organising against passes for women, the federation recognised that true equality for 
women could not be achieved unless the apartheid state was dismantled and thus the fight 
against passes encompassed the entire liberation movement.
36
  
           Although the government was wary of enforcing the carrying of passes by women in 
city centres where FEDSAW was well organised and structured, it commenced its extension 
of pass books to women in rural areas. While Congress Alliance affiliates were slow to 
commit to any planned action, FEDSAW had organised meetings, local protests, and 
demonstrations as soon as the government had announced its plans. A huge wave of protests 
that swept across the country in the first seven months of 1956 created a sense of militant 
optimism within FEDSAW despite the steady and continued issuing of passes to women in 
rural towns. In March 1956 the decision was made to once again march on the Union 
Buildings in Pretoria. However, for this march FEDSAW sponsored four Congress Alliance 
leaders, including Joseph, to tour the main urban centres of South Africa to ensure nation-
wide support for the protest march. While the numbers vary,
37
 current recollections celebrate 
the attendance of approximately twenty thousand women on 9 August 1956 at the protest at 
the Union Buildings and it undoubtedly was a gathering of unprecedented size. Although 
Prime Minister Strijdom was not present, the women left thousands of individually signed 
protests on the steps of the Union Buildings and the now famous slogan „Strijdom, you have 
tampered with the women, you have struck a rock‟ was composed.38 After the protests had 
been delivered, the women stood in silence for half an hour after which the ANC anthem, 
„Nkosi Sikelel‟ iAfrika‟, was sung.39 While it certainly must have been a great spectacle to 
behold, the significance of the demonstration “challenged stereotyped assumptions about 
women and their lack of political initiative.”40 It appears that women had to demonstrate their 
power of political organisation repeatedly to earn the respect of their organisations despite the 
historic precedent set in 1913 and women‟s reactive and recurring mass protest to laws that 
affected them. Indeed, as Walker indicates, the very success of the women‟s anti-pass 
campaign heightened some of the ambivalent feelings within the Congress Alliance towards 
the growing independence of the women‟s movement.41 While the men within the Alliance 
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acknowledged the success of the march, attempts were made to reassert their authority in the 
further planning of the anti-pass campaign. Walker argues that these 
contradictory attitudes towards the women were inevitable in a society as strongly patriarchal 
as South Africa. Yet although men might grow uneasy at the implications for their own 
lifestyle if women were acknowledged as equal partners in the political struggle, they could 
not fail to be impressed by what had been achieved at Pretoria on August 9
th
.
42
  
This success of the 1956 march was recognised within the Congress Alliance and 9 August 
would be henceforth celebrated as Women‟s Day – now a national holiday. Despite the 
continued protests of women across the country against the pass laws, they provoked little 
official response and passes were extended to women on a voluntary basis. As the anti-pass 
campaign lost its momentum over the years, black women reluctantly accepted the passes.
43
 
Although this appears anti-climactic, the failure of the anti-pass campaign is not overtly 
acknowledged in official commemorative events. Official Women‟s Day celebrations tend to 
focus on the success of the organisation of the women‟s march on parliament. As (perhaps 
ironically) stated in the government notice for the declaration of the graves of Maxeke, 
Joseph, and Ngoyi about the 1956 women‟s march on parliament: “The success of the 
demonstration challenged the stereotypes about women and their lack of political drive.”44 
Thus, the focus appears to fall on women‟s success in organising a mass demonstration 
against apartheid legislation rather than on the actual failure of the anti-pass campaign to 
yield the desired results.  
            
           Both the 1913 and 1956 campaigns and the type of resistance they offered were 
shaped by the participation of a small stratum of elite women while the majority of 
participants tended to be neither highly educated nor skilled. Yet, the motivation in 1913 of 
economic difficulty and the non-differentiation between elite women and non-elite women, 
and by a deep political commitment in 1956, these women were able to transcend class 
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differences and unite in a broader resistance to passes for women.
45
 Most significantly, Wells 
argues,  
only by separating into exclusively women‟s organisations could the women express their 
grievances and take the decisions that culminated in actions previously untried by their male 
counterparts. The pooled expertise of women sharing a common front injected the movements 
with a strong sense of moral certitude in their cause and their methods... [T]he women had an 
acute awareness that their struggle was legitimate and therefore worthy of every sacrifice.
46
         
Previously, the primary role of women within the liberation struggle was considered to be 
that of „nation building‟.47 While women‟s political mobilisation brought contradictions to 
the fore, the tone of appeal in 1913 and in 1956 was to women in their traditional roles as 
„mothers and wives‟ and the content of these roles went unquestioned because this is how 
many women perceived themselves.
48
 Mass mobilisation for the campaigns drew on a deep 
sense of female consciousness which impelled women to political action; while their roles as 
wives and mother were emphasised and accepted, they also demanded the freedom to act as 
they felt their obligations entailed.
49
 However, this appeal to the common experience of 
women across racial boundaries to support the anti-pass campaign in 1956 was a 
revolutionary stand considering the racially divisionary policies of the apartheid state. 
Moreover, the African nationalist movement in South Africa tended to associate 
„motherhood‟ with immeasurable strength, and indeed, as indicated by the slogan composed 
for the 1956 march, women saw themselves as “the bedrock of society.”50 Most importantly, 
the 1956 march provided “some of the richest symbolism associated with women‟s struggles 
in South Africa.”51 The powerful slogan composed for the event, the well-known photograph 
of Joseph, Ngoyi, Moosa, and Williams, four women of different races, locking arms to 
deliver the petitions, women‟s dedication to the cause as demonstrated by their willingness to 
travel great distances to attend the march – some defying their husbands and fathers – and the 
women‟s quiet and disciplined defiance have come to define women‟s resistance to apartheid.   
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Remembering and Reconstructing Women‟s Resistance in the Present 
While any efforts to commemorate the 1913 women‟s march in the public landscape are 
conspicuous by their absence, the 1956 march has been acknowledged with a small but 
problematic memorial which was unveiled in 2000 by then President Thabo Mbeki and 
completed in 2002 as part of the greater Legacy Project. In 2012 Gauteng Premier Nomvula 
Mokonyane announced plans to further honour the 1956 women‟s march with a memorial 
development including a multi-purpose centre and „hall of heroes‟ in Lilian Ngoyi Square in 
Pretoria. Despite the annual impressive and well-funded Women‟s Day and Women‟s Month 
celebrations, memorial lectures honouring female activists, and the 2013 commemorative 
march in Bloemfontein to celebrate the centenary of the 1913 women‟s march, physical 
tributes in the public landscape commemorating or celebrating women‟s contributions to the 
formation of a democratic South Africa are few – especially in comparison to the plethora of 
statues, monuments, and memorials honouring their male counterparts and their heroic 
deeds.
52
 Women‟s Day celebrations have repeatedly been under attack in the media and 
social media platforms criticising the exorbitant amounts of money spent by government to 
fund official parties for the event while fundamental public services for women lack vital 
resources and the current levels of violence committed against women leave little to be 
celebrated. Furthermore, the National Women‟s Monument has also received criticism for 
being inaccessible and for simply serving a post-apartheid nationalist agenda that has little 
positive impact on women‟s lived experiences in South Africa. 
           The National Women‟s Monument at the Union Buildings in Pretoria commemorates 
the 1956 women‟s march. The monument was the creation of architect Marcus Holm and 
sculptor Wilma Cruise whose entry into an open design competition for the monument was 
selected by a jury nominated by then Minister of Arts and Culture, Bridgette Mabandla. 
Small and unassuming, the Women‟s Monument is a grinding stone, associated with women 
grinding maize in the traditional African homestead and reflects the protest call “Strike a 
woman, strike a rock”, and serves as a metaphor for women‟s resilience and as a symbol of 
the 1956 march in post-apartheid foundational mythology. Initially, the display was 
accompanied by a sound component in which this slogan is repeated in all official languages.  
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           Sabine Marschall has written extensively on the National Women‟s Monument and her 
work serves as an important point of departure and grounding for this particular discussion. 
Marschall argues that while the National Women‟s Monument appears to pay tribute to the 
contributions of women to the liberation struggle it reveals “that once again the women‟s 
issue has been appropriated to serve a specific political agenda, infused with the values of a 
patriarchal society.”53 Intended as a true „Rainbow Nation‟ monument, the Women‟s 
Monument was designed to be inclusive and commemorative of women‟s contributions to a 
democratic South Africa irrespective of race, class, culture, or political association. Marschall 
states that the “objective here was to celebrate the democratic, collaborative, and communal 
nature of the event and the ordinariness of its actors.”54 In contrast to the older Eurocentric 
monuments erected to the glorification of Afrikaner nationalist ideology, this monument was 
humble and unobtrusive while its “anti-heroic stance stresses the ordinariness of the subjects 
to be honoured here...”55 Marschall continues to stress this emphasis on the ordinary and on 
its inclusive symbolism: 
Highly symbolic and meaningful to the event, the grinding stone is at the same time easily 
accessible and anti-elitist by allowing ordinary Africans to relate to and identify with it. Being 
placed in the vestibule, the very centre of the Union Buildings, this once white, male, political 
preserve adds to its significance, making a bold statement about women‟s equality.56   
Although the monument can be interpreted as inclusive and assumedly dedicated to „all 
women‟, Marschall importantly notes that this necessarily needs to exclude the many 
conservative white women who supported, approved of, or quietly benefited from apartheid. 
The term „all women‟ then, can only include those women who fought against apartheid.57 
Marschall argues that as a national project,  
the Pretoria Women‟s Monument is intricately linked with the foundation myth of the new 
South African state, focused on the meta-narrative of resistance and the anti-apartheid 
„Struggle for Liberation‟. Just as in Bloemfontein [the Vrouemonument], where black women 
were implicitly excluded, in Pretoria, many white women are equally implicitly excluded.
58  
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However, this natural and, perhaps, rightful exclusion is never made overt and official 
rhetoric surrounding the monument continues to emphasise its inclusiveness. Despite this, the 
monument remains exclusive and elitist; while claiming to honour „all women‟, it ultimately 
represents only those women who attended the march. This becomes especially problematic 
when the Women‟s Monument is considered mere tokenism, as Marschall contends. The 
post-apartheid public landscape in South Africa is a space dominated by memorials to and 
statues of male heroes of the struggle for liberation while female activists and women‟s 
contributions remain under represented. Marschall argues that the Pretoria National Women‟s 
Monument, in fact, serves to mute women. As a monument to „all women‟ it declares that 
women‟s contributions have been officially acknowledged and are effectively „covered‟. 
Marschall states that as “a national monument, it conveniently obliterates the need to 
commemorate women and their contributions elsewhere.”59 Although this statement rings 
true for the initial years following the monument‟s unveiling, the recent announcement of 
plans to build yet another, more imposing „living memorial‟ in honour of the 1956 march, 
shows renewed impetus toward acknowledging women‟s contributions to the struggle. This 
reiterates the importance of the 1956 march as a foundational event as government seeks to 
re-commemorate this event with a larger living memorial. However, as already indicated, the 
state-sanctioned honouring of iconic women in public spaces is fraught with re-establishing 
and reinforcing discourses of normative domestic femininity and gaining political capital.  
           The current Women‟s Monument in Pretoria/Tshwane commemorates women‟s 
mobilisation against pass laws, now considered a founding event, and entrenches a seemingly 
growing mythology that equates women‟s political resistance to oppression in South Africa 
with the anti-pass campaign – a campaign that mobilised women through appealing to 
particular discourses of motherhood and femininity. Moreover, like the Women‟s Monument 
in Bloemfontein, this post-apartheid monument locks women into a discourse created by men 
serving a new national agenda.
60
 While women participated in all aspects (and at times more 
successfully) of the struggle against apartheid, Marschall shows that it is largely men who 
continue to determine to what extent female involvement is recognised and which actions and 
individuals are worthy of receiving public acknowledgement. This is informed by men‟s own 
terms of reference, “notably the traditionally male-dominated spheres of warfare and political 
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activism.”61 Thus, the actions of women at the Union Buildings in 1956 met men‟s criteria of 
what constitutes a courageous freedom fighter. But, as Marschall argues, women who have 
contributed in ways that are considered as normative in their supportive roles as women such 
as nursing the wounded, providing shelter, food, or giving emotional and moral support – are 
not acknowledged in such a „grandiose‟ manner.62 While political rhetoric at commemorative 
events tends to stress those very roles that are considered feminine and domestic in an 
attempt to re-domesticate militant female behaviour now that the democratic state has been 
realised, these roles are not accorded the same importance as deeds that have been defined as 
admirable by a male dominated discourse of heroism. In this way, monuments dedicated to 
women are, primarily, about women; “they reflect particular discourses around women that 
circulate in society, which are reinforced and disseminated further through the visual and 
textual signifiers of such monuments.”63 While any prominent monument or 
acknowledgement of women‟s contributions to the struggle against apartheid is, as Marschall 
succinctly states, “better than nothing”,64 they continue to serve a male-dominated political 
agenda and are “mediated by their positioning in a patriarchal society.”65 It could be argued 
that the decade of the 1950s, known as the „golden years‟ of the struggle and which produced 
its most prominent and respected (ANC-affiliated) leaders is enshrined in such a deeply-
rooted mythology that mutes women‟s voices in the present. The Women‟s Monument gives 
women a voice, but it is a voice that is confined and limited by a broader nationalism that 
propagates unity and gender equality as defined by the mythology of the decade of the 
Freedom Charter. In this way, women‟s ability to express themselves politically is 
circumscribed by the boundaries of a post-apartheid nationalism that, in official rhetoric, has 
declared gender equality as being very nearly achieved.
66
 Women who voice dissension are 
muted by these over-arching mythologies that are enforced by the erection of such 
monuments and defined by male-dominated discourses of heroism. 
           More recently, however, a new project has been implemented that attempts to counter 
the current monument which has proven to be difficult to access as a result of increased 
security which limits access to the Union Buildings. While the new proposal persists in 
entrenching women‟s anti-pass protests as the only form of female contribution to the 
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struggle worthy of being honoured in the public space, it also seeks to redress what has been 
considered as an understated monument that has failed to adequately commemorate the 1956 
women‟s march or contribute to empowering women in the present. As a result, the project to 
establish a Women‟s Living Monument on Lilian Ngoyi square in the Pretoria CBD was 
unveiled by Gauteng Premier Nomvula Mokonyane on Women‟s Day in August 2012. The 
„monument‟ will consist of a double- or triple-storey building with a statue, an auditorium, a 
narrative centre, a hall of fame listing the names of women who contributed to the struggle, a 
library and a training facility providing formal and informal training to women and will also 
serve as a leadership training centre for women in political office.
67
 The City of Tshwane set 
aside eight million Rand for the project with a further one hundred million Rand being 
provided by provincial government for its development. Further funding was sought from 
national government and other investors.
68
 The official brick laying ceremony was held on 29 
September 2014 and commences the construction-phase of the monument.
69
 Reportedly, the 
idea for the multi-purpose site was the result of local government heeding the call from 
“women organisations that wanted it to be a place of remembrance and reflection of the 
struggles and diversity of South African women.”70 The announcement was followed by a re-
enactment of the 1956 march and an address by President Jacob Zuma who stressed the 
number of laws enacted in South Africa since 1994 to ensure gender equality and stated that 
the government was satisfied with the progress made in improving the status and quality of 
life of women although adding that more needed to be done.
71
  
           The proposed „living monument‟ seemingly attempts to further entrench the 
prominence of the 1956 campaign in South Africa‟s foundational mythology by creating a 
seamless narrative of women‟s activism in the past and a commitment to female 
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empowerment in the present. The Women‟s Monument, now difficult to access, neglected 
and considered inadequate will be replaced by a grandiose Women‟s Living Monument of 
monumental stature that is intended to remain interactive with the „nation‟ while focusing 
specifically on the perceived needs of women in the present. While enhancing the 
representation of women in the national commemorative sphere, the newly proposed 
„monument‟ appears to avoid the deeply problematic positioning of women in present day 
South Africa by adopting a celebratory tone that ostensibly denies that the patriarchal values 
that dominate South African society continue to shape and affect the lives of many South 
African women. This is problematic as honouring and commemorating the heroines of the 
past in no way translates into gender equality in the present. However, this „living monument‟ 
seeks to do just that by proclaiming the „struggles and diversity of South African women‟ in 
the past tense. Although it proposes to function as a centre for women, it simultaneously is, 
once again, about women serving a male-dominated nationalist agenda. The grand narrative 
of the 1956 march is defined by the central tenets of the Freedom Charter and shaped by 
traditional discourses of motherhood and femininity but represents unity in diversity and 
gender equality in the present. In a short online piece explaining the historic meaning of 
Women‟s Day the South African Government News Agency proclaims this gender equality and 
explains that, 
This historic march was a turning point in the role of women in the struggle for freedom and 
society at large. Since that eventful day, women from all walks of life became equal partners 
in the struggle for a non-racial and non-sexist South Africa.
72
 
This grand narrative of „equal partnership‟, „non-racialism‟, and „non-sexism‟ defines the 
official rhetoric of Women‟s Day and Women‟s Month. However, during 2012 when the 
plans for the new living monument were announced, both the Saartjie Baartman Centre and 
Rape Crisis Centre in Cape Town were threatened by imminent closure due to lack of 
funding. It appears absurd that essential services whose very existence as trauma support 
centres sends a clear message to society that violence against women is not acceptable are 
neglected while grandiose projects „reflecting‟ on the perceived success of women‟s struggles 
of the past receive extensive governmental funding. As a nationalist project it attempts in 
some way to „give back‟ to the nation by ensuring that it appears to empower women through 
„training programmes‟. This reflects what Shireen Hassim has identified as the rarely 
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questioned structural conditions of women‟s inequality in South Africa and the resulting 
“tendency towards accommodation with existing institutions, ideologies and powerholders.”73 
Yet, its emphasis remains on commemorating a glorious past achievement in the present in 
order to strengthen that specific event as part of the nation‟s foundational mythology and to 
bolster the public perception of the government that lays claim to that past.   
 
“Strike a Woman, You Strike a Hollow Memory”74: „Celebrating‟ Women‟s Day 
First celebrated as a national holiday in 1995, Women‟s Day was intended to celebrate, 
commemorate and honour the 1956 women‟s march and all of its participants. Moreover, 
commemorative efforts purportedly focus on „empowering‟ South African women in the 
present while reflecting on and reminding the nation of the historic 1956 march. The 
extension of Women‟s Day into annually „celebrating‟ August as Women‟s Month 
incorporates the commemoration of other “pioneers of the women‟s movement”75 which 
allows for the commemoration of a larger group of national heroines who have made historic 
contributions to the nation. Annually, the month of August tends to see the „plight‟ of many 
women in South Africa highlighted in the media while retailers offer discounts on certain 
products and services to women on the public holiday. Women‟s Day itself is a fairly grand 
affair with celebrations, lectures, and events taking place across the country, and the 
unveilings of new projects aimed to empower women and public addresses by prominent 
Ministers and the President are the highlight of 9 August. While any attempt made to enhance 
the social and economic positioning of women in society and to improve the lives of so many 
disempowered and marginalised women is a laudable effort it remains a symptomatic 
treatment that reflects the lack of any clear plan of action by government institutes to address 
the deeply ingrained gender inequalities that exist in South Africa. Official rhetoric continues 
to cast a spotlight on the past political prowess of women‟s activism in the face of an 
oppressive and violent state. However, its celebratory tone and focus on the constitutional 
and legislative progress made towards women‟s empowerment deflects from the real and 
deplorable state of gender relations and women‟s positioning in society in the present. 
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Indeed, Hassim argues that the “constitutional protections were essentially a bargain struck at 
the elite level between national women‟s organisations and the male political leadership; they 
are not deeply rooted in civil society.”76  
           The government has faced criticism for annually directing a considerable amount of 
resources into commemorating the 1956 march; Women‟s Day/Month events, street 
renaming ceremonies, and unveilings (all considered as hollow gestures) rather than investing 
these resources in the basic services that could make real changes in women‟s lives.77 
Moreover, highlighting the violence experienced by so many South African women for one 
month a year appears to be tokenism considering that women live with this violence or the 
possibility of violence every day, every month, „year in year out‟. This focus on the 
commemoration of past achievements which – tragically – have had very little impact on the 
lived experiences of women in the present have drawn criticism of journalists, academics, 
and activists and highlighted in insight pieces in the media. Feminist scholar/activist and 
writer Helen Moffett wrote two articles concerning Women‟s Day/Month, one in 2012 and 
the second in 2013; both articles went viral on social media sites. Her first article, „Take Your 
Women‟s Day and Shove It‟, addressed to the South African government, is an aggressive 
and enraged attack on what Moffett calls the “pathetic, meaningless, mind-blowingly 
expensive and stomach-churningly patronising Women‟s Day” and continues to call on 
government to „cancel‟ it thereby questioning the point of its celebration. Lambasting the 
spending of “obscene piles and piles” of money on Women‟s Day/Month events which are 
described as wasteful, Moffett suggests that a better use of this money would be to fund Rape 
Crisis Centre and the Saartjie Baartman Centre and other NGOs performing invaluable social, 
educational, and health-care services whose international funding has been cut as a result of 
the global economic crisis. Rather than an opportunity for celebrating the 1956 Women‟s 
March, Moffett sees the current state of affairs as an insult to its memory:  
What you have reduced the 1956 Women‟s March to is a travesty. That was an occasion of 
extraordinary dignity and power, and we‟d like to remember and honour it without having to 
use sickbags, please. Lilian Ngoyi and Albertina Sisulu and the thousands of brave women 
who took part that day are squirming in their graves at your appalling, ongoing, almost 
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CASUAL abandonment of this country‟s women, especially the poorest ones. The public 
spectacle of hypocrisy that is Women‟s Day is just rubbing salt into their wounds.78 
Here, the national heroines of the past are employed to criticise government‟s lack of 
effective gender policies and dedication to truly improving the lives of its female citizens 
rather than to celebrate and applaud them as evident in official rhetoric of the 1956 march. 
This frustration is once again shown in another popular article written by Moffett in 2013, 
„Fuck Women‟s Day. FUCK IT.‟ Here Moffett‟s rage has turned into despair: 
Don‟t ask me to celebrate Women‟s Day. Don‟t offer me ten per cent off beauty products or a 
free glass of cheap bubbly. Don‟t even ask me to commemorate the historic women‟s march 
on the Union buildings – a milestone event whose noble essence has been sold down the river 
by leaders who are eager to claim some sort of retrospective credit for it, but don‟t even 
pretend to honour its values. 
The article outlines her frustration with the constant unchanging gender dynamics in South 
Africa, the persisting myths about rape in South African society, and a government and its 
departments that seemingly champion and uphold the patriarchal values that undermine the 
effectiveness of any progressive legislation. Once again this article features a reminder of the 
political salience of the 1956 march for the ruling party laying claim to this piece of 
foundational mythology imbued with the narratives of nation building and the struggle for a 
non-racial and non-sexist society; trading on past glories rather than making a commitment to 
changing the present. Verashni Pillay reflected on this on Women‟s Day 2012: 
As we're reminded every year, all of this is in commemoration of the 1956 pass laws march... 
Dignified yet resolute, they lay down petitions bearing more than 100 000 signatures 
protesting laws that would further restrict their movement, and stood in silence for 30 minutes 
in one of our country's most poignant displays of resistance. You'd imagine that subsequent 
renditions would fight similar battles, if not reach similar proportions. Start anywhere: rape, 
low literacy rates, infant mortality, an education system in crisis: we have a bevy of issues 
affecting the most vulnerable women in our country. But something bizarre happened when 
the party of resistance became the party of government: the level of organisation, money, 
capacity and sheer bureaucracy directed at the memory of the march increased, while its 
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motive diminished till we were left with mostly hollow gestures and empty words in a country 
where the cause of women is routinely betrayed.
79
 
The anger of the writers of these articles is palpable and understandable. The government has 
betrayed the women‟s movement yet continues to exploit the remarkable and inspiring 
women‟s march of 1956, shaped and recast into a fitting and usable narrative for the post-
apartheid state, to redirect the focus of its failure to take on persisting patriarchal and 
misogynist sentiments and practices in the present. Moffett‟s 2012 article logged over 10 000 
„shares‟ on social networking site Facebook80 indicating that over 10 000 people had shared 
this article on their personal Facebook profiles with the potential of reaching an even wider 
audience. The article published online by Moffett for Women‟s Day 2013, „Fuck Women‟s 
Day. FUCK IT.‟, racked up approximately 7700 „shares‟ through Facebook.81 While these 
articles do not necessarily reflect the views of all South African women,
82
 and such a 
quantitative study could yield illuminating results, their popularity on social media and a 
wealth of news articles sharing similar themes released every year does reflect a deeper 
understanding that the gestures towards „empowering women‟ made by government each 
year are often (but not always) little more than empty gestures.
83
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Honouring the „Unsung‟ Heroines: Claiming Remains  
The declaration of the graves of Maxeke, Ngoyi, and Joseph as national heritage sites during 
Women‟s Month marked the launch of SAHRA‟s Women‟s Legacy Project.84 Unlike the 
day-long live televised funerals of Sara Baartman and Albertina Sisulu, this event received 
remarkably little media coverage despite honouring women who are regarded to be amongst 
the most prominent icons of the post-apartheid state. This could, perhaps, be attributed to the 
lack of immediacy of these women‟s deaths and the fact that for the past two decades their 
political salience did not lie in their physical remains, but rather in harnessing their legacies 
in official nationalist rhetoric. The burial of Sara Baartman who was re-imagined as 
„Grandmother of the Nation‟ in her native soil was symbolic of the end of a long history of 
oppression and inequality culminating in the birth of the post-apartheid state; the death of 
Albertina Sisulu, a living and present archetypal „Mother of the Nation‟, was witnessed by 
the post-apartheid nation and mourning her loss while honouring her lifetime of dedication 
and sacrifice was extant. Maxeke, Ngoyi, and Joseph passed away before 1994 and while all 
three were considered to be pillars of a post-apartheid pantheon, their physical remains had 
already been honoured with appropriate funerary rites at the time of their deaths. In the 
immediate years following the first democratic elections it appears that their legacies and 
names alone would serve in establishing a foundational mythology. However, as the hopeful 
optimism of the founding of the Rainbow Nation has waned, the power of official state-
sanctioned commemoration and commemorative events has been increasingly harnessed to 
remind the „nation‟ of the sacrifices made in the past in order to (re)legitimise the 
government in the present by honouring those heroines who worked and fought tirelessly for 
a democratic state but did not live to see the fruits of their labours. By claiming the legacies, 
lives, and now the bodies of the dead heroines their multivocality as once living individuals 
becomes subsumed within an official grand narrative that harnesses these women to serve a 
nationalist agenda. Their very bodies now belong to the national estate and can be called to 
national service whenever socio-political conditions demand the official versions of their 
legacies for regime legitimation or to stress exemplary citizenship and patriotism. 
                                                          
84
 SAHRA, “Honouring and Celebrating Women‟s Sacrifices and Roles as Midwives of Political 
Emancipation”, SAHRA project document (draft).  Department of Arts and Culture and South African Heritage 
Resources Agency, “Declaration of the graves of Charlotte Maxeke in Nancefield Cemetery, Lilian Ngoyi and 
Helen Joseph in Avalon Cemetery, Johannesburg, as national heritage sites”, Government Gazette, No.658, 30 
July 2010. 
302 
 
           The focus of the celebrations that accompanied the declarations was clearly on the 
communities in Soweto where the graves are situated. Maxeke, Joseph, and Ngoyi‟s names 
are already honoured extensively in the national public space and Joseph and Ngoyi feature in 
the Hall of Heroes in Freedom Park. The schedule for declaration of the graves of Ngoyi and 
Joseph was announced by the Minister of Arts and Culture in 2009 with the deadline for 
completion set for August 2010. SAHRA consulted with various stakeholders including the 
Ngoyi
85
 and Manye
86
 families, and, most prominently, the ANCWL, who, according to Troy 
Phili, partly „own‟ the legacies of these women.87 The special consideration given to the input 
by the ANCWL is noteworthy. If the ANCWL „owns‟ the political legacy of these women as 
a result of their affiliation with the organisation and proclaims them as their heroines it 
certainly supports accusations of the ANC reaping political gain from such commemorative 
efforts. Of course, honoured as iconic anti-colonial and anti-apartheid activists official 
rhetoric will emphasise the political legacies (reconstructed and re-imagined) these women 
have left behind. Yet, the clear division made by SAHRA and DAC between the personal 
lives (by consulting with families) and the political lives (by involving the ANCWL) of these 
women indicates an official government preoccupation with only the political aspects of these 
women‟s lives to which they claim uncontested „ownership‟.88  
           This claim of „ownership‟ also illustrates the conflation of state and party symptomatic 
of the ANC one party dominance in government. The state, governed by the dominant ANC 
employs state institutions and state funding to publically acknowledge the political legacies 
of individuals historically affiliated to the ANC. The ANC, as the dominant party in South 
Africa, provided the platform for the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy. This 
bolsters its claim that its rule is necessary for social progress and democracy.
89
 Of course, the 
mass support that the ANC enjoys is determined by its century of resistance to oppression 
and its ability to appear as a party that represents often conflicting class and ethnic interests 
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which is a study in its own right.
90
 What is of importance here is that this conflation is being 
entrenched by the ANC laying claim to political legacies and presenting these narratives of 
ANC-driven resistance to the public as national heritage. In this manner, the ANC becomes 
the sole founding party of the post-apartheid nation through its creation and dissemination 
(through state institutions) of an ANC-dominated meta-narrative of „The Struggle‟ and 
retains the power to silence counter-narratives that might emerge in the public landscape.  
           The declaration of the graves as national heritage sites meant that they would form 
part of the national estate. The combined grave of Ngoyi and Joseph already form part of a 
„Heroes Acre‟ in Avalon Cemetery. While the respective families and the ANCWL had 
placed grave markers and headstones at the grave, SAHRA, in consultation with the various 
stakeholders, dismantled these to replace them with a new combined headstone 
acknowledging both women and their association with the ANC – whose flag features 
prominently on the headstone – and their dedication to found a non-racial South Africa. Phili 
had been working for approximately seven years on ensuring the declaration of Maxeke‟s 
grave and, within the context of a larger Women‟s Legacy Project, was able to push for the 
inclusion of this declaration in 2010.
91
  
           As already indicated, Maxeke does not enjoy the same level of official prominence as 
Ngoyi and Joseph; perhaps attributable to her pre-apartheid era activism. Despite this, 
Maxeke was a significant „glass ceiling‟ breaker of her time. Hailed as the „Mother of African 
Freedom‟,92 Maxeke, born in 1874, became the first South African black woman to complete 
a B.Sc. degree at Wilberforce University. On her return to South Africa, Maxeke and her 
husband were also responsible for the launch of the African Methodist Episcopal Church in 
South Africa. Her involvement in the SANNC through her husband and serving as a strong 
organisational force in the 1913 women‟s march, Maxeke founded and served as the first 
president of the Bantu Women‟s League in 1918. Maxeke also set up an employment bureau 
after her husband‟s death and was later employed as a probation officer attached to the courts. 
Her continued focus on social work saw Maxeke as a frequently invited speaker at church 
conferences and public meetings concerned with social issues. Walker indicates that while 
biographical details of Maxeke‟s life are scant her “life experience was far removed from that 
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of the average black woman at the time. Her career was remarkably similar to that of 
contemporary male leaders in the ANC.”93 Of course, Maxeke did not enjoy equal status 
within the SANNC leadership as women were considered as auxiliary „members‟. Despite 
her own life representing a radical break with the gender norms of the time, Maxeke did not 
reject conventional attitudes about women and did not question “the assumption that 
women‟s primary function was a domestic one.”94 She was also clear that a women‟s 
organisation‟s primary function was to work alongside the men in order to achieve a 
multiracial society free from oppression by a white minority government.
95
   
           Helen Joseph and Lilian Ngoyi were similarly remarkable women for their times. 
Ngoyi was born in 1911 and following her impressive involvement and rise within the ranks 
of the Garment Workers Union (GWU), joined the ANC during their Defiance Campaign in 
the 1950s. With her powerful oratory skills she was quickly elected as president of the 
ANCWL and served as the president of FEDSAW in 1956. Moreover, she was the first 
woman to be elected to the ANC NEC. She was arrested in December 1956 and stood trial for 
high treason until she was acquitted in 1961. In 1962 she was served her first banning orders 
which, barring a short termination, would last until her death in 1980. Ngoyi was buried in 
Avalon Cemetery in Soweto. Helen Joseph, born in London in 1905, completed an English 
degree at London University and moved to South Africa in 1931 after teaching in India. 
Joseph joined the GWU after serving as an information and welfare officer in the Women‟s 
Auxiliary Air Force during the war. She was a founder member of the Congress of Democrats 
and, like Ngoyi, played a pivotal part in FEDSAW as its national secretary and in the 
organising of the 1956 march. Joseph carries the tragic distinction as being the first person to 
be placed under house arrest in 1962 after being charged with high treason in 1956 and also 
survived several assassination attempts. Her last ban was lifted in 1985. Joseph died in 1992 
at the age of 87 and, reflecting a changing South African political landscape, was buried in a 
shared grave with Ngoyi. Joseph was the first white individual to be buried at Avalon 
Cemetery. Ngoyi and Joseph had a deep friendship despite their vastly different backgrounds. 
Joseph had come into the anti-apartheid movement from a position of privilege but soon 
realised that the privileges that she took for granted as a white woman in South Africa were 
based on the exploitation of black labour and the suppression of black liberties.
96
 Ngoyi, the 
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daughter of a washerwoman, came from an impoverished background and no longer being 
able to find solace from apartheid and its oppressive legislation in religion, entered into 
politics and excelled in every organisation she joined. As leading figures within FEDSAW, 
both women were instrumental in the organisation of the 1956 march and other FEDSAW 
activities. Moreover, they were the only women to be singled out and brought up on charges 
of treason in 1956 along with twenty-eight male colleagues. As the deeply dedicated leaders 
of the 1956 anti-pass campaign, as treason trialists, as ANC-affiliated heroines, and sharing a 
friendship that defied apartheid legislation, Joseph and Ngoyi are considered in official 
discourse as embodying the spirit of the Rainbow Nation and have been considered as 
foundational icons since the advent of democracy in South Africa.
97
   
          The celebrations for the declaration of the graves of these three iconic women as 
national heritage sites took place at the Walter Sisulu Square of Dedication in Kliptown, 
Soweto, between the Ten Pillars representing the ten clauses of the Freedom Charter. The 
event commenced early on 20 August 2010. Then Minister of Arts and Culture, Lulama 
Xingwana
98
 was accompanied by a high profile delegation including Winnie Mandela and 
representatives of the ANCWL, who visited the Ngoyi and Manye families (identified as the 
main stakeholders despite the ANCWL seemingly taking charge of the day‟s events) for tea. 
The delegation then moved to Regina Mundi Church for an interfaith ceremony which 
represented the different religious denominations of Maxeke, Joseph, and Ngoyi and for 
which buses were provided to commute members of the public and the ANCWL to attend. 
From here, the families, official government delegation, and attendees visited the grave of 
Maxeke at Nancefield Cemetery, followed by a visit to the combined grave of Ngoyi and 
Joseph at Avalon Cemetery to announce the declarations and unveil the new headstones.  
           The short speech given by Minister Xingwana for the occasion of the declaration 
outlines the achievements of the three women honoured at this event and their ANC 
affiliation is emphasised. She firstly placed their activism in a context of the struggle for 
national liberation and emphasises that their extraordinary contribution was made for all 
South Africans: 
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They acted within a collective and a common struggle for a free country. They marched for 
all of us. They opened the road to a new reality. Through their heroic and fearless actions, 
they paved the way for a democratic, non-racial and non-sexist South Africa.
99
 
Reminiscent of the language of the transition, Maxeke, Joseph, and Ngoyi were 
contextualised as foundational figures whose actions contributed to the founding of the 
democratic state. Xingwana framed women‟s contribution in terms of sacrifice: “They were 
courageous and outspoken. They could not be silenced. They were willing to sacrifice their 
lives for their convictions.”100 This was echoed in Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation, Maite Nkoane-Mashabane‟s speech in Limpopo for National Women‟s Day in 
2010. Addressing a gathering, she stated: “We are assembled to pay tribute to the heroism 
displayed by the martyr generation of Charlotte Maxeke, Sophie de Bruyn, Lillian Ngoyi, 
Helen Joseph, Amina Cachalia, Frances Baard and many other heroines of our country in the 
quest to build a just society.”101 Women‟s activism is subsumed by an ideology of martyrdom 
in such a statement. It effectively states that women can be acceptably and recognisably 
heroic if such actions are driven by a sacrifice of homes and families for the good of the 
„nation‟. However, for Xingwana, the great sacrifices made by these women have ensured the 
freedom of the nation in the present: 
Today we remember the words of these women. We remember the words of Helen Joseph 
who declared: “I OPENED THE ROAD FOR YOU, YOU MUST GO FORWARD.” Today 
these words have even more meaning as each generation builds on the achievements of the 
previous one... Today we have travelled so much further on this journey that began at the 
beginning of the last century and took us through the popular struggles of the 1950s into 
the1980s and 1990s until the present. Through the decades women have made great strides 
and helped to lay the foundations for our democracy. Let us remain true to the struggles of the 
women. Let us pledge that we too “We shall not rest‟ until we have won for our children their 
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fundamental rights of freedom, justice, and security”. While we have won these rights, we 
need to do more to ensure the full realisation of freedom, justice and security.
102
 
She urged the nation to build upon the legacies left behind by Maxeke, Ngoyi, and Joseph 
and to emulate their tireless activism to fully realise the rights for which these women 
sacrificed so much in the present. While Xingwana indicated that these rights have been won, 
she acknowledged that they have not been realised. While short, the Minister‟s speech 
emphasised the central themes that define official representations of women‟s contribution to 
„The Struggle‟: martyrdom, sacrifice, and motherhood. These themes were placed in the 
framework of an ANC-dominated foundational mythology creation that affirms the 
organisation and its heroes‟ and heroines‟ historic dedication to freedom, non-sexism, and the 
creation of a non-racial South Africa. Once again, the nation was called upon to espouse the 
qualities of its heroines in order to realise the future „golden age‟ in which all the historic 
struggles have reached their fruitful completion. 
           The event culminated in a „picnic‟ for the „community‟ under the Ten Pillars of the 
Freedom Charter. According to Berri Samuels, SAHRA‟s public relations officer, the focus 
on the local communities as stakeholders in this declaration was defined by the location of 
the graves within these communities; the people should benefit from, be aware of, and take 
care of these graves in the years to come.
103
 By encouraging the communities to take an 
informal form of „ownership‟ over these graves it is hoped that a lasting sense of awareness 
of these women‟s legacies will be created and that this will inspire a sense of historic 
consciousness of women‟s contributions to political emancipation on a ground level. After 
all, in the post-apartheid state heritage is seen as an inclusive notion and embraces “things 
and ideas that give us collective identity”104 and these women and their actions and sacrifices 
are constructed in official discourse as an aspect of the shared heritage of all South Africans. 
On a more functional level, the focus of SAHRA to identify and declare sites associated with 
liberation heroes and heroines is also an attempt to create a comprehensive heritage tourism 
network that could economically benefit the smaller or rural communities that many of these 
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heroes and heroines came from.
105
 However, the continued focus on identifying sites 
associated with „liberation heroes and heroines‟ is intrinsically linked to the entrenchment of 
a post-apartheid foundational mythology rooted in the history of „The Struggle‟. 
Commemorating these individuals and events is also an attempt to maintain a specific version 
of this past that adheres to the official narrative. This does not mean that no contesting or 
alternative versions of these histories exist, but rather that these are suppressed by the official 
funding, celebration, and organisation of commemorative events.  
           According to Samuels, the picnic concept for the celebration of the declaration was the 
result of a well known conversation between Joseph and Ngoyi. Both women spent several 
years under house arrest and Ngoyi passed away while still serving banning orders. Samuels 
relates that it was a dream of Joseph and Ngoyi to one day sit under a tree and enjoy a picnic 
together. This served as the point of departure to develop the event concept. It was significant 
to include Maxeke who also formed part of this declaration and had to be ensured equal status 
in this event. Due to Maxeke‟s historical precedence – chronologically and as a pioneer of the 
women‟s movement – and the location of the picnic, it was decided that the height of the 
pillars of Freedom Square would represent both the trees that Joseph and Ngoyi dreamed of 
and the historic precedence set by Maxeke. Metaphorically, Maxeke would represent the tree 
under which Ngoyi and Joseph wished to one day sit together. To further develop the 
Maxeke/tree analogy, SAHRA requested children at local schools to write short messages to 
Maxeke on laminated green paper leaves. These leaves were temporarily attached to the 
pillars to render them more tree-like. Samuels stressed the involvement of mainly women in 
this event. For Samuels, it was meant to serve as a rewarding event for the women 
participants in that it stripped away the anonymity of the seemingly empty names that grace 
street signs and buildings, and give renewed meaning and contexts to the legacies of these 
honoured icons whose lives and actions have the power to inspire the women and young girls 
of today and in the future.
106
 This reflects the somewhat patronising official rhetoric that 
seemingly encapsulates all Women‟s Day and Women‟s Month events. Although 
commemorative events such as these might ideologically inspire a new generation, they carry 
no practical impact to change socio-economic conditions. They serve to ideologically inspire 
a sense of patriotism, national identity, responsible and exemplary citizenship, and a 
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celebration of the current political order (and, indeed, ruling party) for which these women 
sacrificed so much.   
                       
Conclusion 
The annual commemoration of the 9 August 1956 anti-pass march implies a national 
reflection in honour of a mass mobilisation of women in resistance to an extension of 
oppressive apartheid laws. With commemorative events taking place in a post-apartheid 
setting they assume a celebratory tone while official rhetoric declares that the goals that these 
women united for across racial and class boundaries have been achieved. Although it is 
necessary to officially commemorate women‟s contributions to the achievement of a 
democratic South Africa in order to allow it to become part of a shared heritage that 
acknowledges women‟s extraordinary political activism in all its aspects, commemorative 
events are being increasingly employed to applaud a present day government on its 
legislative achievements in policies ensuring gender equality. This seemingly denies the 
fundamental harm that gender-based violence does to democratic principles as women are 
unable to fully assume the rights and responsibilities of citizenship as this threat undermines 
the constitutional recognition of women‟s equality. Moreover, the focus on a single founding 
event to „cover‟ all women‟s contributions constructs a singular narrative of women‟s 
resistance to apartheid as being confined to resistance to pass-laws based on a shared 
experience of motherhood and womanhood that transcended race and class. In this way, 
commemoration serves to establish the women‟s anti-pass campaign as the central narrative 
of women‟s resistance in post-apartheid foundational mythology and its heroines as domestic, 
maternal, and matriarchal foundational figures. 9 August 1956 serves as the central myth of 
women‟s political resistance and has come to represent all female contribution to „The 
Struggle‟.  
           For the particular commemorative event addressed, the inclusion of Charlotte Maxeke 
was not in conflict with the grand narrative of women‟s resistance to pass laws which is 
rooted in the foundational mythology of 9 August 1956. Maxeke‟s inclusion allowed her to 
serve as a founding figure for the women‟s movement itself; an inspirational figure who 
pioneered the way forward for the women of 1956 but always operating from the assumed 
domestic responsibilities of women as mothers to their families. The declaration of these 
three graves as national heritage sites is symbolic of the „nation‟ taking complete possession 
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of these founding figures; their lives reflect the values of the post-apartheid state and as 
shared heritage these unique women belong to the nation. Their sacrifices for and dedication 
to the founding of a non-racial South Africa stresses citizen duties over claiming citizen 
rights and as the ANC-led government claims ownership of their legacies it is implied that 
the South African citizen has a duty towards the regime of liberation as they purportedly 
embody the values that these women‟s lives have been assigned in post-apartheid official 
discourse. 
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Conclusion 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Pitied Plumage: Recalling Iconic Women’s Legacies in the Present 
 
We pity the plumage but forget the dying bird.
1
 
- Percy Bysshe Shelley 
 
           Shelley‟s title for his address to the British people on the occasion of the death of 
Princess Charlotte finds resonance in the dead body politics of female icons in post-apartheid 
South Africa. The public and official mourning of female founding figures is defined by 
expressions of loss; significantly the loss of the values that these women embodied and an 
encouragement for the nation to emulate these lost lives. These women become part of a 
nationalist pantheon of heroes and heroines which reduces lived lives to symbolic legacies 
carefully constructed and narrated to ostensibly inspire national consciousness and pride. 
South Africa has a deeply traumatic past from which to draw inspiration for political 
mourning and commemoration in the present. The eventual „victory‟ of „The Struggle‟ which 
resulted in the democratic state has cast such deaths into a narrative of martyrdom, 
unrelenting dedication to freedom, and eventual victorious commemoration – all which are 
powerful contributors to the creation of a post-apartheid foundation myth. At the time of their 
death, burial, and commemoration the women whose lives and legacies have been the focus 
of this thesis were briefly cast (back) into the national spotlight and they were honoured in 
official rhetoric as heroines of resistance, (grand)mothers of the nation, and sisters in the 
struggle for a democratic South Africa. Certain nations attempt to recall a „golden age‟ that is 
located in the distant past into the present with its heroes and heroines often mythical or 
shrouded in nationalist mythologies. The South African heroines are present; their physical 
remains in their resting places have become national heritage sites and thus, form part of the 
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national estate. However, despite their presence in South African history and the fact that 
(with the exception of Baartman) these women have left behind their words in recorded 
speeches and autobiographical works, this does not render them exempt from becoming 
enveloped in state sanctioned (re)constructed nationalist mythologies.  
           Andrew Nash makes a poignant statement concerning the current ANC government‟s 
reliance on the invocation of heroes, sacrifices, and symbols when he asserts that this “is a 
struggle only for the recovery of the past, never for its critical interrogation; it seeks 
inspiration, and never self-knowledge.”2 Rather, the invocation of these elements which make 
up the nation‟s foundational mythology, serve to deflect from the persistent failure to deliver 
the socio-economic change which a successful liberation struggle was believed to entail. 
While the ANC government has a wealth of iconic and well-known historic male leaders to 
call upon in order to establish itself at the epicentre of South Africa‟s post-apartheid 
foundational mythology, honouring female icons plays an important gendered role within this 
mythology creation. While the promotion of women‟s rights has traditionally taken a 
backseat to the project of national liberation, the strong presence of women leaders within the 
ranks of the ANC and the organisation of mass protest action has meant that the call for equal 
treatment was never truly silenced and was enshrined in the new constitution of the post-
apartheid state. Tragically, however, constitutional protection never translated into social 
equalities and South Africa remains a country tormented by high levels of violence 
committed against women. National Women‟s Day and Women‟s Month events attempt to 
highlight the unconscionable levels of violence perpetrated against women and children in 
South African society. Yet, official „celebrations‟ around these events fail to address the 
deeply complicated and varied constructions of gender and gender relations in society. 
Official rhetoric at such events tends to centre around declarations of „empowering‟ South 
African women through education and government programmes focusing on economic 
empowerment. Often, the iconic women leaders of the past are called upon to remind the 
nation of the „strong‟ women that fought for liberation and gender equality and it is often 
during Women‟s Month that special commemorative events celebrating specific heroines of 
the past take place. The burial of Baartman and the declaration of Maxeke, Ngoyi, and 
Joseph‟s graves as national heritage sites were deliberately planned for Women‟s Day and 
Women‟s Month. This ultimately defined them as important foundational figures by 
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associating their legacies and remains with this foundational event which is now celebrated as 
a national holiday. Simultaneously, the rituals of mourning, burial, and commemoration are 
employed at such events in official rhetoric to render their legacies as sacred to the nation. It 
declared that these women were martyrs and icons whose sacrifices and struggles contributed 
to the democratic freedoms enjoyed by South African citizens today and it is imperative that 
the nation emulate the qualities that made these women iconic. While Ngoyi and Maxeke are 
the only women that can truly be considered as emerging leaders within the ranks of the 
ANC, Joseph‟s close association with the ANC and the Women‟s League as an anti-apartheid 
activist and close friend of Ngoyi have seen her become part of ANC heritage. Baartman 
predates the organised African nationalist struggle but with the ANC government 
spearheading and funding the repatriation processes of her remains she has been drawn into 
an ANC legacy of resistance to oppression. In this way, all four women have become 
foundational icons for ANC regime legitimation in the present. This thesis has shown through 
the application of feminist CDA that official rhetoric has employed, and indeed, exploited 
their legacies to counter criticism, opposition, and civil unrest which arose in response to 
perceived poor government performance in terms of service delivery, socio-economic 
transformation, and in adequately addressing high levels of gender based violence.  
           The examination and analysis in this thesis of this official rhetoric within a context of 
public/official mourning and remembrance has identified how the dead body politics of these 
iconic women have contributed to a new foundational mythology for the post-apartheid state. 
It has also demonstrated the official appropriation of their remains and legacies for the 
purposes of regime legitimation – especially in times of social unrest. The case studies 
examined in this thesis have illustrated several salient points about the importance of a 
continued study of expressions of nationalism in the post-apartheid state. It is clear that 
official articulations of nationalism issued within a context of dead body politics tend to be 
accorded a deep sense of respect through the sacredness ascribed to death, burial, and dead 
bodies. The deaths, burial, and commemoration of women who are considered as having 
contributed to the advent of the democratic state presented an opportunity for expressions of 
state-sanctioned narratives of the „nation‟. Criticism of the current regime is intentionally 
silenced by such narratives for the purpose of regime legitimation and sanctification, 
foundational mythology creation, and the specific constructions of normative standards of 
womanhood in South Africa. The invocation of the heroines of the past attempts to silence 
opposing voices to official rhetoric and the ANC has, indeed, labelled such opposition as 
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„counter-revolutionary‟ and as being outside of, or even opposed to the South African nation 
and the existence of a democratic state. This effectively attempts to create a state-sanctioned 
meta-narrative of the ANCs past struggle credentials which is consolidated by the creation of 
the post-apartheid „nation‟ in order to validate ANC rule in the present in an attempt to ensure 
a hold on power in the future. 
           The rhetoric of the South African government suggests a commitment to the 
empowerment of women. Yet, the language employed in official gender discourse conversely 
continues to situate women primarily as mothers and wives and represents women as 
performing roles and occupations traditionally associated with domestic femininity. This fails 
to challenge, indeed, even supports, persisting patriarchal structures in South Africa with dire 
consequences for public perceptions of constructions of gender and gender roles. By 
examining the three central events that inspire public mourning, namely death, burial, and 
commemoration, and by shifting the focus away from male to female iconic figures, this 
thesis has demonstrated that post-apartheid nationalisms seek to re-establish a discourse of 
normative domestic femininity in South Africa. Successive post-apartheid nationalist 
ideologies have created official meta-narratives of heroic, iconic, and foundational female 
figures that deny them true historical agency and re-domesticates and reduces these women to 
subjects of a foundational mythology of resistance to oppression and „The Struggle‟. 
Baartman found prominence as a national heroine during the transitional period. Her 
repatriation and burial became significant events in the creation of a foundational mythology 
of the post-apartheid state initially constructed as the „Rainbow Nation‟. Historically distant 
and utterly silent, Baartman was a blank canvas on which narratives of the nation could be 
written. The study of Baartman has demonstrated that foundational figures are not static 
identities – their meanings shift and alter with present day socio-political changes. Baartman, 
initially a foundational mother, also became a representative of Mbeki‟s African Renaissance 
philosophy and HIV/AIDS denialist policies while her „fame‟ as transitional icon was also 
employed in the promotion of Khoisan rights.  
           The death of Sisulu occurred at a time where service delivery protests and internal 
conflict between the ANC and members of the ANCYL featured prominently in the media 
and public awareness. This socio-political atmosphere was reflected in the official rhetoric 
issued about Sisulu‟s death and at her funeral. Sisulu, a living foundational figure of the post-
apartheid state, became a symbol for the nation in death. The emphasis on her specific 
qualities was a clear attempt to reassure the nation that the ANC had a long track record of 
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dedication and servitude that is ingrained in the party‟s character and which trumped any 
failures in the present. In other words, the ANC‟s claim to be the liberation party provides an 
alibi for its failures to deliver its promises of a better life for all. Moreover, her status as 
„mother of the nation‟, her celebrated marriage to Walter Sisulu and her unrelenting 
dedication to family was employed as symbolic of the importance of the normative family 
unit and domestic femininity; female activism was (re)cast as remaining solely concerned 
with women‟s roles as wives and mothers in official rhetoric. This sentiment was echoed in 
the commemorative celebrations of the declaration of the graves of Maxeke, Joseph, and 
Ngoyi as national heritage sites. Women‟s political activism was almost exclusively framed 
in terms of the anti-pass campaigns which attempted to bring together women across the 
racial and class divides through shared experiences such as motherhood. By emphasising this 
specific element of the campaign normative standards of domestic femininity are reinforced. 
This assertion is supported by the terminology employed in the project document of the 
Women‟s Legacy project which was launched by these declarations and which labelled the 
women it had selected to honour as „midwives of political emancipation‟. 
        While this thesis has firstly identified and subsequently demonstrated two significant 
trends within post-apartheid official discourses of nationalism within a context of the 
deliberate construction of „suitable‟ gender discourses and increasingly aggressive regime 
legitimation, it has not been able to measure the effectiveness of this rhetoric in expressions 
of public consciousness. This could be a valuable resource in establishing the efficacy of 
expressions of gendered nationalism and foundation myths amongst citizens and serve as a 
marker as to how such official rhetoric is internalised and expressed in public discourse and 
social relations. Thus, this thesis opens up the possibility for two separate but detailed 
practical studies that might investigate the lived results of nationalist ideologies in post-
apartheid South Africa. Qualitative research, possibly supported by quantitative data, could 
perhaps reflect how the public school history syllabus influences understandings of resistance 
politics amongst South Africa‟s future voters, while an examination of internet forums, blogs, 
and reader responses to news articles both on online media and print media might yield 
interesting demographic reflections of public responses to official nationalist rhetoric. On the 
surface level it may be suggested that South Africans, in general, are fairly politically aware 
but it might be prudent to investigate how public awareness of history and historical events 
influences this interest in present day socio-economic politics and general political 
knowledge and its expression.  
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           Nationalist motivated dead body politics are not unique to post-apartheid South Africa. 
An opportunity exists for a broader global comparative study of post-colonial nations and the 
roles played by the dead body politics of female foundational figures or female liberation 
activists in foundational mythology creation and regime legitimation. While each „nation‟ is 
unique with a specific history that resulted in its construction, most human societies afford a 
sacred quality to their dead – even more so when the deceased was an important founding 
figure. Post-colonial female resistance/liberation icons such as the Jamaican national heroine 
Nanny, Elma Francois of Trinidad & Tobago, and Cuban national icon Mariana Grajales 
Coello („The Mother of Cuba‟) could provide interesting parallels with female South African 
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid activists within a comparative study of female dead body 
politics. The celebration of famous female Indian independence activists in the post-colonial 
era could also provide a rich source for a post-colonial comparative study of female dead 
body politics within a nationalist and foundational mythology construction context and the 
high levels of violence committed against women in both countries. Margaret Jolly briefly 
examined comparisons between India‟s and South Africa‟s „Mothers of the Nation‟ in her 
1994 article “Motherlands? Some Notes on Women and Nationalism in India and Africa”3 
and could serve as a point of departure for such a study. As two decades have passed since 
the publication of this article and South Africa since became a democratic state new parallels 
could be drawn between two countries that honour – even revere – iconic women in their 
post-colonial nationalist heroic pantheons but continue to experience high levels of gender 
violence.  
           Within a local context, if the SAHRA and DAC Women‟s Legacy Project gains 
greater impetus and is completed over the following years it would allow for a more focused 
study of foundational mythology creation and regime legitimation through female dead body 
politics in South Africa. As the project is further developed it would be of interest to observe 
which sub-projects receive funding and from whom and which of these will be first in line for 
initiation and completion and to subsequently address this through a pertinent questioning of 
why certain projects involving specific women receive greater official attention than others. 
Moreover, as such projects are revealed in their completed forms how will they be 
represented in official rhetoric? What narratives of the nation will be ascribed to these 
women‟s legacies and inscribed on their remains and what do such narratives reflect about 
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the present? Moreover, the development of the Women‟s Living Monument will provide the 
opportunity for a new study of the 1956 women‟s march as foundational event and the 
official attention this historic event continues to receive in the present. 
           As South Africa embarks on its third decade as a democratic state under the political 
leadership of the ANC it has become clear that, despite a deeply divided history, government 
remains focused on the past in order to legitimate its rule in the present with a clear focus on 
retaining this power in the future. Whether it chooses to recall the oppression of the past or 
the glorious leaders of its (increasingly constructed) illustrious history as the party of 
liberation, in situating the ANC at the centre of post-apartheid foundational mythology it is 
employing reconstructed narratives of the nation for the purposes of regime legitimation. 
With the population of South Africa being highly aware of high levels of crime in society, 
especially gender violence, the dead body politics of iconic women currently play an 
important part in this regime legitimation. By demonstrating, displaying, parading, and 
exploiting the ANCs historic line-up of powerful female leaders or incorporating the legacies 
of influential women who had no official relationship with the ANC into an ANC dominated 
foundational mythology, the ANC-dominated government reassures the „nation‟ of its 
„continued dedication‟ to ideologies of gender equality – despite the deep historic 
contradictions that are conveniently forgotten and erased from official narratives of the past. 
This thesis has shown through its discussion of the interstices of public/official mourning and 
the dead body politics of women cast as „foundational‟ that nationalism remains a powerful 
and influential force in the post-apartheid state. Despite the country‟s long and uneasy 
relationship with nationalist movements in the past, post-apartheid nationalisms continue to 
be wielded as a weapon that silences criticism and constructs narratives of the past and of 
nation that are politically salient for the ruling party. Initially employed as a force to forge 
„nation‟ out of a divided country in order to enable swift and relatively peaceful socio-
political transition, nationalist ideologies have been systematically employed for regime 
legitimation through the construction of a foundational mythology that favours the ruling 
party.             
           This thesis has been an investigation of more recent post-apartheid articulations of 
nationalism – so neglected in the past decade – and aims to start a dialogue on how official 
expressions of nationalist ideology require in-depth analysis in order to consider the social 
and political stakes for South Africa as rainbow nationalism has seemingly run its course and 
official declarations of the attainment of gender equality are clearly flawed. While official 
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articulations of nationalism may appear exhausted and inconsequential this thesis has shown 
that it would be unwise to dismiss the continuing popular appeal of nationalist sentiment as it 
is a powerful expression of societal opinion and party-political agendas which is reflected in 
the continued popularity and rise of nationalist movements globally. Indeed, globalisation has 
not resulted in the demise of nationalisms. If anything, it has given them extra traction in 
certain countries.
4
 
           The physical remains of the women selected for this study have become national 
property much in the same way that their legacies – continuously re-cast, re-imagined, re-
interpreted – have become part of the nation‟s founding myth. A temporary official silence 
has since cast their narratives into a national historic repository: they are „present‟ but not 
necessarily actively utilised by official rhetoric. Yet, these women‟s status as founding 
figures and national heroines and the physical presence of their remains and graves in the 
public landscape implies that their particular legacies can be called upon at any time to 
remind the „nation‟ of the sacrifices that were made for it by the ruling ANC in the struggle 
for a democratic South Africa. Their remains and legacies can be employed as inspiration 
when the nation appears to require it. Yet, their physical presence in the public space is also a 
permanent reminder – however empty of meaning the display of their names on government 
buildings and road signs might initially appear – of a past now re-imagined as a meta-
narrative, a foundation myth of struggle, martyrdom, and sacrifice by the ruling party of the 
present for the nation. A succession of presents with an ever-changing variety of political 
agendas continues to define the meaning and significance of these iconic women in South 
African society as official articulations of nationalism envision a future golden age. This 
assertion of a future golden age, ultimately, is what binds the nation together; it is the 
conceptualisation of a common destiny forged from a history of tragedy in which Baartman, 
Sisulu, Maxeke, Ngoyi, and Joseph played a central role. As foundational mothers, 
grandmothers, and sisters these women have become the inspiration for a future generation of 
national citizens. Yet, their iconisation in the present is, tragically, a reflection of a 
nationalism that seeks to silence oppositional voices in favour of a grandiose canon of 
struggle history. Building on a lengthy history of nationalist movements that have employed 
male-dominated constructions of ideal womanhood in furthering male nationalist aspirations, 
these women have come to represent all South African women. The Volksmoeders of 
Afrikaner nationalism and the mothers of the nation of African nationalism have made way 
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for a new generation of struggle heroines who serve as the heroines of the post-apartheid 
nation. Yet, a continuity clearly persists; iconic foundational women remain symbols – the 
„pitied plumage‟ of the nation – and no matter how positive that symbol might be, they are 
still symbols – not people.  
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